Nessim Ghouas

The Conditions, Means and Methods of the *MfS*

in the GDR; An Analysis of the Post

and Telephone Control

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Kjæreste familien og Yvonne

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Foreword

My first thoughts go to all those that in some ways have been involved in this work, in order to assist me towards completing the research. I have gone through many stages of development, having engaged several persons individually and through their belonging institutions. This has not only been fruitful for me as a person, having had the pleasure to get to know many different and interesting people. These persons and institutions have contributed with knowledge and expertise on the field. As such, it would be anything but unfair if I would not dedicate them a rightful and well-earned spot by the following sentences.

I would first of all like to thank my supervisor Prof. Peter Nitschke at the University of Vechta, who in different ways showed to be a committed supervisor. He was always willing to contribute to my requests and interests, regardless of together having participated on seminars and lectures or having had contact through phone or e-mail. Largely, such efforts particularly led to solving matters flexible and uncomplicated, making the overall situation considerable sufficient.

Since having been situated in Rostock most of the time, my need to access library material of different kind was dependable upon the offers that existed in Rostock. As such, not only was the opportunity of being in Rostock more than satisfying in comparison to the aforementioned. It was also well arranged by Prof. Werner Müller and librarian Sigrid Schmidt at the University of Rostock, whose persons extensively contributed to making the work considerably convenient to fulfil. Thus, since Werner Müller, apart from being an historian at the University of Rostock, amongst others also is the director of the university connected Documentary Centre for the Victims of the German Dictatorships. Sigrid Schmidt relates to this due to being the director of its belonging library, a library that has its focus on the history of the GDR.

Concerning the archival information mainly having come from the German state authority that is responsible for handling the work of the East German state security, many persons were involved. Therefore, my thanks go to all these persons and their respective institutions, with particular gratitude to the ones situated in Rostock and Berlin. Furthermore, many thanks is reserved my interviewees, all of them having lived in and experienced the GDR. Special thanks go to those

having worked for the East German security service. Several obstacles had to be passed on the way, finally to be able to meet them as well as undertaking the conversations. I am grateful they were willing to spend time with me, after all exertions. For some, this factually implied climbing over the highest mountain in order to surmount own personal difficulties, which many of these co-workers of the East German state security as of today still carry as a consequence of their working life in the GDR.

To the reading of the manuscript, I would particularly like to share my thanks with Jon Martin Lie and Roar Iost, with whom friendships go all the way back to upper secondary school as class mates. After all these years, I believe they should have gotten a grip on how I intend to solve tasks. Especially since we, unflinchingly as fellow students during our period at the University of Oslo, Norway, while studying for the Cand. Mag. and Cand. Polit. as well as during my time at the University of Reading, England, undertaking MA studies, amongst others discussed immortal themes within the world of academia. In any case, as the Germans say: "*Man lernt nie aus*". Valuable comments, considerations and correctional reading were therefore given as constructive as ever before. I owe further the computer scientist Thomas Geithner gratitude in regards to the issue of informatics, as of his distinctive skills and quality within his particular field and science having debouched to endowing this work with a distinguished technological solution.

Finally, yet importantly, on the contrary, unique thanks go to my girlfriend, Yvonne - for only she knows the reasons. Towards matters of the professional and daily life, also having directly or indirectly been involved in many of the thesis' concerns, with inner equanimity, she always has a key for opening these doors one needs and wants to pass.

Nessim Ghouas   Rostock, March 2003

Introduction

1 Approach of the investigation

From its founding years until now, the East German secret service, known as the Ministry for State Security, has fascinated people in different ways.[1] Even during the existence of the GDR, people both inside and outside the state showed enthusiasm for knowing more about this security organisation. Especially the people of today's eastern Germany simply see the need to uncover their past, whereas the *MfS*, having had the position it had, is considered the main key for what one might call a revelation. Over time, the interest only seems to have grown particularly since the German state authorities (after the unification in 1990) have given access to people to be able to look into the files once belonging to the *MfS*. Additionally, this is quite a unique experience opening many doors. This is the first archival material existing in the present context that once belonged to a Soviet Block state and security service, which is being allowed to be accessed by the public.

The growing interest also lies in the common, widespread thought of wanting to know more about what was hiding behind the hermetically locked borders of the GDR. Furthermore, since the GDR was geographically in the middle of Europe, this part of Europe also carries its special development and history, before, during and after the Second World War.[2] During the Cold War, it was well known that one of the most heavily guarded borders in the world was the East German border to the West, mainly because of sharing its borders with its often-claimed largest enemy, the FRG. The West Berliners experienced a unique position, since a part of the so-called 'free world' lied in the heart of the GDR, surrounded by

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[1] Officially, the Ministry's formal name was *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS*. However, seen from the German point of view, both domestically as well as internationally it was better known as "*Stasi*" (a shortening for *Staatssicherheit*). Even though other names such as "the Firm" has been used to name the Ministry, the decision has fallen upon using the shortening initials "*MfS*". Besides, what was known as the republican state "East Germany" is synonymous with the shortening "GDR", "German Democratic Republic". The other German republican state (1949-1990), "West Germany", is known with the shortening "FRG", "Federal Republic of Germany".

[2] The term "Second World War" will from now on be shortened "WW II" (World War II).

heavily political and military forces like the superpower Soviet Union as well as the GDR. During the period when the Berlin Wall was being torn down, not only the German population showed interest towards wanting to know more about the whole structure of the GDR. Actually, the Berlin Wall being torn down also resulted in the Soviet power over the rest of Central and East Europe falling as well, opening even larger possibilities in many ways for the rest of the world.

Since the *MfS* before 1989 was known as perhaps the most feared security service in Europe, one of the points that among many people stood highest on the list to uncover was a closer look at the *MfS*. However, from those days, the 'new' Germany had a long way to go concerning several different matters.

Nevertheless, after nearly a year of a united Germany, the responsible authorities of the German state decided to put down a state authority that particularly was to force the East Germans into focusing past the fierce security service of the GDR.[3] 13 years after the unification of the two German states, many tasks remain uncompleted. Perhaps it holds more questions than answers. The state authority working with the files of the *MfS* is still active, mainly based on the aforementioned as well as the huge number of interested people turning up for different purposes. One of the focuses of this authority is to build up an overview of the work, structure and organisation of the *MfS*. Based on the work that has been done so far, many issues of the *MfS* are still uncovered before one may claim to have reached the set goals.

Even though this will be addressed further below in regards to the author's specific actions at the authority's offices, it would nevertheless be said a few words on this. Concerning the fields of interest for this thesis that is to be treated relating to the *MfS*, are the post and telephone control the security service

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[3] This state authority is perhaps commonly more known in German as the "*Gauck-Behörde*" (Gauck Authority), named after the first federal commissioner of the organisation (Joachim Gauck). Its formal name is *Die/Der Bundesbeauftragte(r) für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, BStU* (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic). (Today's federal commissioner is Marianne Birthler).

accomplished.[4]   Although having been more or less treated through different contributions so far, the - files of the - *MfS* regarding these two control methods of the Ministry have nevertheless too often been given what one might call a 'surface focus'. Except from the already given reasoning, another explanation of such might lie in the fact that these control mechanisms often were pointed at the individual, which hence has been a typical focus both for those wanting to cover the work of the *MfS* as well as the "victims" having been exposed of such.[5]   Such topics, aims and focuses for the media could not be better, although not necessarily resulting in a satisfying outcome for everyone. We have often witnessed the contrary. What often has been prioritised for example within the media has been to get hold of the victims' personal stories, which the daily newspaper reader likely will enjoy reading at the breakfast table - perhaps without giving it a further thought. This is often the aim for such media, which thereby are to say the research automatically is of certain lower quality. However, it is nevertheless a well-known fact that different media work with a tabloid frame, amongst others, meaning working within a narrow period. Having such in mind, doing work in depth in the first place tends to be ignored. Secondly, the focus does not hold an overall view in terms of putting facts into a larger frame of understanding. Thirdly, the information given holds the impression of being too narrow and generally too selective in coherence with only focusing on reaching a commercial headline that sells the easiest and

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[4] Officially, the controlling of the post by the *MfS* was led by the *Abteilung M; Postkontrolle* (Department M; Post Control). Likewise, the telephone control was led by the *Abteilung 26; Telefonüberwachung* (Department 26; Telephone Surveillance). Even though having had quite clearly understandable names in terms of expected tasks, their tasks were although largely various meaning the names of the Departments do not capture all their areas of practical activity. However, general conceptions as those mentioned (in English) in terms of naming the Departments will be used. At the same time, with the interest of varying the use of the aforementioned definitions, other terminologies will be addressed these Departments. Nevertheless, they identically reflect the roles of the Departments. More specifically, this means that flexible and understandable terminologies such as for example "post control", "post surveillance", etc., reflects the complete understanding of the term "Department M", whereas "telephone control", "telephone surveillance", etc., addresses the same for the "Department 26". Being even more specific to the post control, when referring to this surveillance, the word "post" or "mail" will often be used, with the main interest of varying the use of words. As long as nothing else is being specified, for example explicitly mentioning "telegram", "package", "letter", etc., the understanding is however similar, due to the utilisation of capturing the overall frame of the conception of the control of the post traffic the Department M executed. Since the *MfS* in different ways used various names and characterisations towards the Departments M and 26 like those mentioned above, where relevant, yet closer focus will be given. This particularly involves Part C.

[5] Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, one has often given labels on persons that were citizens of the GDR. In relation to the *MfS*, those persons somehow having been in the nest of control of the *MfS* are the so-called "victims", whereas those that somehow were connected to working for the *MfS* are the so-called "culprits". A discussion to such approaches will follow further in the thesis.

best.

With those latter words, the work intended to be undertaken here will aim to go thoroughly through the available material, treating both the general and specific information according to given methodological factors that are to be understood within a presented frame.[6] With such a starting point, it is possible to argue that one puts both the individuals' and system's experiences into a larger concept. The goal by doing so is having the possibility to achieve an understanding of the many roles of the GDR and *MfS*. Thus, a further result of this might also show that one is able to combine fascinating and sensitive details of people's experiences and destinies, having used the necessary tools for undertaking objective research.

The *MfS* came about as a Ministry 8 February 1950.[7] The reason was the people responsible for governing saw it as necessary to the existence of the GDR. Looking at it over its time of existence, some have claimed that the Ministry in certain ways grew to be a kind of superior state organ within the state. Especially, since as time went by, the GDR got a more or less independently operating security service.[8] It seemed as if this giant only was to grow and grow. However, as a paradox, when it had reached to be as large as never before, the *MfS* collapsed following the state apparatuses of the Soviet Union and GDR.

Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the unification of the GDR and FRG in 1990, the power and range of control the state security of the GDR in all its years had surprised a whole world. At the once Central (headquarters) of the *MfS* in Berlin (East), the biggest discovery of *MfS* archives and related material has been made. Even today, in different parts of eastern Germany, the work continues of opening archives and other material that once belonged to the fierce security organisation. Only in Berlin a content as large as somewhat close to 180 kilometres of files has been found, all of which contained sensitive and top secret information on several millions of GDR citizens.[9] As of today, it is unknown how many sacks of material are being opened and filed every day in Berlin. It is said to be very many. To put it in perspective, in one of the former *Bezirke-Bezirk* Rostock, where 'only' 3.4 kilometres of files have been found, 16 sacks are opened every day whereas ten pages on a daily basis are examined more

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[6] The steps and frame of the thesis will be given in the last point of the introduction.

[7] H. L. Lehmann, *Chronik der DDR. 1945/49 bis heute*. München 1987, p. 37.

[8] See e.g., C. Wilkening, *Staat im Staate. Auskünfte ehemaliger Stasi-Mitarbeiter*. 1. Auflage. Berlin und Weimar 1990, p. 5.

[9] BStU, *Fakten und Zahlen zum MfS*. Außenstelle Rostock 1999.

closely.[10]   Only in these sacks, which are part of the found aftermaths of the *MfS*, material exists that somehow has been heavily damaged by active forces of the *MfS* wanting to destroy them in 1989.

Mainly, the *MfS* led all the parts of the security work in the GDR. It means this organisation *per se* nearly had a monopoly in the GDR when it came to controlling and handling the security that took place both on and outside East German soil. The *MfS* was the GDR's security service that more or less from the beginning of its existence and to the end operated as a security organisation meant to secure the interests of *das Volk* (the People). In the newly established state GDR after WW II, the *MfS* functioned increasingly as a force against its own people and not for its people.

However, to try to tell the whole story of the *MfS* through one piece of work would be to grasp too many issues and areas concerning this theme. Before going on with the steps of the thesis, a few considerations of the methodological and source aspects should be given. It should be stressed that the focus of the thesis lays on the conditions, means and methods of the *MfS* by putting its weight through illustrations on its surveillance of the post and telephone traffic. In order to understand this focus there are certain fundamental steps of such an approach and understanding of the control that has to be taken, in order to be able to achieve insight into the types of mentioned surveillances being analysed. That is, especially if one considers that different states during the Cold War, and as of today, with different ways of governing practice some sort of intelligence, which most likely also includes the controlling of post and telephone. One important factor to answer is therefore what made it unique for the GDR to have its secret service. Another concern would be to understand how this service came about, and why it functioned. Furthermore, how it fulfilled its tasks. Such approaches and more will be addressed and are highly relevant to follow, in order to be able to understand the GDR and its secret service, including the post and telephone control.

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[10] The GDR had 15 *Bezirke*. A *Bezirk* was something close to what is known as a German *Bundesland* (Federal State), or in English as a district. While a *Bezirk* was the GDR's largest Administrative District (AD), a *Kreis* (also a district, however smaller) was a subdivision of a *Bezirk*. Differently from the federal Germany's inner states, the East German system did not have the same competence and influence on the central power. The central power in all matters was situated in the capital of the GDR, East Berlin. Apart from that, all the AD's were named after their capitals (Berlin having been somewhat special compared to the others). Therefore, the AD of Rostock had a town called Rostock, which was the political centre of the AD (as of today, this town is situated in the Federal State of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania). In the same way, the *MfS* was represented in every AD. However, the name of the Ministry's point of centre was the *Bezirksverwaltung*, *BV* (Administrative District Management, ADM). Concerning the political subdivisions of the AD's, the *MfS* was also present in those. In these smaller districts, the *MfS* called its places *Kreisdienststellen* (District Service Places, DSP's). Further analysis to the aforementioned will follow in the thesis.

Besides these points, it is also relevant to draw a picture of how the East German population was repressed, especially in order to make it understandable for an outside audience that during the Cold War never experienced these weapons of repressive control. A further reason of both importance and interest to why this work should be looked upon with general value is the importance of giving such incidents a name and face. A name and face, as these issues involved many people that unfortunately, dominated by the lack of commercial beneficial interests, until now not have received the attention they deserve. Furthermore, we simply have to focus on political-historical, decisive periods such as this, which both should not and cannot be forgotten. We often hear in media about spectacular cases where the *MfS* was involved, although many of the documented happenings did not have as large implications for most East Germans. The *MfS*' post and telephone control gave far greater consequences for almost all citizens of East Germany. It was an 'open secret' among the East Germans that opening letters and tapping telephones was being done. That is why it is of utter importance to put a light on these relations, as this unfortunately not has been given as much attention as it perhaps should have had. Therefore, one of the interesting matters to investigate is how it was possible for a secret service as the *MfS* to control the population and what it managed to do. All this existed under the roof of a republic that claimed to be democratic. Another issue to address is to map the mechanisms that guaranteed the work of these Departments.

It will be too large a piece to illustrate the whole of the *MfS*' work by looking at all its units completing their control measures.[11] Therefore, in regards to this part, the main issues when considering the control of the post and telephone traffic will concern the two mentioned Departments the *MfS* used in order to control the population through these means. To recapitulate, these Departments were, respectively, Department M; Post Control and Department 26; Telephone Surveillance. Those Departments controlled as much post and telephone traffic as they were able to. This meant having the potential to observe nearly every sort of communication done within this area of the GDR. It was made sure to put a tone on the GDR in the former sentence, since the *MfS* and these Departments to some extend also fulfilled such work, which only operated beyond the borders of the GDR. The approach of the thesis in terms of such matters, however, aims to treat the control that was linked to execution within the GDR. The focus of time treats the period from the founding of the *MfS* until its collapse,

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[11] "Unit" in this sense relates to any organised group of the *MfS*, whether large, small, 'less', or 'more' important, existing on any level of the Ministry.

i.e., 1950-1989.[12]

Without anyhow anticipating the course of the events, it is doubtless that these two Departments played a vital part for the GDR and *MfS*. As such departments presumably are of importance to the secret services of today, including the majority of states, they certainly were in those days as well. Since this most likely happens to be the case, it is therefore more important to look closer at the particular actions that relate to the chosen angle. The essential is to find out the settings of the *MfS*, and from there follows the logical questions that are to give answers to the 'who's, what's, where's', etc. In other words, some of the important reasons the *MfS* presumably had for using these Departments were, first of all, based on that in any modern society using the post and telephone were - and still are - considered as the most effective and rational ways of communicating. Secondly, trying both to use and control these ways of communicating for this secret service's own benefits should have resulted in a great part of the people's communication patterns having been observed by the *MfS*. Alternatively, at least, the *MfS* had built up such an enormous network, which had the potential to observe anyone. An example of this would be the Ministry quite frequently having used these two Departments as two of the largest supportive units for contributing and completing tasks that were given to them by other units of the *MfS* in the first place. In other words, the Departments M and 26 mainly operated in cooperation with other units, since these two Departments were considered as so-called mission-taking/receiving units. That is, based upon what was ordered from the mission-giving units. However, additionally, in order for example to develop and renew their work, tasks and so forth, these Departments also fulfilled work settled within their organisation albeit not in the same range as their main tasks. Besides, these Departments were so much more than what their classifiable names may tell. Since for example the Department 26, although having been named with the additional category "Telephone Surveillance", not only executed the controls of phone calls. As we shall see later, it for example also accomplished tasks such as

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[12] 17 November 1989 the GDR's new state leader, *Ministerpräsident* (Prime Minister) Hans Modrow, declared that the *MfS* should stop to exist and change name to *Amt für Nationale Sicherheit, AfNS* (Office for National Security). This organ lasted from November 1989 until December 1989 (D. Gill & U. Schröter, *Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. Anatomie des Mielke-Imperiums*. 1. Auflage. Berlin 1991, p. 177; B. Miller, *Narratives of Guilt and Compliance in Unified Germany*. London and New York 1999, p. 5). 1 December 1989 the GDR's *Volkskammer* (People's Chambers) dismissed Article 1 in the constitution, which ended the ruling party's, the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*', *SED*'s (Socialist Unity Party of Germany's), leading role in the state. 16 December 1989 the *SED* changed name to the *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS* (Party of Democratic Socialism), under the leadership of the newly elected Gregor Gysi. 23 August 1990, the GDR's People's Chambers voted for unification with the FRG. 3 October 1990 the two German states formally became one state, called FRG. For further comments to the treatment, see the discussion of the sources and methods below.

performing optic and acoustic control.

The thesis needs a framework, in order to analyse the post and telephone control the *MfS* had. The first source that will be of assistance relates to having a theoretical aspect of the thesis.[13] Thus, one can more easily capture the conditions the GDR and *MfS* existed under, hereunder capture the circumstances of the post and telephone control. The theory that will be taken into consideration towards a large part of the material rests upon the theory on totalitarianism that Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski presented in 1956.[14] Briefly said, this theory was presented during the Cold War, and, amongst others, reflected upon the growing political systems of Central and East Europe that were under Soviet influence and control. The GDR was among those states in these parts of Europe that to a certain degree was influenced by the Soviet Union. That as such holds an eloquent reason to why this particular theoretical aspect is well suited as a starting point towards a contribution of 'placing' the GDR and *MfS*.[15]

The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the roles and functions of the Departments M and 26 in relation to their necessity for the *MfS* and, as such, the system of the GDR. That is, in order to be able to fulfil their determined roles inside a specific political system, which held a fundament of different interests with concern to reach set goals. The analysis of these Departments should as such also be seen as being representative in comparison to other units of the *MfS*, in regards to grasp the general existence of the control mechanisms of the *MfS* that played a crucial part in the state of GDR. Furthermore, this basis of functioning relates back to the particular context under which they existed, whereas the theoretical frame of it is accomplished by putting a main weight on the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski.

2   Sources

Firstly, to comment the latter part of the previous point, the literary contribution put forward by Friedrich and Brzezinski presents a profound illustration of totalitarian societies. Related to this thesis, the authors look closer at the totalitarian society of the Soviet Union, where they show what recognises a society like this. By the time this contribution came out, the Soviet Union had fortified its grip on a large part of Central and East Europe, in many ways particularly 'its' GDR.

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[13] A more thorough discussion will be undertaken several places in the following.

[14] C. J. Friedrich & Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, Mass. 1956. For an illustrative view on this theory, see e.g. also C. Arvidsson (ed.), *Öststatsstudier. Teori och metod*. Stockholm 1984; M. Bäck & J. Å. Dellenbrant, *Politik i Sovjetunionen*. Malmö 1982.

[15] See e.g., D. Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*. London 1983.

As such, in regards to their illustration, Friedrich and Brzezinski therefore mainly treat the Soviet Union, whereas the Central and East European states in general are considered as the "satellite states" of the Soviet Union. Since having done so, it might be claimed that a more detailed and differentiated focus of these states have been neglected. Seen in relation to their contribution, one of this thesis' main aims is therefore to focus closer on how the GDR actually was. A renewed view with nuances is called upon, to be able to differentiate and specify exactly what kind of 'belonging' related to Friedrich and Brzezinski's presentation the GDR can be said to have had. Furthermore, based upon having been put forward in 1956, the renewal is also necessary, since their contribution most likely does not hold the up to date aspect on how the GDR and its *MfS* showed to develop and function.

Over years, when having examined the *MfS*, there has been done illustrations to the issues of the post and telephone control. However, few literary products to these topics have been written in the English language. Maybe the only contribution in English that can be classified as being written in a typical scientific way is the one from David Childs and Richard Popplewell.[16] Even if they shortly have treated the two actual Departments to a minimum, it could be claimed that these authors importantly have covered the activities of the *MfS* from a general perspective.[17] Some facts they illustrate are not congruent with for example the archival information. This gives the author another significant opportunity not only to renew, but more importantly, to contribute with greater depth and thoroughness to these particular methods of *MfS* control.

Perhaps understandingly, most contributions have been accomplished in German. This is then however only available for a certain group of readers, which is one of the aims to put an end to. That is furthermore an argument as to why the thesis is being written in English. By doing this, a wider audience of interested readers will hopefully be reached. This is not only because it is being written in the English language, but, as far as known, also because this will be the first ever English written material about these Departments in depth. Hereunder, the audience of such readers will be easier to reach, meaning they will have an easier access to their interests within this particular field of politics and history.

One of the most frequent contributors and known scholars within the field '*MfS*' is the German author Karl W. Fricke. Through his several presentations, he has clearly covered various aspects of the *MfS*, hereunder the Departments M and 26. Nevertheless, when having written about these two Departments, Fricke has not treated the post and telephone control in depth. This can be explained, much due to his general approach of the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26. Further-

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[16] D. Childs & R. Popplewell, *The Stasi. The East German Intelligence and Security Service*. Hampshire and London 1996.

[17] For further detailed comments, see the forthcoming analyses.

more, a main problem with Fricke's contributions,[18] is the presumably lack of archival resources before 1989/90, which brings up a dilemma when evaluating the quality of such work.[19] Secondly, it still fails to see the illustrated approach that briefly has been presented having been done by any other author.[20] That is, the combination of the issues has never been done before. Besides Fricke, other important contributors to matters concerning the *MfS* should be mentioned. However, an important and typical point to criticise applying to all of them, is that also these illustrations 'suffer' from being too general. Thus, when considered from the author's interest to do detailed and thorough analysis of the Departments M and 26. Furthermore, within their general approach, they might also be viewed as for example being too focused on some issues resulting in not having prioritised the Departments M and 26. Mentionable literature related to the aforementioned could be the contributions from *Bürgerkomitee Leipzig* (Citizen's Committee Leipzig), David Gill and Ulrich Schröter, Manfred Schell and Werner Kalinka, Heribert Schwan and Lienhard Wawrzyn.[21]

Even if a great amount of literature already has been written concerning the *MfS*, one may claim that some of this material has not dealt with the topics in an objective, satisfying way. This concerns both the literature produced before and after 1989, which briefly will be commented upon. The problem with the publications done before 1989, nearly only having been possible to produce in the western world, is that the people somehow involved in these publications likely did not have enough available sources and knowledge to document the work of the *MfS*. After 1989, many Germans tried to uncover the actions done by the *MfS* especially towards East Germans. However, these writings often show a lack of objective distance to what actually took place. Moreover, they are far too frequently dominated by someone's own, subjective experiences reconstructed between East Germans and the authors involved. From the author's point of view, as a non-German that is not directly involved in this sensitive internal German matter, it has apparently shown to be easier avoiding this problem of being too coloured by the personal experiences. As such, the latter has made the author benefit from this.

The author has also luckily benefited from the fact of being a non-German not being involved in such a hot issue still being debated in different circles in Germany. A good example of enjoying such a status relates particularly back

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[18] Cf. e.g., K. W. Fricke, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit*. 3. Auflage. Köln 1989; K. W. Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*. Köln 1991.

[19] Further comments to literature before and after 1989 will be given below.

[20] The comments further down treats this issue more closely.

[21] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *Stasi intern: Macht und Banalität*. 3. Auflage. Leipzig 1998; Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*; M. Schell & W. Kalinka, *Stasi und kein Ende: die Personen und Fakten*. Bonn 1991; H. Schwan, *Erich Mielke. Der Mann, der die Stasi war*. München 1997; L. Wawrzyn, *Der blaue. Das Spitzelsystem der DDR*. Berlin 1990.

to the conversations done with the co-workers of the *MfS*. Although this will be commented upon more closely in the next section, some words should be said as to the use of such sources. As aforementioned, the author has used conversations as a source of information. Interview sources have also been used through earlier produced literature, which however have had a tendency to be too dominated by one-sidedness. That is, either from being dominated by the interview objects in terms of influence towards a certain goal in either direction, for the author to prove its aims. Alternatively, the focus has been too narrow, decreasing the quality of the work since deliberately leaving out certain factors without having argued for such.

In terms of the available literature, the material that will be used has to be treated with care in order not to commit classical wrong conclusions. Firstly, one has to be observant to which impartial relations the material has been produced and put forward under. Secondly, one has to be aware of its degree of accuracy.[22]

The sources of the thesis are of both cognitive and normative character, which means the sources that will be used try to explain, understand and/or describe political happenings.[23] On the other hand, the archives are of a more normative view, since after all the archives, belonged to and were filed and recorded by the *MfS* up to its end of existence.

In the first parts of the thesis (Parts A + B), which concern the GDR and *MfS*, the majority of sources will be based upon secondary literature.[24] However, there will be some elements of other sources, like primary data such as conversations and newspaper articles. Additionally, sources such as visual documentary productions are also to be used. Since most scholars are familiar with both ways of using these sources, most of the space left on this point will be used to talk about the primary data coming from the archival institutions. This specific material is the unpublished material, and will first of all contribute heavily to the thesis (Part C). Secondly, since possibilities to the ways of using such material are various, it thereby deserves to be given more attention than the secondary literature.

However, before coming to the primary data from the archives, a few words should be added to the discussion concerning the secondary data. When it comes to the content analysis concerning data to this research, it could appear that one bumps into certain complications. Shortly said, it concerns that one may hold a

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[22] For example: on one side, certain material can, pure quantitatively, score high on the factor of validity. On the other side, the numbers let alone should not automatically be considered as a sign of accuracy. Literary material has although been produced for a certain matter to a certain audience, and these relations should be fully understood so that one accordingly evaluates the fruitfulness of such sources.

[23] For a further description of cognitive and normative sources, see O. Dahl, *Grunntrekk i historieforskningens metodelære*. 2. utgave, 3. opplag. Oslo 1988, pp. 37-42.

[24] A closer description of the steps in the thesis will follow below.

certain handicap to start with, since in earlier Central and East European published material one often misses a complete picture of the condition on different areas. In for example East Europe, there was no officially recognised basic conflicts in the society beyond the class conflict, no known organised interest groups, no freedom of speech, controlled press, etc. What officially reached out, principally counted as what was classified as military, security, political or ideological.[25] The erudition from this is therefore based upon two points. Firstly, one should act with carefulness, especially towards all sorts of published East European material. Secondly, one should avoid the use of such literature as far as possible. Thus, it has been found more relevant to use western produced literature, because this literature is evaluated as more objective, impartial and neutral. However, given the Cold War, one should take account of certain lopsidedness in the presentation, as western publication also was influenced by the situation at the time and the ideological warfare.

In the thesis regarding the secondary literature, it will partly be used cumulative analysis on the data collected. This means that there to a large degree, when focusing on already known scientific material, both will be undertaken rework and structuring of this data for the thesis. To build further on the knowledge that already exists, there is naturally a demand for knowledge about the already existing results. Therefore, the different literature existing from several related areas will be used in such a way that these sources contribute to put forward a more recent picture of the issues to be focused on.

Concerning the data coming from the archives, the content played a specific role for the *MfS*. This information took shape in the form of commands given to the co-workers of the Ministry. As such, one has to take for granted that they were fulfilled. Naturally, the treatment of this material needs to be put into and be understood from a scientific point of view. Otherwise, thoughts being done around these topics may fall into the 'trap of subjectivity'. That is, when for example looking into this material, this signals having been developed by and for persons within the system of the GDR and *MfS* that had a certain purpose for reaching the goals decided upon. Particular attention will therefore also be dedicated to this, since these organs of such a state claimed to have and hold the monopoly of truth at all times. Furthermore, this means the decision makers apparently always performed the right actions. The identical matters addresses itself when it will be gone about to treat the sources from an exhibition in Berlin, which held a showing of the post and telephone control done in the GDR.[26] Without discussing the informative art of this, the material will be treated with utter sensitivity, since

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[25] Arvidsson, *op cit.*, p. 101.

[26] L. Nagengast & S. de Pasquale, "*Ein offenes Geheimnis. Post- und Telefonkontrolle in der DDR*". Museum für Kommunikation Berlin. Berlin 2002.

such an exhibition's interests is to reach out to the visitors using certain narrative techniques. This means further that the use of a popularised, commercialised and communicative way was present. Such information is perhaps fitting for such a performance, wanting to give the simplified view and impression of the 'daily life' to people visiting, in order for them to experience how it was in the GDR with the *MfS*. However, this results in an absence towards a scientific relationship and approach. The aim of a clear and present science is exactly the task, where it will be tried to rework the information according to the best abilities.[27]

One may say the same about the effects of the conversations, which in relation to the archives mainly were done with co-workers of the *MfS*. Nine thorough conversations were led with the Ministry's co-workers.

Considering the conversations and contacts spoken to, using a technique of "open ended nature" and "focused art" solved these situations.[28] In other words, this meant that during conversing (and interviewing) the key respondents was asked for facts about special issues where they at any time had the possibility to comment and answer as they pleased. Doing it this way particularly meant that the co-workers of the *MfS* for example were able to extend the author's knowledge to certain issues when comparing the information to the archival information. However, this may not result in a higher scientific approach, since one problem lies in the art of generalising and making the conversations scientifically. Nevertheless, bearing these points in mind, especially the conversations with the co-workers of the *MfS* having been made are relevant contributions in terms of showing a different aspect of the work of the *MfS*.

Having mentioned that, it is desirable to come back to the author's particular role in such a relation. When conversing, it seems as if this particular past has not yet been buried, that is, for better or for worse. Some of the '*MfS* interviewees' did not for example hesitate to check upon who the author really was, since having given the impression of showing such a high interest for this topic. Some of them said that they would not have done this if the author had been a German, fearing a general lack of understanding and mistrust towards their own co-citizens. Seen from the author's point of view, some bad luck was experienced. Thus, since some interesting '*MfS* persons' returned with the bottom line that they simply were psychically tired of the complete personal situation towards this after having had one too many disappointments. Making a conversation with them would have stressed them more, some said.

Although baring in mind the points above, even though issues of the Cold War still are a sensitive issue particularly for many co-workers of the *MfS*, it did not

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[27] Cf. Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02.

[28] R. K. Yin, *Case Studies Research: Design and Methods*. 2. ed. London 1994, pp. 84-86.

turn out complicated resulting in getting fairly reasonable answers. In this way, the persons having spoken with turned out to be fruitful, where the questions on what the author wanted to know by far were answered. That is, since they themselves felt comfortable with the situation, this led to open and trustful conversations. Therefore, especially the conversations with the co-workers of the Ministry are not to be treated only as being information of a supplementary nature to the other material, but should moreover be seen as original challenges and contributions to the archives. Overall, particularly the conversations having been undertaken with the co-workers of the *MfS* therefore bring about a considerable value for the thesis. Mainly since contributing as unique sources, which neither can be found nor replaced e.g. by archival or secondary literature.

Considered this approach of conversing from an ethical point of view, the protection of a person's identity will to all times be adhered to by treating all these aforementioned interviewees anonymously in this thesis. Concerning the data coming from the archives, they have already been secured in nearly identical way through state regulative laws of personal security. In principal, this is a correct approach of treating the personal security of the so-called victims and culprits.

The practical functions of the *BStU* resulted in largely favouring the persons coming to see their own files in spite of one of the main interests of this state organ officially being to support research as well on an equal basis. This furthermore resulted in a disadvantage when wanting to get access to the archival information. This was particularly a hindrance when it concerned the author's interest of getting information on people and their personal details. As aforementioned, it is found to be correct to protect persons against getting their private lives somehow presented to the public. However, it is not of interest to support such when laws protect from accomplishing reasonable work and research, which do not lead to disfavours of any involved parts. A clear example of such hindering of work was when the author did not get access to certain private files that held examples, as the argument of the law reasons that when not knowing the full name of a person having a file means the same as being denied access. The problem is by far the laws not having been made flexible enough for purposes such as the author's. A first incision would be to make the files available largely also for research, for example through leaving out any personal information that could damage. As it is nowadays, as a researcher one practically has no access to such, since quite naturally in most cases information is anonymous or hidden. To pick up the latter point made, knowing the names or not would not anyway play a decisive role, since the laws of handling such material after all clearly tell that names in the first place are to be removed from the archives before being given out if such should appear.

Overall, this resulted in fewer chances of receiving private acts than expected. Additionally, this weakness of the mandate the *BStU* holds especially turned against the author's (original) research interests, since - presumably - a large,

yet unknown, amount of the archival information concerning the post and telephone control is related to private persons. At least, how the picture looks like, the actual Departments did not have as many commands as other units of the *MfS*, since mainly having been Departments that fulfilled tasks for order-giving mission units. Secondly, the work they accomplished was often pointed at doing secret work towards persons.

Nonetheless, the information the author finally sat with mostly contains information more related to overall characteristics of tasks, obviously including e.g. details of the Departments' work. Based on this background, the topics investigated have been possible to uncover. Concerning the material from the *BStU*, they are mainly handed out from the *BStU*'s *Außenstelle Rostock* (regional office in Rostock), since having been the author's 'base' of contacts.[29] That is, all information that will be used in the thesis is not only from the direct contributions done from this *BStU*, but also come from other places the *BStU* has, like the *BStU* in Berlin. The main office of the *BStU* lies in Berlin, which, amongst others, has distributed information through the *BStU* of Rostock.

Apart from the aforementioned obstacles, the author was confronted with some other limitations of material. It is a well-known fact that before the *MfS* dissolved, in the last months and days of it existence co-workers desperately tried to destroy files from its archives. However, it has been said they succeeded in destroying only some of the material. Other material somehow got lost in the process of the rebuilding of the archives. Additionally, the *BStU* are still working on building up and classifying its material, which as such is a long lasting process in many ways as shown. Based upon the given facts, it has also therefore been difficult to receive more information than the author finally had.

Taking the illustrated into consideration, this may be seen as a handicap for the work. However, if it was to be gone through every possible detail of any archive existing besides what the author already has, this would most likely lead to a high degree of irrelevancy as well as perhaps taking the focus away from the work. That is, because of having to examine too much information. Furthermore, one can also only speculate in what it might have been, since it seems as if no one can present an overview of what actually exists in the archives of the *BStU*. Additionally, when treating the archives, there also does not seem as if there has existed patterns in terms of for example giving orders to certain periods, months, years, etc. When for example sitting with a command from 1962 whereas the last command before this specific year came in 1959, there is no indication that there are commands

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[29] At first sight, this may seem as it results in a regional advantage when considering the former regions of the GDR, given that the *BStU* of Rostock has been the largest regional support in terms of archival information. However, this does not turn out to be of any problem, although such a starting point might have gone on the expense of being too focused on regional work instead of being able to make generalisations. For further comments, see the point on methods below.

existing between 1959 and 1962. Thus, since the command from 1962 reflects upon the command from 1959. To extend that point, the research concern does neither aim to treat every year from beginning until end in detail. Besides, there is often a tendency that one is not able to treat all available sources if one was to have them, even within the choice of clear and limited areas.[30] That is, the view of completeness on the treatment of sources can only be fulfilled in certain concrete research contexts, i.e., where the focus is of a very narrow, limited art, or where few sources have been kept. As explained above, it has therefore been done a collection within the mass of relevant sources, whereas having as a base that these sources will answer the goals.

Although having met certain obstacles on the way while working with the *BStU*, the possibility of having been able to use this authority has in general been valuable. Not only has it been of value for the author's purposes, but also for any other with a need and an interest to take advantage of its existence. Concerning the work, one might only speculate on the chances the author would have had to undertake the research without the alternative of the *BStU* being present. It is therefore of importance to underline that the *BStU* in many ways does important work, which should be supported further. In this sense, with the present debate of whether to shut down this institution or not, abolishing it would highly likely put an end to a crucial contribution of building up an important past of Germany, not to mention the risk of overlooking a large number of individuals it, directly or indirectly concerned.

3   Methods and research concerns

What furthermore will bring about new knowledge on this field of research is the approach in combination with the material at hand. As aforementioned, the most thorough analyses will be made about the post and telephone control, which hopefully will give results to different aspects of the system of security in the GDR. This will mainly be done through the intention of illustrating the conditions, means and methods of the *MfS* by putting the weight on its surveillance of the post and telephone traffic. This empirical approach should show to what extent a security organisation such as the *MfS* hung together and worked in a specific political system. The overall analyses of these latter control mechanisms shall describe what type of control having been done and how it was carried out in the society. All this, in circumstances of being the final step on the ladder that acted on behalf of the given criterion of this particular society system, based on a presumably heavily controlled state and society.

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[30] Dahl, *op cit.*, p. 50.

It has been mentioned the Departments having accomplished the post and telephone control having been two out of many mechanisms having done the final operations in regards to executing the control in real life. However, before reaching such final decisions, several stages had to be passed. These stages were unique for such final effects, which aforementioned mechanisms only can be understood when there exists relativity to the controls having taken place. Thus, before having reached as far as to do the analyses on the Departments M and 26, certain steps are crucial to discuss and have to be given a context. Otherwise, one risks to fall in the illustrated problem of surface based work. Alternatively, one, with one's best will, may not be able to clearly distinguish fundamental features of why these specific forms of control were undertaken in such a system when comparing to the reasons of such controls in today's western world. In other words, a context of the GDR is needed, as well as the same for the *MfS* in the GDR and the *MfS* as well.

Moving chronologically through the history will most conveniently solve this. The first source that will be of assistance relates to having a theoretical aspect of the thesis. Thus, one can more easily capture the conditions the GDR and *MfS* came in grip with, hereunder capture the circumstances of the post and telephone control. The theory that will be taken into consideration towards a large part of the material rests upon the theory on totalitarianism that Friedrich and Brzezinski presented in 1956.[31] This theory was presented during the Cold War, which, amongst others, reflected upon the growing political systems of Central and East Europe that were under Soviet influence and control. The GDR was among those states in these parts of Europe that to a certain degree was influenced by the Soviet Union. The latter is therefore yet a reason that this particular theoretical aspect fits well in a contribution of placing the GDR and *MfS*.[32] A main focus will be to put the GDR and *MfS* into a historical context, in order to be able to understand the basis for the secret service's existence as well as its functions. It is of importance to explain certain relations that had a connection to the GDR to understand the roles of the *MfS* properly. From the history the reader will understand that the *MfS* hardly was founded just because, all states, including the GDR, needed (and need) a security service. In the thesis it will be shown that one cannot understand the creation of the GDR and *MfS* without understanding the context of the development on how Central and East Europe at the time developed. However, in the case of the GDR and *MfS* it is also intended to focus on showing that the roots lay further back in history, since, amongst other things, the forthcoming leaders of the GDR both during and before WW II had contact with Moscow and communism in different ways. Thus, a point such as if it were the Soviet Union having pressed

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[31] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*.
[32] See e.g., Childs, *op cit*.

forward a creation of an organisation like the *MfS* would be of interest to uncover. Another question to ask is whether it was the GDR's own evaluations that led to the creation of the *MfS*. Furthermore, to find out if the situation in the *Sowjetische Besatzungszone, SBZ,* developed in a direction that led to the creation of a state later to be known as the GDR.[33] These questions are important to answer in order to understand the context of the *MfS* and its post and telephone control. At the same time, it is important to underline the historical focus being of a subordinate nature in the thesis. Nevertheless, it is crucial to ask to which degree the historical, geographical and political picture after WW II played in terms of creating an organisation like the *MfS*. Furthermore, and yet importantly, how it functioned in detail.

When topics such as these are answered, one should hold a convenient basic understanding to how the *MfS* came about in the GDR. Additionally, both the GDR and *MfS*' political creation laid much of the foundation the GDR's power elite was to develop for its political governing in accordance with the international socialism. It will furthermore be necessary to analyse both the *MfS*' roots and the organisation's system of work during the Cold War. The latter will be seen as the natural part after having analysed the theory, GDR and its political-historical context. With this help, the reader will also have enough background information to be able to understand which roles the *MfS* played through its presence and actions in the society. Alternatively, more specifically, how the organisation infiltrated, used, abused, etc., the different aims and groups in the society to its advantage. Additionally, to which degree the *MfS* saw it as necessary to guarantee the existence of the GDR. Many have claimed the argument on how to define different states' governing put forward the answer on how different states' domestic policy best can be understood. Without a certain minimum understanding of the happenings having created the *SBZ* and later the GDR, we cannot understand the uniqueness of those roles the *MfS* played in the GDR. Reflected upon through the theory, a task will therefore also be to show to what extent the theory is applicable, whereas one of the interests is to show whether it can state deviances and harmonies to the empirical material. Apart from that, other nuances of the theoretical aspect will be taken into consideration by introducing other approaches on this view, which came in the following years after the theory had been presented. Consequently, this will be focused on in the parts that concern the role of the GDR and *MfS*. With this background, the point is furthermore that it will be easier and more relevant to understand the *MfS* and its two chosen Departments for the further analysis when looking at their reasons of work. Therefore, before coming to the point of finally going in depth of illustrating the chosen specific control executed, fundamental factors will be focused on that are unavoidable for

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[33] *SBZ* was the Soviet Occupied Zone (of Germany) that lasted in the period 1945-1949.

placing and capturing the *MfS* and its control functions.

Having in mind the main empirical approach for the analysis of what finally led to performing the control of the post and telephone, the context of this particular existence will mainly be based upon the theory briefly having been presented. Although a more thorough description of the steps of the thesis will be done below, it should explicitly be mentioned here that the theory is not supposed to be a sort of sparring partner towards all the material of the thesis - especially not the empirical part of the post and telephone control. Rather, one should consider the theory as being a fundamental supportive tool for the frame of understanding the overall context, in order to be able to capture the composition of the state GDR. Therefore, the theory will be given more weight in the first parts of the thesis, which as such intends to treat the precursors and superiors of the post and telephone control.

The election of method plays an important analytical part in analysis of social science and history, because the method shall contribute to create a structure and causal relation of the data being under the analysis' investigation.[34] In other words, the data contributes to an overview and thereby a simplification.

The interest is present for putting the system of the *MfS* into a context. Having no basis for the analysis is the same as denying the reader the ability to understand the issues being analysed. Secondly, the lack of quality is highly present if this analysis only should focus on documenting details without having a skeleton helping to give a more correct picture of the results of the research, and vice versa. That is also the reason why it was earlier mentioned the general point of having a related political-historical part at the beginning of the thesis, which in this case places both the GDR and *MfS*.

Through the archival information related to the last part of the thesis, gives us an example to the latter point of how fundamental it is for the thesis to follow from a certain path. Said differently, it would be difficult to heed and grasp the post and telephone control, i.e., the last part, if not having the frame of these control's circumstances, i.e., the first parts. Extending the latter with further comments, the reality as such was the system of the GDR, including the system of the region Rostock, all having received their superior orders from the central power situated in East Berlin, the capital of the GDR.

The thesis is divided into three parts, Parts A, B and C. The aim with the first chapter in Part A is briefly to present the theoretical view of Friedrich and Brzezinski, in regards to their theory on totalitarianism. The interest is theoretically to place the GDR and the context the *MfS* existed under before going on to

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[34] I. Andersen (ed.), *Valg af organisationssociologiske metoder-et kombinations perspektiv*. København 1990; O. Hellevik, *Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsvitenskap*. 5. utgave, 3. opplag. Oslo 1993.

the more detailed and empirical part of the thesis. It is important to do so, since otherwise one cannot thereafter understand the roles the *MfS* had in the GDR. In other words, to the details of why and how the post and telephone control worked, one needs to possess background information to why those Departments and the *MfS* came about and existed. Thus, one has to grasp the context they operated under, as a crucial part of the explanation to why and how they at all existed before going in depth of the post and telephone control.

As a comparison, one can suggest that Departments such as these as well as others also existed (and still may do) in western democratic systems. The angle of the thesis is however not to compare or try to analyse how it may have worked in western democratic societies in relation to the GDR. This was only mentioned based upon the reason that if those Departments had existed under western states, they most likely would have had different premises and functional roles. Such is obvious, because they existed under very different types of states and political systems. The interest is therefore to look at the premises the two Departments existed under in relation to the *MfS* and GDR. In other words, in what relation they were built up, how they functioned etc. Based on this, when it comes to examining the more empirical part of the thesis (Part C), up to that point, it should have been given a basis to which context the *MfS* and thereby these two Departments existed under.

As an example of limiting the approach to what is relevant, the relationship between Moscow, the East German leadership and *MfS* is accordingly an important question in regards to the development of the GDR system. Nevertheless, there is no intention to treat this relationship in depth, other than explaining the context that the *MfS* was born and lived under, perhaps carrying an unconditional influence by Moscow. Particularly, since it is commonly put forward that Moscow played an important role as both machinery and as model for the German communists' organisation of the state of the GDR,[35] which do not need further examination in depth.[36] Another danger that could arise if one were to go in depth to this is that this can lead away from the actual angle of the thesis.

Since it from a theoretical view more or less is well known that Stalin governed the Soviet Union in a totalitarian way, one is able to deduce the GDR was governed in exactly the same way. This is a known consideration, especially since it also is well known that the GDR, to a large degree, not only was a satellite state governed from Moscow, it was more importantly the 'child' of the Soviet Union. As an

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[35] Childs, *op cit*.

[36] I.e., on behalf of the Soviet Union and the Soviet communist party's leading role within the socialist block that was raised in Central and East Europe after WW II. Moscow's importance for the birth of the GDR is furthermore presumed to have laid important leads on the development internally in the GDR, as well as on the relation between the GDR and Soviet Union through the GDR's existence.

approach to focus on the situation that the GDR and *MfS* came about and grew, it is therefore found relevant to use Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory as a main tool. Additionally, this chapter will also include important contributions from the academic field Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory was produced under. Thus, the interest also lays in finding possible nuances to the theoretical view and thereby alternative understandings of the GDR system, mainly since the theory from 1956 might not give a correct view on the GDR through the period it existed. Such parallels and more will be influenced during the author's approach to the analysis.

The aim with the following chapter of Part A is to give an overview of the situation in the *SBZ* and GDR, by looking closer at the relation the Soviet Union laid as a basis in this region. Included here are factors that eventually led to the Soviet Union, GDR and *MfS*' future. We will see that this influence dates back to the end of WW II. However, on the contrary, it is not intended to go in depth regarding the relation between the four large victor countries from WW II. Neither will there be heavily focused on their influence on the parting of Germany after WW II.

Firstly, the first part of this chapter will ask what was typical for the *SBZ* in the period the GDR and *MfS* were about to be formed and thereafter existed. Hereunder, to which degree it, directly or indirectly, became decisive for the roles of the *MfS* that the GDR was understood as a so-called satellite state under Moscow's power. Thereafter, after the *SBZ* had turned out to become a state, i.e., the GDR, it will be focused on the GDR and what kind of state it was going to be. The focus reflects the illustrated totalitarian theory, and will contain analyses to which degree the GDR can be said to have been a totalitarian regime. In regards to the first part of the second chapter, it will mainly be focused on how the Soviet Union's politics functioned in relation to building up a security service, and less on other political relations in the *SBZ*. In this way, since it firstly lies within the frame of what the thesis addresses. Secondly, because a state did not exist, meaning at the time the political situation in the *SBZ* was not at all settled. Thirdly, since a state did not exist it is automatically difficult to define where, why and how in the overall political landscape the forerunner of the *MfS* and the *MfS* as such belonged. In other words, it shows automatically the first things have to come first. Even if there may be both easier and structurally more correct to define the roles of the *MfS* after the creation of the state to investigate in which context it existed under, we will nevertheless experience the forerunner of both the state and the security service likely having been heavily dominated from Moscow.

Moving to Part B, the thesis from there on will be more concentrated on the *MfS*. This particular Part will contain one chapter that will deal with the *MfS* more in general, in order to analyse those needs an eventually totalitarian state has. More correctly, it will treat the understandings of how the different units in the *MfS* had their rightful position in the Ministry. Briefly said, through the earlier

chapters (of Part A) we will have seen why and how an *MfS* came about, while in Part B's chapter there will be gone more thoroughly into the *MfS*' detailed reasons of particular work. Before going on to the Departments that consisted of the post and telephone control, their positions within the *MfS* have at first to be understood. The post and telephone control of the *MfS* were merely two units of the *MfS*, within a Ministry that held many more tasks than just those two mentioned. In order to understand the positions of these two units having interacted with most other units of the *MfS*, one should be introduced to the Ministry and its other units before going on to the more specific details of the two Departments. For the possibility to capture the roles of these two units, one ought to be familiar with the overall role, position, work and interest of the *MfS*. However, since the main interest of the thesis is to analyse how the *MfS*' Departments M and 26 completed their work within the GDR, when generally looking at the Ministry in different ways, those aspects related to the security service's 'domestic' control will be preferred treated. That is, the Ministry's control apparatus functioning for the sake of accomplishing control within the republic. Therefore, treating the control methods directly related to the part of the *MfS* having dealt with espionage mainly connected to foreign territories, i.e., going beyond performing control within the republic, will barely be undertaken.[37]

Concerning the work of the *MfS*, the material that will be presented below is not unfamiliar when speaking of these issues. However, it is intended to put the presentation in the light of the presented theory, in order to illustrate the way the *MfS* worked was done in the interest of securing the party and the given theoretical features of development. In this Part, the Ministry with its belonging units will be shown, which existed in concern to preserve, maintain, protect and secure the state of the *SED*. Furthermore, we can only understand the positions and the reasons of the post and telephone control after first having caught the general overview of the Ministry.

In the light of the reasons of the GDR, *SED* and *MfS* that will be given in Part A, although this chapter seeks to illustrate how the *MfS* organised its control, it will first be started with the logic the republic used to found and develop the Ministry. In this way, to focus on formal fundaments of the *MfS* after briefly through the other chapters having shown how and why it at first functioned with the forerunner of both the *MfS* and GDR in the *SBZ*, and thereafter the role of the GDR.

With almost no discussion of how one looks at the *MfS*, there is especially one historical incident that one cannot ignore in the name of explaining and describing why the *MfS* at all was to become so important for the GDR. Without

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[37] The *Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung*, *HV A* (Main Administration Reconnaissance), was the *MfS*' intelligence organisation for foreign affairs.

any overstatement, it is not doubted that other scholars with the author also would classify this happening as having been the most important episode for the GDR concerning its future possibilities of existence. The special historical aspect being hinted to is the June Uprising of 1953. This stands as the most important event the GDR used to find necessary for further arming the Ministry heavily. Amongst others, because of this incident it will be necessary to investigate whether the *MfS* went beyond its formal fundament and acted on behalf of tasks it on its own had defined. The latter will also be reflected through the theory. Additionally, it will therefore be looked upon the organisation and structure of the *MfS*, to address eventually new perspectives of these issues. A detailed examination of every of the *MfS*' areas of tasks and ways of acting would go beyond the frames of the thesis. In relation to show certain crucial elements, it will therefore be chosen to focus more closely on some units of the *MfS* than others.

Coming to the last part of the chapter, there will also be looked into tasks that specifically were seen as connected to the recruitment of the Unofficial Co-

workers.[38] During the whole of the GDR's time, it is estimated that between one and two million inhabitants in one way or another worked for the *MfS* as *IM*'s.[39] These can as such be said to have been the *MfS*' spinal column, and deserves to be dedicated closer attention out of the assumption that these throw light over the thesis' goals.

Moving on to the next Part of the thesis (Part C), the focus will be directly on the roles the two Departments of the post and telephone control had without necessarily conferring them with their imminent political surroundings. Nevertheless, also in Part C, where relevant, it will still be of importance to connect the functions and roles the post and telephone control had inside the political system. Moreover, because there existed certain mechanisms of how and why they worked, which first where decided out of political goals. This will as such however be shown and discussed in regards to what directly concerned the security service. Additionally, the reasons of work through presenting detailed analyses will likely more easily be grasped in relation to the thesis' goals, since at first having illustrated the overhanging frames through the first Parts. This approach thereby also amongst others includes the use of detailed examples towards these Departments for the reason of explaining their development.

Unlike the previous Parts, Part C will be more dominated and dedicated to the technical, professional roles of the *MfS* and its post and telephone control. In order through these Departments to show how the *MfS* on behalf of the *SED* really did function through its physical efforts. Everything decided upon for holding the state together mainly with the help of the *MfS* will be shown through these Departments as examples for this. That is, since they will illustrate the ends and thereby what the actual practice of such a security service meant. As aforementioned, the choice of the *MfS* units is not picked by chance (considered they would throw a light on the angles of the thesis), particularly when one considers what vital role

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[38] The German term for an Unofficial Co-worker is *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter*, *IM*. For informational sake in relation to the treatment of the *IM*'s, different literary contributions have used different abbreviations to identical *IM* categories. Perhaps most likely because of the changes that took place over time concerning these groups. In order to make it as orderly as possible, the *IM*'s will therefore be treated according to the last Guideline of 1979 regarding the *IM*'s and their work. Doing it this way does neither result in any disadvantages for the angling of the thesis. Besides, not all the *IM* categories will be taken into consideration, and those that will be taken into evaluation were not exclusively operational only within their categories. They also functioned actively across the *IM* categories. Additionally, although there were some groupings that were not known as typical *IM*'s, if at all, the most important figures compared to such co-work the *IM*'s undertook with *MfS* will be included. Even though the names of the different categories and their work exclude one another, the common goal was identical; namely doing co-work on an unofficial basis for the *MfS* through part time work. One might say the main similarities are far more dominant than the main differences. Nevertheless, where obvious, the differentiations of all the groups will be presented, each of them with their clear tasks.

[39] BStU/H. Müller-Enbergs, *BF informiert: IM-Statistik 1985-1989*. Nr. 3/1993, pp. 1-19.

these Departments most likely had within and for the *MfS*. At the same time, it should be stressed that the point is to undertake an analysis of variation for the sake of illustrating when the post and telephone control can be said to have stated their importance for the *MfS* and *SED*, for example without blindly having to be tied to certain years. Nevertheless, the chapters regarding the post and telephone control will be 'systematised' into three 'periods' each. Concerning the post control, the first period will be the 1950's. The second is to include the two following decades plus the last year of 1950, whereas the third and final period will treat the 1980's. For the telephone surveillance, the first period is to deal with the 1960's. The following intends to treat the 1970's, whereas the third period will handle the 1980's.

The Part is divided into three chapters. The first and second chapter will deal with, respectively, the telephone and post control through the focus of having an empirical-descriptive view. In those chapters, the primary data from the archive will dominate the spectre, i.e., in order to cover their roles and functions. It will be presented different aspects of the controls executed, including characteristics of work and cooperation. Since these Departments were two out of some *MfS* organs having worked and coordinated efforts with nearly every important unit of the *MfS* that were the mission-giving units, it especially addresses a need to look at such execution. Therefore, the concentration will lie on doing analyses containing the more technical role having been ordered through the central policy.

Since this Part will be solved as described above, the reader will understand that it will be put less weight on what until here has been presented. The sense to why one had such control mechanisms as the Departments M and 26 should have been taken by now, in regards to the analysed material in the previous Parts. In other words, constantly giving focus on the larger contextual matters have a smaller priority, taking for granted that the reader will handle those milestones of such understanding implicitly (having in mind the Parts A and B). Therefore, where relevant and possible, arguments connected to the chapters' facts will rather be coloured by drawing own, relative reflections to e.g. how, why, etc., the composition of the security service with its Departments M and 26 functioned. That means not necessarily therefore making directly links to discussions having been done in the earlier Parts.

The final chapter in Part C will moreover seek to draw the lines of this Part, mainly on behalf of the material having been put forward in the Part's two previous chapters. It will be done to complete the analysis through connecting the empirical discoveries and thereby 'close the circle', mainly in order to draw the most important roles and functions of these *MfS*' Departments.

What is common for all three Parts is that at their end an attempt to draw the most important facts from the discoveries will be undertaken. This will however be done two times in Part A, at the end of both the two chapters. As aforemen-

tioned, the same will be done in Part C in relation to the Departments M and 26, although in this Part it will be separated as an own chapter (chapter 3). In this chapter, the most important roles and functions to the effectiveness of the post and telephone control intend to be illustrated.

The thesis closes with a last section, in order to treat the final considerations. Since the superior focus of the thesis is to undertake an analysis of the conditions, roles and functions of the *MfS*' Departments M and 26 in the GDR, the last analysis will mainly be dominated with elements to the specified units of the *MfS*' control. This is supposed to hold a mixture of summarising and concluding facts of the research undertaken, i.e., mainly about the post and telephone control.

Part A

The Role of the *MfS* in a Totalitarian Context

1 Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory on totalitarian regimes

In 1956, Friedrich and Brzezinski put forward a six-point definition of totalitarian societies. This definition was built upon the empirical material the authors had collected from typical totalitarian societies, which all internally had certain common features. More specific, it concerned the society of Mussolini's fascist Italy, Hitler's Nazi-Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union.

These societies have been characterised as totalitarian on behalf of their nearly identical way on how to govern a state. Even if it is of interest to set focus on the theory in relation to the Soviet Union, GDR and *MfS*, it is however important to be aware that these societies also had variations. One difference was for example that the corporate real estates' businesses in the fascist economy were in private hands, while they were classified as public property in the Soviet Union. In relation to the thesis' approach, in this aspect it is important to put forward a clear separation that differentiates these regimes, because at the time the theory was shaped the Soviet Union's ideology was mainly linked to certain presumptions through the work of Marx and Engels. On the contrary, the Italian fascism and the ideology of Nazi-Germany were based on other ideals.

The aim of the material is to analyse why the *MfS*' two aforementioned Departments were seen of importance to the Ministry in order to contribute to the party elite's control over the state. This raises a few questions regarding the GDR. In an attempt to describe this closer, it has been found useful to focus on the GDR (and thereby the *MfS*) with the help of the theories of totalitarian societies. These theories were developed in the 1950's with the aim to describe the new systems,

which rose in Central and East Europe. Friedrich and Brzezinski developed one of the most discussed theories. They focused on many elements, which characterised totalitarian regimes. The theory they put forward contained six elements:[1]

1. an official ideology, which contains rules for all aspects of human behaviour oriented towards a historical end goal, and which involves all citizens

2. a single mass party, which is hierarchically politically organised and which normally is led by one person, the dictator

3. a secret all perceived police control, which uses terror against arbitrarily chosen parts of the population

4. communication monopoly, controlled by the state

5. defence and arms monopoly, controlled by the state

6. state governed economy, which from the state is both centrally directed and regulated

To say something short to how the points will be used in the rest of this chapter plus the second part of next chapter, the two last points of the theory (point 5 and 6) will not be treated in the thesis. This is mainly because these two points are visible in many regimes.[2] However, those sides of the theory that concern the author's argumentation will be presented and discussed more in depth as mentioned.

The figure below (figure 1.1, Part A), which is developed according to Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory, tries to show how these four points in regards to the Soviet Union were related in terms of that particular totalitarian dictatorship. More generally, these points were empirical generalisations that were emphasised towards certain characteristics in societies such as these. In regards to the Soviet Union (and the GDR), all features were important points for reaching the end goal, which was the classless and communist society. One of the features that were particularly typical for societies such as these was the secret police control. This is in fact not only said to be one of the important means in a totalitarian society, but the bare essence of it.[3] This has been seen as the strongest and most practical tool a party elite of such a state used to fulfil its goals. Therefore, possibly without further explanation, it does not come as a surprise to claim the *MfS* will be considered under this classification. Furthermore, as facts, it leads from this that the postal and telephone control were of great importance in the GDR.

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[1] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*.; Arvidsson, *op cit*., p. 44; Bäck & Dellenbrant, *op cit*., p. 122.

[2] "Of these [six points], the last two are also found in constitutional systems: Socialist Britain had a centrally directed economy, and all modern states possess a weapons monopoly." (Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 9).

[3] E.g. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. London 1967.

In societies like these, feature 1, ideology, can be said to have been the most important and superior factor, because the totalitarian regime's ideological goal was articulated through the ideology to reach the end goal. The points 2 to 4 (6) are seen as means to achieve the goal. In other words, the five last points refer to the means totalitarian states had as the apparatus of control and force, to achieve the goal that is given in the first point. The control aspect can be said to have been a totalitarian regime's most important mean, since this was to be all-inclusive and was to penetrate the whole society.

As an illustration, the theory in figure form looks like this:[4]

MEANS

A mass party

AIM   END GOAL

Ideology

Secret police control   The communism and its state and classless society

Communication monopoly

Figure 1.1: The theory illustrated as a figure, which shows the GDR's and thereby the *MfS'* general reasons of existence

1.1   Ideology

The first common aspect Friedrich and Brzezinski claimed was typical for totalitarian societies, was the official ideology that was to lead the people to an end goal:

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[4] The point arrows are given to illustrate the theory's complete road to the end goal of totalitarian societies. It has here been used point arrows to the end goal, not because they isolated have less importance. They are given because one cannot with 100% predication claim that it would have looked like this, since none of the totalitarian societies at that time reached their end goal. This solution is also chosen since an analysis of the end goal in itself does not lie within the framework of this thesis. Another point to stress regarding the figure is that there theoretically exists no causal link between the points mentioned.

> "[A]n official ideology, consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society supposed to adhere, at least passively, this ideology is characteristically focused and projected toward a perfect final state of mankind, that is to say, it contains a chiliastic claim, based upon a radical rejection of the existing society and conquest of the world for the new one;"[5]

For totalitarians, ideas are important because truth does not have a superior meaning. Ideas are seen as more important to use than the truth, which the totalitarians use in order to give themselves advantages. According to Marx and Engels, it was this way the ruling class governed. In this system, the ruling class used factors such as religion, law, and other value systems to camouflage the reality, in order to hide the economic reality and keep the economic control. These factors were seen as weapons in the class struggle the ruling class hung on to.[6] The dominating class used its ideology to stop the history from developing. In the ruling class' fight, the historical momentum was put forward that established the economic class' power position. Ideas were seen as fundamental for the Soviet communists' belief in the future, since they were rooted in the history of science. Because the future was understood as being scientifically correct and that the future would become better than the present time, this called for class struggle. For East Germany, it is believed that their belief rested on this instrumental nature of the ideas and the ideology. These convictions were to lead to the great socialisation of the masses in the Soviet Union and its related satellite states, where the proletariat was to take the power.[7]

1.2 A mass party

The other common aspect Friedrich and Brzezinski said was typical for the totalitarian regimes was that these societies had a leading mass party:

> "[A] single mass party led typically by one man, the "dictator," and consisting of a relatively small percentage of the total population (up to 10 per cent) of men and women, a hard core of them passionately and unquestioningly dedicated to the ideology and prepared to assist in every way in promoting its general acceptance, such a party being hierarchically, oligarchically organized, and typically either superior to, or completely intertwined with the bureaucratic government organization;"[8]

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[5] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 9.
[6] K. Marx, *Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*. Berlin 1971-1972.
[7] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, pp. 77-79.
[8] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 9.

On behalf of the three regimes Friedrich and Brzezinski developed their theory from, one of the characteristics was there usually was one person, a dictator, which possessed complete power, and that was on the top of the pyramid in terms of governing.[9]   Stalin is likely to have been the only great communist dictator through times who possessed such a position. Since the theory stresses that there normally sits a dictator that possesses all power, this is not decisive to whether or not the GDR had totalitarian features. One of the distinctions of Stalin's way of governing was that it never was put any critical questions towards him. Even not from the highest power apparatus. Stalin was in this way a master to possess the dominating one-man role. Master, since he made sure that in the power apparatus, which existed around him, were no form of horizontal communication between the top leaders that could lead to a split in the leadership, and furthermore to aggression and conspiracy against the dictator.

In totalitarian states, it does not make any sense to talk of constitutions for the leadership.[10]   The reason for that is they are continuously under change. Said differently, there exists a strong contribution of arbitrarily power. The Soviet Union and its satellite states' politics are believed to have operated like this, with the example that there did not exist any form of control organ in the state that independently checked decisions that had been taken in accordance with specific guidelines. The judicial machinery became a part of the administrative and bureaucratic hierarchy, stripped of all independence.

The enormous non-shaped bureaucracy in totalitarian states is a part of the technique the leading party uses to manipulate the absolute power the leader and his subordinates have at disposal. It is this important role the political subunits have in totalitarian societies, and which give them the special position. These political subunits and their leaders use their power to keep the totalitarian regime together. Furthermore, they are instrumental to see to the leader remaining safely in his power position.[11]   The party organisation is especially a hierarchical structural political machine, where the obedient bureaucrat functions as a sub leader to the leader. Seen in relation to how the theory describes it, it is believed that

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[9] This way of governing can be look upon as somewhat general, because the challengers to this way of governing have claimed that it for example was the party and not the dictator in the Soviet Union that possessed all power (cf. e.g., S. & B. Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*. 2nd ed. London 1937). There have been different ways of explaining this. Amongst other things, the scientific procedures have been involved in the question relating to how this should be understood. Since the interpretation in the main text is the one that less than others separate itself from the mainstream of understanding, it has been chosen to relate to that particular angle. At the same time, Friedrich & Brzezinski (Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 17) do say that one can prove Stalin was all dominating, especially after the great and many purges done in the Soviet Union during the 1930's.

[10] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 18.

[11] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 19.

the subunits of the GDR had a stronger position in their leadership compared to their equals in Moscow.[12] That is, because the bureaucrats in Moscow had a stronger control apparatus, everything was more centralised, the bureaucrats had less power and they operated out of more direct orders. In the GDR, the political decision process was more anticipating in relation to the central leadership in Moscow, which likely not to every time could have had the opportunity to offer direct guidance. Therefore, the possibility opened up for the GDR's leaders to possess a stronger authority when decisions were to be taken. Broken down to the detail, this indicates that the two actual Departments of the *MfS* played an important role on their field. At the same time it is therefore more likely that the real power in the GDR not only was placed in the leader's hands, but that the power was divided between the leader and the country's Politburo that played a great formal, political role.[13]

It is said that the leader of the party in totalitarian societies follows his party. This appeal is however very different from the type we find in constitutional democratic societies.[14] One can say that totalitarian movements adopt the shapes of democratic regimes, but that their inner dynamic is different. The leading party does not for example recruit their members freely, something which democratic parties do. It rather institutes tests that are characteristic for clubs, orders, unity, etc. Even when persons are recruited, one cannot say that it inside the party exists some form of democracy.[15] The party does not make its own decisions, when voting for or electing the leadership. It relates to autocratic guidelines in terms of the political, at the same time as it relates to hierarchical control regarding policy of leadership.

Lenin was the first who let the operational principals for the totalitarian party count in practice. He insisted nearly fanatically that the party should have a strong party discipline, total worship to the will of the leadership and a non-discussible acceptation to the ideological program. On top of this leadership was the absolute 'monarch'. Later, Stalin and his successors insisted that these principals had to be followed, until Mikhail Gorbatchev initiated his attempts to reform the leadership principals of the communist party.

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[12] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 22.

[13] Although the leader of the Politburo was seen as *primus inter pares*.

[14] In democratic system of government, through elections for parliament, the majority of the people have the decisive political influence. It is a governing form where the majority of the people govern through political freedom, and where the minority has free access to work for its opinion.

[15] Compared with the western democratic system of government, this way of governing is non-democratic, because this principal of organisation gives higher organs unconditional authority over lower organs. Additionally, the minority always has to accept itself for the majority, where this system does not result in an outstretched right to participate for subordinates.

The Soviet communist party's organisation was designed to give a public impression of that its inner was democratic, so that its final authority rested in the hands of the members of the party through the party congress. The party congress was divided into units, which all in different ways had something to say when decisions were to be taken. According to official interpretation, all these units operated in the spirit of democratic centralism. In theory, this means that before for example a political leadership was to be decided, it was to exist full freedom and float of all sorts of meanings through discussions. Once the policy was decided upon it was expected nothing else but unity, where everyone followed the policy 100%.[16]

Up to Gorbatchev, Stalin was the one Soviet Union leader that showed himself as the strong, absolute ruler, and broke with the principals of democratic centralism. Even if the authority and the decision process in the Stalin era were highly centralised in one collective leadership, the actual power lied in the hands of the leader. It was hardly meant to develop to become like that, but Stalin's personality and power as the Soviet Union's great leader was realised through his skills and characteristics, which led him to the position of becoming the party's General Secretary. In practice, the Soviet Union was not to follow up the principals in the democratic centralism. It is believed that the GDR's socialist party more or less developed itself along the same lines as the Soviet Union's.

In accordance to the theory, it is in totalitarian regimes seen as a privilege to be member of the party, which promotes an uninhibited enthusiasm of belonging. The members' personal identity is dragged under the party's totality, where there do not exist separations between the public and private sphere. When the state apparatus maintains the function of the system, it is the party rather than the leaders that put forward new aims to reach and keep the totalitarian grip on the population. Therefore, member or not member of the party, the state was the great leader to communism that both had and needed to control and bring the people onto a common path, to be able to achieve the end goal. Friedrich and Brzezinski claim that without this, the Soviet system would have become weakened, sterile, and most likely would have lost its vitality.[17]

1.3   Secret police control

The third typical common aspect Friedrich and Brzezinski claimed the totalitarian societies had, was the secret police control:

> "[A] system of terroristic police control, supporting but also supervising the party for its leaders, and characteristically directed not only against demon-

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[16] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 30.
[17] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 36.

strable "enemies" of the regime, but against arbitrarily selected classes of the population, the terror of the secret police systematically exploiting modern science, and more especially scientific psychology;"[18]

Amongst others, totalitarianism is the revolution's system. The aim is to crush the existing political order so that the society can be revolutionised economically, socially and culturally. When the existing power is conquered, the party's power and strength shall be spread to every part of the society. The communism is not completed through the physical liquidation of the main enemies, but becomes a continuously task one has to complete over generations. The revolution continues, so that every single task that is completed gives birth to another. The present is never looked upon as satisfying; the totalitarian movement is always occupied with the future. The future orientation is fundamental in the totalitarian ideology. The everlasting denial of the present for the purpose of the social reconstruction composes the fundament for the total extension of totalitarian power to all segments of the society. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, it is this determined attitude to achieve total change that gives the birth to the secret police control.[19]

According to the theory, in a totalitarian society the opposition is stripped of all possibility to develop because the organisation of the terror is able to go out on everyone. In all aspects, the help of the ideology puts peoples lives aside. They are thereby supplied through the regime's expectations on how the life is to be lived. The totalitarians have over time few possibilities than to intensify the control, since the society is put together of closely connected and overlapping groups. Therefore, it is almost impossible to expose one special group for retrained measures without producing an aggressive reaction from other parts.

The aim is first to eliminate the regime's obvious enemies. After a while the snowball roles on, get bigger and extends to other parts of the society. Not only shall the totalitarians control political opponents, but the terror also becomes a fundamental method of achieving the regime's goals, and maintains the permanent revolution. Without this, the regime will loose its total character, and possibly the power.[20] All embracing police control is therefore the vital nerve in the totalitarian society. Hannah Arendt claimed that the essence in totalitarianism consists of exercising control over the population.[21] She defined totalitarianism as "...a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking."[22] Because of the perfect idea of the ideology's content the terror increases, because it shall force all people to conformity. Since

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[18] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 10.
[19] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 130.
[20] C. J. Friedrich (ed.), *Totalitarianism*. Cambridge, Mass. 1954.
[21] Arendt, *op cit.*
[22] Arendt, *op cit.*, p. 474.

the history tells the totalitarian leader that he is right, he expects that all others agree with him through supporting him on his historical knowledge. It is this passion for unity, which makes the totalitarians insist on a complete agreement, meaning to have the whole population under their control in relation to the aims the regime puts forward.[23]   Through this deal, the regime insists on that enthusiastic unity shall characterise the political behaviour of the captured population. One can ask why the leaders of such omnipotent regimes demand support from more than 99% of the population, and what causes such passion for unity. There are ways of explaining this. It is for example a totalitarian's task to evaluate the history the right way, as described in George Orwell's *1984* where the totalitarian propagandist in "the Ministry of Truth" uses some of his time to rewrite the history through manipulating reports.[24]   After such a regime's power possession, all of the control's resources are put in to crush obvious enemies. When they are crushed the regime's sword are aimed at the wide masses. Only then, the mass control is developed systematically.[25]   Its aims are to fill all with fear at the same time as it fully reveals its passion for unity. Many can get the impression that they are being hunted, although the secret police may not even touch them for many years, if at all. The important task is to keep the possibility alive, where the threat of future control always is apparent. In other words, the way of creating an act of future control becomes almost as important a control factor as the action itself. Generally spoken, it is to presume that the system in the GDR built upon this fear when organising and executing effective resistance against any opposition to the regime. Some of the measures taken to achieve control over any opposition (individual or group), where done through postal and telephone control. As a last way out, the police control is always apparent albeit in the background, and the potential for use does not disappear. With the help of the secret police operating in a strenuous ideological atmosphere, makes the total aspect of control and its spreading remain as a unique case in the totalitarian society.

   Lenin is supposed to have warned that when the old society dies, the corpse of the bourgeois society cannot be nailed in a coffin, and thereafter put in the grave.[26]   It dissolves in our contemporary centre, where this body rotten and pollutes us. For the totalitarian leaders, this rotten body continues to be a deadly enemy the people need to be protected from. It does not matter whether the people themselves wish such a protection or not. The totalitarian leaders are convinced that the masses are with them, or that they should be.[27]   Anyway, the need is there

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[23] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 135.

[24] G. Orwell, *1984*. Oslo 1984.

[25] Arendt, *op cit*.; Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 137.

[26] R. Yaroslavsky, *Bolshevik Verification and Purging of the Party Ranks*. Leningrad and Moscow 1933, p. 13.

[27] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p.139.

that the masses shall be defended from the enemy that does everything to hinder the process of socialisation and even overturn the totalitarian system. The GDR's enemies were therefore presumed to include all individuals and groups that for different reasons were critical to the regime.

Totalitarian regimes do not proclaim a total destruction of all the regime's enemies. In theory, it is on the contrary an important task for the regime to retrain the class' problem child.[28] However, in practice the people's enemies are looked upon as being difficult to bring onto the correct path. More or less this leads to liquidation becoming standard practice, something that strikes large groups of the population as well as individuals.[29] Sign of modesty of the secret police after Stalin's death did not happen.[30] Khrushchev was for example the first of the Soviet Union's leaders who claimed the importance of always having the secret police available.[31]

In later years, the *MfS* might have managed to penetrate the population more thoroughly with the help of a network of police informants, than it managed in the early years where means of more brutal character were used. This resulted in that underground movements in the GDR succeeded less with its work than in identical state forms, and than they possibly expected to do.[32] Related to this, the theory indicates the secret police going strengthened out of the battle when not mass arrests, shooting of prisoners, public executions, etc., are being activated, because this only serves and intensifies the resistance.[33]

1.4 Communication monopoly

The fourth common aspect Friedrich and Brzezinski looked upon as typical in the totalitarian societies was that the leading party has communication monopoly:

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[28] As a comparison, the Nazis had less hope for this when it came to their capacity of getting this done with. It was said the people's enemies had sinned. However, when the totalitarian regime was at power and the environment was different, some of them were retrained. Such a process demanded of course sacrifices from the victims, and it was because of this cynical spirit that the prisoners in Auschwitz and Dachau were met with expressions proclaiming "*Arbeit macht frei*".

[29] M. Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*. Cambridge, Mass. 1953, chapter 13.

[30] Stalin died 5 March 1953.

[31] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 143.

[32] The states in Central and East Europe did not recognise the existence of any conflicts in the society, which thereby meant it did not exist any public organised interest groups in opposition. Some places in Central and East Europe groupings like this existed, such as for example in Poland after the founding of Solidarity and in Czechoslovakia after the founding of Charta 77. However, their vigour to act was heavily limited. In Poland, Solidarity was banned in 1981. Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia never became an important power factor, partly because its many year leader, Vaclav Havel, and other members were put in prison.

[33] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit*., p. 147.

> "[A] technologically conditioned near complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and its subservient cadres, of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, motion pictures;"[34]

It is being said that two close related phenomenon, propaganda and control, create the psychical supply in totalitarian societies. Since the control gives contributively support to the monopoly of the mass communication and a great deal of other communication, the totalitarian propaganda can only be understood within this context. Contrary to this the control is totalitarian, because it is spread around by constant repetition through the official guidelines for the propaganda.

One of the most striking characteristics with a totalitarian leadership is its monopoly on mass communication. Modern mass communication, media, press, radio and TV, have been seen as an essential assumption for the spreading of the democracy. I.e., without possibility to communicate, even modest participation in political decisions becomes impossible.[35] Under the *SED*'s leadership in the GDR, it is presumed that the party centrally controlled all the means of communication. Because of former revolutionary agitation, it is presumed that it was the party's highest functionaries that normally had the important relevant and specific knowledge concerning the propaganda.

Regarding the bottom line of the propaganda, the main aim with it is to teach people how to live. In general, the propaganda is action related, since it aims to get people to do, or not do certain things. The focus of action can either be very visible or it can exist covered, and therefore many totalitarian propagandists are not interested in revealing the source for their support.[36]

In the totalitarian dictatorships, all propaganda is aimed towards the keeping of the party's power that controls it. The power apparatus does not avoid any means, even not against one's own people. Temptations to create stereotype pictures of the enemy are classical. The propaganda operates on a large scale that appeals to the large masses by representing a simple, unrefined, and striking negative picture of the enemy. This shall provoke politically wanted reflections inside the human beings. To place the logic of the system, it will be shown whether the propaganda in the GDR was used in different contexts to give the people the picture of how terrible non-socialist countries were. Another important factor with totalitarian propaganda is its all-inclusive and repetitive character. This is naturally a direct result of the propaganda's monopoly. Both the members of the party and the more or less indifferent masses come too short against the propaganda's absoluteness. This also counts for the active enemies of the regime, in relation to the never-ending repetitions of the same phrases and the same accusations that seldom can

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[34] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 10.
[35] E.g. Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 107.
[36] C. J. Friedrich, *The New Image of the Common Man*. Boston 1950.

be proved.[37]

In some areas, use of direct personally agitation, is the most important instrument. This involves many thousands of agitators, some on part time and others on full time. In a way this mass indoctrination can be said to participate in a national brain washing process, only few people succeed to avoid. Based on these propaganda processes and the educational training system, totalitarian regimes expect to achieve total ideological infiltration of their people. It is these mental forms of tools the GDR is presumed to have used for the sake of producing the communist man, thinking and reacting unison with discipline. Through propaganda and communication monopoly, one by far achieves to dehumanise the inhabitants of the regime by taking away the individual the chance to both think and judge independently.

1.5 Critics of the presented theory

The types of the 1950 totalitarianism, and especially Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory, created debate and gave birth to critics from many angles. Some, as for example Peter C. Ludz, argued in the 1960's that if one effectively was going to run an advanced industrial society it had to raise technical experts.[38] These experts were to shape what he called an "institutionalised counter elite", a counterbalance to the power the central party political group possessed. At the same time, Ludz meant that this developed a more pragmatic, career orientated society, where inner bindings were less important than outward conformity. In this way, the GDR in the 1960's was not a totalitarian society model, according to Ludz, but rather a society model he named as "consultative authoritarianism". In addition, Ludz gave birth to critics. Thomas A. Baylis, amongst others, put questions to this thesis on a present time's growing counter elite.[39] He pointed to that the members of the technical intelligentsia that came in politically important positions also were political conformists. The positions they had were mainly in the advisory, and not in the genuine decisive political, category. In other words, political evaluations governed their priorities, instead of technical or professional evaluations. Others, like Ralf Dahrendorf and Jaroslav Krejci have opposite to Ludz, said that the GDR was characterised by having a "unitary elite".[40] This was to be understood

[37] Friedrich & Brzezinski, *op cit.*, p. 115.

[38] P. C. Ludz, "The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies" in *Occasional Papers in International Affairs*. No. 26. November 1970; P. C. Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany*. Cambridge, Mass. 1972.

[39] T. A. Baylis, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite*. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974.

[40] R. Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*. London 1968, chapters 17, 26, 27; J. Krejci, *Social Structure in Divided Germany*. London 1976, chapter four.

in such a way that the real political power remained in a unitary, elitist core. There only existed weak signs of counterbalance. Such an understanding lays close up to the theory of Friedrich and Brzezinski. Others again, such as Siegfried Thielbeer, have argued that the GDR continued to remain a pure totalitarian state also after the 1950's more Stalinist era.[41]

It looks like it is of little help to classify the GDR's political system based only on the presence of a dominating communist party with its associated ideology and power apparatus. It is especially a simplification to place the entire Central and East European states together. A more differentiated approach to the GDR and the East Block for that matter reveals different alternatives that show the GDR somewhat different from its east neighbours. These differentiations included factors such as different agriculture structure, general economic productivity, but also differences in the constitution, in regards to the relation between the groups in the society. If one compares the GDR with for example Czechoslovakia and Poland, one sees the difference in development. From the late 1950's to the mid 1980's, it seems as if the *SED* kept a greater control in the GDR than the Czechoslovakian and Polish communist parties did in their countries. These communist parties had to different times formidable reformative movements.[42] In the GDR, neither the East German technical nor the cultural intelligentsia was any threat to the dominance of the *SED*. Neither did they form any alliances with each other, contrary to what for example the Czechoslovakian reformers did towards the end of the 1960's. However, after a certain time, the East German protestant church stood ahead with a unique position, because it stood forward as a forum for discussion both by self dissenting and appearing with unorthodox meanings. Especially at the beginning of the 1980's, the church leaders involved themselves often in the direction of a more moderate radical opposition. The church became a place for the opposition groups' articulation. On the other hand, by creating space for dissent, the church gathered the opposition more or less under the same roof. This resulted in that it all became easier for the *MfS* to control them. Such relations should be included to better understand the dynamics of the East German politics. This stands in great contrast to the church state relation in Poland. Such considerations might possibly lead away from both the understandings of totalitarianism and consultative authoritarianism, and towards a more complex model. The theory of totalitarianism that Friedrich and Brzezinski at one time presented seems however fruitful in an approach to the GDR.

Above it has been tried to show a more shaded picture of how it can have

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[41] S. Thielbeer, "Ist die DDR ein totalitär Staat?" in E. Jesse (ed.), *Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik: Die beiden deutschen Staaten im Vergleich*. 3. Auflage. Berlin 1982.

[42] M. Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation. A History of Germany 1918-1990*. New York and Oxford 1992, pp. 251-252.

functioned in practice. The GDR system can be defined as relative party dominated through a variation of co-opted subordinate elite. State structure, which functioned as tools for and limitations on the party's political wishes and ends, to a certain extent can have forced the party. Even if there only existed one official ideology, Marxism-Leninism, not all religious communities were actively fought down. This presumably played an important fact at the end of the GDR's existence. Outward conformity to certain times can have been more important than inner bindings. When this tolerance now and then was combined with concessions to consumerism, at different times East Germany could achieve a certain stability that was more based on just the use or threat of power alone.

1.6   Sum up

In this chapter, it has mainly been presented the theoretical approach to the analysis concerning the conditions and context the GDR and thereby the *MfS* presumably existed under. In relation to this, it has amongst other things theoretically been indicated how the historical relevance of the Soviet Union's influence on the GDR was. In shape of that frame, in the second part of next chapter it will be tried to pursue how the empirical material in relation to how the Soviet communist party's leader role within the socialist block in Central and East Europe after WW II was. The focus of such influence will be seen in the light of the GDR. We have seen that the central point most certainly is the relation between Moscow and the coming East German leadership, including the *MfS*. In other words, the politics of the Soviet Union is believed already to have played a great role even before the founding of the state that was to be called GDR. This politics is furthermore believed to have played a decisive role on the forthcoming security service that was to be called *MfS*. Therefore, in regards to the first part of next chapter, the assumption will focus on how Moscow played an important part both as an organiser and ideal for the German communists' organisation of the GDR and *MfS*.

Based on how Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory of totalitarian societies has been presented, the theory was related more specifically to describing the GDR's political system, in order to be able to focus on that particular state empirically in next chapter.[43]   Additionally, any critics given above in relation to the presented theory will be added and thereby discussed, where this shows relevant. Considering these theoretical elements, the essence to this part of the chapter will be to analyse briefly whether the GDR and *MfS* can be said to have had totalitarian features. By doing this, the analysis seeks to place the *MfS* and the two actual Departments in the rightful, conditional context before going ahead with focusing more in depth how these Departments of the *MfS* functioned. In other words,

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[43] This will be carried out in the last part of the next chapter.

being critical to a certain point where one also tries to keep as much objectivity, calls for having an understanding of its skeleton/fundament at first. Firstly, however, the first part of the next chapter has the aim of addressing what kind of role the Soviet Union played in the *SBZ*, especially in regards to, as fast as possible, building up a security service.

2 Germany's occupied eastern zone, the GDR and the *MfS*

"The principal link in the chain of revolution is the German link, and the success of the world revolution depends more on Germany than upon any other country."[44]

- V. I. Lenin, Report of 22 October, 1918

2.1 The Soviet Union; the strong leader

At the end of WW II, the Soviet Union stood as one of four victors in Berlin. The Soviet military power stood well and safely in Berlin, after having won the battle of the German capital. So far, in history this has been the battle where most lives have been lost.[45] After having sacrificed nearly 600 000 men in the battle of Berlin, Stalin had a good starting point at the end negotiations of the future of Germany. The negotiations between the victors took place in Potsdam the summer of 1945.[46]

The result was as expected, Stalin got the eastern part of Germany. The whole of Germany's territory was divided into four territories, in accordance with the number of victors. Great Britain, France and the United States got their zones in western Germany, which in 1949 became the republic known as FRG. Stalin had thereby gained one of two triumph cards. This was going to give him the possibilities he needed to reshape 'his' part of Germany. The wish was to form this part of Germany to a system close up to the regime type that at the time existed in the Soviet Union.[47] The second triumph was that he and 'his' Soviet Union could choose to govern in their zone. He chose to do so. Stalin exercised thereby all influence as well as control over the zone's population and political development. The *SBZ* was after the agreements in Potsdam politically structured in accordance to the Soviet society model. This shows in particular the formal start to the main connection between the politics of Moscow, and thereby the satellite status the GDR was going to have through the years it existed. In other words,

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[44] V. I. Lenin, "Bericht in der gemeinsamen Sitzung des Gesamtrussischen Zentralexekutivkomitees, der Moskauer Sowjets, der Betriebskomitees und der Gewerkschaften" in *Werke*. Bd. 28. Berlin 1959.

[45] Barna-Alper Productions Inc, Connections Productions Resources Inc & Moriland Int Inc, "*Slik bygdes en mur i Europa*". Episode 13 Productions Inc., 1997.

[46] Capa/France 3, "*Med ryggen mot muren*". 1990.

[47] I.e., as mentioned earlier, without going in depth on what kind of political system that existed in those days in the Soviet Union, it has through time been quite a general understanding from the western world that this particular system was to be categorised as totalitarian. The greatest and only serious attempt radically to change this political system came when Gorbatchev came to power in the Soviet Union in the mid 1980's.

this type of regime lasted more or less until the time when the GDR started to fall apart.

2.1.1   The Soviet occupied eastern zone

After 1945, the Soviet Union was quick to build up a Soviet military administration, with control over all aspects of the development in the *SBZ*.[48]   One of the *SMAD*'s tasks was to report direct to Stalin. The standard of the Soviet security network in the *SBZ* reflected the wide variation of tasks it was supposed to carry out. Among other things, this included the 'denazification' the victors had agreed upon in Potsdam. Furthermore, it included running a scheme over political parties as well as creating a new German communist party, business, labour organisations, politicians, 'sovietise' the zone and creating an intelligence apparatus. The Soviet security organisations gave themselves also the duty to observe themselves, the *SMAD*, as well as look after Soviet troops stationed in Germany.[49]

The first step, which led to the creation of an independent East German security organisation, came in July 1946. This happened with the *SMAD*'s reorganisation of the regular police in the *SBZ*.[50]   The *SMAD* saw the centralisation of the police as a key to effectiveness. The Soviet authorities had to create a new German authority, capable of coordinating and control the police. The new organisation was the *Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern, DVdI* (German Administration of Interior).[51]   Even if it was described as a German institution, the Soviet authorities continued to hold a tight control over it, because *DVdI* reported directly to the *SMAD*.[52]   Additionally, the *NKVD*, *MGB* and a third Soviet security bureau called *Smersh* were stationed in or in the near of East Berlin.[53]   The Soviets also established offices in every *Land* (State) and District. In other words, the total Soviet intelligence operation in the *SBZ* was massive. These relations help to explain why the coming GDR was to become so dependent. Moreover, it was also looked upon as one of the most important satellite states the Soviet Union had in Europe. At the same time, this shows the connection to the political system the Soviet

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[48] The military administration's formal name was *Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland*, *SMAD* (Soviet Military Administration in Germany).

[49] D. J. Dallin, *Soviet Espionage*. New Haven 1955.

[50] The regular police was called the *Deutsche Volkspolizei*, *DVP* (German People's Police). This existed 1945-1990.

[51] Fricke, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 39. The *DVdI* lasted 1946-1949.

[52] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., pp. 35-36.

[53] *Narodnyj komissariat vnutrennykh del, NKVD*, was the Soviet Union's People's Commissariat of Interior during the 1930's and 1940's. This included among other things the secret police, *Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, MGB*, which was the Soviet Union's Ministry for State Security, 1946-1953. *Smersh*'s full name was *Smert Sphionam*, 'Death to Spies'. This was a military Soviet counterintelligence group, operating during, and just after WW II.

Union rapidly built up in the zone, because Stalin's Soviet Union introduced its type of governing, and as such with iron fist.

The creation of the *DVdI* was out of two reasons the fundament of the East German party police. Firstly, because the *DVdI* generally had success with the plan on centralising police activities in the whole of the *SBZ*. Secondly, since communist control over the police was guaranteed.[54] These were two typical features of the 'Soviet totalitarianism', which reflected the coming state of the GDR. In addition, the *SED* and *SMAD* in the *SBZ* started to train the police in Marxism-Leninism. This remained a feature all the way to the end of GDR's existence (1989/90). The most important person in the coming *MfS* was also one of the most important persons in the *DVdI*. He attended to the control over the personnel, cadre and matters of school training affairs, and was named Erich Mielke.[55]

2.1.2   The commissariat; the seed to the *MfS*

The Soviet authorities chose to strengthen the *DVP*'s power in the *SBZ* in August 1947, to have a speedup of the denazification. A special unit within the *DVP*, which was to carry out this, was established. It was called *Kommissariat 5, K 5*.[56] As most of the other official declarations, this was also misleading, since the *K 5* functioned more as a bureau related to the *SED* rather than the "state".[57] It almost had free hands to execute the power it needed, when use of power was seen as necessary. The Soviet authorities extended the *K 5's* competence and authority as time went by. This resulted in giving them tasks that had nothing to do with denazification. The *K 5's* priorities to a larger degree concerned to observe and crush all opponents of the development. Through this, the seed to the terror's police was by far established.

Focus was especially pointed towards the members of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD* (Social Democratic Party of Germany). The members of the *SPD* did not let themselves be forced to unify in a union with the *KPD*, which Stalin earlier had conquered.[58] This shows a clear strategy in the direction

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[54] This process shows parallels to every future Soviet East Block state, where all the local communist parties first secured their position by controlling the forces of law and order, and indeed organising security forces after Soviet model (Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 36).

[55] Schwan, *op cit*., pp. 79-80.

[56] K. Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat. Partei, Staat und Gesellschaft 1949-1990*. München 1998, p. 432. The Commissariat 5 was seen as a forerunner to the *MfS*.

[57] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 38, use the word "state", but this can be said to be somewhat misguiding since there did not exist a creation of a state in the *SBZ* at the time the *K 5* was founded.

[58] 21 and 22 April 1946 the forced alliance between the *SPD* and the communists, the *KPD*, *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany), in the East, on the *Vereinigungsparteitag* (Day of Party Unification) took place (Childs, *op cit*., pp. 15-19; A. McElvoy, *The Saddled Cow. East Germany's Life and Legacy*. London 1992, pp. 16-18; H. Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*. München 1999, p. 82. There, the new party got its name *SED*.

of leaving the political power to be governed through one mass party, just like the totalitarian Stalin wanted. This unique way of governing was forced from the Soviet Union, which also had the director's role to make sure that everything was rightfully copied. The *SED* was totally dominated by the communists. To start with, the party received orders from the *SMAD*. Around 1950, thousands of *SPD*'s members and indeed former members were taken into prison. Afterwards, the fight against the social democrats somehow eased. Thousands of members from other parties also became *K 5* and *MGB*'s victims. For example, 597 cases of *CDU* members have been documented, which were taken into arrest between 1948 and 1950.[59] Possibly, many of the arrested found their way into Soviet, and not East German labour camps.

Even if the Soviets gave *K 5* the tasks, the German communists played an active role, because they also organised the elimination of their opponents. A central control commission in the name of the *SED* was put up with smaller sections in the provinces. Their task was to check *SED* members through the whole of the *SBZ*. The close relations between the *SED* and *K 5* were clearly seen out of the party's torture chambers. There, East German party members now and then took part in the questioning of political opponents.[60] It was all the time Soviet intelligence that controlled everything, even if *K 5* was led by the *SED*. Soviet officers assisted on every level of *K 5*, and played a key role by training their German likeminded. They were present at every interrogation.[61] According to documented statements, Soviet officers reported that to secure trust from the Soviets, *K 5's* apprentices often went beyond their teachers' actions in terms of brutality.[62] The *K 5* therefore got a reputation of being as brutal as Stalin's secret police, and worse than the *Gestapo*.[63]

The Soviets' control over the German police was so comprehensive that Soviet military justice authorities carried out the case in a court. Prisoners were kept in special camps only by the help of the *MGB*, without any form of judicial procedures was followed. Furthermore, many convicted prisoners were deported to Soviet labour camps. As late as in 1955, thousands of German prisoners of war and political prisoners were set free from imprisonment in the Soviet Union, after the West German Prime Minister Konrad Adenauer had visited Moscow. These examples show one of the specifications in a totalitarian regime, the arbitrariness

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[59] Childs, *op cit*., p. 22. *CDU, Christlich Demokratische Union* (*Christian Democratic Union*).

[60] N. M. Naimark, "To know Everything and to Report Everything Worth Knowing, Building the East German Police State, 1945-1949" in *Cold War International History Project*. No. 10. August 1994, p. 12.

[61] Naimark, *op cit*.

[62] Dallin, *op cit*., p. 332.

[63] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 39. *Gestapo* was known as the Nazi-Germany's Secret State Police.

of the power and justice system.[64]

The deportation was somewhat worse than being taken into prison in the *SBZ*. The *SED*, on its side, was satisfied by the act of taking political prisoners into prison that finally were brought to its own labour camps.[65] The *SED*'s police controlled the German labour camps at the time the *K 5* was created the summer 1947. Two years later and the same day the GDR was created (7 October 1949), all camps, except one, were closed. However, it did not help much for the prisoners, since they only were transferred to the GDR's regular prisons.

Although the *K 5* held a strict control and had complete overview over the situation in the *SBZ*, there were indications that the control had certain weaknesses. The *K 5* had problems with the work force, because of the large number of political prisoners the Commissariat was responsible for at the end of the 1940's. Not only did it have too few officers, they were badly qualified. This was the situation, although the Soviet assistance. The same day as the GDR was created, the Commissariat concluded that its own political police was inadequate for social control.[66] Thereby we already here see the start of the upgrading of the state security. The creation of the GDR and its political contrasts demanded a strengthening of this police form.

2.2 Important characters and central events

Because of the Nazi's 12-year long mastery, the German communist movement was so to say crushed after WW II. Except from the *KPD*'s cadres, which were in exile in Moscow, the *Gestapo* and *NKVD* liquidated a huge number of communists, and nearly destroyed everything that possibly could be destroyed. The movement had to be re-raised. However, the result of the Nazis' plundering was something that concerned the coming East German leaders. New initiative was inevitably visible, because Stalin and his world leading communist party in the international socialist movement were present with new inspiration. The *SMAD*'s main task was to rebuild the German communist party, to be able to support the Red Army after the occupation of the eastern Germany was a fact.[67]

With outstretched help from the *SMAD* and Moscow, the *KPD* managed fast to build up the organisation and the grassroots movement inside Germany. Many of the coming leaders of the GDR had worked for Soviet security service, as far back as to the 1920's. Many of those persons that were going to play important roles in the GDR had additionally had several educational stays in Moscow. They

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[64] A. Solsjenitsyn, *GULag-arkipelet 1918-1956: et eksperiment i kunstnerisk forskning*. Oslo 1974-1976.

[65] Weber, *op cit.*, pp. 63-64.

[66] Naimark, *op cit.*, p. 13.

[67] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit.*, p. 33.

had been in Moscow both before and during WW II. Amongst these persons were Walter Ulbricht, Erich Mielke, Rudolph Herrnstadt, Wilhelm Zaisser and Ernst Wollweber.

Rudolph Herrnstadt played an important political role in the first years of the GDR. He was both chief editor of the *SED*'s party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*, and candidate member of the *SED*'s first ever Politburo. Wilhelm Zaisser became the GDR's first leader of the *MfS*. As Herrnstadt, he also had an earlier career of being a Soviet intelligence agent. Ernst Wollweber also became a part of the GDR's political core, and was later to take over the role Zaisser kept until 1953. As the others, Wollweber had several stays in Moscow.[68] The connection he had created between Moscow's intelligence agency and what was to become the *MfS* in the GDR, was to last for 34 years (1923-1957). The connection lasted until he was forced from his position as leader.[69]

Not only the different Moscow stays and the different tasks they had taken to create German and international communism had connected close bonds between them. Another incident also gave them a common experience. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) had been important for many of the coming GDR's leaders. The *Komintern* led the international brigade and placed its rough communists in the top positions.[70] This meant it gave both itself and the *KPD* an important possibility to raise the international socialism. Moscow was interested in sending all its political immigrants that had military education, to help the Spanish republicans to higher resistance. Many of these were German communists. For all it mattered, the discipline was both strict and police governed. This meant a part of the control that was done was aimed at controlling its own forces. The methods were 'Tchekist-like', meaning its own military force could be liquidated, exposed of torture, or taken into prison.[71] Thereafter one could be convicted after the leaders' own will, without the possibility to appeal to higher authorities.[72] Leading in controlling the *Komintern*'s army on behalf of Soviet mission, were later known East German communists such as Walter Ulbricht, Erich Mielke, and Wilhelm Zaisser.

This background tells us something about how and why the *SBZ* after WW II was Soviet infiltrated. Especially since the Soviets additionally almost were given the eastern part of Germany, after first alone having liberated it from the

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[68] McElvoy, *op cit*., p. 13.

[69] J. von Flocken & M. F. Scholz, *Ernst Wollweber. Saboteur-Minister-Unperson*. Berlin 1994, p. 38.

[70] The full name of the *Komintern* is *Kommunistische Internationale* (Communist International).

[71] The word relates to the Soviet intelligence organisation with the name Tcheka. From 1917 to 1922, it worked as the Soviet Union's first political security police organ. The founder was Feliks Edmundovitsch Dzierźyński.

[72] R. D. Richardson, *Comintern Army. The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War*. Lexington 1982.

Nazis. Besides, German communism and Soviet intelligence were intimately bound nearly already from the time of the Russian revolution. It was self-chosen, but also forced. As an extension of this, the GDR's intelligence service was going to be strongly influenced by the Soviet Union and its intelligence service. The two leaders who 'were the GDR', Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker, were both strongly loyal to Moscow. Under Moscow's direction they had additionally experienced and been present during the whole German restructuring process. After Stalin's death, a 'destalinisation' took place in most states of Central and East Europe, and even in the Soviet Union. This happened on the Soviet communist party's 20. Party Congress in 1956. However, little was to be changed in the GDR. In other words, a certain direction to follow had already been made regarding the structures of the GDR and *MfS*.

2.3 The GDR, a totalitarian regime?

Both the dividing of Germany in 1949 and the collapse of the GDR in 1989/90 were closely connected to the relation between the Cold War's two superpowers. It had also to do with the two countries' domestic policy, which for over 40 years can be argued was a success in both countries. The aim here is to look closer upon why the GDR developed in a certain direction, as well as describing the GDR's political system closer. While the FRG in 1949 could hold free democratic elections, where the citizens chose their political leadership and system, the GDR's political and economical system followed another development. The main features itself in the system that were shaped during the 1950's, seems to have been kept all the way to 1989/90 in spite of certain liberal tendencies as time went by.

2.3.1 Tools for the ideology

The GDR leadership's main ideological content was first aimed to create the classless society with its classless human being. The ideology legitimised the state's power, where its fundament was stated in the constitution. Formally, the GDR's ideological fundament was stated in the constitution of 1968, where it was written that it assured the labour class' leading role under its Marxist-Leninist party. The leading party, the *SED*, was in other words the mean that carried forward the ideological message to the people, where the party with its different organisations became the country's instruments. That is, to mediate the ideological message to the population, and socialise them in the right faith.

In Marxist-Leninism theory, it is claimed that the proletariat is suffering under capitalism due to an alienation and false consciousness. The proletariat needs its own suitable solution in order to reach the classless, communist society. Such a fitting tool would be an organised party, and it is demanded that this party remains

fully devoted to the proletariats. Thus, a party is needed to be able to reach the goal as discussed earlier, since it is believed to be the correct organ that can accomplish the ideology in order to achieve an ideal communist society. From the creation to the disintegration of the GDR, the GDR leaders' own understanding was the country moved towards communism. Ideological one-way was looked upon as its main goal to achieve the historical end goal. When the end goal of history had been developed, there was no longer need for a state and a party. The *SED* defined itself as being under the phase of transformation, called "Actually Existing Socialism". According to historical-scientific laws, under this phase one had a certain need for a Marxist-Leninist party to govern and control the development of the society. The GDR leadership needed to use different means to reach the goal. The ideology was present in all parts of the society, whereas the most important tools for executing it were functions such as the *SED*, the different mass organisations as well as the army. The material as such points to that the GDR's politics was in deuce with the totalitarian theory.

Unlike different authoritarian regimes, where the population is archaic subjects, the totalitarian regimes are recognised by the demand of active support from the population. Such a mass mobilisation is meant to give the regime a proper sanction, and by this legitimise the system.[73] However, the formalities alone were not enough to legitimise the regime's power. The *SED* demanded active support from the population. It was indeed taken for granted that the citizens in the GDR were people that actively participated in the politics, but on the premises of the *SED*. In the GDR, the activity was only canalised through the one big party, the *SED*, in the state apparatus and in the different organisations of the society. Since the totalitarian ideology wished to abolish the dividing line between the state's and private interests, as such there existed no autonomous spheres in such a society. Thereby all aspects in the life of the GDR citizens were marked by the ideology, the believe in this and an active support to the advantage of its goals.[74]

In relation to the theory's points on processes of socialisation and principals of governing, all school classes in the GDR had the organisation

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[73] Cf. B. Hagtvet, "Totalitarisme" in *Pax-leksikon*. Pax 1981, pp. 285-286.

[74] This is how for example Hagen Koch, the co-worker of the *MfS* that in 1961 got as task practically to draw the line of the future Berlin Wall, was raised (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Hagen Koch. Berlin, 19.04.02). Before joining the *MfS*, he told that he was raised to believe in the building of communism from all his contact spheres of the society. During his youth, he was a man of good example for the GDR society, a man for the republic's future. These convincement and statement finally led to his entering in the *MfS*. With his background, it did not take long before he in those days was ordered upon to stand in front of his life's task, being a very important participator of building the Berlin Wall.

Pioniere.[75]   It was organised hierarchically like the *SED*, and, some might claim, in a somewhat military way.[76]   Divided into different directions, the organisation sought to mass mobilise the younger generations of the republic. The Pioneers can be said to have been the earliest stage in the lives of the GDR citizens lives where they more or less felt forced to participate in the country's organisations. In practice, it was not voluntary to abstain. This tells us that this was a totalitarian feature in the system of governing in the GDR, in accordance to the theory. With totalitarian means from the childhood and onwards, one was to be nourished with the only right ideology and principals. This counted for the rest of the socialist countries as well. As a pupil, if one showed little or no interest for this organisation, one was frozen out of all social activity. Therefore, in every class in the GDR school there existed so to say 100% membership.[77]   In accordance to the theory, this is a sign of that those who were not "with them" were "against them".[78]   It showed dangerous to be passive, since one was supposed to be involved in the society through the patterns of mass mobilisation, because of the GDR's need for the unity and support from the masses. To be involved and included into the society meant following the *SED*'s policy straight up the line, stripped of as much independent and individual thinking as possible. This should not be too heavily underlined, as the tendency on the other hand was that these citizens of the GDR were seen as only children of a state where such organisation was seen and felt as no more than a scout's activities.

An adult led the Pioneers' district meetings.[79]   There, one spoke about how the development and routines were in the different classes. One talked particularly

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[75] It is necessary to draw a closer explanation to what is meant with *Pioniere* (Pioneers). Mainly, since there existed two groupings of Pioneers, the *Jungpioniere* (Young Pioneers), and those Pioneers related to the name of Ernst Thälmann. In terms of the two groupings of pioneers, the overall sense of organising the school pupils of the GDR was the same. Depending on which year at school you were in decided your belonging and membership (to one of them). As the name evinces, the ones attending the first years at school (first four years) belonged to the Young Pioneers, and the Pioneers 'of' Ernst Thälmann were those that had passed the first years mentioned. Overall, both these organisations committed the younger persons of the GDR that was between age 6 and 14. *Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ* (Free German Youth), on the other hand, recruited the youth of the GDR (generally counting from the age of 14).

[76] The members had to wear uniforms where it was shown on the left arm what type of rank one had. Furthermore, there also existed behaviour similar to military procedures, where for example the leaders of the organisation's sub groups at meetings had to gather their members in order to perform different plenum reports. One type of reporting included a common, compulsory saluting between the respective leaders and their members, with certain set manners being performed identically all over the republic.

[77] It appeared that some children in fact did not join this republic wide activity. These were typically sons and daughters of the clergy. However, this was a very seldom exception.

[78] Cf. Dagbladet, 11.02.00. Here, Bernt Hagtvet discusses what is central to all modern dictatorships, especially the totalitarian ones.

[79] The adults in this case were known as *Pionierleiter* (Pioneer Leader).

much about the communication patterns among the pupils, as well as how the individual pupil's communication patterns at home were. The aim was to get as large an overview over all individuals' public and private atmosphere as early as possible, in order to put everyone under the state's iron fist.

For the *SED*, the control over the socialisation process and the education were important means to raise the citizens to fulfil their ideological duty, and as such not sabotage the goals of the GDR. This control was nearly all embracing and pervaded the society completely. The ideological training and mass mobilisation was not only limited to the non-military organisations.

A short look on the GDR's military organisation shows us that political-ideological training of the population had a central place also in the military. The importance of the military apparatus became a part of the common education. To generally demilitarise Germany after WW II was one of the few fundamental goals all the four occupying powers had agreed upon to do.[80]   Nevertheless, both the FRG and GDR had put up armies, only ten years after the collapse of Hitler's Third Reich. January 1956, the *Nationale Volksarmee, NVA* (National People's Army), was formally established. It became an integrated part of NATO's counterpart, the Warsaw pact. Theoretically, the *NVA* was a national army that was to defend the socialist state against potential aggression from its class enemies. Great efforts were therefore invested in the military training of young East Germans. Amongst other things, they were to get a picture of the enemy, where their West German friends and relatives were seen as devilish representatives of capitalism. As such, they should also be willing to participate in battle against them. However, the identical also counted for this nearby enemy, i.e., the defence forces of the FRG.

The mobilisation in the GDR was enormous. The upbringing of how valuable the military was, started already in the kindergartens. Obligatory military training was introduced as a subject in lower secondary school in 1978, and floated over to youth and sports organisations. Many teachers resisted on teaching this new educational aspect. It often ended with that they were sent to prison. The military forces were often visible over the whole of the GDR, with tanks placed in groves or at areas that were heavily dominated by traffic such as motorways.

This military appearance over the whole of the GDR can naturally lead to the question to what degree the GDR was militarised. Firstly, the tentative socialisation did not become as successful as one presumed, as the theory on totalitarian societies described. It was also present that a considerable number of the GDR's youth resisted on taking up military service, and applied to do alternative service. Alternative service meant one did not need to carry weapon. It was possibly more than just a small minority, which opposed to the military service. Given the pres-

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[80] Fulbrook, *op cit.*, p. 258.

sure of conformity that existed, it is difficult to state an estimate on the suspected figure. Secondly, on the highest state level, the military cannot either be said to have dominated over the party, in relation to how the training and socialisation should have taken place. The *SED* reserved the right to have control over military police. Even if there was strong military representation in the Politburo, it was a symbiotic rather than a rival relation between the party and military. This material shows that the *SED* was all governing. The party gave directions to subordinate units, which were to follow the party's ideology and propaganda policy. This seems to be in accordance with the theory on totalitarianism, because part of the ideology and propaganda's essence was to mobilise the masses in as young an age as possible. That is, to give the political system the necessary support and legitimacy. Therefore, the masses were led into a forced, manipulative sense of apprehension.

The function of the ideology was meant to give the leaders and the development in the society legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism was to be a source for the meaning of, and the mission to the governing elite. The arguments for the one party system were stated in the ideology, and were as such made legitimate in the eyes of the GDR citizens. Because of the totalitarian state's monopoly in regards to the interpretation of the ideology, it could be changed if it was so that the reality deviated too much. The ideology was seen as a justification of the actions of the leaders. Over time, the practice therefore was the ideology became an optic illusion for the GDR citizens, since the citizens did not directly have a strong influence on decisions. That led to many showing political apathy and cynicism to the system, where the active support varied to a large degree. For example, not everyone that was a member of the party was a member because of the sake of the ideological end goal. Rather, many were members of the party because it gave personal privileges in the form of career advantages, or other interests that otherwise would not have been possible to reach. This results in a modification of the totalitarian theory, in regards to the development over time. Over time, the ideology did not show to have the stimulating function, where the vision towards the communist society was meant to influence the mobilisation of the citizens. The passivity and dissatisfaction reached its height at the end of the country's days, because 'the father of the GDR's ideology', the Soviet Union, went apart, something that resulted in the GDR loosing support on most of its spheres.

2.3.2   The mass party, the *SED*

When the GDR was founded 7 October 1949 and its first constitution was accepted, the country's status and future were not certain. Earlier that same year (23 May 1949), the FRG had been founded. The help of the people's votes did not ratify the GDR's constitution. It was flexibly designed in relation to the FRG's con-

stitution, with possible prospects for a reunification.[81]   The meaning in the GDR was to have a multiparty political system, with a parliament consisting of two parts. The parliament's lower part was the People's Chamber. The upper part was the *Länderkammer* (States' Chamber), and was to represent the different States and their interests. The People's Chambers included all the legal parties like the *CDU*, National Democratic Party of Germany (*NDPD*), Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (*LDPD*), Democratic Peasants Party of Germany (*DBD*) as well as members of mass organisations including the *FDJ* and Free German Trade Union Confederation (*FDGB*). One followed the Soviet model, which in principal meant that elections took place on behalf of single lists with candidates. Every party or organisation had furthermore a predefined number of seats that were given in the People's Chambers. This meant the *SED* had most seats, since the party in practice had the GDR's leading political role. By this, the party also dominated the other parties' and groups' personnel and politics. They were only independent from communist control in the name. This is how the factual East German democracy was, very different from how it was in the other German state. In other words, this meant that only one party actually governed, based on stipulated ideological principals. Through the party, the ideology was to lift the population and create enthusiasm. In regards to the totalitarian theory, the presumption is therefore strengthened. That is, the GDR had the totalitarian features in regards to a mass party.

As time went by not only the equalities between the two German states' constitution disappeared, because the political, social and economical reality developed different. In addition, the hope and alternative about a possible common future the regular German in both countries shared faded gradually. One of the earliest and largest changes taking place in the GDR concerned the matter of centralisation, which took shape during the 1950's. Amongst other things, in 1952 the five States that had come about as States in the GDR in 1950 were replaced by 15 AD's.[82] These administrative regions were founded to easier stimulate the *SED*'s goals, which meant to achieve full control, since the power became centralised. At the same time, the centralised policy was meant to repress possible strong political bastions, to hinder that alternative political centres developed. Already in 1958, the States' Chamber was abolished. One of the features in a totalitarian regime's one party state was to organise all control and power centrally. Nothing was to be left to the coincidences. This supports the totalitarian theory, since totalitarian states always operate with a strong central power.

In both 1968 and 1974, there were again changes in the East German constitu-

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[81] Fulbrook, *op cit*, p. 171.
[82] M. Dennis, *German Democratic Republic. Politics, Economics and Society*. London and New York 1988, pp. 91-93. The States of 1950 were Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg.

tion, because of the changed political realities. As we have seen, the *SED*'s leading role was stated in Article 1 of the constitution of 1968, since the Marxist-Leninist party interpreted the formal 'rights' of the citizens. In 1974, the constitution was changed again. This time as an answer to the GDR's new status, following the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt.[83] Amongst other things, this politics opened for the GDR becoming internationally recognised by the world community. Additionally, the GDR's status towards the FRG was changed, by the FRG accepting the *de facto* partition of Germany. Besides, Article 6 in the constitution of 1974 stated that the GDR forever an irrevocably always was to be allied with the Soviet Union.[84] Seen in relation to the theory, the party and the one party state again became the focus for the future of the GDR. The population was totally governed on behalf of the *SED* and Moscow. On the other side, this is hardly enough to draw a conclusion on the GDR's total subordination to the Soviet Union, because the time aspect came to play an important role to the relation between the GDR and Soviet Union.

Formally, the GDR was not a one party state, but the other legal parties had a formidable lower number of members than the *SED*. As we have seen, they even allied together with the *SED* for "elections" on a so-called unity list. On behalf of the political support it generated, it did not seem that they were understood as actual political alternatives. In fact, the East German mass organisations had more members than the alternative. Only the *FDGB* alone had a member number of over 8 5000 000 in 1980, which meant more members than the whole of the GDR's labour force.[85] The *FDJ* had at the end of the 1970's over 2 000 000 members, while Ernst Thälmann's Pioneers had over 1 500 000 members. Together, the *SED*, the four small parties, plus the biggest mass organisations formed the block that represented the different population sections in the People's Chamber.[86] Elections did not decide the number of seats proportionally to how many seats the parties and the organisations were supposed to get, because they were already decided. Instead, elections served as a mean for mass mobilisation, where they presented the candidates and their issues to the public. The presentation was not innovative, since these elections commercialised for issues that already had been decided upon in other forums. This shows first of all the leadership's need

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[83] From the end of the 1960's, the FRG started higher, official politics of approach towards the GDR and Soviet bloc. It was under the leadership of Willy Brandt, and was called *Ostpolitik*. This politics consisted of a number of agreements. Mainly, the agreements focused on the relation between the two German states, and the superior relation between East and West. This was a process confessing to the concept "*Wandel durch Annäherung*" ("Change Through Approach").

[84] Childs, *op cit*.

[85] Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik (ed.), *Statistiches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*. Berlin 1981; Neues Deutschland, 12.04.81.

[86] Fulbrook, *op cit*., p. 247.

for support, through the repetitive character and beneficial value of the mean of propaganda. In spite of this totalitarian feature, the totalitarian theory should be modified, because it did not mean that the organs mentioned were totally overruled by the leading party and did not have any functions. They only had a different role in the society. To be member of the party and some mass organisation indicated a will to participate in the build-up of socialism/communism. At the same time, we have seen that it was a possibility for these persons to pursue career possibilities and possible advancement. In addition, this strengthens the critics Ludz put forward to the GDR's totalitarian way of governing. It was only an advantage for the state that the members supported the state, and in a positive way spoke about it, because this state did not have real democratic elections, and was depending on support from the population.

The *SED* was a mass and cadre party, even if there existed a larger unit of passive members. In 1981, the number of *SED* memberships contained 2 069 629 persons, something which meant that it was 17.38% of the population over 18 years that belonged to the party. Of the part of the population that worked, the percentage was 21.9.[87] For the passive members, contrary to the active cadres, membership meant something else. As we have seen, a membership, especially at the end of the republic's existence, was often more an adjustment to the system than a genuinely expressed enthusiasm for the party and the political ideology.[88] The way Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory characterises totalitarian regimes; the *SED* itself was hierarchically organised, after the principal of democratic socialism. Lower levels in the hierarchy that had the possibility to comment the discussed policy, were bound to accept and execute decisions that were made by higher organs. This gives support to Baylis', partially Dahrendorf and Krejci's thesis, where central politics concentrated in few hands were superior to other organs. In particular, the power laid in the leadership of the *SED* (Politburo) and its General Secretary.[89] This led to the party leader being the supreme leader and front figure. The party leader in the GDR was in practice the leader of both the party and state. However, he did not act in the way the dictatorial monarch Stalin once did. This is an argument for modifying the theory's descriptions on how it describes the leader culture in totalitarian societies. Something similar can be said to the development of leadership in Soviet Union. After the death of Stalin, it was

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[87] Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik (ed.), *op cit*.; Neues Deutschland, 12.04.81.

[88] Compare the discussion mentioned earlier, where for example higher education nearly was impossible without party membership. As an extension to this, opportunists were members because it paid.

[89] The characterisation of the formally highest position in the party - "General Secretary", changed name to "First Secretary" in 1953. However, from 1976, the first name was once again applied. To make it as convenient as possible in regards to the thesis, the characterisation "General Secretary" will hereafter be applied consequently towards both terminologies.

developed a larger distribution of power between the elite in the Politburo and its leader.

Mentioning the relation between the party and state organs, in principal there existed two separate, but parallel, organised power hierarchies in the GDR. On the one side was the state, with its different levels of power. On the other side was the party, with its own hierarchy, based on the principal of democratic socialism. As such, the totalitarian theory is strengthened, since it treats the feature of how the party is to function within such a state. Many western academics have suggested that the state only was the mean for implementing party decisions. In practice, the relation between the party and state organs during the development of the GDR was more complex than that. For example, in the 1950's the party often had to break in to make sure that belongings to the party were placed under the state. In the 1980's, the state defined the political agenda, even if the party theoretically had the power.[90] However, this is a reference to the GDR neither having acted regularly, nor could be classified as an unlimited totalitarian regime during its whole existence. In other words, this material shows the GDR breaking with the static theory, because, as time went by, the country dynamically adjusted to the development. Hereunder, Thielbeer's thesis is indeed also partly weakened, which referred to the GDR continuing to be a totalitarian state after the 1950's more Stalinist period.

Theoretically, the state structure of the GDR's political system consisted of a pyramid. To start with, the GDR had a president as its formal Head of State.[91] This ended fast, because when the GDR's president died in 1960, the president's office followed him in the grave. The *Staatsrat* (Council of State) became the replacement for this office, where the *SED*'s General Secretary also was the formal Head of State by having the chair position.[92] From 1960, it was formally clear that it was the party and its leader that practically ran the GDR, and as such independent from the changes on the *SED*'s top. This development supports the theory, since Friedrich and Brzezinski underlines that it is one party at the top of the state system governing the matters of the state. Even before 1960, without the formalities in tact, it was anyway in this and similar political systems the party and its leader that really had the power. For example, when Pieck was President and Grotewohl was Prime Minister, the Moscow trained *SED* leader Ulbricht consolidated the power in his hands all the way to his retirement. However, also this office had a short life. When Erich Honecker replaced Ulbricht as General Secretary of the *SED* in 1971, the Council of State continued to exist with Ulbricht as

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[90] G. Neugebauer, *Partei und Staatsapparat in der GDR*. Opladen 1978, chapter three.

[91] Wilhelm Pieck was the GDR's first President, while Otto Grotewohl at that time was the GDR's Prime Minister.

[92] Fulbrook, *op cit*., p. 173ff.

leader.[93]   The difference was that this council from now on only had a ceremonial role. What replaced the Council of State and instead became the important state organ was the *Ministerrat* (Council of Ministers). Even if Honecker, during a period, did not possess the role of being Chairman in the Council of State, he had in return the chair in the *Nationale Verteidigungsrat* (National Defence Council). In reality, this meant that one man had gathered all the important power organs in his hands: the party, state and military.[94]   Besides, it was over time other variations and considerable overlaps of personnel between the party and state organisations. Amongst other things, it was a determined policy that leading party members had to be members of the Council of State. This was for example the case with persons sitting in the Central Committee, because, amongst other things, when being abroad they did not only represent the party but officially also the state through the state organs. This overlap between the activity of the party and state organs came especially to expression in the military hierarchy.

Under the Council of State was the Council of Ministers, where the different Ministers were responsible. They were important decision makers on areas such as economy and state security. Under this was the People's Chamber. It often met to ratify and publicise law giving, which were decided upon at a higher level. There existed governmental organs on district, regional and local levels. On every level of governing, the *SED*'s leading role was prominent, after the revision of the constitution of 1968. The party was included in the constitution of the GDR from 1968 all the way to 1 December 1989.

Under the GDR's Politburo, the most important organ was the Central Committee, with its subordinate special groups. The members of the Central Committee had a more advisory rather than a decisive based role. This especially counted for the candidate members, which did not have the right to vote. From the 1960's, membership in these organs was to an increasing degree reserved to certain levels of technical expertise. I.e., important areas such as economy, questions related to the armed forces, culture, etc. Thus, one can argue that the GDR's one party system deviates somewhat from Friedrich and Brzezinski's totalitarian theory. Possibly, a combination of Ludz and Baylis' theses on a technological, career-orientated counterbalance to the central power might better capture more of the GDR's situation. Nevertheless, it is important to present that political bindings to party goals and methods always remained a decisive factor.

The Central Committee was chosen from the Party Congress, which under normal circumstances met every fifth year. On lower levels, regional and district organisations existed. They were comparative to the organisation structure exist-

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[93] Ulbricht governed this organ until his death, in 1973. Willi Stoph took over 1973-1976, whereas Honecker continued thereafter. In this way, it was a short period (1971-1976) where Erich Honecker was leader of the *SED*, but did not have the chair in the Council of State.

[94] Fulbrook, *op cit*, p. 250.

ing at the national level, with their own leader, secretariats, and meetings. On the lowest level, party members were organised in unions that were connected to work, or in groups regulated in regards to where one lived. The borders between the individual and society were as such tried to be wiped out.[95] This went so to say automatically, since the mentality that existed was that one was against the state if one was not with it. This has to be seen in relation to the theory's descriptions of the one party system's ideology and aspect of governing, where the masses were steered into an all-embracing collective identity, and where social formations first of all where controlled centrally from the party. The *SED* dominated every sphere in the GDR. It maintained the power in own hands, and can be defined as a mass party. The factor in Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory that a mass party governs a totalitarian state is in the case of the GDR given.

2.3.3   The secret police control, the *MfS*

The GDR both had a regular police, the *DVP*, and a security service (the *MfS*). The latter organisation is the same as the theory's secret police. The GDR also had the well-built police form in terms of the *DVP*, which was established as regular police. This police acted with authority against criminal incidents, regulated traffic, had personnel in different bureaucratic positions, controlled the borders, etc. On the whole aspect, there existed a formidable police force, and often citizens encountered the police. For example, most foreign visitors had to register at the offices of the police in every local society they visited. Visitors were also often stopped and asked to show visa and identity papers. While checked at the place they even could be given a ticket for minor, unimportant infringements. For the GDR to reach its goal, the point with this system's mean was constructed as such that no one was to get away with anything. Not even from the regular police. Everyone was potentially exposed of surveillance, without knowing it. The smallest mistake could lead to fatale consequences.

The most important mean of control the GDR's leadership had to reach its historical goal was the *MfS*. As mentioned before concerning the defined view of the thesis, the main empirical focus will concern and lay on the *MfS*' post and telephone control. That is, how these Departments where used for the so-called good of the republic. It was therefore not only important to defend the country, but also work towards the superior aim of one day having achieved to build the communist society. However, it can here be mentioned that the "terror's police", better known as the *MfS*, undoubtedly exceeded the regular police in its methods and forms of action. The core of force and control in this state form was the secret police control. The *MfS* functioned here as the *SED*'s operative organ, and acted

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[95] See e.g., Dagbladet, *op cit*.

when the top leaders of the country saw it as necessary based on their evaluations to what was considered as advantageous for the state.

However, purely defined, the use of the *MfS*' power can be said to have varied over time. For example, in the 1950's and partially in the 1960's, it acted more as the terrorist, repressive, all observing unit, compared to how the governing way of Stalin was. This changed somewhat after Honecker took over as the leader of the GDR in 1971. A more open atmosphere apparently seemed to be introduced. In accordance with the development of the Soviet Union's force and control apparatus that heavily distanced from Stalin's methods of terror, the GDR more or less followed in these lines of development. It is said that it no longer was typical for the *MfS* to make large numbers of raids in the night, and hold long interrogations. The control did not necessarily decrease for that reason. The terror was only swapped with a more subtle use of control. Amongst other things, this was reflected in the growth of *IM*'s, which increased from the 1970's.[96] This shows that both the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski and Thielbeer's critics should be modified, since the GDR apparently did not continue in the distinctive Stalinist style.

This growth of the *IM*'s came as a consequence of the changed tactic from the *SED*'s leadership. The leadership wished to accomplish the surveillance in other ways. Torture, executions and physical repression descending from the GDR's earlier days was changed with a more selective use of power. Subtle means and a more sophisticated power execution replaced the former.[97] That is because the infiltration, recruitment, and socialisation of the society went on in the hidden, by peaceful means.[98] The silent, convincing manipulation of the population showed more rational. Brutal behaviour only created larger splits between the citizens, and was not any longer economical.

In 1975, Honecker had signed the Helsinki Final Act together with other European state leaders.[99] The Final Act accepted amongst other things that all coun-

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[96] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 82. A closer examination will be done in Part B.

[97] We will look closer at this, especially in Part B.

[98] Although interviewees of Nessim Ghouas were not recruited as *IM*'s, they were smoothly recruited into the *MfS* after having gone through the 'right' steps towards finally getting a position in the *MfS* (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department XIX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02, 13.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). I.e., for example, one of them had important positions in both the Pioneers' and *FDJ* organisations as well as serving the *DVP*, before finally entering the *MfS*. Besides this, the same person can to a certain extend verify that the way of employing persons did not take place through force, rather the contrary. In this person's Department, there were about 30 *IM*'s, whereas 95% of them were recruited out of own will to fulfil such work.

[99] Dennis, *op cit*., p. 123; H. Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies since 1945*. New Haven and London 1987, p. 182; Weber, *op cit*., pp. 293-294.

tries should respect fundamental human rights, including the right to emigrate. Many thousands of GDR citizens applied for exit permit, but only a few per year were given a green light to leave. This indicates that the *SED* leadership had little interest in fulfilling something it officially had signed for. Of two reasons, it nevertheless did not seem that the GDR lost track, on the contrary. Firstly, because the GDR took advantage of the CSCE showing incapable of acting towards countries that broke the agreement.[100] Secondly, the republic had achieved more interstate relations than earlier, as a result of the signing of the CSCE agreement. The oppressing effect that laid in the permanent threat of the *MfS*' surveillance, involvement and potential possibility to ruin people's lives can hardly be exaggerated. It led to a tremendous uncertainty in personal relationships. That the *MfS* was there all the time as the fundament and unpredictable weapon for the party against the population, nevertheless verifies that the GDR had this totalitarian feature. The *MfS* was the secret police of the GDR that in comparison to the totalitarian theory is characterised as an important mean a totalitarian regime will use to reach its end goal.

2.3.4 The communication control in the GDR

The *SED*'s aim with this monopoly's force and control form was two-sided. On one side, it was there to filter information before reaching the masses, while the other side of it was present to raise the masses. Both forms were consciously used to influence the population.

For the leadership to hinder particular information getting available to the masses, meant to control it. This meant the GDR citizens did not have a need to seek any other information via other means of communicating, other than the official channels the *SED* had decided was available. In other words, all sorts of communicative media was led and controlled by the *SED*. With the latter facts, related to the visual media, the party thereby acted as the decision maker in regards to how the expression and presentation of this particular media was to be.[101] With this starting point, the GDR started its first state wide TV broadcasts already in 1956.[102] That is, in spite of that for example *Neues Deutschland* was an all-inclusive news channel for the citizens of the GDR according to the GDR's leadership.

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[100] CSCE was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[101] It was the *SED*'s *ZK-Abteilung Agitation* (*ZK* [Central Committee] Department Agitation) and the *Staatliche Komitee für Fernsehen* (State Committee for TV), which more specifically had the last words in a decision. These units had for example the responsibility of filtrating TV broadcasts before they were shown, to avoid showing people how the reality was. This harmonises as such with the presented theory.

[102] Schroeder, *op cit.*, p. 569ff.

The news program *Aktuelle Kamera* (Actual Camera) was particularly a program the party considered as very important to evaluate closer. This program was the only news program that existed on the GDR's broadcasts. As such, this led to the *SED* having monopoly on the visual news coverage. Therefore, the broadcasts were in detail also thoroughly examined in accordance to the party's line and policy. As much as 95% of the journalists of the Actual Camera were members of the *SED*.[103] The fact that such a high number existed would at first sight obviously mean those journalists having been allied with the country's leadership. On the other side, this did not necessarily result in an automatic consequence, meaning they were 100% loyal and faithful to the state. Much indicates that also they needed to be controlled by the police, since we have seen that many of the career and opportunist motivated persons first of all had to have membership in the *SED* to succeed. In other words, the membership in the *SED* was for many only a camouflage to be able to fulfil their own, private beneficial wishes, instead of true devotion to the system.

Regarding further aims that carried purposes of propaganda, also other types of TV broadcasts existed. Some broadcasts were shown over decades, where the content was especially agitated in direction of negatively criticising the society of the West. There existed for example a special propaganda influenced political program.[104] This was called *Der Schwarze Kanal* (The Black Channel), and was from its very start until the end led by Karl Eduard von Schnitzler. For some important reasons, the program was meant to give particularly good lessons and teaching in political understanding for all citizens of the GDR. One of the reasons was that it was presented on a highly political, agitated level, so that people was to understand it as especially informative, not to mention directive. Seen in relation to the theory, with the help of such efforts the particular factor regarding the communication monopoly was to be achieved. The point with this program was to captivate the necessary sympathies the state's leadership needed. Those pictures that were picked showed negative, sarcastic, unmoral, enemy minded, warlike, unsociable and to times blasphemous impressions of how the society was in the West. The *SED* used this possibility fully to show the West, since the GDR citizens did not officially have the right to take in western broadcasts. Thereby, Schnitzler's program was the only legal way of getting to understand the West. However, it is believed that this particular program did not enjoy a large and stabile spectre of audience. It is reasonable to claim that the program in general had a poor number of viewers. When being watched by the GDR citizens, it was even by some viewers rather done for amusement purposes than anything else.

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[103] P. Ludes (ed.), *DDR-Fernsehen intern. Von der Honecker-Ära bis "Deutschland einig Fernsehland"*. Berlin 1990, p. 13.

[104] Ludes, *op cit.*, p. 269ff.

This produces some thoughts around the theory. Maybe the most important aim to have The Black Channel permanent available was because of its ideological and communicative control. The aim was to steer the people's thoughts and negative impressions of the enemy, because the GDR leadership did not succeed in avoiding that people channelled and thereby saw western broadcasts. Obviously, the leadership also experienced problems in getting the amount of wanted audience for The Black Channel. As such, this contributes heavily to modify the theory. Mainly, since these are examples of the country neither having had a total communication monopoly nor control over the population through both invested voluntarily aspects as well as force. The Black Channel was to function as the antidote against the infection the population repeatedly was exposed of through western media, even if this media in the first place had been stigmatised as illegal. Deviating from the theory and something it does not include is how important a role the TV broadcasts turned out to become for the population throughout the GDR's existence.

As Peter Ludes claims, the *MfS* was very likely also involved in the control of Actual Camera and The Black Channel.[105] In accordance with the socialisation process, the *MfS* was quick to employ personnel of the TV establishment.[106] One of the great baits to get TV personnel into the *MfS* was to give them half a month's extra salary. If the GDR either from the *MfS* or from the *SED* quarters had managed to sign up media personnel into one or both of the country's organs, the party and *MfS* had succeeded in their political governing and socialisation. That is, because the *SED* centrally in this way nearly had secured all power, especially in relation to this media that had an enormous influential power on the population.

With time, obviously a great deal of the population used party membership purely to stimulate own, personal interests, which was one of the decisive factors resulting in the state falling apart. Especially towards the end of the GDR, the party did not have the active support from the masses it actually permanently needed to have. Then, rather passivity governed over activity, something that led to a heavy weakening of the system.

Seen in the light of the *MfS*, although the illegal TV watching was reported and tried to do something about, it continued. Ever since the time of the very beginning people got TV broadcasts, to the very end of the republic's last days. In fact, from the time the GDR was founded, nearly the whole population received western TV broadcasts. As time went by this TV watching increased. This became in fact as normal and openly that the *MfS* did not manage to have control over the people's habits. However, the *MfS*' main problem was hardly the habits

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[105] Ludes, *op cit.*, p. 18.
[106] However it is difficult to prove how many persons the *MfS* managed to employ, i.e., persons that were members of the *SED*.

of the citizens, but by far the development of the modern technology. On this area, the technological development led to the *MfS*' control forms meeting its superiors. Therefore, as well, the *SED* founded and more importantly maintained The Black Channel, since it was considered yet another important mean of the control instrument in order to put a stop to the existing reality. The fact that most GDR citizens were out of reach for the *MfS* regarding this control after a certain time contributed to increasingly loosing the control over the population.

Not quite different from what is described above, *anno* 2003 western TV also does possess this angle and interest. The today's TV may result in occasionally ending up with seeing the same as to what has been described above. The main differences compared to the theory are parted in four. Firstly, it is controlled neither generally nor directly centrally from the highest state authority, in regards to what is to be shown at any time. Secondly, there does exist a combination between TV companies' and viewers' interests. This results in multi regulated conditions of production. Thirdly, the media is generally independent from the politics. The fourth and most important point, being the sum of all three points, is that these conditions exist under democratic circumstances.[107]

As an example of yet another crucial media contributor in the GDR society mainly in terms of appealing to all kinds of citizens of the state, the party newspaper of the GDR, *Neues Deutschland*, had a very important position. The important position came about, as the *SED* considered this to be of greatest value for the people, in terms of the potential and quality of truth the newspaper was able to carry out to its citizens. As such, *Neues Deutschland* was the information source that became specifically well presented among the different forms of media being available. According to the party's leadership, *Neues Deutschland* covered the news a good GDR citizen needed to know. The aforementioned having been the case, closely connected with this at the same time resulted in the newspaper having been given a tight follow up in regards to censorship. Therefore, a typical phenomenon that for example critical articles of the system were not to be published in the newspaper was the rule more than anything else was. As an extension of this, such aim of approach and way of control also counted for the other legal press media supported by the party and/or being on the marked of the republic. This was in fact heavily regulated from the years of attending kindergarten and all the way thereafter. That is, already in kindergarten one had the magazine *Bummi Heft* (Bummi Booklet) which was present to influence the children on as early a stage as possible. Furthermore, the pupils in the first class at school were supported by the *ABC Zeitung* (ABC Newspaper). Later, after having past a few stages at school, one had the

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[107] I.e., related to what is considered as the typical western civilised way of understanding democracy.

newspaper *Frösi*.[108]   Available for the GDR youth was the newspaper *Neues Leben* (New Life). Besides this, for anyone, perhaps particularly for adults, apart from already having mentioned *Neues Deutschland*, one also had a newspaper like the *Freie Erde* (Free Earth) in terms of the aforementioned purposes. The information and propaganda was not only effectively controlled. It was also efficiently covered whereas importantly having played the leading party's all-embracing role in the society. Drawing the analysis made in this paragraph in regards to the totalitarian theory, this is strengthened

As an extension to the latter paragraph, in regards to the time aspect, an example of the censorship of the GDR media can be picked up dating back to the beginning of the reform period.[109]   The GDR then avoided giving the Soviet Union the usual attention and media coverage compared to what it earlier normally had given. According to Gorbatchev, the GDR media was not slow in showing passivity when he wanted to make public the political content of *perestrojka* and *glasnost*. Gorbatchev knew his press releases, TV broadcasts, newspaper and radio related news and program, etc., did not reach out to the everyday GDR citizen because the *SED* before having come so far had closed the doors for that kind of impressions and changes.[110]   The GDR kept its mask to the very end, and avoided to show the population pictures of the mass escapes that took place. The mass escapes consisted of a great part of the people, which was involved the summer/autumn of 1989. At the time, the GDR citizens seethed in their "*Trabis*" with course towards southeast (Hungary), with final destination Austria.[111]   In many circumstances, the official press coverage changed the reality in similarity to the way Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory describes these regimes' relations to mass communication. According to the theory, this material therefore strengthens it. That is, particularly because the leadership of the GDR (and *MfS*) continued to act in totalitarian manners. Practically, we have seen that Gorbatchev literary went out to the people to meet the problems and see the realities. In the GDR, for example the work, production and living standard was presented as if being in paradise, while the factual reality was governed by lack and chaos.[112]

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[108] The name "*Frösi*" actually came from a Pioneer song, which full name was "*Fröhlich sein und singen*" ("Be Happy and Sing").

[109] Several other examples of forbidden media can be listed, whereas for example the critical program *Panorama* was on the list of forbidden communication for the citizens of the GDR.

[110] Capa/France 3, *op cit*.

[111] *Trabi* is the nickname for the East German produced car. Its full name is *Trabant*.

[112] Jeremy Isaacs Production, *Cold War. The Wall. 1958-1963*. Turner Original Productions, Inc., 1998.

2.4   Sum up

The material has by far verified that the GDR and *MfS* through its existence remained dominated from Moscow. To accomplish the communism, we have seen the GDR needing extended help from Moscow to protect itself against, and cut off all forms of critics to the introduced Moscow model. The communist parties claimed that democratic centralism and the one party state were the only correct ways of governing. We have seen that the coming leading party of the GDR, the *SED*, used different means to fight its enemies. The *MfS* was as such seen as the party's most important mean in this process. Related to this, we shall in the next chapter see that the June Uprising in 1953 was verification to that the country's security and development were threatened. This was an uprising, which, from Moscow and the *SED* especially, indicated to run increased control of the people. In regards to the ideology and its goals, the party had the need to accomplish its politics. In accordance with giving the party all embracing power, the secret police control was going to contribute to hold the population in check. This increased control was heavily influenced by Moscow, and became the *SED*'s strongest weapon against the population.

Speaking of the presumption to whether the GDR can be said to have been totalitarian, the material show that the GDR had many of the totalitarian features Friedrich and Brzezinski included in their theory. At the same time, this also shows us signs of modification, when for example relating to the aspects of the ideology and communication monopoly. We can for example see that the ideology did not have as strong a penetration as the leaders of the country expected, and that it became impossible to maintain full monopoly over the media through the whole of the GDR's existence. Even if the GDR all the way to the collapse remained heavily influenced by Moscow, the GDR changed somewhat. At least such happened after Honecker took over as General Secretary for Ulbricht. The change in power was by many seen as a presupposition for *Ostpolitik*, where the GDR, amongst other things, opened up for greater visiting possibilities from the West. At the same time, the secret police control's methods were somewhat changed. This change of power contributes to modify the picture of the GDR as having been a strong totalitarian state through the whole of its existence. Exactly this development indicates that the critics towards Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory as a static theory might be justified. On the other hand, Honecker showed little will for new orientation when Gorbatchev's reform program started. He tightens the grip internally in the GDR, and by far separates from Moscow's policy. This indicates a weakening of the relation to Moscow and its influence, since one can presume that Moscow exercised less influence on the shaping of the *MfS*' roles in the last period of the GDR's existence. On the other side, it seems as the theory is supported. Since, like Friedrich and Brzezinski describe the necessities of the

party, the *SED*'s distinctive needs possibly became decisive for the *MfS*' roles and actions, until its leader - Mielke - chose the side of the reform politicians during the final breathing of the GDR.

A few words should however be added concerning such a society like the GDR. A society that in difference to for example the West European states at the time, because of its history, was more advanced to get a detailed and complete overview over. Different aspects of the society of this state have so far been described, also including the individuals living inside it. The weight has although been put on the structure and overall aspects of the GDR, having had a smaller focus on the individual's daily role in this particular country. The GDR has been described with a certain academic approach, to a certain degree resulting in having left out for example roles of the daily life. It is therefore an important point to underline that the GDR, like most other states in the world, also had its niches, in which people through different ways used in order to find 'their own roles and positions'. That is, in spite of the heavy regulations and laws existing at all times. Having the author's approach in mind, the descriptions of a GDR having been the typical state with typical features, within a specific, known political-historical frame tends to go on the expense of describing the roles and positions of the individuals in the GDR. Furthermore, it is therefore to be kept in mind that although the GDR society as described was organised and functioned according to specific features, the daily life of a single person was so to say at all times not necessarily dominated by such aforementioned analyses. People, in their possible ways, did indeed go left and right, when both being able and/or wanting to. It would therefore be too black and white if one was to argue that all the citizens at all times 'marched with', which opposite thought given through this discussion has tried to address.

Part B

The GDR's Security Service

1 The *MfS*

1.1 The control apparatus being formed and developed

The East German security service was founded only four months after the GDR had become a state. As a result of a publicised proclamation 13 days after the founding of the *MfS*, the organisation had formally only two statutory enactments to relate to:[1]

> *"1.Die bisher dem Ministerium des Innern unterstellte Hauptverwaltung zum Schutz der Volkswirtschaft wird zu einem selbständigen Ministerium für Staatssicherheit umgebildet. Das Gesetz vom 7.10.1949 über die Provisorische Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik wird entsprechend geändert.*
>
> *2. Das Gesetz tritt mit seiner Verkündung in Kraft."*

Quit simply, the above meant that the Main Administration to the Protection of the People's Economy was reformed, and was thereafter to act as an independent ministry called *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (*MfS*). Up to that time, the Main Administration had been under the *Ministerium des Innern* (*MdI*).[2] The areas relating to the first point and concerning the GDR's provincial government in the constitution of 7 October 1949 were changed. The other point only confirms the law being legally binding after announcement. Since the *SBZ* had turned to become the GDR, it was also easier and at the same time necessary to form a

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[1] Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 21.02.50; cf. Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Wolfgang Kühn, BStU/Außenstelle Rostock. Rostock, December 1999; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 15.

[2] The *MdI* was the Ministry of Interior, 1949-1989.

formal state apparatus. After the FRG was founded, the break between the Soviet Union and the western allies turned to be a fact.

Although the above was considered the fundament of the *MfS*, two related statutes to the *MfS* came, respectively in 1953 and 1969.[3]   These included the roles and meanings of the link between the *SfS*/*MfS* and its roles and the work put down from all the important organs of the state of the GDR. This meant the lawful basis and frames for its total activities were carried by the decisions of the *SED*, the constitution of the GDR, the laws of the People's Chambers, the decisions, instructions, statutes and other rules of the Council of State, the National Defence Council as well as the Council of Ministers of the GDR, the instructions of any responsible Minister and the General State Attorney of the GDR - as far as their activities as protection, security and rightful law forces did count, the Statutes of 1953 and 1969 as well as the decisions and instructions of the Minister for the state security.

30 July 1969, Honecker did not present a differentiation between the responsibilities and tasks. He confirmed with his signing exclusively the Minister and his Deputies as being the leaders of the *MfS*. At least it was decided that the units were to work as they already earlier had been decided upon to function. Hereunder, it included as such everything from the performance of the secret service, first of all the Main Departments, Main Department Reconnaissance, Departments and Divisions, etc., of the headquarters in Berlin as well as the ADM's and the subordinate DSP's. In general, the *MfS*' main structure was in accordance with the state's order concerning administrative structure. In harmony with the federalist build up of the GDR, after its foundation in 1950 the *MfS* was ordered in five provincial administrations for state security. Nearly identical to what we already know about the administration reform in 1952, regarding the *MfS* the province administrations were at first rebuilt in 14 ADM's and

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[3] 15 October 1953, Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl officially claimed the Statute of the State Secretariat for State Security (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. SdM 1574). To clear possible misunderstandings, it should be said that after the June Uprising 17 June 1953 (see further analyses below) the *MfS* was reduced to be a State Secretariat for State Security (*Staatssekretariat für Staatssicherheit*, *SfS*) officially under the *MdI*, during the time from July 1953 to November 1955. Regarding having a systematic presentation, the term "*MfS*" will be used in general, even to matters of the Ministry that took place during the '*SfS* period'. Concerning the year 1969, 30 July 1969, the National Defence Council spoke out the Statute of the Ministry for State Security, signed by the coming General Secretary of the party, Erich Honecker (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. SdM 1574).

217 DSP's.[4] With the administration reform that connected and thereby adjusted the *MfS*' main structure to the new, central construction of the administration of the GDR, made it possible for the *MfS* to function in all areas of the society.

Circa 40% of the amount of people that worked for the security service was stationed in East Berlin.[5] The biggest part of the personnel existed in the ADM's and DSP's. After Honecker entered office in 1971, the personnel strength grew with nearly 50% within nine years, from 1971 to 1982.[6] In this period, over 3000 co-workers were employed on a yearly basis, a reaction that came after the growing problems within the domestic politics. This came as results of having made it easier to travel, increase in the East-West trade, increasing numbers of applications of wanting permanent possibilities to travel outside the GDR as well as the growing domestic influence on the society in terms of political 'concurrence' increasingly existing in the state. In 1971, the amount of co-workers was 45 600, whereas in 1982 it was 81 500. In 1950, there were 'only' 2700 co-workers, and by the year the Berlin Wall stood finished the *MfS* had 23 500 co-workers. In regards to the given approximate number of co-workers, about 14% of them only worked with recruiting and running the duties of the *IM*'s. At the beginning of 1989, it was more than twice as many *IM* leading co-workers in the ADM's and DSP's than at the Central in Berlin. This underlines the large significance of the *MfS*' organisation on the ADM and DSP levels.

The GDR leadership's propaganda apparatus proclaimed to the people that the *MfS* was founded as a necessary defence move in the Cold War against the West. Earlier same year, the GDR's leading party had gone out with an official declara-

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[4] With a look back on the four-power status for the whole of Berlin, until 1976 it did not officially exist an ADM of Berlin. Somewhat similar existed in practice though, albeit under the name of *Verwaltung für Staatssicherheit Groß-Berlin* (Management for State Security Great Berlin). As such, besides the ADM's, during certain periods it officially existed two kinds of different Managements, which were Great Berlin and Wismut. Concerning Wismut, the Ministry had in 1951 built up a somewhat special Object Management, *Objektverwaltung Wismut*, situated in the south of the republic (Siegmar-Schönau). This had sort of the same status as any other ADM, although it officially never became categorised as one. Neither did it have as large a personnel force. The Object Management existed and worked in close cooperation with the Soviet security organs, as they mainly ran the protection and security of the ore extractions of uranium in Thuringia and Saxony. This Management was dissolved in April 1982, whereas thereafter administratively put under the ADM of Karl-Marx-Stadt as Department Wismut. Apart from the name, as we see, not too many differences existed between an ADM and a Management, when mainly seen in relation to the supreme goal of organising and executing control. The aforementioned particularly being related to Great Berlin. To make it more convenient, it will therefore further on only be used the term "ADM" as a common description for the ADM's as well as the other administrative units of the GDR.

[5] Schwan, *op cit*., p. 144.

[6] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.

tion in *Neues Deutschland* claiming an increased political oppression in the GDR done from the West. At the same time, the party admonished the people to be on guard against this. According to the official declaration, Mielke wrote two contributions that were seen as the only justifications for the foundation of the East German secret police.[7] Mielke's contribution in *Neues Deutschland* warned against the increasing danger of British and American secret actions. He explained the allied using systematic terror against leading GDR leaders. He claimed this to be true without quoting one single case, since there did not exist any. Furthermore, the British and the Americans had started a comprehensive campaign of sabotage against the East German industry, and they had even gone as far as to use explosives. At the end of the contribution, Mielke meant the western powers spied on the GDR. One can hardly exclude that this assumption was right, but Mielke did not attempt to prove it.[8] The party used its propaganda apparatus to create a malicious atmosphere among the population. The statements Mielke had come up with were not based on truths, but the population received a distortion of the realities. The police control and communication monopoly went here hand in hand. In this way, the reality was created. All other information that was not officially was presented as being fascist and enemy based. Moreover, it was also illegal.

There were clearly many reasons to why a Ministry for State Security turned out to be one of the answers of the present situation, in order to build up a new society for the German people existing under the GDR. Such reasons were for example based on the facts the German people had to their history and experiences and the believes in the 'capitalistic, unmoral, egoistic' West having started a large campaign with interest to tare down the state of the GDR and its socialist structure of society. These ideas were combined with the goals of the GDR and Soviet Union, which so to say contained the opposite approaches to life in comparison to what took place in the West.

The first Minister of the *MfS* was the aforementioned Zaisser, who stepped in same day as the Ministry was founded. He was appointed via Moscow and Ulbricht, whose latter person had become the *SED*'s General Secretary in July. Already the same day, the *SED*'s Central Committee chose Zaisser in to the Politburo. Mielke became State Secretary of the *MfS*. By this, he was again Zaisser's right hand, just as he had been in Spain. He remained "*der ewige Zweite*" ("the Forever Second"), however not for long.[9]

Zaisser took over an organisation very weak on resources. Even though it at the beginning of the 1950's only was estimated for national security, the force

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[7] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 46.

[8] Neues Deutschland, 28.01.50; Schroeder, *op cit*., p. 432.

[9] Schwan, *op cit*., p. 105.

was very small. It still received help from the *KGB*.[10] Despite of the training from the Soviets, there were still few professional security people in the *MfS*. However, the *MfS* grew fast. From the beginning, it had 1150 co-workers. At the end of 1950, the force numbered only 2700, while three years later the Ministry had mounted to more than 12 000.[11] In 1989, the number of paid co-workers in the *MfS* had grown to be around 85 000 persons.[12] Additionally, there existed a widespread network of Unofficial Co-workers and informants on different activity, observation and intervention level. The *BStU* claims that a network of more than 170 000 *IM*'s was built.[13] Seen that these aforementioned numbers more or less are correct, per approximately every 180 citizen of the GDR, there were one official co-worker and two *IM*'s that executed control. This gives a clear signal that the interest and execution of controlling people was enormously built.

Something that worried the *SED* leadership was the poor level the secret police got in regards to ideological training and devotion. One even recruited a large part of ex-Nazis to get the organisation in order. As aforementioned, the *MfS* still got help and was very close connected to Moscow and the *KGB*. The bonds existed on several levels.

Firstly, both organisations had a common ideology. Secondly, the *MfS*' leaders had been trained in the Soviet intelligence schools. At the same time, they had been given instructions from the *MGB*'s officers in the period the *K 5* still existed. Thirdly, they both had incorporated the national and international functions of intelligence in one organisation. Fourthly, the two organs' practice was close up to identical. Fifthly, the *MfS* officers began to possess military rank after October 1952, the way the Soviet security forces already had done for many years.[14] According to Mielke, the *MfS* would then be looked upon as being more serious. At the same time, it was easier to raise military discipline, because all co-workers would know exactly where in the hierarchy they were to be found at any time. Militarising the *MfS* furthermore meant that the co-workers received uniforms, which contributed to integrating and forming of a common consciousness. In addition, the military positions gave the *MfS* officers higher rank than they would have had in the regular armed forces, the police or in any civil occupation. Sixthly, Soviet

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[10] *KGB*, *Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti* (Committee for State Security), was the Soviet Union's intelligence organisation 1954-1991.

[11] Cf. e.g., Schwan, *op cit.*, p. 89.

[12] These numbers have been presented from Fricke (Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 21), which also reflects upon the numbers the *BStU* has given (cf. e.g. also Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit.*). However, there are different understandings of the numbers and its history, where authors such as Schell & Kalinka (Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 15) suggest the number of co-workers to have been as high as 105 000.

[13] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin Abteilung Bildung und Forschung,. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit.*

[14] Flocken & Scholz, *op cit.*, p. 139.

officers continued to serve in the *MfS*. All this substantiates the relation as well as the influence Moscow had to the GDR and *MfS*. This importantly stresses the *MfS* remaining strongly connected to Moscow, whereas also being developed by the help of the Soviets.

The *SED* needed an effective *MfS* to build up the socialist state, even if the *KGB* and *K 5* had crushed most of the potential political opposition against the *SED* within the *SBZ*.[15] Seen in relation to the force and control aspect, we can see how important the *MfS* was going to be as the *SED*'s most important weapon. The class struggle continued where the *MfS* declared all people that did not fit in the ideology as belonging to the enemy class, and approved the right to punish them. This concerned particularly people that owned something or had something in private they could make a living of. Amongst others, this was the case for people like shop owners**,** Christians and farmers.[16] Concerning the farmers, the GDR's collectivisation of the agriculture took away their properties. Other sanctions of punishment were discrimination, by giving them less rations than others. Alternatively, one was denied access to universities. As a result of the *SED*'s escalation of the industry, the workers were also subjects for intimate observation and possible reactions of punishment.

Based on this, it was legitimate both for the *MfS* and for the *KGB* to act. The infiltration in a number of factories was a method of surveillance, which increased with time. In the eyes of the security service, the resistance existed as it became clear that the number of trials in the court concerning economic criminal offences increased. However, one cannot exclude that more accusations from the state's side were false. Thereby, the judicial prosecutions increased, because of tightening the ideology, the government and the control's power apparatus. Additionally, with an ever-growing secret police control as its strongest weapon and tightened ideological warfare both against the capitalistic abroad as well as towards the citizens of the GDR, it is doubtless that the society of the GDR developed in the light of the totalitarian ideas.

1.2 The year 1953

It is important to look closer at 1953, since with Stalin's death the political situation changed. Another date of crucial importance is 17 June. On that day, the workers of Berlin rose in protest against the GDR regime. This gave side effects to other important industry centres such as Gera, Jena, Görlitz, Magdeburg and Brandenburg.[17] The incidents lasted short, but lasted long enough to surprise and

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[15] Childs, *op cit*., pp. 27-28.

[16] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 50.

[17] Weber, *op cit*., p. 165.

humiliate the leaders of the regime. Demonstrators stormed different places in different towns of the GDR where the despised Ministry was stationed.[18] The whole operation mounted in the power organs of the GDR not being able to defend the country alone. Had it not been for the Soviets that intervened, the regime could have fallen. This incident gives strong signs to the GDR regime not being able to manage or maintain its existence all by itself, but was dependable on help from the Soviet Union to survive. This is in accordance with the political influence Moscow executed, and resulted additionally to Moscow continuing to maintain the influence over the GDR on indeterminate time. The *MfS* had failed largely, something that led to both the *SED* leadership as well as the Soviet authorities accusing the Ministry for having failed.

The *SED* explained the uprising as inspired of propaganda from western radio, something that contributed to spreading the event to other towns in the GDR.[19] The power elite of the *SED*'s did not believe the uprising was the result of fascist provocation alone, a clear indication on how it looked upon the ideological threat from the West. It was a reasonable explanation, but the workers' bitterness and disorientation to the party apparatus also possibly contributed to the riot. At the same time, this was both politically and economically motivated. These emotions came after the *SED* leadership the year before had decided to accelerate the build up of the socialism, something that meant harder and longer workdays. The building of the heavy industry, collectivisation of the agriculture and the fast growth of the military forces meant intensified work efforts without compensation in salary. The total increase of the work norms meant an increase of ten percent. At the same time, there was to be an equivalent percentage cut in the salaries.[20] Additionally, Stalin's death had brought about a less tightened political atmosphere with increased space for protests. Many assumed that the society was going to loosen up, after the death of the great leader. They were terribly wrong.

Apparently, it might seem as if the *MfS* failed to control the population. The June Uprising was not the only sign of people being dissatisfied, as for example a great number of citizens had escaped, or were on their way to escape the republic. At the *MfS*' local level, one knew well about this widespread dissatisfaction, but the information was not systematised and did not reach the leadership.[21] Both the Soviet authorities and Ulbricht were fast to blame the *MfS*' leader Zaisser for the situation, because he had not managed to deem up for the influence created by the enemy. No other reason was discussed. According to the totalitarian system's

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[18] Schroeder, *op cit.*, p. 435.

[19] N. Stulz-Herrnstadt (ed.), *Das Herrnstadt-Dokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953.* Reinbek bei Hamburg 1990, p. 98; Ashby Turner, Jr., *op cit.*, p. 122.

[20] Ashby Turner, Jr., *op cit.*, pp. 116-122.

[21] Flocken & Scholz, *op cit.*, p. 143.

logic, it was nothing else to do for Zaisser than to accept the critics. This, even if there clearly existed documentation relating the *MfS* to having observed the situation and presented reports in accordance with its tasks and understanding of the situation. As a reaction to the failure of the *MfS*, the Ministry was taken away the status of being an own, independent ministry. As earlier mentioned, from October 1953, it was degraded to be a State Secretariat for State Security under the Ministry of Interior.[22] However, by the time Mielke had taken over in 1957, the *MfS* had nearly for two years once again existed as an own, independent ministry.

The June Uprising and its aftermath elucidate many aspects of Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory as well as the GDR's subordinate position in relation to the Soviet Union. Both the *SED* and Soviet authorities attacked Zaisser, even if there were clear indications that he had not done anything wrong. The top leaders within the *KGB* and *SED* should themselves have taken part of the critics, but did not execute any self-criticism. Instead, the responsibility was pushed over onto the subordinates, since the GDR had a clear power political hierarchy with clear rules. Even the control the *MfS* in 1953 provably had executed was not understood as satisfactory for the leadership of the *SED*. It had expected a stronger control. However, in practice, the GDR's power elite had not the real power in the republic regarding the superior control of the country. Rather, this was in the hands of the Soviet leadership, and strengthened the influence and power of Moscow. Who in such a system wanted and dared to criticise the superior master? With the June Uprising as background, it became more visible that Moscow's democratic centralism was the fundament in the society model of the GDR. The Soviets claimed already from the beginning that enemies of the system and the ideology had started the riot. It was nothing wrong with the system, but with the people. The help of different reprisals took care of the enemies of the system. In other words, the *SED* did not give any space for critics to the ideology and the system of the society, which strengthens the theoretical aspect of Friedrich and Brzezinski. 17 June 1953, the population demanded free elections, and wanted Ulbricht's retirement.[23] However, no openings of any system critics were done. The uprising was interpreted as a counterrevolution initiated by the West. The June Uprising had primarily produced a shock reaction inside both the *SED* and *MfS*. If the society model was to survive, there was a need of necessarily tightening of the system's means. Maybe the most important to get an order on was the party's physical force and control apparatus. Said differently, the *MfS* was a unique, important organ, mainly to provide that the *SED* maintained control over the regime. Since the *SED*, which was the political power, used the *MfS* as a force

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[22] Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, p. 72.
[23] Childs, *op cit.*, pp. 31-33.

and power apparatus to crush down any critics that were to be put forward against the regime's politics. Once more, this strengthens the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski.

The strange with the whole incident was that also the *KGB* had reported on the conditions directly to the Soviet Politburo. The *KGB* described a considerable worsening of the atmosphere in the GDR, and suggested that it was because of the *SED*'s hard economic politics.[24] The Soviet leadership in Moscow had been given clear indications from both the *KGB* and *MfS* on the conditions in the GDR. In other words, the scapegoat was General Secretary Ulbricht. It did not actually make it any easier for Ulbricht that the GDR especially under this period was on a strong collision course with the post Stalinist elite in Moscow. The disagreement existed as a result of Ulbricht's continuation of Stalin's politics. Moscow thought of replacing Ulbricht, but of two reasons, this was not done. The first reason was that Moscow struggled with its own internal political problems, and the last they wanted was foreign policy problems. The other reason was that to follow the wishes of the people and replace Ulbricht would have been seen as a sign of weakness of the regime, because the Soviet society model then would have adjusted to the will of the East German people.[25] On behalf of this action and consequences, one can see the close relation to Moscow and the totalitarian way of governing. Mainly, since the leadership of both countries followed their set goals. This also meant that the elite consisting of a few people was not willing to act on behalf of the direct interests expressed by the people of the GDR. Ulbricht had also built up an opposition within the party, meaning there existed two fractions in the *SED* in 1953. Erich Honecker was among them who were on Ulbricht's side. The opponents were, amongst other, Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolph Herrnstadt. Ulbricht chose to crush his political opponents using a similar behavioural manner as the one Stalin had used so effectively.

Zaisser was replaced, and again Moscow played the decisive role. Even if Ulbricht did not sympathise with the choice, it fell on Ernst Wollweber. That Ulbricht had to give away for Moscow's choice strengthens the influence Moscow exercised over the *SED*. After a while, Wollweber however experienced a lack in support from both Ulbricht and Moscow. This was to be his weakness, and gave him a short life as the very top of the *MfS*. Wollweber was exposed because he stood for a national line, and did not blindly accept orders from Moscow.[26] In accordance to the relation and influence Moscow had on the GDR, the result of the distance Wollweber wanted could have led to a weakening of this particular relation. The fact that Wollweber sat in the leader position only for a few years in-

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[24] Stulz-Herrnstadt (ed.), *op cit*., pp. 81-82.
[25] Childs, *op cit*., p. 38; Ashby Turner, Jr., *op cit*., p. 123.
[26] Flocken & Scholz, *op cit*., p. 151.

deed verifies the strong relation and influence Moscow had. Seen from Ulbricht's point of view, Wollweber's line would have led to a distance from Moscow. After the riots in Hungary in 1956, it was 'Ulbricht's' and not 'Wollweber's' *MfS* that received credits for having kept the GDR under control. Ulbricht saw the danger of keeping any form of internal opposition, and was after the riots eager to clean out his opponents in the *SED* before Khrushchev got the chance to put in persons that were more moderate. Ulbricht continued to use his Stalinist approach, even when Khrushchev's government and way of governing were not as absolute, brutal and controlling as the way Stalin's was. Ulbricht started to attack Wollweber both by saying that he was incompetent for the job, and that the Ministry publicised negative reports on the atmosphere that existed among the population.[27] Wollweber and his fraction fell on the *SED*'s Central Committee's 35. Party Congress, February 1958.[28]

The man that followed Wollweber and was synonymous with the *MfS* for almost 32 years was Erich Mielke. He outdid his predecessors in terms of personality, political skilfulness and abilities. Mielke was his entire carrier very busy with how his ideal Stalin acted in relation to politics, temperament, behaviour, language and gesticulation.[29] Since also Mielke knew the *MfS* was closely observed, controlled and trained by its main comrades from the East, this was another motive and a motivation to comply with the Soviets. Indeed, one was also to outdo and show oneself better than them, first of all because manners of loyalty likely impressed. One out of many reasons why he possessed the leader role in the *MfS* for so long was that he managed to avoid confrontations with the leadership in the *SED*. He understood that the *SED* was the leading power, closely connected to Moscow. One was not to criticise this too strong, too much, neither too often. Mielke's success can also be viewed as coming from the benefits he freely used from Ulbricht, much thanks to that they belonged to the same fraction. Ulbricht

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[27] Flocken & Scholz, *op cit*., pp. 186-187. It may seem as from that time and onwards the fear of being criticised from high-ranking superiors resulted in operating with a certain two-sidedness. This was done since, as far as possible, trying to avoid giving in real statements of the situation in the GDR - if they reflected upon something negative (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department XIX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02, 13.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02). One was therefore sometimes better off if the whole truth, partially or none of it was left out on the expense of preferably giving positive signals. Besides, critics put forward among colleagues in regards to further development was seldom met with open hands and/or accepted, allowed, etc. Since, amongst other things, a constant surveillance of such communication was undertaken at all times.

[28] Weber, *op cit*., p. 199.

[29] Schwan, *op cit*., pp. 127-133.

now dominated the bureaucracy totally. The *MfS* was not either looked upon as a deviate part from the rest of the *SED*'s apparatus, governed by the Stalinist party. To the world outside, the GDR at least represented itself as a united front.[30]

Based on the situation at that time, there was absolutely no reason to change course. Ulbricht had secured himself, amongst other things, by finally having it his way through having one of his own people as the head of the *MfS*. With success, he had also exterminated all opposition. In addition, earlier situations where one had given space to other groups and leaders in the society had only led to chaos. The leaders of the GDR were able to explain and express such in form of propaganda, amongst other things, by referring to episodes as their own 1953 and Hungary 1956 as a result in the belief in a liberal socialism. Thereby existed no reasons to change something. The opposite happened. Actual tightening and a stronger control of the society were needed to realise communism, by the help of totalitarian methods as Friedrich and Brzezinski describe in their theory. Moscow and the *SED* related such methods to Mielke and the *MfS*.

1.3 The further development of the *MfS*' structure and organisation under Erich Mielke

Mielke rebuilt the *MfS*' organisation structure after patterns of the Soviet secret service. The *SED* shaped the *MfS* to become an instrument, to affirm its own position. The demands the *SED* put forward meant the surveillance and the oppression operating on every level of the society, including the private.[31] For many decades the *MfS* worked after the following principals:

- everyone is a potential security risk

- to be sure, one has to know everything

- security goes before rights

Concerning how the organisation was built up and functioned, the principal of being given as little information as possible became guide lining to what kind of information the employees of the *MfS* received. Maybe the only one that knew exactly how the whole hung together was the Minister himself, thus, giving him enormous power. On the other hand, it happened that co-workers from one unit later worked in another, and in this way picked up larger understandings than what was seen as desirable. The figure below shows an overview over Minister Mielke's and his three vice ministers' rows:

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[30] M. Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship*. New York 1995, p. 35.
[31] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.*, p. 53.

Figure 1.1: The organisation structure of the *MfS* per 01.10.89 (excluded is the Main Department Reconnaissance)

Source (partly): Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.*, appendix

Ministry for State Security

To the left of this split (artificially constructed): Mielke's 'own empire' within the *MfS*

Erich Mielke, Minister

Collegium

Legend:
——— Official subordinate
– – – Professional, technical subordinate

The Minister's Secretariat

AGM, The Minister's Work Group

ZAIG, Central Evaluation and Information Group

BdL, Office of the Leadership

Main Department Cadre and Education

Main Department II: Counter Intelligence

Main Department IX: Investigation Organ

Department X: International Relations

Department XIV: Detention House; Punishment Execution

Department Finance

Office of the Central Leadership of the SV Dynamo

Main Department PS; Person Protection, Attention

Leader of the 15 ADM's (incl. 218 DSP's + OSP's)

Guard Regiment "Feliks Dzierzynski"

Department XII: Central Information/Store

Department XIII: Central Accountancy Station

Justice Place

Central Medical Service

College of the Ministry for State Security

Department M: Post Control, Major General Rudi Strobel

Rudi Mittig, Superior Deputy

VRD, Administration Reflective Service

Main Department XVIII: People's Economy

Main Department XIX: Traffic, Post, News

Main Department XX: State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground

ZMGG, Central Work Group Secrecy Protection

AG BKK, Work Group Area Commercial Coordination

ZOS, Central Operative Staff

AG E, Work Group E (Operative Technique)

Gerhard Neiber, Deputy

Main Department VI: Pass Control, Tourism, Inter Hotel

Main Department VII: Defence Work, Ministry of Interior/German People's Police

Main Department VIII: Observation/Investigation

Main Department XXII: Terror Defence

ZKG, Central Coordination Group; Escape, Moving

Work Group XVII: Visit Offices West Berlin

Wolfgang Schwanitz, Deputy

Main Department I: Defence Work in National People's Army and Border Troops

Main Department III: Radio Reconnaissance, Radio Defence

OTS, Operative-Technical Sector

Department News (Security)

Department XI: Ciphering

Department Armament/Chemical Service

Department 26: Telephone Control, Major General Olaf Leben

Partly based on the figure above (figure 1.1, Part B), the following points will consider the structure and build up of the *MfS* before going onto the points that will consider the post and telephone control.[32] However, some limitations have already been considered, i.e., as it first of all will be to big an issue to consider the whole of the *MfS*' structure and organisation. This is not either the focus of the thesis, but rather an important contextual explanation for the thesis' issue as earlier declared. Secondly, by looking at it with Mielke as the centre is a fairly representative aspect, as he, who led the *MfS* almost from its very beginning to its end, was the main person in the *MfS* that both developed and lived through the whole of the *MfS*' life. Although, a short overview from the *MfS*' very beginning will be given, since most of the front figures of the *MfS* got their top positions already in the 1950's.

1.3.1 The front men of the *MfS*

In 1988, just before the total collapse of the GDR, the Ministry consisted of these leading persons:

- Minister for State Security:

    - *Armeegeneral* (Army General) Erich Mielke

- Deputies of the Minister:

    - *Generaloberst* (Colonel General) Rudi Mittig (Superior Deputy)
    - *Generalleutnant* (Lieutenant General) Dr. Gerhard Neiber (Deputy)
    - *Generalleutnant* (Lieutenant General) Dr. Wolfgang Schwanitz (Deputy)
    - *Generalleutnant* (Lieutenant General) Werner Großmann (Deputy)

Looking at the cadre political development of the leadership of the *MfS* since 1950, two points should be underlined. Firstly, the strength of personnel grew

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[32] For the *MfS*, this model was an ideal model, in relation to how it all was to work. According to the model, every unit had their specialised tasks to exercise and fulfil. However, not everything functioned automatically without hitches. As aforementioned, and as we later will see, there existed overlaps between the different units that executed the same job. This led to that those units not only worked with a greater connection to one another than originally designed. This also led to that it after some time was more difficult to separate the different units' work relation. Additionally, it was a fact that units were given new names and/or exercised other tasks, even if there generally were made few changes in the structure of the *MfS*.

increasingly, where originally one minister and his state secretary were enough. As a result of the growth, one needed one minister and four deputies, all of them given high General ranks. Secondly, it became the routine and a characteristic of the cadre policy to keep this created situation on highest level of continuance, which the table below indicates:

Table 1.1: The Ministers and their Deputies

Minister for State Security	Time in office
Wilhelm Zaisser	1950-1953
Ernst Wollweber[33]	1953-1957
Erich Mielke	1957-1989
Minister's Deputies	Time in office
Erich Mielke[34]	1950-1957
Otto Last	1951-1957
Rudolf Menzel	1952-1953
Martin Weikert	1953-1955
Otto Walter	1953-1963
Hermann Gartmann	1955
Bruno Beater	1955-1982
Markus Wolf	1956-1986 (*HV A*)
Fritz Schröder	1964-1974
Alfred Scholz	1975-1978
Rudi Mittig	1975-1989
Gerhard Neiber	1980-1989
Wolfgang Schwanitz	1986-1989
Werner Großmann	1986-1989 (*HV A*)

Source (partly): J. Gieseke (ed.), *Wer war wer im Ministerium für Staatssicherheit*. Berlin 1998, in the BStU series, *Anatomie der Staatssicherheit. Geschichte, Struktur, Methoden*, S. Suckut, E. Neubert, C. Vollnhals, W. Süß, R. Engelmann (eds.); B.-R. Barth, C. Links, H. Müller-Enbergs, J. Wielgohs (eds.), *DDR: wer war wer?*. Berlin 1994

To table 1.1 (Part B), we see that the *MfS* had three Ministers and 14 Deputies. When the situation turned out convenient, all of them stayed long time in their

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[33] In the time from July 1953 to November 1955, Wollweber was not Minister but State Secretary of the *SfS*. He simultaneously acted as the Deputy of the Minister of Interior.

[34] Amongst others, Mielke was in the period from July 1953 to November 1955 Wollweber's Deputy.

positions. Regarding some of them, their time of service in the *MfS* lasted remarkably longer than they were Deputies. This was the case with for example Mielke, Mittig and Großmann, who entered the apparatus already in 1950.

Undoubtedly, this continuance reflected not only a considerable stubbornness of these men to keep their positions in such a political, sensitive apparatus as the *MfS*. One also has to include the reasons of political security. Every change in personnel brought with it a political risk for the leadership of the *SED*, since bringing in new leadership in the *MfS* meant that these men were to protect and maintain the party elite of the *SED*. Therefore, changes in the leadership of the *MfS* were seldom done. For the same reason, when there was to be advancement within the *MfS* to the deputy post, the security service made sure only to pick the men that belonged within their cadre and apparatus.

In other words, no typical procedures were followed when people were nominated to positions. Instead of being decided by various organs and relevant persons to the promotion of jobs and employees, this was rather done from a few men at the very top of the GDR regime. In addition, the decisions were taken pragmatically, where no democracy existed to the benefit of all involved parts. This was partially the idea of the persons governing the state; the party together with the state organs, in order to achieve the people's best, which were meant to take the decisions they knew were to be the best for the population in regards to accomplish their end goal. Based on this, such aforementioned examples support to underline the relevance of the theory towards such a society.

The hierarchy and organisation of the *MfS* followed military structures, where certain tendencies to bureaucratisation were unrecognisable. In general, for the *MfS*, a fundament for single leadership counted like in all of the other ministries of the GDR. However, the head of this Ministry was responsible to a *Kollegium* (Collegium) in regards to a collective advisory of basic questions of importance.

Concerning the composition of the Collegium, the Minister had *de jure* the right to suggest personnel during when the leader of the Council of Ministers confirmed the composition. However, the Minister decided *de facto* particularly within the *MfS*. In the GDR, every Ministry had a Collegium that consisted of the Minister, the State Secretary and the leaders of the most important Main Departments and other central Departments as well as 'particularly qualified coworkers'. In the case of the *MfS*, the Collegium consisted of the Minister, his Deputies, *1. Sekretär der Kreisleitung der SED im MfS* (First Secretary of the District Leadership of the *SED* in the *MfS*), the leader of the *Hauptabteilung* (*HA*) *Kader und Schulung* (Main Department Cadre and Education) as well as the bosses of other central units.

As illustrated by figure 1.1 Part B, Mielke had his own secretariat inside the *MfS*. The Secretariat was lead by Major General Hans Carlsohn. Shortly said, the Secretariat was responsible for the Minister's personal arrangements as well as to

carry on his orders to other units of the *MfS*.

With the Minister and his four Deputies, the state security governed more or less successfully for four centuries. They built up a strength that was not only quantitatively but also qualitatively dominated to which political role the *MfS* was to play in state and society. This was a real fact, amongst other things, since the Minister for State Security was a member of the Central Committee's Politburo of the *SED*. Additionally, two of the Minister's Deputies, Mittig and Schwanitz, were, respectively, member and candidate of the Central Committee. The afore-mentioned gives a clear signal to what type of structure existed. In general, as with those few persons holding important positions in the party and state organs, also the *MfS* obviously possessed enormous power beyond what the 'regular' man in the GDR could dream of reaching, for example through fair, open debates and active participating. In fact, the regular man had in practice few, if any, chances to influence some sort of eventual development, mainly because there existed a general approach through the *SED* and *MfS* towards holding the population under surveillance. As such, the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski is strengthened. Mainly, since we witness the state's security service having heavily contributed to secure the *SED*'s power, system and state, to see to the mass party remained in its universal role as the one and only political governor of the republic.

1.3.2   The *MfS'* horizontally and vertically structure

It will now be looked upon the so-called horizontal and vertical organisation of the *MfS*, mainly to give an overview of how it all was organised centrally, region-ally as well as locally. Additionally, this will be done in order to give a name to how this security service was governed through the leadership of Mielke and his three (four) Deputies, for the sake of preserving the regime as good as possible.[35] However, the task of the thesis is not to treat the *MfS* with such an approach. Nev-ertheless, it is still of importance to analyse the general aspects of the *MfS*. First and foremost in order, through the coming contribution of the detailed analysis of the post and telephone control, to understand the structure, tasks and methods of the state security that existed on behalf of the *SED* regime. Since the related point merely is to illustrate the main task of the *MfS*, it will therefore be chosen to introduce only a few of the *MfS'* Main Departments and Departments in depth, related to the theoretical aspect. As such, to give the reader examples on how the horizontal organisation functioned. The same interest counts for the presentation of the vertical structure. The vertical structure was somewhat different compared to the horizontal. Nevertheless, this is as much an important part that should be

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[35] To recapitulate, it will only be considered the areas of tasks and responsibilities for three out of the four of the *MfS'* Deputies, since the one not to be considered further (*HV A*) exclusively was occupied with foreign espionage.

shown, to illustrate how the *MfS* functioned in the AD's (and thereby its ADM's) and DSP's.[36]

Of more than four decades, the *MfS* grew further and further, although few fundamental changes in its existence were done. Maybe the biggest changes that took place were when the very top of the *MfS* was changed the two times we have seen. At the same time, the largest developments took place under Mielke's leadership.

As presented earlier in this chapter by figure 1.1, this was the structure and organisation of the *MfS* per 1 October 1989. Some scholars like to categorise this as being the horizontal structure of the Ministry.[37] The figure above reflects the central leadership and the areas of tasks and responsibilities each of the persons had. These top situated men of the *MfS* sat in Berlin, where also approximately 40% of all of the *MfS*' co-workers were placed.[38] Under Mielke, Mittig, Schwanitz, Neiber and Großmann's leadership, there existed 13 Main Departments and 20 independent Departments, still more, smaller units and groups, staffs, managements, and last but not least the Main Administration Reconnaissance. The aforementioned Collegium belonged to this, although it can be argued that it played less and less a decisive role as Mielke favoured a more authoritarian leader style.

The Minister's areas of responsibility

Arbeitsgruppe des Ministers, AGM (The Minister's Work Group)
This Work Group had the responsibility for an amount of different activities, from preparing the Minister's speeches to plan measures of arrest, custody and isolation. Besides this, the group had a special force consisting of approximately 50 officers. They had the responsibility of planning measures in case of danger.

Since it was a matter of prestige as well as conviction that the Ministry had its own arsenal, the *Wachregiment "Feliks Dzierżyński"* (Guard Regiment "Feliks Dzierzynski") was under the control of the Work Group. The Guard Regiment was equipped with armoured cars, anti-aircraft artillery, grenade throwers, heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, water cannons and helicopters. The job of this body was to protect important buildings and individuals of the party and state organs. When necessary, it could also be deployed in case of internal disorders and disasters. It was in general also used as an honour guard as well as on other ceremonial duties. Additionally, it used *Offiziere im besonderen Einsatz, OibE*

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[36] As aforementioned, through time, the *MfS*' organisational structure led to different units of the *MfS* holding different names and categories. Although few changes were done, the ADM's in comparison to the Central in Berlin were no exception. Concerning for example the *ZAIG* situated at the Central, its counterpart in the ADM's carried out the identical job although it was classified under the name of *Auswertungs- und Kontrollgruppe*, *AKG* (Evaluation and Control Group).

[37] See e.g., Fricke, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit*.

[38] Schwan, *op cit*., p. 144.

(Officers in Special Operation), for different interests.[39]

Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe, ZAIG (Central Evaluation and Information Group)

One can surely claim that one of the *MfS*' key elements was this unit. The particularity with the *ZAIG* was that it prepared documents that Mielke was able to circulate to his comrades in the Politburo. Mielke regulated in other words the choice of information to the Politburo and who was to get what. As such, Mielke played his power political role almost in the same way as how Stalin had done it. Mielke regulated a great amount of information on behalf of the people. Besides this, the *ZAIG* was the *MfS*' representative in the GDR's mass media.[40] Interestingly related to the two rules that were the 'constitution' of the *MfS*, these actions show that it did not act in accordance with its formal law. Firstly, since this action shows Mielke's own definitions of which roles the *ZAIG* were to have. Secondly, and briefly in relation to the presented theoretical aspect, this gives a signal to that Mielke possessed a greater political power than what the theory described. These examples practically went in the direction of extending the importance of the control apparatus of the GDR regime's power political hierarchy, something that deviates from the theoretical aspect on political power distribution. On the other side, it is clear that the *MfS* was a large contributor to the keeping of the system, whereas the Ministry assured the regime's ideology and media monopoly. By this, the police control and the communication monopoly went hand in hand. The material shows the GDR's secret service having worked much similar to the way Friedrich and Brzezinski relates to in their theory. This furthermore means the *MfS* clearly can be defined as having supported the *SED* regime. Additionally, this information collected by the Ministry led to the *SED* regime participating as contributor to the socialist states' data bank, because the Group gave detailed information about unwanted and potentially dangerous individuals.

Abteilung XII; Zentrale Auskunft/Speicher (Department XII; Central Information/Store), was one out of three Departments the *ZAIG* controlled. It was responsible for storing all information on persons and registrations existing in the GDR. The Department managed the archive folders of the *MfS*, but also the folder holdings of other places of duty such as the General State Attorney as well as information of the military.[41] Again, we see that the *MfS* was an apparatus for the governing party, since it functioned to serve and thereby secure all potential

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[39] This group of co-workers was the elite of part time co-workers, and was highly qualified *MfS* co-workers with long experience in duty. One found them often in leading positions in or related to the Ministry, the economy and culture related work relations, where they normally had their main job activities. Although the persons belonging to this group were considered yet another type of informants, they were not classified as *IM*'s (for further to the *OibE*'s, see discussion below).

[40] Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, p. 47.

[41] Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, p. 44.

power lying in the hands of the party. That is, because it interfered on the area of the General State Attorney and the armed forces, which in regular non-totalitarian societies operate with a more or less certain undependable role towards a ruling party.

Abteilung XIII; Zentrale Rechenstation (Department XIII; Central Accountancy Station), was the second smaller Department under the *ZAIG*. It had the task of being an electronically data processor centre, where it projected and programmed the data processing for defence and reconnaissance.[42] It was also a material technical place of security, in terms of the Ministry's dispositions towards internal data processing.

Rechtsstelle (Justice Place) was the third smaller structural unit under the *ZAIG*. It had the responsibility of critically examining questions related to matters in court as well as judicial counselling to the co-workers.[43] These facts, on the one hand, strengthen the theory, since judicial questions according to Friedrich and Brzezinski were not dealt with independently from the court of law, but was both politically controlled and adjusted through the security political ministry. On the other side, what somehow weakens the overall theory is the trust in the means and aims to reach the end goal. Since such societies apparently looked upon the human being as being in the centre of the development that was to be treated as equally as possible, this was certainly not so in this case. That is, practically, in order to stand stronger in the society, the co-workers of the *MfS* received judicial counselling, something which the average-man in the society of the GDR did not receive at work or anywhere else. Furthermore, it is also then arguable to whether one not only created differences between people, but also, in the reflective sense of the theory and these societies, classes of the society. Although weakening the theory, it certainly underlines a greater importance the *MfS* had in the system of the GDR.

Büro der Leitung, BdL (Office of the Leadership)
This was the *MfS*' central administration. Amongst other things, this service had the responsibility of keeping the control on actual service systems, guarding, courier offices as well as document offices.[44]

Hauptabteilung Kader und Schulung (Main Department Cadre and Education)
In many ways, one might say that much of the power and control centre lied here, with almost unlimited rights and possibilities. Amongst other things, the tasks it had were to recruit, teach, prepare and employ the full time co-workers. It also

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[42] The word "defence" in the context of the *MfS* meant taking care of all inner republic security, while "reconnaissance", which as known was the *HV A*, was mainly occupied with relations concerning intelligence connected to foreign territories.

[43] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 47.

[44] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 39.

had the responsibility of instructing and shaping the cadre units of the Ministry as well as observing the full time co-workers and the disciplinary work. Lastly, it had to maintain an inspection of the Ministry's own directions of education.

Two categories existed under this Main Department's control. The first was the *Zentraler Medizinischer Dienst, ZMD* (Central Medical Service). The *ZMD* had its own clinics, a hospital and a prison's hospital. The main reason for the *MfS* having its own hospitals and clinics available was that all personnel were to be protected from the public. With similar tendencies, the arguments presented under Justice Place are applicable here as well.

The other unit the Main Department controlled was the *Hochschule des MfS* (College of the Ministry for State Security).[45] The College was founded already in 1951 as an institution of education for the *MfS*' cadres of leadership. The *SED* regime's control of guest professors and docents came to dominate the scientific standard at nearly all universities and colleges of importance. The profile of the education was comprehensive, and was more known than the education level of the law education at other universities.[46] An aim with the College was to increase the *MfS*' prestige in order to attract qualified recruits, lay the state of affairs on the same line as any other modern police, practice teaching of security and intelligence services, etc. By far the most important aim of having an own education system was that the *SED* then arranged the reproduce and worshipping of the ideology as well as the system of governing the recruits were to learn. At the same time, one also kept control of any potential critics coming from the higher educational institutions of the GDR, if they already had not been buried through this process. Besides controlling the education at the higher educational institutions, this propagandistic process of reproducing was meant to give the masses impressions that only the best and exemplary citizen of the GDR became such a recruit. These were to be the leaders of tomorrow that were going to lead the society on the right path. The regime frequently managed to raise loyal citizens that through time came to raise even new, faithful citizens. The existence of such an educational institution shows the huge efforts invested to maintain the ideology, and to form the people through the sense of the leadership. By having had this school, the *MfS* found a way to follow up the end goal over generations. Furthermore,

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[45] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 43. Although for example the Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit*., has chosen to classify this educational institution with the name "*Hochschule des MfS*", there should be underlined that this was tantamount to mainly being a law educational institution (see e.g., Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*). Besides, throughout its history, this educational institution held different names (see e.g., BStU, *Abkürzungsverzeichnis. Häufig verwendete Abkürzungen und Begriffe des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit*. 4. durchges. Auflage. Berlin 2000, p. 48). The latest came in 1984, which resulted in renaming it to the aforementioned.

[46] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 40.

this shows in practice what Friedrich and Brzezinski meant with their description to how necessary and important it was to fight for a common goal in a totalitarian state.

Hauptabteilung II; Spionageabwehr (Main Department II; Counter Intelligence)
This part of the *MfS* had in general counter intelligence as its main task. Hereunder, it for example observed foreign missions and journalists in the GDR.

In addition, the *Abteilung M; Postkontrolle* (Department M; Post Control) was under this Main Department's control.[47]   Since this particular Department will be treated more thorough later, for the sake of presenting the *MfS*' structure it will only shortly be said that this Department had the task of executing the political-operative control of the GDR's postal service, on the assignment of the defence and reconnaissance.

Hauptabteilung IX; Untersuchungsorgan (Main Department IX; Investigation Organ)
With the responsibility put on the Ministry, this Main Department had through pre-investigations the responsibility of inspecting and interrogating different purposes (e.g., Nazi and war criminals, criminal offences done against the state, criminal offences done against any state and public laws),[48] in accordance to the GDR's § 88 of the *StPo*.[49]   It was also the connection to the General State Attorney and court of law as well as having influence on the release of prisoners. Related to the presented theory, this weakens its validity because from this information it looks as if the *MfS* as a security service on one side did not act arbitrarily with the law in own hands. Rather, it seems as if the Ministry followed rules set through constitutional frames. However, one should not ignore that the *MfS* operated after own discernment besides the *StPo***,** since the Ministry although had an own unit for cases like these.

Abteilung X; Internationale Verbindungen (Department X; International Relations)
This unit had the responsibility of dealing with international relations, coordinate the contact and cooperation with the security services of the states belonging to the Warsaw Pact. Related to this, another task of the Department was also to keep a translating service.

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[47] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., pp. 27-28.

[48] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Lieutenant Colonel of the Department IX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 02.05.02; Schroeder, *op cit*., p. 447.

[49] The *StPo*, *Strafprozeßordnung*, was the GDR's Criminal Process Regulation (see e.g., K. W. Fricke, *Zur Menschen und Grundrechtssituation politischer Gefangener in der DDR*. 2. ergänzte Auflage. Köln 1988).

Abteilung XIV; U-Haft, Straffvollzug (Department XIV; Detention House, Punishment Execution)

The Department was created to manage and observe the *MfS*' houses of detention. The Department also accomplished the recruitment and the orders to prisoners in the detentions that operated as *IM*'s, with the task to spy on co-prisoners.[50]

Abteilung Finanzen (Department Finance)

This Department was responsible for all the Ministry's bookkeeping, in terms of financial questions.

Büro der Zentralen Leitung des SV Dynamo (Office of the Central Leadership of the SV Dynamo)

As other socialist states' security services had their football teams, so did the *MfS*. It was also called Dynamo and had its own Department within the Ministry, as it often was in the other socialist states as well. Besides leading and financing the football team, the Office also looked after that the players of this football team were observed.

Hauptabteilung PS; Personenschutz, Betreuung (Main Department PS; Person Protection, Attention)

This Main Department's responsibility was to protect the party leadership, members of, and candidates to the Politburo, their service, living and spare time houses such as for example Wandlitz. With different units, it also accomplished massive surveillance and security tests on neighbours that lived along the travel distances of the persons that somehow were connected to the Politburo.[51] Against whom were they secured? It is hard to believe that this was necessary towards protection from other enemies of other states. Therefore, one can say that it is quite astonishing to register that such a huge protection was needed in a state that claimed to have such a close and correct relation to the citizens that resulted in a generally satisfied population. In practice, one lived in a state where the states men somehow felt so insecure from the population that their living places were surrounded with heavy armed guards 24 hours a day, behind a complex built with huge walls towards the outside world.

In relation to the theory's descriptions of the power apparatus and its control apparatus, it is of importance to underline that Mielke's subordinates had to report directly to him on several occasions. Firstly, this was clearly meant to show the structure and the build up as well as to conclude with whom the *MfS*' sovereign leader was. Secondly, and more important, Mielke's subordinates had to report directly to him because he was to have full overview over all details. At the same time, he avoided that others got that kind of information. The sub leaders were not

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[50] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 35.
[51] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 44.

supposed to be able to express their meanings to equally forces or others within the *MfS*. We have also seen how Mielke filtrated information to the Politburo, giving him a stronger position in the power political hierarchy. This weakens the theory, first of all because he as leader of the security service sat with more political power than *SED*'s General Secretary; in other words, more political power than the mass party leader the way the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski takes account for. Mielke mastered to possess greater power in the GDR's leadership, something that points to the power in the GDR having been more spread than the theory expresses. Additionally, this weakens on the one side partly the critics Dahrendorf and Krejci have presented, which stated that the central policy was concentrated on few hands superior to other organs, because Mielke's use of power cannot be said to have been embraced in a compact, collective elite. On the other side, Mielke was after all a part of the Politburo, which means one should not put too much weight on the weakening of Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory.

There existed a certain fear also within the *MfS*' rows to suffer the same destiny as they had exposed to the population. By far, Mielke was the only person safe. Apparently, he controlled the organisation along a combination of Napoleon's seek-and-divine tactics and Stalin's unique, absolute monarchical role. It can therefore be raised doubts to how dominated the GDR regime was as the satellite state of the Soviet Union. Even if the *SED* and nearly all persons in the regime's highest party leadership apparently were under Moscow's influence, it does not seem that Mielke and 'his' *MfS* had an identical role. Mielke organised and controlled the *MfS* in such a way that the Ministry acted autonomous within the GDR leadership rather than being an unconditionally subordinate to the *SED*, and thereby Moscow. In spite of Mielke being on the side of the *SED* the thoughts to the influence from Moscow do not necessarily become weakened, because Mielke by far swore loyalty directly to Moscow. As such, this shows again that the power elite of the GDR was not compact, but that the considerable power persons inside the party nevertheless were subordinates to Moscow. The theory also mentions that the sub leader structure in the Soviet Union's satellite states had a tendency to show to be somewhat stronger inside these countries than how the sub leader structure in Moscow was. As we have seen from the empirical material so far, much indicates this having been the case with Mielke, something that strengthens the presented theory.

The Superior Deputy, Rudi Mittig's areas of responsibility

Verwaltung Rückwärtige Dienste, VRD (Administration Reflective Service)
This unit provided the Ministry with a wide range of domestic and economic services, such as retail stores, holidays, housing, office equipment, hairdressing, kindergarten, dry cleaning, printing, weapons, and much more. Here again, like

under e.g. the *ZMD*, the Ministry wanted to ensure that its employees lived in a virtually closed community.

Hauptabteilung XVIII; Volkswirtschaft (Main Department XVIII; People's Economy)

This Main Department's areas of responsibilities were many. It was for example responsible for the protection and surveillance of the people's economy, security checking of the nomenclature and travel cadres of the economy, cultivate contacts to functionaries in the leadership of the economy, infiltration in all economy based areas with the help of many thousands of *IM*'s as well as generally using *OibE's*.

Hauptabteilung XIX; Verkehr, Post, Nachrichtenwesen (Main Department XIX; Traffic, Post, News)

The Main Department had as task to insure the security towards matters connected to the traffic, post and news. Especially through the *IM*'s, the Main Department also had the responsibility to hinder any escapes from the republic done through traffic via the border crossings.[52]

Hauptabteilung XX; Staatsapparat, Kunst, Kultur, Untergrund (Main Department XX; State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground)

This unit possessed a key position through its enormous surveillance of the GDR population. With secret methods, the Main Department had as task to adapt the state organs, area of justice, health service, culture, education, the media and youth work as well as the communities within the church and other religions.[53] In other words, it was responsible for fighting, discover and crush the political-ideological diversion and political underground activity.[54] As said in the introduction as well as earlier in this chapter, there existed overlaps between Departments, Work Groups, and so forth. This especially existed concerning the post and telephone control, since these Departments did not mainly work for own interest, but acted on missions given from for example other units needing their service. The Main Department XX was no exception, as it employed the Departments M and 26 to carry out its interests of accomplishing post and telephone control. Another important task for the Main Department was to intrude into opposition groups generally to achieve information on all types of forces existing within the opposition. When possible, the *MfS* always had a wish to confuse and split these groups.[55] The *MfS*' all embracing control of the society's segments coheres with the theory's description on ideological control. In other words, this strengthens

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[52] Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 45; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 37.

[53] Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 44; Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 74. Compare e.g., the illustrated shown to the point that dealt with the communication monopoly.

[54] *PID*, *Politisch-Ideologische Diversion* is the shortening for Political-Ideological Diversion, while *PUT*, *Politische Untergrundtätigkeit* is the shortening for Political Underground Activity.

[55] Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 45.

the theory, because the GDR leadership used the *MfS* as a mean to keep the control over the population. Last, but absolutely not least, the Main Department used thousands of *IM*'s, particularly *OibE*'s, to penetrate different areas within the state in order to achieve control.

With such a unit like the Main Department XX that penetrated all levels of the society, one can ask to which degree the control was effective, and for whom. Firstly, since the control asked upon coming from the *SED* included controlling many state organs. Perhaps with final effect performing control of the organs the persons having ordered control they, themselves, belonged to. If they did not, the *MfS* anyway had its methods of control, which meant that no one was exempted from being controlled. A question to the theory rises, which indicates a weakening of the theory, since with this situation one has to ask: who led whom in this state? This shows again that the *MfS* held such an important role that practically led to a larger degree of influence on the state power than the theory expresses, even though not formally stated. As for example illustrated at the beginning of the chapter, it was not originally proclaimed to be like this. However, maintaining a state's security under the known conditions would most likely otherwise have left the overview and security of the state quite open.

Zentrale Arbeitsgruppe Geheimnisschutz, ZAGG (Central Work Group Secrecy Protection)
The Work Group's task was to build up and control the protection of secrecy and security of information that were present in everything from the state organs to companies of the GDR.[56]

Arbeitsgruppe Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung, AG BKK (Work Group Area Commercial Coordination)
This part of the *MfS* looked after protecting and observing the Area of Commercial Coordination in the Ministry for Foreign Trade as well as State Secretary Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski's commercial groups and organisation. Additionally, it also used *OibE*'s for different purposes.

Zentraler Operativstab, ZOS (Central Operative Staff)
This was the place where the centre and system of service was being made, in relation to the leadership and coordination of central actions and efforts on security.

Arbeitsgruppe E (*Operative Technik*), *AG E* (Work Group E)
This Work Group's tasks were to provide and prepare the operative-technical and technical means, material as well as the equipments for all units within the area of Mittig. Planning, provision, storing and servicing of required material were typical sorts of tasks belonging to this Work Group.

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[56] Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 47; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 41.

Deputy Gerhard Neiber's areas of responsibility

Hauptabteilung I; Abwehrarbeit in NVA und Grenztruppen (Main Department I; Defence Work in National People's Army and Border Troops)

The main task of this Main Department was to infiltrate every level of the *NVA*. Mielke's aims for the *NVA* were reached, as every fourth soldier serving in the *NVA* was an *IM*.[57] To illustrate the many (smaller) parts of the *MfS* that were subordinate groups to the Main Departments and Departments mentioned earlier, the Main Department I also had some similar arrangements. Although minimised and maybe not of that big a value, many of them did a reasonable important job. There existed for example special companies within the Main Department I worth mentioning, which more specific belonged to the *Hauptabteilung I/Kommando Grenztruppen* and were named *Sicherungskompanien, S-Kompanien* (Security Companies). These companies especially educated the *MfS* forces that had the task to look up escape tunnels in the underground, which were built after the Berlin Wall (1961) leading to closing all routes westwards. After people had established different routes of escaping under the earth, the companies was present to make sure that no one no longer was able to use the chance to escape through such tunnels. Again, this shows the *MfS*' all-inclusive work, since the Ministry also possessed control over one of the regime's organs that was supposed to secure the GDR's development against national and international enemies. At first hand, this can seem as if Mielke as such lost track within the power elite, by running an own defined, autonomous policy isolated from the *SED*. However, the case was the opposite, since the *MfS* also on this area possessed most of the information to the condition of the republic. When Mielke here found new roles to the *MfS*, he strengthened in other words his power position in the GDR's leadership. Compared to Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory, the material shows that this in fact goes beyond the descriptions in relation to the positioning of power of the secret police. In other words, this weakens the theory, as a result of Mielke's choice leading to the *MfS* getting more power inside the system than presupposed.

Hauptabteilung VI; Paßkontrolle, Tourismus, Interhotel (Main Department VI; Pass Control, Tourism, Inter Hotel)

This unit stood for the control and security in matters of entering and leaving the border crossings. The job consisted of investigating all available information on persons that both entered and left the GDR. The Main Department contributed to that only those somehow having been cleared and thereby considered as 'accepted' persons could enter the GDR, whereas the same counted for those having the chance to leave the country.

In regards to political tourism, the Main Department's *Bereich O* (Area O) as-

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[57] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., pp. 26-27.

sured that official visitors were well protected against negative minded individuals and experiences.[58]   This is in line with the presented theory, since such interests from people to freely express and criticise different issues in public were seen as unwanted and thereby not tolerated. Inter hotels were also under observation, something citizens of the GDR staying in the socialist world also were exposed of. The control of the competence of the state's travel agencies was placed under this Main Department. In practice, this meant that the employees in these agencies blindly had to follow the knowledge and instructions given from their highest leaders, in which the *MfS* took a great deal of interest to follow up. Additionally, the Main Department VI ran a purposive overview over a group of co-workers that stepped in as Unofficial Co-workers in travel groups. These *IM*'s aims were to observe every single citizen that travelled abroad.[59]   However, the *MfS* did not only have Unofficial Co-workers that travelled with groups abroad to keep surveillance over GDR citizens. Certain Unofficial Co-workers also had the task to travel domestically on different train stretches to observe passengers. They were trained to recognise different types of human beings that had deviate meanings in regards to the regime's policy. The work consisted first of standing on a railway station with the intention to look out for people that seemed suspicious. On the train, the chosen ones got fast company from these Unofficial Co-workers. Besides that, the Unofficial Co-workers looked up train passengers where the atmosphere among the travellers was blunt and intimate.[60] On such places, where many people were at the same time, the minds and voices of enemies existed, since the possibility was higher towards exchanging all kinds of different thoughts. According to the theory, persons such as these had to be observed by the *MfS*. The next step, which was necessary for a system such as the GDR carried, was to crush its opponents that turned out to show unaccepted criticism. The *MfS* fitted well in for executing that kind of job.

Hauptabteilung VII; Abwehrarbeit MdI/DVP (Main Department VII; Defence Work Ministry of Interior/German People's Police)
The Main Department had, amongst other things, the secret responsibility for all organs' security, the *MdI* categories of duty as well as the German People's Police. Inside the German People's Police's prisons the *MfS* operated identically as described above, with recruiting prisoners to undertake duty inside the prisons they stayed. This is yet another sign of the *MfS* having felt the need to infiltrate all the important state organs, to achieve complete control. Inside the *MdI,* the

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[58] Area O was concentrated on objects and tourism. Negative minded people were those that had any negative considerations, which obviously were against the regime.

[59] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 75; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., pp. 30-31.

[60] The former Unofficial Co-worker Dietmar Passenheim has told that this was his task in the *MfS* (Jeremy Isaacs Production, *1989 People Power*. Turner Original Productions, Inc., 1998).

Main Department organised the work the *MfS* exercised in this Ministry. The *MfS* secured all elements controlled by the *MdI* to protect it from hostile infiltration, and assured the two Ministries following each other in parallel in regards to organising solutions of common tasks.[61] This gave the *MfS* a unique authority role, since the force and control apparatus sat with a superior responsibility and a control over the *MdI/DVP*. With background in the theory's descriptions on ideology, system of government and control apparatus, this Main Department is a good example of the division between party and state organs in best case having been most doubtful. In other words, this is in agreement with the theory of Friedrich and Brzezinski. Additionally, also this unit of the *MfS* used *OibE*'s.

Hauptabteilung VIII; Beobachtung/Ermittlung (Main Department VIII; Observation/Investigation)
For only a certain period, this unit of the *MfS* spied on the FRG via West German agents the GDR regime had recruited in the FRG. However, in overlap with the Main Department XX the Main Department showed more interest to observe own citizens inside the GDR. Especially exposed for the surveillance were naturally enough oppositional groups, where one method of surveillance was done through conspiracy by searching through people's living places.[62] The surveillance of these enemies of the state was partially shown very open since people belonging to the opposition received clear signals that they were being observed. The aim the *MfS* had was first of all consciously to make the power perspective and the weapon of control visible, to show who gave the rules in terms of how the society was to function and ruled.[63] Moreover, this Main Department explicitly gave this signal, as it also was responsible for apprehensions.

The theory is as such strengthened, since few alternative political lines to the leadership were tolerated. The *MfS* was the apparatus of the *SED* that took care of troublemakers such as these, through different methods of surveillance.

Hauptabteilung XXII; Terrorabwehr (Main Department XXII; Terror Defence)
This Main Department was responsible for countering both left and right wing extremism and terrorism, where it amongst other things observed German and international terror organisations. The unit also followed up educational measures in terms of running a school for anti-terror education.

Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe, ZKG; Flucht, Übersiedlung (Central Coordination Group; Escape, Moving)
This unit had two main tasks. One was to hinder that people in the GDR escaped, while the other was to reduce the interest people had in moving. One way the *MfS*

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[61] Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 43; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 31.
[62] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 29.
[63] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., pp. 32-33.

effectively hindered escapes and moving was via Unofficial Co-workers, which worked in the FRG's refuge camps. They passed on information that was useful for the *MfS*' work.[64]   These Unofficial Co-workers were mostly quasi refugees and/or West German personnel that worked in different positions.

Related to the theory, in some ways this curiously enough does not capture the GDR on this point, as the GDR deviated from typical totalitarian societies due to the German situation of having had two states. Since, even if this was an important area for the party and *MfS* to get under control, the *MfS* did not manage to solve the task completely due to the special relation. If one nevertheless compares with the theory, this relation's consequence contributes to weaken it. That is, the special context of the two German states in many ways hindered both the party and security service fulfilling their actual goals towards what in the theory is considered as a typical enemy that has to be completely fought against.

The control and force to have the people to stay especially existed in the early years, but the regime did not manage to end the serious tapping of persons with high education that took place in the period 1949-1961. This can arguably be seen as a main reason, which led to the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Equally, the *MfS* intensified its work, but when Honecker took over after Ulbricht the regime seemed to be regarded as milder.[65]   As one result of this, the number of persons that was allowed to leave the republic in periods of the 1970's and 1980's increased. In theory, it was understood as that more people got permission to leave because they wanted to, while in practice the persons that left the country were victims of a sophisticated barter.[66]   Out of two actions, Honecker saw this action as suitable.

Firstly, the regime lacked convertible currency and the sale of so-called political prisoners from the prisons of the GDR and other bothering persons to the FRG led to the GDR getting a considerable economic lift. Secondly, this gave advantageous international signal effects, since the GDR was looked upon as a more human country. On the one side, this meant that the GDR got a larger international recognition, and that more trade partners thereby showed their interests. Equally, the regime's income also increased. On the other side, the total effect of the regime's profit shall not only be focused on in this way, since the effect also gave an outcome pointing in opposite direction. With the action that the *SED* leadership gave some distinguished regime critical persons - often against their

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[64] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 43.

[65] This was also a consequence of the aforementioned *Ostpolitik*, which produced easier relations with the FRG.

[66] This action was identified as "*Ausbürgerung*". In practice, it meant the *SED* treating citizens that had to leave the country as if they had been expelled from the country. Furthermore, such an action resulted in these people loosing their rights as citizens of the GDR as well as their citizenship.

own will - the possibility to leave the country was a more sophisticated way to get rid of its critical elements.[67]   In this way, also the *MfS* was easier able to tighten the grip over the critical forces, since fewer remained. As a result of the afore-mentioned, i.e., how the system of the party and *MfS* treated their oppositional forces - as enemies, these examples of Honecker's politics is in accordance with the theory.

Arbeitsgruppe XVII; Besucherbüros West Berlin (Work Group XVII; Visit Offices West Berlin)
This body ran a secret security surveillance of the offices the GDR had in West Berlin from 1972, which handled visa applications for West Berliners wishing to visit the GDR. The Work Group also used *OibE*'s for its tasks.

Deputy Wolfgang Schwanitz' areas of responsibility

Hauptabteilung III; Funkaufklärung, Funkabwehr (Main Department III; Radio Reconnaissance, Radio Defence)
This unit mainly accomplished the control of radio, which in general led to collect-ing information for purposes of reconnaissance and defence.[68]   Amongst others, one task therefore resulted in tracing radio electrical telecommunicate technique people in the republic had, which also was used for enemy tasks.

Operativ-Technischer Sektor, OTS (Operative-Technical Sector)
The *OTS* consisted of modern laboratories that researched on behalf of the *MfS*. The aim was to find new methods inside fields that made the *MfS*' work more effective and rational by the help of technical detection.[69]

This unit was of particular value, since it secretly developed different tech-niques that were used in regards to keep control over the enemy. As with some other units of the *MfS* that have been mentioned, also in this professional area there existed a similar organ in the 'civil' (GDR) society. However, cooperating, or somehow exchanging too much information with identical places inside the GDR highly likely would have put the surveillance of the *MfS* in danger. That is, since many of the methods used came from the *OTS*. The *OTS* reflects how impor-tant the *MfS* was in the system and security of the GDR. Not only because of the methods it developed, but also that the particular need was there to have such an organ existing within the *MfS* finally bringing about new methods to control the

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[67] This was for example the outcome of the regimecritical and artistically voice of the GDR prominent Wolf Biermann, who in 1976 practically was expelled from the republic.

[68] "Radio Reconnaissance" meant surveillance of western radio network and news communi-cation. The defence tasks (*Funkabwehr*) through the radio communication meant observing the GDR ether, in terms of its areas on *Ultra Kurzwelle, UKW* (Ultra Short Wave) and *Kurzwelle, KW* (Short Wave).

[69] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 41.

enemies of the state. This does not only show the importance of the *MfS* within the society of the GDR, when comparing to the theory. The value of the *MfS* shows that it goes beyond the theory when related to importance and positioning in the GDR. That is, since the Ministry, with this organ contributing to the control as well, indicates that it also kept another unit that additionally existed in parallel in the GDR society, albeit with the more 'neutral' basis of existence.

Abteilung Nachrichten (Sicherstellung), (Department News)
The Department had the responsibility of the material techniques of the security communication that existed in the units of the Central, the ADM's as well as the DSP's and OSP's. Besides this, the Department also had the task of running the telecommunication security that came about in the government and party.[70]

Abteilung XI; Chiffrierwesen (Department XI; Ciphering)
This Department secured and protected the central cipher and intelligence service as well as observing active persons somehow involved in the radio and telecommunication. Here as well, this job was partially done by the help of the *OibE*'s.

Abteilung Bewaffnung/Chemischer Dienst (Department Armament/Chemical Service)
This unit was responsible for securing weapons and ammunition as well as chemical substance and equipment.

Abteilung 26; Telefonüberwachung (Department 26; Telephone Surveillance)
Regarding this Department as it was done with the Department M; Post Control, there will only be given a considerably short introduction, simply for the order of having had it introduced. That is, since a more in depth analysis follows in the next Part of the thesis. In general, this unit of the *MfS* mainly dealt with the conspiracy towards different ways of tapping any possible telephone connection as well as accomplishing a variety of optic and acoustic techniques of surveillance.

Compared to how the States in the GDR in 1952 were reorganised and divided into a number of 15, much the similar way where the highest administrative units of the districts of the *MfS*. Per 1 October 1989, the *MfS* was organised in 15 different ADM's, including 211 DSP's and 7 OSP's. An example of how an ADM looked like, can be illustrated with the ADM of Rostock:

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[70] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 46; Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 30.

ADM of Rostock

Leader of the ADM of Rostock, Lieutenant General **Rudolf Mittag**

Leader's Commissioners of the ADM

Deputy for reconnaissance and leader of the Department XV, Lieutenant Colonel Günter Falk

- Department IX: Investigation Organ
- *AKG*, Evaluation and Control Group
- Department Cadre and Education
- Department XIV: Detention House; Punishment Execution
- Department Finance
- *AGL*, The Leader's Work Group
- **Department 26: Telephone Control, Lieutenant Colonel Bodo Schulz**
- 5 Divisions; 56 Co-workers, 7 of them *IM* leading co-workers, app. 90 *IM's*
- 10 District Service Places (in the 10 Districts of the AD)
- Department XV: Reconnaissance (especially the FRG)
- Department XII: Information/Store
- Department Medical Service

Deputy for operative technique/security, Colonel Rudolf Hoffmann

- Department Operative Technique
- *BdL*, Office of the Leadership
- *SR B/CD*, Independent Division Armament/Chemical Service
- Department News (Security)
- Department XI: Ciphering
- Department Reflective Service
- Guard and Security Unit "Alfred Scholz"
- Department III: Radio Reconnaissance; Radio Defence

Superior deputy operative of the ADM, Colonel Arthur Amthor

- Department XVIII: People's Economy
- Department XIX: Traffic, Post, News
- Department XX: State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground
- *AG G*, Work Group Secrecy Protection
- Object Service Place Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) North (NPP "*Bruno Leuschner*", Lubmin [by Greifswald])
- Department Harbour

Deputy operative of the leader of the ADM, Colonel Horst Becker

- Department II: Counter Intelligence
- Department VII: Defence Work Ministry of Interior/German People's Police
- Department VI: Pass Control, Tourism, Inter Hotel
- Department VIII: Observation/Investigation
- Work Group XXII: Terror Defence
- *BKG*, Administrative District Coordination Group
- *SR AWK*, Independent Division Defence Protection Commando
- *SR PS*, Independent Division Person Protection
- *SR GS*, Independent Division Boarder Security
- **Department M: Post Control, Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Kummerow**
- 9 Divisions; 122 Co-workers, 1 of them *IM* leading co-worker, app. 5 *IM's*

Legend:
——— Official subordinate
– – – Professional, technical subordinate

Figure 1.2: The organisation structure of the *MfS'* ADM of Rostock per 01.10.89
Source (partly): BStU, *Fakten und Zahlen zum MfS. Außenstelle Rostock 1999*

With the operations done in 1952, the power the Central of the *MfS* in the future was going to hold was to result in a control functioning with a generally better overview than it had done earlier. This way of organising undoubtedly settled the role of where the superior power of the *MfS* was to be situated. The Central also created a huge network of *MfS* support points through the existence of the ADM's, being the subordinate of the Central. The ADM's as such also held their clearly defined and homogenous power hierarchy. Going further down the ladder of power, the ADM's had their subordinates. Furthermore, this was again divided into smaller cells, all for the sake of accomplishing the general aim of controlling the population.

As illustrated with figure 1.2 (Part B), the leadership of an ADM consisted of its leader and four deputies. Of the deputies, it was a superior deputy operative of the leader of the ADM, a deputy operative of the leader of the ADM, a deputy for technique/security as well as a deputy for reconnaissance that also was the leader of the Department XV. The latter was connected to the *HV A*, whereas it should be said that it at the same time through the Department XV in every of the ADM's led what was the counterpart of the *HV A* at the Central. However, the Main Department I/Line I did not exist in every ADM, because the military defence was not connected to for example one particular geographical area, but rather functionally systematised all over the republic.[71]

In regards to all of the ADM's, DSP's and OSP's, the picture per 1 October 1989 looked like this:

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[71] The following will treat the issue of "Line" closer.

Table 1.2: The organisation of the ADM's, DSP's and OSP's in numbers, per 01.10.89

ADM's	Personnel, ADM's[72]	DSP's	OSP's	Personnel, DSP's	Personnel, DSP's + OSP's
Berlin	1953	11	—	641	—
Cottbus	1515	14	1[73]	—	682
Dresden	2574	16	1[74]	—	963
Erfurt	2221	13	—	745	—
Frankfurt/Oder	1738	11	—	522	—
Gera	1717	11	1[75]	—	624
Halle	1829	23	3[76]	—	1539
Karl-Marx-Stadt	2731	22	—	900	—
Leipzig	1634	13	—	753	—
Magdeburg	2685	20	—	895	—
Neubrandenburg	1411	14	—	471	—
Potsdam	2892	15	—	788	—
Rostock	3261	10	1[77]	—	550
Schwerin	1797	10	—	417	—
Suhl	1345	8	—	340	—

Source (partly):   Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, pp. 32-34

As we know, the ground structure of the *MfS* was identically built up the way the administrative structure of the GDR was. This principal covered all areas of the GDR society through the security service's different units founded. From the very beginning, the *MfS* had a work structure that was orientated towards areas of responsibility concerning all kinds of objects and territories. According to Fricke,

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[72] Applying to all classifications of personnel listed in the table, the numbers to any personnel force reflect the amount of full time co-workers. The classification "Personnel, ADM's" does not include the numbers of the personnel forces of the DSP's and OSP's. Figures to the DSP's and OSP's appear through the columns "Personnel, DSP's" and "Personnel, DSP's + OSP's".

[73] This was named *Schwarze Pumpe*.

[74] This was the Technical University.

[75] This was the *VEB Carl Zeiss Jena*. *VEB* was *Volkseigener Betrieb* (Nationally Owned Enterprise).

[76] The OSP's here were the Electrochemical Combine Bitterfeld, *VEB* Leuna factory "*Walter Ulbricht*" as well as the *VEB* Buna factory in Schkopau.

[77] This was the *VEB KKW "Bruno Leuschner"* situated near Greifswald. *KKW* is shortened for *Kernkraftwerk* (Nuclear Power Plant, NPP).

the *MfS* reckoned the Central and ADM level to carry the responsibility of all possible objects, whereas the DSP's had the responsibility to carry out orders in their territories.[78] In the secondary literature, the *MfS* recognised the level of the Central as being the "horizontal" power. Since for example one Main Department and its belonging Departments at the Central were independent from any other Main Department and their belonging Departments at the Central.

Following for example the Main Department IX at the Central, its counterpart in the ADM's was the Department IX. Since this Department as many others were identically built up also carrying the same classification number as its origin - the Main Department, this power structure took the shape in the form of a "line" or a "vertical".[79]

Moving to the DSP's, their responsibilities only counted for their limited territories, independent of the amount of for example objects or persons.[80] Tasks such as these laid in the responsibility of any unit of the *MfS* including the DSP, although for example many Main Departments of the *MfS* had their line structure all the way down to their ends, i.e., the DSP's.[81] Even though not structurally organised like their higher connected authorities, because of certain tasks on this level simply falling away the lower one got in the system, these ends were however the factual case for the fully structured lines such as for the units M, 26, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, XVIII, XIX and XX.

At the same time, and as seen through figures 1.1 and 1.2 (both Part B), it should be stressed that not all the names of the units and their constructions were identical. For example, the *MfS* did have a common Reconnaissance through the *HV A* at the Central. However, the *MfS* did not have a 'Main Administration Defence'. The total area of defence was instead based upon different Main Departments and independent Departments, whereas the latter had the status of being Main Departments. Inside these Main Departments and independent Departments, there existed several subordinate levels. These levels consisted of Areas, Departments and Sub Departments. Further, going downwards within those, one had Divisions, Work Groups and Operative Groups. The number and parts of structures were less the longer down in the partition one came, just as the case

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[78] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, pp. 22-23.

[79] To the use of the classifications "horizontal", "vertical" and "territorial" power, see discussion below. It is however of importance to notice that not all Departments of the ADM had to hold the identical name and classification number as their counterpart at the Central in order to build a Line. For example, the Main Administration Reconnaissance's counterpart in the ADM's was the Department XV (which name identified the *MfS*' first units to reconnaissance work founded in the 1950's. After the change of its structure and thereby name, the original name nevertheless continued to apply in the ADM's in opposite to the case in the Central).

[80] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 12/82, p. 89.

[81] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department XIX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02, 13.05.02.

was with the DSP's, the latter having been the lowest structured organ. The further down one came, a smaller level of structure existed. This meant that one registered a stronger bundle of tasks, whereas the specialisation and tasks got less and less. On the level of the Central, a Main Department or similar consisted of the Main Department, whereas the further down one got in a Main Department the following existed: Areas, Departments, Sub Departments, Divisions, Work Groups and Operative Groups.[82] On the level in the ADM's, the organisation was somewhat smaller as there only existed Departments and Divisions. Within these, one had Divisions, Work Groups and Operative Groups. In the DSP's and OSP's, the largest structural unit was a Division, Work Group and an Operative Group, whereas to those there did not exist further subunits.

It is possible to compare the structural meaning of a Main Department with the structure of an ADM, in which the Main Department together with a Department of an ADM built a line. In some cases, the latter was also completed to the very bottom (i.e., the DSP's). Exactly as such, a line existed between for example the Department of a Main Department and a Division of a Department of an ADM. One could say they were one another's counterparts. In regards to the latter this can be seen as the 'counterpart line', whereas the line (the vertical power) between the Main Department in the Central and its counterpart (a Department) in an ADM can be seen as the 'main pattern counterpart line'. Before illustrating the analyses with a figure, some comments to the different expressions concerning the structures should be made, since the figure by far is to contribute to the results being showed here.[83]

Some comments should be given to the use of the words "horizontal" and "vertical" structure when talking about how to classify the inner powers of the *MfS,* as there seems to be an unclear use of meanings in the literature. In the secondary literature, the expressions "horizontal" and "vertical" have often been used.[84]

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[82] As shortly been on to concerning these organisational tasks, it should further be said that there is not known to have existed a highly situated unit at the Central having contained all these different levels and units mentioned that also followed exactly as described (obviously, concerning the roles of the units of any ADM, the same applied to those). As such, towards figure 1.3 (Part B) that will be shown below, this is moreover intended for illustrating the starting point and complete alternatives towards the organising of the *MfS*' work regarding any possible unit of the Ministry. In this way, for example the horizontal arrows going out from the Main Department IX and Department IX to the Areas, Departments, etc., respectively, Divisions, Work Groups, etc., underline the possible described steps. As such, and as we will witness, not all the steps applied to e.g. the Main Department IX.

[83] Although the figure is heavily simplified compared to the large machinery of the *MfS* including the two actual Main Departments in the figure, the examples in the figure below is although supposed to illustrate two Main Departments. The one Main Department having been fully structurally organised from top to bottom, the other not all the way through. These cases also illustrate the function of the DSP's.

[84] E.g., Fricke (Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*) uses these terminologies.

However, in such literature it has not been presented what these expressions actually may have meant, holding a lack of clearance. Furthermore, neither has there been presented limitations and definitions in terms of what their functions in the *MfS* consisted of. Therefore, as the headline of this point has been called, it should be made attempts to settle these expressions as rather having been the 'horizontally' structure for the "horizontal" part, and 'vertically' structure for having been the "vertical" structure of the *MfS*. That is, strictly speaking because of not fully, but only apparently having held features of what can be reckoned as having been horizontal and vertical structure.

The meaning in the secondary literature when calling the flat structure for the "horizontal" structure does seem clear. By the illustration below through figure 1.3 (Part B), there is on the other side however clear that it did not exist such a pure horizontal structure as explained in the literature. Secondly, concerning the horizontal structure, it is in the literature mentioned only one - a - horizontal structure, without further differentiation. By this, one presumably has meant to focus on the structure of the Central, possibly with the aim to underline the meaning of the superior structure in terms of where the highest power was situated. Nonetheless, it should not be overlooked that such a power also existed in the ADM's, reflecting upon the crucial power structure of the superior model of the Central. Although the Central and the ADM's had their vertical power relation, within each of the ADM's there existed after all a horizontal structure among the different units. Therefore, the power in the Central can be said to have held the first horizontal level, whereas the ADM's through their subordinate vertical role towards the Central, within the ADM's held their horizontal power on a second level. Thirdly, if we have in mind that Mielke was the absolute monarch in the *MfS*, whereas his closest leaders clearly were subordinates. Still, these leaders enjoyed large powers mainly since ruling their lines, which thereafter had their leaders on the first horizontally level, and so on. Fourthly, since he ruled the way Stalin did, he made sure to avoid any confrontation of power between his subordinates at any level. This was shown through the function in which nearly all of the first row, relevant officers having to report directly to him.

In relation to the theory's descriptions of both the power apparatus and its control apparatus, it is clear why most of Mielke's subordinates reported directly to him. Firstly, because of signalising the structure and build up of the *MfS* power hierarchy as well as to conclude with who the *MfS*' sovereign leader was - where few horizontal lines existed in reality. Secondly and more important, Mielke's subordinates reported directly to him because he was to have full overview over all details. At the same time, by this he made sure that others did not have such. The sub leaders could not express their meanings to equal forces or others in the *MfS*, which in facts tends to have had a more vertical than horizontal structure of leadership.

It also existed a certain fear within the *MfS*' rows to suffer the same destiny as they had exposed towards the population. By far Mielke was the only safe person, something that strongly leads in the direction of not having had a horizontal leadership structure. Since even the people possessing the highest positions, consciously or not, automatically had to watch out and care for themselves with Argus eyes.

It does not either seem to be the fact, what according to the secondary literature may appear as a strict vertical structure. Although not quite wrongly illustrated, it is neither quite right. It can be argued that the vertical/line structure by far appears to be the case, although only to a certain extent. Between for example a Main Department from the Central and its counterpart (a Department) in an ADM illustrates the fact of this vertical structure. However, although it is claimed by different authors that this followed all the way down to the bottom, i.e., having been the DSP's, the author holds another opinion. It is easy to think that this is the mere fact, since the DSP's were the lowest level of power within the *MfS*. In addition, since one had Divisions in a DSP that were responsible for the same areas as their partners and superiors somehow directly or indirectly connected in the vertical structure. However, the DSP's did not stand fully and only responsible on behalf of all respective lines (Main Department, Department, etc.), but were also rather operative because of the role of governing areas. As we will see below as well, from the illustrative figure regarding the horizontally and vertically structure, there is a difference in structure from top to bottom between the given examples of the Main Departments IX and XX. More correctly, it was rather so that any unit of the *MfS* theoretically was able to use for example a Division in a DSP in order of cooperation, even though not having been fully organised from top until toe.

Based upon the above, the structures can be illustrated by a figure:

Figure 1.3: Illustrating the horizontally, vertically and territory authority and working structure of the *MfS*. Examples to a not fully (Main Department IX) and a fully (Main Department XX) structurally organised unit of the *MfS*

* Main Department XX has here been simplified. Nevertheless, the main point related to the full structure is shown
** Point arrow made, due to not having been fully structurally organised from top to bottom

We have now seen how the *MfS* was organised both ways, i.e., how it was so-called centrally (horizontally) organised, and, by far, down the ladder (vertically) of power, how it functioned as a so-called line. As for the post and telephone control, placing those Departments more specifically, Mielke controlled those Departments in more than one way. First of all, seen from this horizontally point of view, Mielke directly controlled the Department M being the direct superior to Major General Strobel. He also, directly and/or indirectly controlled the Department M to the last details in the smallest units if wanting to do so. Apart from that, Mielke was also the superior to the central figure at the Central (Deputy Minister Lieutenant General Schwanitz) as well, who, amongst other things, was the highest responsible after Mielke towards where e.g. the telephone control orderly belonged. As such, one might claim the latter person was the nearest superior to the leader of the telephone control (Major General Leben). However, here as well, identical to the control of the Department M, any information was able to go directly to Mielke without first having to go through for example Deputy Minister Schwanitz.

Seen from the vertically point of view, potentially Mielke had at any time full overview over the post and telephone control being done in every of the ADM's, since he also was the superior on behalf of the leaders of the 15 ADM's. These 15 leaders gave reports directly to him that, amongst other things, contained information about the post and telephone control in the ADM's, including the smallest units. Here as well, although it was *comme il faut* to pass all information through the usual and/or correct steps from the lower levels before it reached the highest (Mielke), there were possibilities to bypass all the stages in order to reach a certain goal. Was Mielke able to control the information given from the person in charge of for example the telephone control in an ADM if this person reported directly to its 'technical superior' in Berlin (Major General Leben)? If we go back again to what is explained above to the way Mielke controlled his horizontally power, it is obvious that nothing was hindering Mielke in accessing all information developed in the *MfS*.

With the analyses of the power hierarchy in the *MfS* and on the example of the post and telephone control, this can be shown by the illustration below:

Figure 1.4: Illustration of the *MfS'* horizontally and vertically hierarchy of power concerning the control of the post and telephone

Apparently, it seems with these examples as if Mielke controlled the organisation along a combination of Napoleon's seek-and-divine tactics and Stalin's unique, universal role. Since the theory also expressing the structure of the sub leaders in the Soviet Union's satellite states having a tendency to be somewhat stronger inside these countries than how the structure of the sub leaders in Moscow was. As the examples have shown, Mielke's actions confirmed this presumption, through using his great possibility to act independently.

We have also seen how Mielke filtered information to the Politburo (done by the *ZAIG*), something that gave him a stronger position in the power political hierarchy. This however weakens the theory, first of all because Mielke as the leader of the *MfS* apparently had more political power than the General Secretary of the *SED*; in other words the mass party leader the way the totalitarian theory foresaw. Mielke seemed to have mastered to possess greater power in the GDR's leadership, something that points to the power in the GDR having been more spread than the theory expressed. On the one side, this additionally partly weakens the critics of the thoughts to totalitarian states Dahrendorf and Krejci have presented, who claims that the central policy was concentrated on few hands superior to other

organs, because Mielke's use of power cannot be said to have been embraced in a compact, collective elite. On the other hand, Mielke was after all a part of the Politburo, something which means one should not lay too much weight on the weakening of this theory nor Friedrich and Brzezinski's.

Some critics can although be given to this awesome detailed system of power and control. In general, it is likely to presume that with such a power organ having been as huge and sophisticated, nothing could possibly go wrong. On the other hand, it cannot always have been as easy to get an overview over the control at all times take into consideration that the *MfS* more or less had the aim to control the whole population. One was not supposed to miss anything or anyone, and that is why one had such a well-built organisation. Nevertheless, even if the *MfS* did its work, i.e., the physical role of observing the people of the GDR, the whole system of the state that was largely depending upon the *MfS* showed not to function the way it was developed. This especially became clearer at the end of the GDR regime, although such tendencies had been going on for a long while. Due to the high degree of specialisation and the enormous organised system of Unofficial Co-workers, it resulted in a certain visible distance from party control. Furthermore, over time, this meant that the *MfS* increased their influence on party decisions because of being better informed.

The *MfS* was the organ of the GDR that knew best how the situation really was at all times in the GDR. The task of this thesis is not to discuss the reasons and context concerning the collapse of the GDR and *MfS*. However, a few thoughts to these issues will be shared, although a further analysis is not intended.

The problem for the rulers of the GDR did not lie in that they did not know how the overall condition was in the GDR at all times. Moreover, the problem was that the reports of the surveillance given by the *MfS* to the highest party organs did not reach them somehow. Even if the reports reached all the way up, they were often received with great distance and mistrust. This was especially the case during the final period before the collapse of the GDR started, since the leaders of the state were not used to receive critical reports at all. The easy solution was to turn around and look away when such problems were presented, as the leaders of the state mostly did not believe in such reports. They had other problems to think of, and anyway, they had although the *MfS* and other physical repressive state organs present in order to flattened the streets for possibly unwanted bumps.

It was simply not understandable that people explicitly wanted to express that the state was their largest enemy, and that the state as easy as before was not able to hold total control over the population. Even the *MfS* had difficulties in understanding the situation, especially since being the first one having received such facts. However, how can such a system in the first place function effective, when even the state security has a more or less absurd picture of the reality both internally and externally? Additionally, believes it had towards facts and reality was often

questioned, resulting in a dysfunctional outcome. These frames were founded and based on powers that, on the other hand, when using logic, paradoxically grew - or was meant to grow - only wider and stronger.

Particularly during the final stages of the end of the regime's days this led to large frustration among the *MfS* co-workers, as they first of all knew that not acting according to what the reports told was a catastrophe. Secondly, it must have been pretty misleading for an officer of the *MfS* that in the first place was there to protect the state and its leaders, but on the other hand was being ignored by the same people it apparently was protecting. As such, the *MfS* officers were doing their work as they were planned to do, but unfortunately, from their point of view, without achieving the necessary results. The large machinery containing all detailed rules on what to do in every situation obviously did not to all times function as it was supposed to. This can also be said in regards to Mielke's post and telephone control. As we have seen from the model above, it would demand tremendous efforts to improve the organisation whereas for example trying to reach perhaps an even higher, more rational efficiency than illustrated. On the other hand, exactly because of having had it built in such a way, the original idea can be turned on its head. What may have seemed to be waterproof in terms of all channels giving and receiving the necessary information seems to have had opposite effect. Since these particular routines contained such complexities that mostly meant collecting and giving information in accordance with certain highly bureaucratic rules and codes, the system in practice did not work as effective. Many simple moves and decisions all took too long in order to be efficient. Instead of that for example a lower level of the *MfS* would have to wait for a decision to be taken at a higher level in regards to a certain case that in the first place could be worked on by the lower level with equivalent professionalism, the more convenient organisational solution would have been the latter. Thus, the lower level would take affair and as such act more rapidly as well as acting on behalf of own routines. Instead of having to report to the higher level in the first place, before a decision at the top likely would have resulted in the lower level after all being ordered to solve the case.

It seems as the *MfS* obviously had enormous power. These given examples of structure and tasks confirm that its role as a security service in such a system goes beyond and thereby weakens the presented frames of the theory. Identical to the aim of the *SED*'s centralisation of power, which was executed in order to kept the districts remaining weak on behalf of the central power, the *MfS* and Mielke had identical interest. Additionally, maintaining other differences within the Ministry, and its vivid way of organising the republic's security, doubtlessly gave the *MfS* success for many years. Along these lines of control was its self-imposed internal control. Exactly because of running the matters in such a way did in the long run not only lead to success. It also led to a larger internal control,

mistrust, confusion, frustration, contradictory orders, growing bureaucratisation, etc. These drawbacks existed side by side with the frequent mere fact of having a dissatisfied population, regardless of the existence of the *MfS*. Having an *MfS* present only showed to weaken its superiority over time towards one of the most important defined enemies - its own citizens. This problem turned apparent in the later years of the GDR regime, as the personnel strength of the *MfS* had grown with nearly 50% within nine years, from 1971 to 1982.[85] In this period, over 3000 co-workers were employed on a yearly basis, a reaction that came after the growing problems within the domestic politics.

1.4 No one exempted from surveillance

The *SED* was organised on every level in every Ministry. The *MfS* was no exception. After the Soviet model for the *KGB*, the *MfS* claimed to be the "*Schild und Schwert der Partei*" ("Shield and Sword of the Party"). This apparently defined the relation between the *SED* and *MfS*.

The leader of the *SED*'s organisation in the *MfS* was Major General Horst Felber. He was also a member of the aforementioned Collegium, whose task was to coordinate the *MfS*' politics and advice Mielke who was its chair. Officially, Felber worked under the guidelines given by the Central Committee's Security Secretariat of the *SED*. His main tasks were to assure the *MfS* working loyally and enthusiastically, that the moral of the workers was kept, and creatively implement the politics of the *SED*. By clearing the ideological relations and values, Felber stood for controlling the moral aspect in the *MfS*. He helped to choose the best cadres for promotion as well as taking care of the problems the *SED* members had in the *MfS*. For Felber to have the overview as easy as possible, the lower *SED* organs reported to him. The *SED* apparently had full control over the *MfS*, since they were organised at every single level in the *MfS*.

However, the *MfS* operated by having own informants inside the *SED*, with the understanding that no one but certain people inside the *MfS* knew about it. The job of the informants was to assure that tendencies such as ideological conflicts other than those accepted did not get free space. Amongst others, this meant to watch out for persons holding sympathies for reforms, other directions of communism like the one Trotsky had as well as groupings of anti-party formation. Even people inside the *SED*'s power elite did not know that they were exposed of surveillance. Neither were they aware of when, by whom nor for what purpose they were being observed. The *MfS* had even organised surveillance of Honecker, something that makes one wonder who really had the supreme political power in the GDR. From this, it looks as if the *SED* did not have full control over the *MfS*, despite that

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[85] Cf. e.g., Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.; Schwan, *op cit*., p. 144.

in many *MfS* officers' eyes, the party was the one and only leader they appeared 100% loyal to.[86]   Thus, this material weakens the presented theory, since one of its starting points seen in relation to this state's system of power actually see the party as the undisputed leader.

In relation to the above mentioned it looks as if Mielke's *MfS* in many aspects ran its own race, independent from the *SED*. Taking into consideration the position Mielke had in both the GDR and Soviet Union it is not so sensational, although he politically seen did not sit on the throne. Additionally, most people feared the *MfS*. Especially also with the thoughts to Mielke's close relation to Moscow that made him untouchable inside the GDR, since the power elite of the GDR laid for Moscow's feet. This strengthens the view to that the GDR had both direct and strong ties with the Soviet Union. Without any doubt, furthermore the theory is strengthened, in regards to what role the force and control apparatus in the GDR had, because the *MfS* was both largely operational and necessary in relation to the context it existed in. At the same time the theory should be modified concerning the hierarchy of the power, where the state party at all times obviously not was the actually highest political organ.

One shall nevertheless not exaggerate the meaning of the *MfS* having been a kind of state in the state, where only Moscow was the Ministry's political head. On the one side, it is clear that the *MfS* built up a surveillance apparatus on a scale without parallels to earlier German history.[87]   When comparing to the *Gestapo*, this managed to have a few number of official co-workers and the will from the regular German to inform about the neighbour often out of personal reasons.[88] Differently, the *MfS* had a larger degree of specialisation and a larger organised system of Unofficial Co-workers. The size of the operation alone was enormous and led in a certain degree to a visible distance from the party organisation and maybe to an increase on the control of party and state organs decisions executed by the better-informed *MfS*. At least, the *MfS* reports often concluded with suggestions to political and government officials. It was apparently a degree of institutional differentiation and estimate frictions. The *MfS* reported directly to the *SED* on every level (local, regional and central), but many *SED* tops chose especially to ignore and/or deny believing in negative information. This led to a certain frustration among the employees of the *MfS* that had made the

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[86] R. O. Hahn, *Ausgedient. Ein Stasi-Major erzählt*. Halle 1990, p. 100.

[87] J. Gauck, *Die Stasi-Akten. Das unheimliche Erbe der DDR*. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1991, p. 67; R. Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945*. New York and Oxford 1990.

[88] The example is given without further comparison whatsoever. If one were to draw a further comparative perspective this would amongst other things need a more detailed consideration than what is being made here.

reports.[89] On the other side, the *MfS* was clearly the *SED*'s and, last but not least, Moscow's creation. The Ministry was led by loyal *SED* members, with the aim to assure the domination of the party against all potential threats and opposition. Besides these analyses, since the *MfS* neither did have large, if any, influence on decisions concerning social nor political matters that in general concerned the population on a daily basis, to claim that it was a state within a state would simply not be a fitting description.

Taking into consideration all unavoidable individual frictions between different elements in a heavily bureaucratised regime, to claim that the *MfS* constituted a state within the state is to exaggerate somewhat. Maybe the *MfS* practised its work as such, which somehow led to an unwillingly higher position. Strictly spoken, this was however not the intention.[90] Therefore, a kind of combination between the two expressions "Shield and Sword of the Party" and "State Within the State" is something that may place the *MfS*, although far less focus should be put on the last expression. A more fitting description can rather be that the *MfS* operated as the GDR's *Alfa* and *Omega*, more or less being the party and state organ's crucial nerve and brain, whereas it should be added that the Ministry to an indefinable degree stayed under the cloth of the party. This as such can be said to have been some of the factors that gave the *MfS* the unique position it achieved through time, since the *MfS* gathered information, sorted it, sent out orders to act as well as acted on own chords. The Ministry acted on behalf of being the GDR leadership's intelligence instance by both analysing and acting, and did it in cooperation with the organs of the party. For example, the *MfS* informants reported to their superiors on opposition problematic, whereas the decisions thereafter were taken at a higher level as the organisation's most fitting way to react. Depending on the relations, influence was clearly given from key persons belonging to fitting party/state organ level.

Independent of any historical background and heritage the coming leaders of the GDR took with them into the political power elite, the *MfS*' surveillance of its co-workers can nevertheless be seen as absurd. However, we know how Mielke and his fellow conspirators operated to one another during the Spanish Civil War. Besides, the *KGB* and the Soviets had during the whole of the GDR's time permanently one person present during meetings in the Politburo, additionally to that we, before the founding of the GDR, have seen how the *SMAD* functioned in the

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[89] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 68; Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, pp. 21-22; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, pp. 63-64; see also, R. Grimmer, W. Irmler, W. Opitz, W. Schwanitz (eds.), *Die Sicherheit. Zur Abwehrarbeit des MfS*. Band 1. 1. Auflage. Berlin 2002, p. 117.

[90] Concerning the *MfS* co-workers Nessim Ghouas has conversed with, when asked upon, they denied the *MfS* having been a state within a state in terms of being the actual power at the top of the GDR system.

SBZ. These factors show clear signs of that the GDR regime functioned in such a way that the elite itself observed and sentenced 'own' people in any way it preferred. The effect of such was both to look after others and one's own carefully, since the society *de facto* was not safe for anyone.[91]

Something that hindered and/or lowered that oneself was exposed of surveillance, was to be allied with the right persons. A clear example of how important it was to be allied with the right ones was Mielke. With his unique position in the GDR mainly because of having been the Soviet Union's 'man', he managed to combine both positions. According to Markus Wolf, Mielke did not only look upon himself as being the best friend of the Soviet Union, but also its representative inside the *SED*.[92]   Mielke apparently considered himself as the Soviet Union's agent, something which contributed to strengthen his independent position within the *SED*. Seen in relation to the build-up of the power structure of the GDR, by far the *MfS* had a stronger autonomous role and greater authority inside the GDR than presupposed.

It was by far a matter of tactics, since Mielke knew that his career never would have been so strong had it not been for the special relation to Moscow. Not only Mielke, but also Ulbricht and Honecker all came from the generation that was to build communism and transfer the Soviet model to German soil; a model which mainly originated from Stalin's era, where the same person had brought them all in to the spotlight. Additionally, they perfectly well knew how vulnerable the GDR was without the support from Moscow. For example, Mielke was repeatedly acknowledged from the Soviet Union, by receiving the Lenin ordination as much as six times. His last decoration was in 1988, awarded from no other than Gorbatchev. Seen in relation to the influence of Moscow, it is no doubt that the GDR by far was a subordinate to Moscow up to its last days. Since this close relation was a fact, it is natural to suppose that it also got influence over the roles and functions of the *MfS*. However, towards the end of the GDR's life the split between those two countries clearly became more visible than earlier. Amongst other things, certain people in the GDR's highest leadership including the General Secretary of the *SED* distanced themselves from Gorbatchev's reform policy. As for Mielke, he acted as loyal to Moscow as ever before although he did not especially sympathise with Gorbatchev and his reform policy.

Mielke's good relation to Moscow led to that his position in the Politburo remained strong. Little critics were aimed at Mielke, even though he formally had others above him. In combination with the regime's political settings, this is one

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[91] The similarities can be found to why and how both Hitler and Stalin rather pragmatic got rid of unfitting personalities that in their eyes just did not fit in the system. In regards to Stalin, this 'operation' is known as the Moscow Processes, whereas concerning Hitler it is known as the Night of the Long Knives.

[92] M. Wolf, *In eigenem Auftrag. Bekenntnisse und Einsichten*. München 1991, pp. 210-211.

of the strongest explanations to why and how he came well out of it compared to others that found themselves on equal power level. According to Wolf, Mielke often went outside the Politburo and discussed directly with Honecker.[93] This gives impressions of that the Politburo to times was a more to-man organ rather than a compact elite. If this was the case, this deviates from the theory in regards to which degree it existed a democratic centralism in the GDR. Even if the theory is somewhat modified, this anyway shows that the GDR regime had a strong totalitarian character, since the leader for the state's physical control apparatus alone often outside the Politburo advised himself with the leader of the party and state. The connection between Honecker and Mielke was thereby clearer, since the *MfS* only discussed those cases the General Secretary wanted to discuss.[94] Therefore, much of the *MfS*' tasks were apparently in Honecker's hands, while Mielke administrated them. According to Günter Schabowski, the practice was that most of the Politburo's members only talked about their own areas of responsibilities during the meetings.[95] It was done as such because a meddling in others' areas was too risky, which in the worst case could have ended with being stigmatised since having been hostile. The members seldom met outside the meetings, in spite of that they so to say were neighbours. The main reason not to meet each other outside the Politburo was the fear among the members that it was to be understood as if they planned a conspiracy against the higher power elite and the leader itself.[96] Mielke's position however led to that he was not as politically compared to the other members of the Politburo.

Even if Mielke and Honecker apparently were looked upon as political inseparable friends, even Honecker was not safe from Mielke. Obviously, so to say, all citizens - except Mielke - of the GDR were seen as a potential risk and held the potential to be exposed of the surveillance of the *MfS*. This came clear to expression during the GDR's death struggle in the autumn of 1989, when certain members of the Politburo got together in the wish to throw Honecker from the leading positions he had in the party and state organs. If the GDR's Politburo to that point more or less had consisted of a compact elite, it certainly fell apart then. In the

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[93] Der Spiegel, 02.07.90.

[94] See also, F. Streletz, "Der Nationale Verteidigungsrat und das Vereinte Oberkommando des Warschauer Vertrages" in Wolfgang Wünsche (ed.), *Rührt euch! Zur Geschichte der NVA*. Berlin 1998, pp. 130-152.

[95] G. Schabowski, *Das Politbüro*. Reinbek bei Hamburg 1990, pp. 41-42. Schabowski was member of the Politburo 1984-1989.

[96] Compare the son to the Soviet Union leader Anastas Mikojan's statements, Stepan Mikojan. He claims that the members of the Politburo, especially during Stalin's era did not meet each other in their spare time of fear that it would have woken the party leader's suspiciousness on conspiracy against the party leadership and the leader itself (Educational Foundation, "*En maktens triangel*". WGBH, 2000). It seems as if this fear survived Stalin by nearly half a century, and maybe it was system conditioned.

Politburo, it came about two splitting groups as a result of Gorbachev's reform politics; those that were for reforms and those that were against. Mielke took side with the reform group, against Honecker. It showed that the *MfS*' long time leader had gathered material on his own and the GDR's apparently undisputed leader. A so-called "red suitcase" with material collected through many years on Honecker stood standby, if it turned out that Honecker would have refused his retirement.[97]

In relation to both the influence from Moscow and the theory, this episode can be justified with two reasons. Firstly, it indicates that Mielke was Moscow's man, both because he supported the reform group and because he was willing to throw his own - the *SED*'s and GDR's - leader. This strengthens the meaning of the influence Moscow had. Considered this from the theoretical aspect, the theory can be said to be strengthened. Mainly since the security service of the GDR became the tool that wanted to save the socialism - even in a reformed edition, and found its own state leader a threat to the maintenance and development of the system and regime.

1.4.1   Internal and external organisation

When considering the structures of the *MfS* closer it is of importance to make differentiations. With the analyses made so far, one can suggest that the *MfS* operated with one 'internal' and one 'external' organisation within the society of the GDR. The internal organisation is considered as having been the organisation of control taking place within the *MfS* itself, whereas the external organisation of control was the one being done towards the population. Thus, within the Ministry, it mastered to organize both internal and external factors regarding such mechanisms of organisation. As a digressive note, this perhaps touches most into the concept of somehow having had an own "state within the state" of the GDR, when only considering the organisation as such. The internal factors were many, which, except under Mielke himself, also existed under his Deputies. These internal factors existed in the *MfS*' own society parallel inside the rest of the GDR society, which the *MfS* had created. This society was able to offer a lot more to its servants than the GDR society possibly could dream off offering its population. As aforementioned, this society had for example its own system of education, own hospitals, own personnel for protection and even own shops where the *MfS* employees and their families went for shopping.

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[97] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, p. 77; cf. e.g., Wolf, *op cit.*, p. 210. Honecker possessed a "red suitcase" of his own, carrying it with him wherever he went (cf. e.g., Focus TV, 06.10.02). However, this suitcase did not contain anything else but private settlements that Honecker wanted to keep secret. Besides being kept secret due to intimate matters amongst others, it also remained secret since the content of the suitcase presumably also held information that Honecker somehow had achieved through illegal acting during his period as the party and state leader.

In relation to what is presented above under Mielke, 'his' internal organisation consisted of many factors.[98] Amongst others, those were the *AGM* - The Minister's Work Group, *ZAIG* - Central Evaluation and Information Group and its Department XII; Central Information Store and Justice Place, *BdL* - Office of the Leadership, Main Department Cadre and Education and its *ZMD* - Central Medical Service and College of the Ministry for State Security as well as the Main Department; Person Protection, Attention. Under Deputy Minister Mittig, the organs typically parts of this internal organisation within the *MfS* were the *ZAGG* - Central Work Group Secrecy Protection and the *AG E* - Work Group E (Operative Technique). Deputy Minister Neiber can be said to have had no such characteristically internal organs, but Deputy Minister Schwanitz had. However, it was only one, the *OTS* - Operative-Technical Sector.

From this, it is clear that Mielke had full control over own comrades inside the *MfS*, because most things that consisted of internal organising and control were directly under him. The *SED*'s enormous control organ that was put to control the society did not after all only do that. The *MfS* did not only want to control the *SED*, but also its own within the *MfS*. As such, Mielke looked after that his control apparatus also formed the development of the society, which seems to go beyond both its power and role regarding the theory. These results lead to a weakening of the theory, since it was mainly the political power, i.e., the *SED*, which was to bring about and lead the political role towards the citizens of the GDR. Theoretically it may have done so, but not as dominative in practice. Few, if any, 'regular, civilised' was able to get information, knowledge and understanding of how the *MfS* operated, since Mielke managed to create this own society within the GDR society. By this, everything was kept more secret and effective, where the normal citizen seldom, if at all, was in contact with *MfS*' employed persons. Even the 'civilised' profession of medicine that existed in the GDR that up to that time had had long international tradition concerning professional secrecy, was not seen safe for an *MfS* employee to use. That is, due to the fact of having to give in one's personal information and possibly other intimate and sensitive information. Unnecessary coincidences such as those had to be avoided at all expense, if the apparatus was to function to its maximum. This resulted therefore to that one had own hospitals and medical offers.

It must have been highly secure, since having such an organ that managed to control both its own co-workers as well as the rest of the society the way the *MfS* did. On the other hand, one can question whether it showed to be as effective as it seems like. Firstly, since the employees after all were human beings, to a certain extent with own feelings of what were right actions to take at all times. By this, a

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[98] Not every unit of the *MfS*' internal and external organisation are considered, because the point is moreover to illustrate the fact through examples.

questioning of orders to control other fellow comrades within the Ministry highly likely appeared, which again led to that the Ministry now and then must have dealt with ineffectiveness due to not having 100% loyal co-workers. When acting 100% loyal, the result of believing in the work that was undertaken likely gave effects over time, which to a minimum presumably weakened the inner strength and credibility of the *MfS*. Secondly, controlling own personnel surely led to confusing orders and frustrating co-workers that might have lost track in regards to the idea of the meaning of it all. Thirdly, the enormous costs of accomplishing these operations over time can only have weakened the mission and effectiveness of the *MfS*' control. Not only did this give results to the *MfS* in general, but appeared also as negative, evidential facts on the financial balance of the GDR economy. As sum, it is therefore hard to doubt that this particular system of control showed itself to be somewhat dysfunctional, when taking the points above into consideration.

Concerning the external organisation, the other Deputy Ministers were to a larger degree present in comparison to Mielke. This form of organising mainly had the aim to run direct control with the population. The population was primarily both the *MfS*' employment agency and labour marked, which made sure the *MfS* had work to do. The citizens were thereby able to feel this surveillance both physically and psychically, maybe without actually knowing that it was a greater internal organisation that lied behind and stood for much of the basic work of the surveillance. However, without having had this internal organising effect, it is plausible to claim that the *MfS* never would have functioned as effective. Mielke's management here was mainly based on four different posts. Those were the Main Department II; Counter Intelligence with its Department M; Post Control, Main Department IX; Investigation Organ and Department XIV; Detention House, Punishment Execution. Deputy Minister Mittig's main responsibilities were the Main Department XIX; Traffic, Post, News and Main Department XX; State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground. Deputy Minister Neiber's main areas were the Main Department I; Defence Work in National People's Army and Border Troops, Main Department VI; Pass Control, Tourism, Inter Hotel, Main Department VIII; Observation/Investigation as well a the *ZKG* - Central Coordination Group; Escape, Moving. Deputy Minister Schwanitz' main area was the Department 26; Telephone Surveillance. This can be illustrated with a model:

INTERNAL:

EXTERNAL:

CITIZENS*

* As illustrated with the Main Department XX, the final stop in regards to the control being undertaken was the citizens of the GDR. The identical counted for the other units of the *MfS* listed under the external organisation

Figure 1.5: The relation between the *MfS'* internal and external organisation

1.5   The *MfS*' recruitment and infiltration of the society

1.5.1   Unofficial Co-workers, *GMS*', *OibE*'s and the recruitment

The wide dimensions of the *MfS*' comprehensive force and control apparatus seems to a large degree to have been based on an enormous network of Unofficial Co-workers, often having done the spadework in the security system. Overall, it has been difficult to estimate how many to any time was Unofficial Co-workers. However, people enganged in civil rights, *MfS* Generals as well as the Modrow government estimated in 1990 the number having been well over 100 000 persons for the current year.[99]   Fricke's estimate for 1990 indicates between 170 000 and 180 000 persons having had status as Unofficial Co-workers, but claims at the same time that more may have existed.[100]

Fricke is among those that has claimed that the *MfS*' Unofficial Co-workers were the most effective co-workers, and thereby the most important.[101]   The reason was that the majority of the co-workers apparently was busy with giving directions and guiding, and were thereby seldom out in the field where the spadework of controlling the population was carried out. The Unofficial Co-workers functioned in many ways as the *MfS*' operative tool. We are therefore going to look closer at the guidelines of the *IM*'s, different categories as well as their areas of work and how they were recruited.

The fundament for the recruitment of Unofficial Co-workers was *Richtlinie 21* (Guideline) from 20 November 1952.[102]   The aim with this Guideline was to seek after, recruit and work with agents in the population. These *IM*'s tasks gave the *MfS* a possibility to fight espionage, sabotage, look up underground movements and political-ideological splitting as well as getting the overview and hinder that people escaped the GDR. The fundamental way to work did not change mentionable during the *MfS*' history even if it later came new Guidelines. The *MfS* built up a surveillance system on every level of the society, operated through the Guideline 1/58. It achieved a system that by far infiltrated every level in the society: the political, cultural and scientific.[103]   As a result of amongst other things the

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[99] Cf. e.g., Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), *Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit - Seilschaften, Altkader, Regierungs- und Vereinigungskriminalität.* Band VIII. 1. Auflage. Baden-Baden 1995, p. 15.

[100] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 44.

[101] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*; see e.g. also Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, pp. 52-57; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 07.05.02, 16.05.02.

[102] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 39; H. Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Richtlinien und Durchführungsbestimmungen.* 1. Auflage. Berlin 1997, pp. 26-33.

[103] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 41; Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship,* p. 47; Müller-Enbergs, *op cit.*, pp. 33-44.

Berlin Wall's separation of Europe and the bipolar international system, the same Guideline was later repeated through Guideline 1/68. The only difference was that it was formulated more in detail, strengthened and stressed heavier due to an increased need for control being apparent.[104]

In 1979 a new Guideline came, Guideline 1/79, which gave the Unofficial Co-workers new tasks. This Guideline consisted of four points:[105]

1. to fight against attacks from the abroad and foreigners by finding out of their methods, intensions, etc.

2. fight own citizens in the GDR that showed to be against the regime and the regime's politics

3. fight against criminality and criminals

4. fight people that was a danger for the public and the people of the GDR

The Unofficial Co-workers' efforts, work and personality were described in detail and archived in special files, which were parted into three points.[106] The first point consisted of the personal file of the *IM*, where a photo of the actual *IM* was put in together with a description of the person. The description of the person was everything from what kind of spare time interests one had, to where one liked to shop the evening food, etc. Point two consisted of two parts. The one part contained the different reports the Unofficial Co-worker had delivered, while the other concerned the different meetings the Unofficial Co-worker and its different contact persons had had between them. The contact person wrote the meetings, whereas it referred to how the meetings were accomplished, where, what they talked about, what the next move was

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[104] Müller-Enbergs, *op cit*., pp. 45-51.

[105] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*; Müller-Enbergs, *op cit*., pp. 51-61.

[106] Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, pp. 45-46.

going to be, etc.[107]   Third and last point consisted of what the *MfS* gave the *IM*. That is, what sort of equipment and material the *IM* got, as for example documents, cameras, etc.

1.5.2   Different categories of Unofficial Co-workers, *GMS'* and *OibE*'s

The *MfS* had different *IM*'s to disposition in relation to what kind of tasks they carried out. Here follows the most typical categories, where the two latter are discussed closer based on their importance for the *MfS*' keeping of the control in the GDR particularly during the critical stages in the life of the GDR:

- *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter im bzw. für einen besonderen Einsatz, IME* (Unofficial Co-worker in, respectively, for a Special Operation). This group of persons was picked to carry out special missions outside their other areas of activities, in order to solve particular political-operative tasks.

- *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter Sicherheit, IMS* (Unofficial Co-worker Security). This group was responsible for controlling certain relations in the society, such as for example all social life and intercourse.

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[107] The most typical place for an *MfS* co-worker and an *IM* to meet was in so-called *Konspirative Wohnungen* (Conspiracy Flats) and/or *Konsprative Objekte* (Conspiracy Objects), which security before use had been cleared by the *MfS*. This meant that a flat stood ready when a co-worker of the *MfS* wanted to undertake secret talks with an *IM*. This was done in such a flat, since this was the safest, most secret and anonymous place these two mentioned persons were able to meet (cf. e.g. with point 1.5.2 below). However, this was not particularly stipulated only for *IM*'s, but rather all sorts of matters and co-workers of the *MfS* that needed to accomplish work through such means and methods (see for example below with the example of the First Lieutenant of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock). A "Legend" was created for this use, and if this for example was accomplished in a flat that was in private hands, the *MfS* had already been in contact with the owner of the flat, which furthermore already had been checked and clarified by the *MfS*. This way of working needed a cover story, which for the *MfS* was the legend. For anyone inside or outside the *MfS*, such a story was constructed in order to make the whole set up as credible as possible. In general, legends were used with the superior goal to bring *IM*'s, co-workers of the *MfS* as well as planned means and methods out in life with their most effective efforts. Concerning the owners of the flats, being involved in the work and/or with a legend or not, the *MfS* regularly controlled these owners. This was mainly done in order secretly to maintain the conspiracy, to make sure that the flat, the owner, the owner's family as well as the area where the flat was, all were under strictest control through a complete, frequent overview done by the *MfS*. Some of the controls being undertaken to this security of the flats and *IM*'s were done through the work of both the Departments M and 26 (Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, p. 95ff.; S. Suckut [ed.], *Das Wörterbuch der Staatssicherheit. Definition zur "politisch-operativen Arbeit"*. 2. Auflage. Berlin 1996, p. 217). However, the Main Department VIII also accomplished this security, when the Department 26 for example needed to enter a flat in order to put in its own type of control. Besides, another often used communicative way was done through 'Dead Post Boxes' ("*Toter Briefkasten*"), which meant that one practically dropped information in post boxes that were out of use, but which allegedly seemed to be in use for the official traffic (more to 'Dead Post boxes' in the next chapter).

- *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter Bearbeitung, IMB* (Unofficial Co-worker Elaboration). These co-workers' task was to build up closer relations to specific people, since these people already had been classified as suspicious regarding particular cases the *MfS* wanted to look into and elaborate thorough. The *IM*'s collected for example secret information at the working place.

- *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter zur Sicherung der Konspiration und des Verbindungswesens, IMK* (Unofficial Co-worker to the Security of the Conspiracy and Connection). With the last Guideline of the *IM*'s given in 1979, this group of Unofficial Co-workers were divided into several subgroups. Those were:

  1. persons having the responsibility of giving their own rooms or flats for availability in order to accomplish meetings of conspiracy
  2. persons having made the object they administrated available for meetings of conspiracy
  3. persons that used their official post address to receive post for the *MfS*, and in an already determined way inform a responsible co-worker about such
  4. persons that used their telephone connection in order to receive messages, and in an already determined way inform a responsible co-worker about such
  5. persons carrying the responsibility to secure and support the conspiracy

- *Hauptamtlicher Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, HIM* (Professional Unofficial Co-worker). The co-workers in this group worked as full time Unofficial Co-workers besides their 'regular' lives. These co-workers were financially supported from this work, as they were put in on long terms to do special political-operative work both inside and outside the territory of the GDR.

- *Führungs Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, FIM* (Leading Unofficial Co-worker). This group consisted of people that were the Unofficial Co-workers' superior, and was the closest leading organ on behalf of such co-workers. They had particular responsibility of the *IME*'s, *IMK*'s and *GMS*'.

- *Gesellschaftlicher Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit, GMS* (Society Co-worker for Security). This group was not active on a daily basis, but enrolled in the *MfS* as 'sleeping' co-workers. They were generally on guard on behalf of any eventual situations that could arise, often in combination with their daily work. The co-work with the *GMS* did not follow in a frame of conspiracy,

which we otherwise have seen was characteristically. Meetings with the *GMS*' mostly took place at their work or in public places. The *GMS*' were neither locked to a co-work of conspiracy, in difference to the *IM*'s. Furthermore, they normally did not carry a cover name. Besides, they mostly got into cooperation with the *MfS* out of own free will and convincement of the society model.

The two last mentioned groups were the *OibE* and *Unbekannter Mitarbeiter*, *UM* (Unknown Co-worker), which neither of them were Unofficial Co-workers. They were rather seen as yet other types of informants.

- *OibE* (Officer in Special Operation). As aforementioned, persons within this group of *MfS* servants were seen as belonging to the elite of part time co-workers. For different reasons, most of them had served the *MfS* for a long time carrying experience and high qualifications. Directly or indirectly, they were often situated in leading positions of the Ministry, the economy and work related to culture. Concerning the latter, they normally had their main job activities related to these areas of the society.[108] They were in most cases under the responsibility of the leader of the unit they belonged to; only in exceptions did they stay under the control of qualified and experienced *FIM*'s. Their meetings took place in the form of conspiracy, where the security was evaluated as high that they were not meeting in conspiracy flats used by *IM*'s or *GMS*'.

   Parts of their tasks were to control different instances and places, through activation in higher positions of all types of *MfS*' important institutions and organisations. They practically made controls of the different Departments in the DSP's and ADM's, churches, places of foreign travel where people had registered their wishes to travel to the West, these places' security, post and communication places, the universities and the TV and radio. In the ADM's (and DSP's), these co-workers were often joined in a special unit (*K 1*), which task was political-criminal offences. Within these workplaces, these types of co-workers were leaders, or, as long as they were enough persons in the same unit, they created a group. Other work personnel had difficulties in discovering that their colleges were *MfS* co-workers. Even when they earned far more than their colleges, the *OibE*'s received the same salaries as their colleges and avoided as such suspicion. At the same time, they were paid for their special efforts through own salaries directly from

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[108] *Ordnung* (Regulation) 6/86. BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/86; Gauck, *op cit*., p. 67; see also, R. Grimmer, W. Irmler, W. Opitz, W. Schwanitz (eds.), *Die Sicherheit. Zur Abwehrarbeit des MfS*. Band 2. 1. Auflage. Berlin 2002, p. 113. The command from 1986 was an analogue to the one from 1968, which in 1986 additionally contained collected and summed up experiences from the practice of such work.

the *MfS*. Everything took place in the hidden, and great efforts were made to present them as being as similar as the regular worker was. Exactly by not acting visible with a known threat picture, the *MfS* collected great success in getting the necessary information to carry out wanted control. As we will experience below, the Department M took directly or indirectly advantage of such co-workers.

The *OibE*'s were not generally placed on a workplace to control one certain person. Their task was mainly to control and report on the atmosphere at the workplace. They had not direct power to order changes at a place of work. The task was to practice influence over the leader's and/or the leader group's decisions.[109] They did this without waking any particular suspicion, since they were trained and additionally not by chance placed to carry out a special form of control.

When the reports were to be handed in, the *OibE*'s work task was to control that the responsible director for its department did not hand in a report based on false and/or information based on lies. The *OibE*'s often corrected the reports that were sent over. When this was done, the reports were handed directly over to Mielke's aforementioned *ZAIG* group, which again controlled the *OibE*'s' report before it was further on delivered to the Politburo for closer discussion. By the *ZAIG* being able to filtrate information to the Politburo, it thereby influenced important decisions. The *MfS* with Mielke on the top had the direct control and collection of the information, and reported on the atmosphere in the different parts of the society. In practise, it seems as if Mielke also here had a tactical objection to how this information was to be treated. Had a report revealed large problems on a field a member of the Politburo was responsible for, Mielke was able to see to that this particular report was kept secret and reached neither the Politburo nor the responsible person. As illustrated earlier, even in a modest sense, it was preferred that no negative descriptions of the society were to exist, and if that happened Mielke himself was in the delicate situation where the *MfS* was supposed to use its arbitrary power and control against the responsible person in the Politburo. Since it was like this in theory, it meant the *MfS* was able to point the sword even against its own closest ones in the *SED*'s leadership. The *MfS* and Mielke achieved a more independent role in the GDR's power hierarchy than assumed, whereas not 'only' having been the party's tool compared to how Friedrich and Brzezinski in their theory describe a security service's position.

On the one side, with regards to the GDR's existence, Mielke's holding back of critical reports was therefore more a thought genius move than to

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[109] Gauck, *op cit*., p. 68.

deliver the critics. On the other side, this also became the GDR's lane, since the tendency was to look away when negative reports of the society were given, whereas with time great changes were necessary. In contrary to what Moscow and Gorbatchev in the leading position tried to do at the end of the 1980's, one had few clear attempts on reforms in the GDR. When they came, they came too late. The *SED* regime and GDR were not to save.

Even if the society critics not directly went out on Mielke personally, one can ask how the reactions *de facto* would have been if any form of critics had been presented from the Ministry Mielke was responsible for. What could have happened to Mielke if he handed over unacceptable numbers of negative reports, seen in relation to what the GDR history had shown in regards to critical forces? Compared to the information about the red suitcase, it is obvious to believe that Mielke all the time was conscious on how his position was to be secured within the totalitarian system's own logic. Mielke avoided critics for example by not handing in negative reports. This gave him also time and possibilities to straighten out the critics his especially secret co-workers (the *OibE*'s) + *ZAIG* group had given regarding information. First after the problems had been solved, Mielke chose to put forward the different situations to the Politburo as if everything was normal and under control. The society model did not let any open space for self-critics, because that would have gone out on its carrying beams with deadly outcome. This strengthens the theory, because it shows how the *MfS*' roles and ways of acting contributed to keeping the *SED* regime at its power. Even Mielke closed the eyes to plausible critical relations, because the power elite had necessities to underline the system's excellence. As having been onto earlier, Mielke possibly also had personal motives for this. The important was that all actively supported the regime, where the unity for it was Alpha and Omega.

During the summer of 1990, the *BStU*'s archives had revealed that it was totally circa 3000-registered *OibE*'s, even if there presumably were more.[110] The estimation of the approximately 3000 came firstly because of that these were registered. Secondly, that they also were registered after having received money for carried out work. However, the assumption that it existed more similar cases is based on the reason that many of the *OibE*'s were not registered, neither as persons nor as receivers of salaries.

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[110] Gauck, *op cit*. Of the circa 3000, circa half of them were active at the Central, a quarter in the Main Department Reconnaissance and the rest in the different ADM's (cf. e.g., Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 118).

The other and last group we shall discuss is the *UM*.[111]

- *Unbekannter Mitarbeiter, UM* (Unknown Co-worker). This group of Un-official Co-workers was somewhat extraordinary.[112] While the *OibE* had a job relation outside the *MfS*, the *UM*'s had an occupation within the *MfS*. As the totalitarian leader fears all enemies and impulses, Mielke saw the need to observe the *MfS*' own observers, which presumably needs no further explanation. In such a pressed situation, Mielke's, and for that matter the *SED*'s, solution was not to pull back, opening the system and thereby make it easier for the population including themselves. The result was the opposite, also leading to increasingly irrelevant and hereunder ineffective control at last. The fundament for the creation of the *UM* built on a deepening and complementation of the tasks an *OibE* had. This informant got a completely new identity. It always operated alone, was automatically isolated from contact with the *MfS* property as well as fellow comrades in the *MfS*, as long as they all did not have the same status.[113] Therefore, this person was *"der Geheime unter Geheimen"* ("the Secret One Among the Secret Ones"). Its special work task was to control co-workers of the *MfS*, especially those that worked inside counterintelligence, agents that spied on agents from the West and agents that had contact with western agents. As such, this informant functioned as "*der Überwacher der Überwacher*" ("the Observer of the Observers").

[111] There existed few co-workers of this sort, as they up to the end of the GDR's existence only existed under the leadership of the Main Department Reconnaissance, Main Department VIII or Main Department Cadre and Education (cf. e.g., Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 122). Nor did they exist in all the ADM's. Except from the Central, they were only educated in the ADM's of Karl-Marx-Stadt, Cottbus, Erfurt, Halle and Rostock. It existed a total of only circa 100 such co-workers, whereas the Main Department Reconnaissance and Main Department VIII together had circa 25, the Main Department Cadre and Education 45 and the ADM's circa 30.

[112] The First Lieutenant talked to, of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock, held such a status (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a First Lieutenant of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 14.05.02, 18.05.02). This person claimed that its position sometimes for example resulted in being employed in a firm as for example a secretary when working under cover. When such happened, the whole firm consisted of people from the Department VIII, which in a hidden way accomplished tasks on behalf of their orders in the *MfS*. As aforementioned, this work needed a cover story, whereas the use of a legend was seen as necessary. Furthermore, it was of importance in order to be able to infiltrate into for example the group the *MfS* observed (cf. e.g., Gill & Schröter, *op cit*., p. 139ff.). According to what the recruiters of the *MfS* told the First Lieutenant, it was seen as a valuable person in many ways for this type of work, since being a woman able to join in on special tasks men were not able to do alone. This apparently showed to be a success for the *MfS*, as this resulted in the ADM of Rostock starting to recruit more women to nearly all units after her entrance, having been the first woman of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock.

[113] When they had the same status, these persons built a team, as the example of the First Lieutenant has shown.

The group of Unknown Co-workers was founded as late as in April 1986, as a result of the political development in the Soviet Union.[114]   In other words, the *MfS* answered on Gorbatchev's step in into Soviet politics by extending the control, not reducing it. This illustrates how Mielke estimated the political world. In other words, the *MfS* went against Moscow's political signals. This is however yet another example to that Mielke rode the herd on more than one case simultaneously. After all, we know that he finally was loyal to Gorbatchev. However, he took own decisions without conferring with the Politburo, Honecker or Moscow, something that weakens the close relation to Moscow. At the same time, it should be mentioned that splits like this only revealed itself towards the end of the GDR's time, when Gorbatchev's 'liberalisation and liberation' of the Soviet society increased. That the *MfS* increased the control in the GDR strengthens the theory, because the totalitarian system still considered it appropriate that the force and control apparatus held a grip on the population. At this point of time, Honecker, Mielke and the rest of the Politburo had unified goals on how they were to run the GDR, despite of Gorbatchev's politics. However, we have seen that this changed within short time, where the reform group Mielke joined the autumn of 1989 adjusted considerably to the will of Moscow.

1.6   No one exempted from recruitment

As we earlier were onto, people that were born and grown up in the GDR had in practice all the time been nourished and manipulated with information on how perfect the GDR was. The country was to be understood as a peaceful nation, which did not want anything bad to anyone. As a stage in the propaganda process, the *SED* leadership often repeated often that the country would not go to war, was anti-imperialistic and anti-fascistic, a state where all had the right to work, welfare and a place to live.[115]   In the GDR, it was told that it existed bad and strong forces in the West, which at any time would crush the peaceful state and the other socialist countries. Thereafter the West would force onto the citizens the unfair, capitalist system, where only a few rich people owned everything and where people were used as a material to enrich the wealthy persons to become even richer. The latter was also considered as the reason to both world wars. In accordance with the theory's view on the communication in totalitarian states, the GDR citizens were forced to have a specific view on reality and belief. Related to the latter, this can even be further underlined, as neither the youth was excluded from the *IM* system of the *MfS*. After all, they grew up in a context that made it

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[114] Cf. Regulation Nr 10/86. BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 32/86.
[115] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit.*, p. 83.

difficult for them to be critical to the GDR.

In 1989 as much as six percent of a total of 170 000 and 180 000 persons with status as Unofficial Co-workers, were less than 18 years.[116] The *MfS*' tactics also concerned having recruited and infiltrating groups of young school pupils, so that they could report about deviation among pupils and teachers. Every single young *IM* had a *Führungsoffizier* (Leading Officer) that received information orally. When a pupil did not report directly to its leading officer, it was done via the parents. In such cases, the pupil's parents was his/hers leading officer on behalf of the *MfS*. The main reason to why some parents were the pupils' leading officers was that these parents were seen as especially trusting by the regime. The arguments to that many pupils chose to report to the *MfS* on irregular situations at their schools were many. The five most important reasons were:[117]

1. ideological convincement

2. moral indifference

3. press means[118]

4. own interest[119]

5. family related situation[120]

Since the *MfS* managed to recruit young citizens, it indicates that the *SED* and *MfS* were well on their way to achieve control over large parts of the society. Many pupils enrolled for service because of ideological convincement. They believed in the regime's excellence, no matter if it was the propaganda as such that had laid the fundament for the belief or not. For example, many had grown up in a household where both parents were convinced communists and members of the *SED*, which was a natural force to enrol.[121] No matter the motives, the result was that

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[116] K. Behnke & J. Wolf (eds.), *Stasi auf dem Schulhof*. Berlin 1998, p. 13.

[117] Behnke & Wolf (eds.), *op cit.*, p. 14.

[118] For example certain groups such as punks, neo-nazis, etc., were pressed to give help to the *MfS* under threat of otherwise being taken into prison.

[119] For example, some sport athlete's motives held the interest of either receiving or maintaining sport scholarships.

[120] Some were driven by the wish to belong to a group/organisation, which apparently worked for something important, and that these as persons contributed to the functioning of the organisation through their actions.

[121] Over 2 300 000 citizens of approximately 17 000 000 were per October 1989 members of the *SED*. In December the same year, the number of *SED* members had fallen dramatically and counted nearly 1 780 000 persons. The member number in January 1990 was all the way down in catastrophic 283 882 persons. These numbers are naturally a result of the period before and after the GDR's collapse (see e.g., G. Neugebauer & R. Stöss, *Die PDS. Geschichte, Organisation, Wähler, Konkurrenten*. Opladen 1996, p. 147).

the *SED* and *MfS* had succeeded, because they got people into the *MfS* on behalf of this reason. The same cannot be said about those having been enrolled because of moral indifference.[122]   They were in practice passively participating, but for their own and the family's sake to be inside the *MfS* meant that the risk all in all decreased to get in trouble with the regime's control apparatus. Amongst other things, the participation led to that they were not excluded from the society, isolated from friends, and so forth. However, this indifference in itself contributes to illustrate how strong the regime's system was, since they after all chose that side instead of the opposite, or simply another. In terms of press means, the choices were not especially many. The most common methods were press means, which due to different characteristics mainly went out on the family. Even for those that had done criminal actions there were in practice few choices, if any. Since, either one did the sentence one had been given for the punishment, in addition to that one after having ended the prison stay most likely risked to experience an extra punishment on indecisive time given by the population. The latter punishment came because of not being accepted by the society, due to earlier having been convicted of a crime. The other alternative was to work for the *MfS*. Many refused to carry out work for the Ministry, but after some means of press had been presented most agreed to enrol after all.[123]   To use press means as a reason for recruitment is in clear contrast to the two first points. Equally, it is a rational acting in totalitarian systems to use power. In practice, people did not themselves choose participation, but worked for the *MfS* under force. However, this category of people was not less as big a contributor to the system than the persons being in the classifications of ideological convincement and moral indifference.

In relation to own interest, in some ways this touches some of the other classifications. Thus, because the main aim the young persons in this category had that also is the equality to the ideological convincement and moral indifference, was primarily to achieve something for own credits. However, the motives were not that most persons were especially ideological convinced. Additionally, many showed moral indifference to the system. Persons that were recruited because of their own interest had approximately same motives as the working stock, meaning that they themselves got the *SED* membership only for the carrier's sake. By

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[122] This type of engagement might also be understood as if one simply hung onto the main stream of the system.

[123] Cf. e.g., W. Stiller, *Im Zentrum der Spionage*. 5. Auflage. Mainz 1986, pp. 68-69; BStU/Gera, MfS - BV Gera. AIM 153/73. Concerning the latter reference, a 17-year-old Rolling Stones fan stood confronted with such a case of press means practically carrying two alternatives. In the first place, he had sent illegal mail to the RIAS' youth sender, expressing his critics to the 1969 "Meeting of Younger Socialists" in Berlin. The Department M had snapped up his post, where the *MfS* finally came up with two suggestions to him on what to do: either he had to choose to go in prison, or he could work as *IM*.

enrolling, many achieved their wishes to come through, something that would not have been the case if they had not enrolled. This was a fair deal for the *MfS*, in terms of having a sort of trade where the Ministry achieved what it wanted. In other words, it built upon mutuality, by the *MfS* giving privileges as back payment for carried out work. Since many young people were an easy trade off, the *MfS* got to complete its goal by easy means. That is, to observe as many as possible, because young people did not meditate as thorough over all the consequences it brought with it the same way an adult possibly would have done. In addition, they worked for the regime, and what was wrong with that? Techniques of convincement were not especially in use, since many young people fell for the temptation as soon as they knew they would get their dreams fulfilled by doing a job for the *MfS*. In relation to the family related situation, it is partly connected to the issue of own interest. The belonging to a group in shape of feeling that one did an important piece of work stimulated first of all own wishes towards feeling excitement and be others superior. Neither these persons were especially difficult to recruit, since the starting point was that they sold themselves to the *MfS*. For this category, the ideological convincement as well as the moral indifference were subordinated the individual's motivation in the recruitment process.

The school pupil's contribution was also used as propaganda for the regime. Young people that were presented as the correct, right and wise people that had done the right choices for the future's GDR.[124] The youth was the future, and this age group was presented as rational individuals that had thought twice about their alternatives before choosing to become co-workers for the *MfS*. Had the *MfS* managed to recruit a young promising person, the same person practised influence on others. This furthermore led to recruiting more correct and firm believers to undertake work for the Ministry. This strengthens the theory, since the *MfS* managed to recruit and mobilise most levels of the society for the sake of maintaining the system, just as Friedrich and Brzezinski points out. Furthermore, the *SED* was correctly the highest guiding leader that dictated the people's behaviour and way of thinking, since the party's understanding of the only right principals to live by was Marxism-Leninism. This underlines the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski, because the regime's ideology and the unity's message often were spread by the help of young agents that acted as the state system's messengers in different forums.

Apart from press means and partly the moral indifference, the main cause with these forms of recruitment was that that both parts got something back. Overall, this made it easy for the *MfS*, since the setting around the whole business functioned with few obstacles. Most of the co-workers achieved what they wanted, but the *MfS* achieved more. One the one side, the *MfS* was the winner. Some sac-

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[124] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., pp. 120-121.

rifices from the *MfS* to the co-workers in return led to the *MfS* getting important back payments in form of that the control over the individual became considerably easier to keep via the co-workers. On the other side, it is not sure how effective the recruitment and contribution from these young GDR citizens were. It is questionable which of the parts were the actual victims, and which were the culprit. These young people grew up in a system where most persons likely did not know of other forms of living and reaction patterns. Seen in relation to the regime's socialisation process, it is maybe easier to understand the motives and interests these citizens had. Many regular GDR citizens thought they were contributing to creating a better every day for others and themselves, which neither is false. Through the regime's universal socialisation, which we have seen started already in the kindergarten, many were convinced that they acted correctly as long as they acted in accordance to what the regime's wishes were.[125] After all, one was educated to believe the leadership always to be right. Compared to the theory, this was exactly what the leaders of the republic wanted to give clear signals of, and which it by far succeeded in doing. As an extension of the latter, by far the most decisive contributor to maintain the system of society, the *SED* had the *MfS*.

1.7   An apparently softening up of the control

According to Joachim Gauck, who once led the *BStU*, the GDR's leaders wished more people in the *MfS* than Heinrich Himmler had needed to control Hitler's Third Reich.[126] It has been estimated that the number of informants in the GDR in relation to the population was seven times as comprehensive to what Nazi-

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[125] It was not only the younger ones in the GDR that reported on persons of their own generations. Additionally, adults in the *MfS* controlled the youngest ones, as the Ministry also saw other ways of getting hold of fruitful information. Such happened regularly on the school Manuela Hamann (born and grown up in the GDR) went to (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Manuela Hamann. Rostock, November 1999, June 2002; see also e.g., H.-J. Maaz, *Der Gefühlsstau. Ein Psychogramm der DDR*. Berlin 1990, p. 26). The representatives of the regime legitimised such behaviour as being normal dialogues, by referring to that one achieved a cleaner socialist way of thinking and life pattern. In reality, it was sophisticated control. The control was organised hidden from the GDR leadership's highest authority, and executed by the *MfS*' Main Department XX. The responsible for questioning reported thereafter on the condition to this *MfS* unit. At the school, such questioning took the form of the teachers asking the pupils about what type of programmes they and their families watched on TV. Manuela Hamann has told Nessim Ghouas that she in the aftermath easier could understand the special logic at the time. The teachers addressed themselves friendly to the pupils, and suggested for example that they should notice what kind of design the clock on the TV broadcasts had the next time the parents watched news. The news broadcasts on eastern contra western broadcasts had different design. As such, the teachers knew what kind of sending the parents and the rest of the household were watching. Those anomalies that had watched western news broadcasts were further on reported to the *MfS*' Main Department XX).

[126] Gauck, *op cit*., p. 61.

Germany had during the whole period 1933-1945.[127]

As we have seen, much speaks for the physical control aspect having gotten milder with the years, amongst other, due to Honecker having signed the Helsinki Final Act. This was however not a decision taken by the *SED* leadership as such, since the *SED* followed in the footsteps of Moscow. This strengthens the relation Moscow had to the GDR. Compared to Stalin and Ulbricht's regimes, the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and the GDR under Honecker with time stood forward as more liberal and less controlling.[128] The thaw period that was introduced between the superpowers at the end of the 1960's made as we have seen the West German *Ostpolitik* possible. This was an original approach between the two German states, amongst others, leading to the GDR opening for more visitors from the West as well as increasing the state's international contact sphere. Nevertheless, the system was far from changing drastically. More sophisticated methods of control were used to hide negative signals internationally. An increase in the Unofficial Co-workers was therefore constantly seen as important tools to reveal problems to the regime before they developed further, and/or at all. It was therefore not odd that the *MfS* had the need for more *IM*'s. At the same time, their functions and roles were fine shaped and further extended. Indicating an increase of the control with the enemies, the growth of the *MfS*' *IM*'s illustrates yet another tool the security service applied in order to maintain the party's leading power. Reflected in the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski, such sort of move shown is an important role for the security service, in order is to secure the mass party of the state with means and methods contributing to underline its position. The *SED* regime's new needs influenced the *MfS*' ways of acting. The main difference was that the control was restructured and carried out differently. It is however somewhat more complex to point out who the persons that worked for the *MfS* were. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the co-workers came from and had different backgrounds. Additionally, they belonged to different generations as well as the efforts having been undertaken were made from both genders.[129]

The table below gives us a picture of how it looked like before the fall of the GDR, when this activity widely had developed:

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[127] Cf. e.g., Der Spiegel Spezial, Nr. 1/1993.

[128] E. S. Campbell, *Germany's Past & Europe's Future. The Challenges of West German Foreign Policy*. Virginia 1989.

[129] BStU/Müller-Enbergs, *op cit.*, p. 13; BStU, *MfS-Bezirksverwaltung Rostock. Daten und Fakten zur Bezirksverwaltung*. Außenstelle Rostock 1999.

Table 1.3: An illustration of the number of citizens per *IM* in the 15 ADM's,
for the years 1985 and 1986

Average in the GDR for both 1985 and 1986: 120

Number of citizens under average per *IM*			Number of citizens over average per *IM*		
	1985	1986		1985	1986
Cottbus	79	80	Gera	125	125
Frankfurt/Oder	94	95	Dresden	128	128
Schwerin	96	94	Karl-Marx-Stadt	141	134
Magdeburg	95	95	Leipzig	143	141
Suhl	95	99	Berlin	146	148
Rostock	101	100	Erfurt	159	149
Neubrandenburg	106	109	Halle	156	159
Potsdam	116	117			

Source (partly): BStU/Müller-Enbergs, *op cit.*, p. 26

The table (1.3, Part B) shows the number of citizens per *IM* for the years 1985 and 1986 in the 15 ADM's. Numbers for the ADM of Rostock show that 11 508 persons were *IM*'s in 1975, whereas in 1985 it had decreased to 9436, and in 1989 to 9194.[130]   Seen in relation to Honecker's milder political signals, it may seem as if the ADM of Rostock in the period from 1975 to 1985 enjoyed the party leader's liberal tendency. However, the numbers alone do not necessarily reflect the result from this. As we have seen, the *MfS* did not mentionable loosen the grip on the population. Another possible explanation is that the regime not constantly managed to keep its entire stock of *IM*'s active at all times. A third explanation might be that the numbers do not capture what we have seen earlier in regards to that many *IM*'s got other tasks in the *MfS*. A fourth reason can be that since none of the aforementioned sources have managed to state the exact number of the number of *IM*'s that existed at any time, we cannot exclusively therefore draw the conclusion that the numbers indicates a decrease in the surveillance. The common result with these explanations shows that one cannot with full security claim that the speech of the numbers is a unanimous signal to that the surveillance decreased. Additionally, the numbers from the table also show that it exist other cases of doubts, compared to the *MfS*' priorities. After closer examination, it is not directly logical that for example the ADM's of Cottbus and Frankfurt/Oder had more *IM*'s per inhabitant, than the ADM's of Erfurt and Gera had. This can

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[130] BStU, *Fakten und Zahlen zum MfS*. Außenstelle Rostock 1999.

be reasoned based on that the *MfS* most likely would have been more active in areas which laid closer to the borders of the West, rather than in the ADM's of Cottbus and Frankfurt/Oder. The two latter ADM's both bordering towards the East (Poland). On the other side, it is maybe not that sensational that these places were under the average, with thoughts to what kind of situation having existed in Poland. That is, because in the period before, during and after the Solidarity movement (1980-81), Poland was unstable and threatened by revolution. The high preparedness of *IM*'s can explain the GDR regime's fear towards a spread of the tendencies in Poland.[131]

However, it is interesting to compare the ADM of Rostock's period from 1975 to 1985 with the numbers for the ADM of Rostock's period from 1985 to 1989. During the ten-year period (1975-1985), the number of *IM*'s decreased with 2072 persons, whereas for the four-year period (1985-1989) the numbers decreased only with 242.[132] Additionally, the ADM of Rostock was stable in the years 1985/86 in relation to be one of the ADM's that were lowest placed under the GDR's average. The same stability can be said to have counted for the rest of the GDR's ADM's. Compared to Honecker's political direction towards the end of the regime, much indicates that he did not want to loosen the grip on the population. That is, also when considering the aforementioned growth and thereby the scales of the number of *MfS* co-workers together with the practice of the governing of the GDR. In other words, it does not seem as if there was achieved a further liberalisation, possibly as a result of that Honecker did not wish reforms in the GDR in the same way Gorbatchev tried to practice in the Soviet Union. That the specific number for 1989 - no matter which direction - did not change mentionable from 1985, is most likely due to the split inside the *SED* leadership where the reform group together with Moscow held the GDR's and Honecker's political development in lock.

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[131] Additionally, not only were more *IM*'s mobilised, as for example the control of the post tightened (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). This was a typical reason for the *MfS* to increase its work, which also showed to be a fact during for example the Prag Spring. However, the *MfS* did not stand all by itself when it came to such operations. The largest contributor of control to such matters remained the Soviet Union and its *KGB*.

[132] I.e., the number for the ten-year period decreased almost 3.5 times as fast as during the completely four-year period.

1.8   Other forms and places of recruitment, infiltration and control

1.8.1   Different groupings within the population

There were many ways of getting people recruited into the *MfS*. No wonder, as there also existed different places in the society the *MfS* wished to observe. Looking at the different methods of recruitment show how adapted the *MfS* was, and in some ways flexible in order to adjust the methods to its needs. In the *MfS*' earliest years, the Ministry recruited soldiers from WW II. This was not surprising, given that most of the men over 15 years had been soldiers. The way to recruit these persons was done by different methods. Most commonly was through award by giving better food rations, a place to live, voluntarily sign up for the Soviet led anti-fascistic schools for prisoners of war and thereafter being questioned to enrol in the new police force of the *SBZ*. The system was superior the individual on some points, mainly because many were vulnerable economically and as such became an easy target. At this time, Germany was in ruins, and the living standard was very poor for large parts of the population. By tempting with awards, the recruitment process was relatively easy. Those that let themselves enrol had little to loose, at the same time as the system got cheap expertise. However, the population was not only stroked by the war. In addition, the coming leaders of the GDR were hit, as a result of Germany being in ruins. As we have been onto, the political power was built up like a pyramid, where the Soviet Union was at the top. One of the best examples of a person that was recruited at this time is Hans Modrow, who later was going to be the GDR's next to the last Prime Minister. Childs and Popplewell claim that Modrow immediately became a firm communist, after having been a convinced supporter of the Third Reich in 1945 at an age of 17 years when the Red Army took him to prisoner.[133]   Even earlier members of Hitler's *SS* were recruited to the *DVP*, and many of those recruited to the *MfS* in this period were illegally transferred to the *DVP*.[134]

At the beginning of the 1960's, the *MfS* had for real become the *SED*'s tool of securing power. In 1962, over 92% of the *MfS*' employees were also members of the *SED*. The *SED* had thereby so to say secured full support from its most important force and control apparatus, with the intension that the Ministry was to remain loyal to the *SED* leadership's political will. The rest of the *MfS* employees that were not members of the *SED* were either very young or worked in routine characteristically areas like administration. Worth noting is that of the total *MfS* personnel in 1962 there were only 15.8% that had ended education on *Volksschule*

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[133] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 77.

[134] *SS*, *Schutzstaffel* (Protection Force), was founded as Hitler's own personal elite of bodyguards.

level.[135]   The aspect of time considered, this is not necessarily an indicator that the *MfS* consciously had as purpose to recruit people with low education only because the party this way easier managed to distance itself from internal opposition as a result of less critical forces. Of different reasons, it does not seem as if the Ministry at this time had too many to choose between. A main reason that narrowed the possibilities on choices was based on the heritage the GDR took over after the end of WW II. Another reason can be traced back to how the situation was after the Berlin Wall (1961) was built, where we have seen that the GDR was not left with many people holding higher education. Thus, because this group, ahead of the building of the Berlin Wall, had left the republic. During 1962, the *MfS* had approximately 25 000 full time co-workers.[136]   Compared to 1950 where it 'only' had 2700 persons, there had taken place a build up of huge format and strength. The number was only going to continue growing with time.

The *MfS* anyway continued to recruit people with low education, possibly because one easier was able to form them through own raise and by this control eventual internal opposition. The *MfS* nevertheless also employed persons with high education. This was necessary, since the secret police work became more technology based with time, and because the *MfS* more often than earlier was involved beyond the GDR's borders. At the same time, this was a sign of the development in the GDR society. As in many other countries, the education level among the population increased during the 1960's and 1970's. Many promising young persons were already during the study period recruited to serve their country. This was for example the physics student Werner Stiller's destiny, as he in December 1970 was recruited to work as an Unofficial Co-worker.[137]   1 August 1972, he entered service as a full time employee at the *MfS*' headquarters in Berlin, holding the rank of a Lieutenant. Students belonged to a group that was brilliant to recruit, firstly because most were members of the *FDJ* or *SED*. Many of them joined the party because they easier could fulfil their career wishes. For many students, a membership in the party was the only way to get forward, and their personal career and future aspects were thereby dependable upon the regime's future and strength. Most of them had something to loose if the regime experienced people working against its existence. This led to that students were easier to recruit for *MfS*, regardless if they had membership in the *SED* or not.

It existed also other reasons to why one recruited university people into

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[135] BStU/J. Giesecke, *BF informiert: Die Hauptamtlichen 1962. Zur Personalstruktur des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit*. Nr. 1/1994, p. 16. The *Volksschule* level equals today's high school level, however only until having reached age 17.

[136] Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.

[137] Stiller, *op cit*.

the *MfS*.[138]   Professors, university teachers and students were looked upon as one of the most resource strong groups of the society. Not only were they responsible for the coming generation's education and thereby ideological education, in relation to the theory's description of the ideology and the one-party state. The GDR's leadership also feared that alternative political ideas would grow and spread among the most educated. As such, this group became objects of surveillance for the *MfS*, because they were understood as those that often put critical questions towards the political system and the people in power. However, this also happens to be the case in western democratic societies. In relation to totalitarian societies, the main difference between the two systems of society is the danger that one party in a western democracy so to say dictates and controls how the science shall be understood and taught, by far is smaller. It was therefore different reasons to that this group was between the most interesting to infiltrate. The most practical solution for the *MfS* was to recruit persons that already were inside the settings, because they knew best how the relations and spheres were. Secondly, it became easier for the *MfS* to keep control, since the persons inside these settings observed their own colleges. Given this group's frequent travels and close contacts with colleges in other countries, the recruited functioned at the same time as the *MfS*' co-worker on the trips abroad. It became like this easier to report on deviate tendencies to the last detail concerning their colleges.

Maybe the strongest mean the *MfS* had on the university sector was the Ministry's decisive influence on many persons' destinies and careers. Amongst other things, as we already have seen in regards to the system's approach and as we shall see later in relation to the Departments M and 26, the *MfS* was by far the *SED*'s mean towards controlling and regulated who got to study as well as who were registered to carry out research. Furthermore, the Ministry did similar in regards to who got to be teachers, forthcoming persons to important positions like professor positions, who were denied to teach independent of any reason, etc. It is been estimated that 80% or more of the GDR's professors were members of the *SED*. Without estimating a specific number to how many of this group that would have let themselves enrol, it is close to assume that more would have been positive to do so, mainly for the concerns of career opportunities. For example, at the Humboldt University in East Berlin, it is estimated that circa 25% of the academic staff was in the *MfS*. One operates with the identical percent for those that worked

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[138] Amongst others, this was the Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock's tasks to solve (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 07.05.02, 16.05.02). Sometimes this task exceeded its normal range, as the *KGB* and Central also were involved. The latter came about since having and holding an overview of what happened between the abroad and GDR was considered to be of particular interest to the highest leaders of the party and state organs.

in the administration for higher education.[139] This shows yet another area where one of the GDR's most important sectors was regulated by the party, a sector that primarily shall contribute to creative, individual and - what is considered a matter of course - independent thinking.

It was not only at the universities the *MfS* tried to recruit people. Dirk Stadie, born and grown up in the GDR, has told that he was exposed of a laborious recruit attempt in 1983 right after he was finished with his education as *Metallbauer* (Metal Worker) in Neubrandenburg.[140] He was one of the best pupils in the final class, and was invited to a talk with the school's leadership. As he later understood, one of the meeting's participants was a representative from the *MfS*. At the meeting, it was positively put forward that he was a particularly good student, which the GDR regime wanted to invest in. In addition, he also had good social abilities, and qualities only a loyal and good GDR citizen for the future had. They gave him laudatory notice, and the purpose of the meeting ended the way the hosts wanted. He was offered a full time employment in Mielke's personal guard force Guard Regiment "Feliks Dzierzynski".[141]

He admitted that the offer was very good. It was filled with prestige to be a member of the guard regiment, which brought privileges such as a salary way above what the regular GDR citizen earned. Nevertheless, out of different reasons, Stadie finally denied joining the force. One reason for the denial was that he had heard that this force acted especially violent. He felt that he did not identify himself with the force. Another reason was that he and everyone he was in close contact with, had to break up all contact they may have had with the West.[142] This included also near family. This concerned him personally, since his girlfriend and

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[139] Welt am Sonntag, 10.04.94.

[140] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Dirk Stadie. Neubrandenburg, November 1999, April 2002. In addition, one of the author's interviewees that worked for the *MfS* was recruited in similar forms, as responsible co-workers of the *MfS* turned up at this person's work in order of recruitment (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a First Lieutenant of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 14.05.02, 18.05.02).

[141] Compare with figure 1.1 Part B, outlined earlier. Mielke named this force's name to the honour of the first leader of the Tcheka, Feliks Dzierźyński. The force was subordinated the *AGM* (The Minister's Work Group) and led by Major General Döhring, who reported directly to Mielke. It consisted of more than 10 000 soldiers, military equipped with anything from special education to special weapons (BStU, *Die Organisationsstruktur des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit 1989. Vorläufiger Aufriß nach dem Erkenntnisstand von Juni 1993*. Nr. 2/1993; Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 47; Schwan, *op cit*., p. 130).

[142] Two of the persons Nessim Ghouas conversed with happened to be in the same situation, during when they faced possible work in the *MfS* (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 07.05.02, 16.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a First Lieutenant of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 14.05.02, 18.05.02). Nevertheless, even though the parents of the wife of the Captain lived in the FRG they were although allowed to maintain contact with them, which was an exception.

her family had different family relations in the West.

In spite of the turn down, he felt the *MfS* still had not given him up. He was called in to another meeting. At the meeting he was threatened with the fact that he at as late a stage in life as possible was to be called in to do the obligatory military service. The leaders of the meeting knew that this was inconvenient for Stadie based on that this would disturb his family and job situation. This was in 1983, and when the Wall fell in 1989, he had not yet been called in. He interprets it this way that the *MfS* maintained its threat. This situation tells us how a citizen of the GDR experienced the regime's use of means of power, when resisting its decisions. Arbitrary power and forced socialisation were the *MfS* and system's way of treating their citizens. This can be related back to Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory, whereas this illustrates how strong a security service controlled and pressed its own population.

1.8.2   The National People's Army, the German People's Police and the *MfS*

We have seen above how the *MfS* worked closely together with, and infiltrated in other organs of the GDR. That was not all the *MfS* mastered, as even those that were in the regular police got ideological and military education. A part of the education took place through a hard physical and psychical program.[143]   Reflected in a totalitarian way of thinking, this way to teach was first of all aimed towards that the pupils were made conscious regarding the correct development of the society and ideology. Through ideological training, the recruits were stressed to understand what kind of important and leading role the *SED* had. The recruits were at the same time told how important it was to cooperate with other mechanisms of defence such as the *MfS*, *NVA* and Soviet forces. Given the ideology, the structure, training and the tasks the *DVP* had, it was for most of the persons in the *DVP* seen as normal to work closely with the *MfS*. Alternatively, at least have an understanding and interest to do so, if asked upon.

The leader of the *MdI*, Friedrich Dickel, who was responsible for the *DVP*, was as Mielke veteran from the Spanish Civil War. Additionally, he was looked upon as a loyal man of the regime, since he had been a member of the *KPD* since 1931. His military background underlined that the *SED* regarded the police as a vital organ for the state's security. The *DVP* had thereby a military commando structure where one had traditional police titles at lower levels, while at the higher levels it was normal to have military titles.[144]

As earlier described, the *MfS*' Main Department VII (Defence Work Ministry of Interior/German People's Police) was amongst other responsible for the *DVP*

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[143] N. T. Wolfe, *Policing a Socialist Society. The German Democratic Republic*. New York, Westport, London 1992, p. 36.

[144] Childs & Popplewell, *op cit*., p. 78.

and *MfS* working closely together. We have seen that the cooperation between the *MdI* and *MfS* took the shape of the *MdI* extending its basis of service to the advantage of the *MfS*, and not the opposite. Different units in the *MdI* were put to the disposal of the *MfS*, such as for example town and regional advisory offices. At these offices, meetings were arranged with members from church societies, citizens that wished to emigrate or with others, the *MfS* wanted to get in contact with. The whole set up had a character of camouflage operations, the persons the *MfS* talked to did not know it was co-workers of the *MfS* they were talking with.[145] Since the *MfS* was organised outside its own Ministry, this also reveals how important it was for the *MfS* to be inside other state organs to achieve full control. As it was argued earlier, the examples above also show that the *MfS* functioned as the superior organ to other state organs, other state organs that were responsible for running control with the population. This reflects how important the *MfS*' roles were for the GDR regime, since it may seem as if the Ministry did not trust its allied forces within the state doing their job. Related to the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski, where a security service uses the necessary means to secure the party's position, the theory is strengthened. That is, on behalf of the illustrated organising the *MfS* accomplished, in order to support the power of the *SED*. Furthermore, as similarly analysed earlier, this was in many ways the totalitarianism and the totalitarian's logic. I.e., having one's existence under certain set frames leading to that no one should feel safe, or, is able to.

It was important for the GDR's political power elite to maintain full control over the *NVA*. The main reason was to see to that there did not come about any forms of splits, in such a way the risk for splits also was present in other instruments of the state. One of the risk factors for split was that many in the *NVA* first of all looked upon themselves as soldiers, and secondly as party members. Additionally, one had in similar society systems experienced 'Hungary 1956' and 'Czechoslovakia 1968', where the military forces took the side of the reform communists. The fear that first of all high ranking officers would show indifference, passivity and maybe even disgust and negative attitudes to the regime's politics, apparently existed in the GDR's power elite. As we were onto earlier, the *NVA* and the individual soldier were subject to a strong ideological educational process, and it was seen as necessary to assure that the *NVA* in terms of commands remained under the iron fist of the *SED*. That the officers had party membership by the fact that the *SED* was organised in the *NVA* was for the *SED* leadership not synonymous with having full security for the support of the regime's politics. The *NVA* therefore also became a task for the *MfS*. By, amongst other things, placing *IM*'s and *OibE*'s on every level of the military forces the *MfS* made sure that the total control was considerably secured. The *MfS* had informants at every single

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[145] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit*., pp. 67-69.

unit in the army, independent of size. In regards to the discussion of the one-party state and the mass party that formally governs, we see yet another factor of how important the *MfS*' control was for the ruling party. That is, the contribution from the *MfS* looked after keeping the party remaining in its position.

The coordination between the organs mentioned above was not present from the GDR's beginning, but was built up over time. The experiences 17 June 1953 amongst others exactly witnessed the absence of such cooperation. This was seen as an important factor to the uprising being able to grow and cause uncontrollable conditions. Such situations and similar had to be hindered in the future, something which the coordination of the different physical power organs was an answer to. The effective coordination became a key factor to secure the regime against potential unrest that could exist to any time. Especially during the crisis in August 1961 and in August 1968, the coordination proved to function more than satisfactory.[146] Since, if these two incidents are compared to the situation in the GDR at those times, they turned out to be peaceful for the GDR when also seen in the light of the 1953 incidents. With the *MfS* in the front, the effectiveness of the forces and close cooperation with the party became a key factor through the period 1953-1989. The effectiveness and cooperation looked after that the stability was kept, contrary to what the case was in for example the GDR's neighbour country Poland. The coordinative role of the *MfS* underlines the strong relation to Moscow, since also reflecting upon the necessity of working close together with the Soviet forces. This effectiveness was a decisive factor that looked after the *SED* maintaining the power, in the shape of keeping the society at calm and order. The *MfS* looked after the *SED*'s power having been kept by functioning as its physical tool as well as controlling an important institution like the army. These factors are yet other ones supporting the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski. Since, reflecting upon a security service as having been a vital organ for the ruling party in terms of securing its leading role in the state by holding the organs of the state under different forms of control.

1.9   Sum up

In this chapter, it has been tried to show that the *MfS* was organised on many different levels of the society in order to handle the surveillance as well as deem up for the potential opposition. It has also been tried to find political reasons to why and where the *MfS* recruited *IM*'s. Especially the June Uprising in 1953 was illustrated as the first and most likely biggest clear signal in the history of the GDR to how necessary it was for the regime that the *MfS* continuously was kept as well

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[146] In August 1961, one started to build the Berlin Wall. The people's revolt against the regime's politics in Czechoslovakia took place in August 1968.

as further developed and expanded. That is, for the *SED* having been able to keep the power and its system of society. The *MfS* cooperated closely with the *SED*, where it by far was shown that between these organs it was the *SED* that lastly had the actual control of the GDR. By this, we see that the roles of the *MfS* were decided out of those needs any totalitarian regime has, as Friedrich and Brzezinski document. However, both organs were subordinated Moscow, something which also illustrates the degree of influence Moscow kept. Besides this, we saw that the *SED* elite was not as compact towards the end of the regime, as it had been from the start. It happened as a result of Gorbatchev's politics, where the highest leadership went onto separate tracks. The visible split came the autumn of 1989 between the GDR leadership's reform group, which included the *MfS* and Moscow on the one side, and the Honecker supporters on the other side. Clearly, this incident underlines how important Moscow was for Mielke and the *MfS*, since he entrusted more to Moscow than to his own state's politics and leadership. In other words, Mielke looked upon himself and the *MfS* first of all as subordinated Moscow. The consequence resulted in that Honecker was put aside, something underlining the degree of power Moscow had on the leadership of the GDR to the very end. Additionally, it also shows the assumption that the *MfS*' roles were influenced by the GDR having been subordinated the Soviet Union.

We have also seen that the examples gives reason to considerations that goes beyond the theory, and that weakens it. One of the factors was the consideration of the democratic centralism. It was illustrated through Honecker and Mielke who had a special relationship to each other inside the Politburo, separated from the apparently compact elite the theory presupposes. Although a weakening of the theory, it is nevertheless possible to argue that a clear totalitarian feature was present. In this way, since there was only two persons of the power elite that like dictators finally decided over millions of people's destinies. Additionally, something that has already shown to deviate from the theory is that the GDR regime did not manage to have a monopoly on the means of communication. Even when the *MfS* used different means and resources in order to repress the potential opposition with the aim to hinder the population's access to alternative information. We have seen to this that the lack of communication monopoly became one of the most vulnerable elements for the regime. Particularly the visual media played a greater role than other media, and especially towards the end of the GDR's time it played a decisive role both nationally and internationally in relation to the GDR's and Moscow's politics.

Examples also having shown a different view of the society than the theory describes to the force and control apparatus, on the one side indicates the theory to a certain degree having been weakened. The theory's starting point to this tells that the security service is present to operate on behalf of the party, which in the case of the *MfS* not always took place. From time to time, the *MfS* operated

on the sideline of the GDR's hierarchical structure of governing by the help of own, defined roles, where maybe the most decisive case showed to be during the autumn of 1989. Besides the incidents of 1989, throughout the life of the *MfS*, Mielke's power and the role of the Ministry turned out to be identical to an increase of power. Especially when considering how Mielke's network and use of information functioned, in regards to possession of power and domination. By Mielke and the *MfS* having had a stronger power position than the theory assumes led to the Ministry to times having challenged the leading power of the *SED*. On the other side, this aspect supports the theory, because it after all includes the Soviet Union's satellite states' sub leader structure having had a stronger authority to its leadership than the bureaucrats in Moscow had to their. Not only was this shown towards the *SED*, it was also shown towards the system of both the GDR and its own. In other words, how the *MfS* in its particular way governed and controlled the society as well as how this turned out to be concerning its own way of structure, hereunder, finally yet importantly, its faith regarding the internal life.

Concerning the *MfS*' recruitment and infiltration in the society with the aim of keeping the republic alive, it may also here seem as if both the theory and relation to Moscow in each way have captured fundamental points of the *MfS*' roles. It has mainly been illustrated how the *MfS* recruited and infiltrated the society, where the relation between Moscow and the GDR is strengthened out of many reasons. Firstly, because the *MfS* nearly to all times was following Moscow loyally, after the Moscow leadership after WW II had put in its German loyal communist leaders in the party leadership. An expression of this was the *MfS*' coordination of the GDR's *DVP* and *NVA* with the Soviet forces. Secondly, we saw examples to Honecker having changed the force and control apparatus' patterns of acting, since Brezhnev changed the Soviet Union's political character. Thirdly, we also saw how Mielke handled the relation to Moscow in the mid 1980's, even when the *MfS* in this period, amongst other things, strengthened the Ministry as a result of Gorbatchev's politics. Gorbatchev's politics resulted in Mielke going the opposite way whereas strengthening the Ministry in shape of creating new categories of *IM*'s. It was here discussed if the relation to Moscow possibly was weakened as a result of Mielke's actions. This was rejected, mainly since Mielke after all continued remaining loyal to Moscow.

In many ways, the material underlined the theory's validity, when having been considered in the light of the reasons and efforts the party and *MfS* had and put in, for accomplishing recruitment and infiltration of the society. The empiric concerning the *MfS*' informants and how these were recruited mainly showed how and why the Ministry became a necessary tool that made sure the *SED*'s elite kept the power. In other words, the recruitment and infiltration of the citizens were especially important contributions to the regime's leadership continuing to have control over nearly all levels of the society, similar to Friedrich and Brzezinski's

descriptions. The main reasons that the regime in this way managed to hold an iron grip on most people are bisected. Firstly, the *MfS*' implied methods led to the regime managing to aim for achieving a universal control over the population than the case was in the earlier years. Brutal violence and physical punishment as means of recruitment had been exchanged with more sophisticated ways. We have already seen the Ministry understanding that the old forms of infiltrating and recruiting did not gain the regime, simultaneously as they demanded far too many resources. For example, Honecker's political tactical choice illustrated this. The more pragmatic, refined way resulted in the *SED* and *MfS* easier having been able to hold the grip, mostly because the regime and informants had something to gain from this form of work. As such, the *MfS* managed to keep the overview over nearly all levels of the society, amongst other things, because the *MfS* can be said to have divided the population in two; those persons that were for the regime, and those that were against the regime or passive. The organisation and work took place in the hidden, often also where only a few persons inside the *MfS* knew who did what. For most people, this resulted in living in a highly insecure atmosphere. Secondly, this form of surveillance led to that the coordination between the different organs of state functioned better than what it had done until 17 June 1953. As examples to this, crucial historical parallels were presented as basis of comparisons to 1953. The different uprisings taking place in Central and East Europe after the GDR's 1953 showed on the contrary how successful the work and coordination had been in the GDR. The aggravated coordination the *MfS* accomplished contributed to the *SED* regime managing to keep the state more or less in calm in the years between 1953 and 1989.

Part C

The Post and Telephone Control of the *MfS* in the GDR

1 The telephone control

1.1 The 1960's: the first actions of greater importance

The surveillance concerning the telephone control got its vital life in 1962, which thereafter was to exist for decades.[1] The control of the telex connections was ordered upon the same year.[2] It was of crucial importance to both keep up and severely strengthen the work of such controls especially since the tension with the West was a defined fact having reached an enormously high level. The East and West had now for sure become large enemies, particularly since the Berlin Wall had been drawn through the politically, symbolic town nearly half a year earlier stating the division and confrontation between two world systems and powers. With a sharper eye towards anyone, all persons were from the point of view of the

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[1] *Dienstanweisung* (Service Instruction) Nr. 10/62. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 002176. Concerning the different commands given, they were orientated after military hierarchy and political bureaucracy. The most typical commands held different determinations, and consisted of Guidelines, Regulations, Service Instructions, *Befehle* (Orders) and *Schreiben* (Writings). The three first categories were seen as fundamental documents carrying extensive directions of work, nearly always having come from the Minister with the aspect of having a longer duration. Orders and Writings were given in connection with an actual or a concrete task. These latter ones were given from the Minister, his Deputies as well as from the leaders of the ADM's. The type of commands mentioned were not always used, and not for every single unit and purpose of the *MfS*. Additionally, one cannot separate the different commands, stating that the one type of command normally was more important than the other. However, what is more typical to notice, is that these ways of working reflects upon a strong formal, bureaucratic style of coping with tasks, which by the *MfS* was one of many remarkable rules of both internal and external functioning.

[2] Order Nr. 341/62. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000754.

MfS seen as potential enemies, which already in those days further underlines its roles in the society. First came the June Uprising with all its reactions, then the Berlin Wall. Another crucial step for the future of the GDR had been taken, all this within less than ten years. Taking the context into consideration, no wonder that the *MfS* took - or had to take - these choices that amongst others resulted in intensifying the telephone control with all possible means.

Before going on to the analysis of the commands of the telephone control, at the end of the 1950's a change in the law of the *Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen*,[3] *MPF* (Ministry for Post and Telecommunication) came.[4] More correctly, the law underlined the importance of keeping the secrecy of the post and telecommunication, where paragraph 35, point VII, section 1, clearly stated that "[T]he post and telecommunication secrecy is to be secured."[5] However, paragraph 37, section 1, limited this secrecy, since the duty to care for the post and telecommunication secrecy did not apply if it was cancelled through judicial decisions, or laws were applicable in terms of an accusation towards a criminal act. Nevertheless, this decision did not at all mean that the *MfS* had a basis for performing a general control of the post and telecommunication. An Article (Article 8) in the constitution of the GDR already existed from 1949, which guaranteed the security of the secrecy of the post.[6] We see that it, on the one hand, formally ex-

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[3] What the German Post concerned, the *MPF* was on the top of the hierarchical pyramid. The German Post was seen as the sole news traffic carrier of the GDR. Through the GDR's existence, the inner dynamic of the different levels within this Ministry resulted in an often change in names and sometimes roles, albeit few. However, as an organ it remained a Ministry. This is therefore the reason to why it in the following in the rule will be used the name that remained constant, for the mere reason of keeping it as orderly as possible. Since the foundation of the *MfS* and the Departments M and 26, they had close cooperation with the *MPF* (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 804; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.). According to the fulfilment of tasks concerning the surveillance of the post, telephone and related control mainly done through the Departments M and 26, the Department 26's closest co-partner at the German Post was the leader of the Administrative District Direction (ADD) of the German Post. This state organ with their leaders existed in all of the AD's, which again was formally subordinated the *MPF*. The same relations happened to be the fact for any other ADD that will be mentioned in the thesis, if nothing else is specified.

[4] Gesetz über das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Gesetzblatt I Nr. 27, 03.04.59, p. 365.

[5] Gesetz über das Post- und Fernmeldewesen, Gesetzblatt I Nr. 27, 03.04.59, p. 370.

[6] Gesetz über die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Gesetzblatt, 07.10.49, p. 4; Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *Der Staatssicherheitsdienst. Ein Instrument der politischen Verfolgung in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands*. Bonn/Berlin 1962, p. 32; cf. also S. Mampel, *Die Verfassung der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands. Text und Kommentar*. Frankfurt a. M., Berlin 1966, p. 10. To clear up a possible confusion, it should be notified that this constitution was the constitution of the GDR, although authors have used the classification "*SBZ*". The reason for that is that the GDR in those days was not formally recognised as a state from the world community, including the FRG.

isted laws applicable even to the *MfS*. However, on the other hand, from the very first moment in time we are familiar with the *MfS* having held a unique position in the GDR. In practice, this led to that the Ministry more or less had free hands to whatever control and surveillance of the population. As mentioned earlier, this is yet another representative example of how little, if any, independence the judicial apparatus actually had in the society. When force repelled force, with almost unlimited power the *MfS* was on the side of the party and state organs. Thus, the regular man could do little with the 'help' of the law. This gives verification to how and what kind of system it existed in the GDR, and to which extent the *MfS* held great power and influence already from the earliest days.

The *MfS* did not have the judicial and every day responsibility and control of the post and telephone traffic. This mainly lay in the hands of the *MPF*. From there on, the surveillance of the post and telephone traffic took place, through a secret and most often illegal cooperation. As aforementioned, already in 1962 the telex connections between "West Germany" and the GDR were controlled.[7] It simply had to be avoided that telex with agitate contents were passed on further. In general, for the year 1962 it was not a wide, daily usage of telexes in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Nevertheless, the *MfS*' co-workers on this particular area were on the case, which illustrates that the Ministry took this control importantly, since although wanting to observe the telexes that were in traffic. This shows furthermore that the *MfS* wanted to stop and hinder all kinds of actions at as an early stage as possible, with the aim to protect the party and the system from enemies.

The Service Instruction held the goal of strengthening the use of the means

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[7] The *MfS* obviously consequently, at least in the early days, used the term "West Germany" and not "FRG". This shows that the Federal Republic only was considered as being the western and geographical part of a Germany. However, not an own, independent German part officially known and recognised as a state, 'allowed' to call itself "Federal Republic of Germany". This moreover reflected the political ice front between the two German states. On the other side, neither particularly odd nor surprising, as the FRG at that time neither had recognised the GDR as a state. In this analysis, however, the term FRG will generally be used, if nothing else is being related.

of Line 26,[8] and to put in the necessary measures to higher the conspiracy.[9] Furthermore, it ensured a strong regulation in the co-work of all Departments,[10] and ADM's with the Department 26 at the Central,[11] as well as the Divisions O of the ADM's.[12] At the same time, in order to obtain a strong observance as well as the strictest conspiracy on the area of the Line 26, the leaders of all Departments

[8] Even if this is the next earliest document that states the direct work of the Department 26 there is however given clear evidence that the Department 26 already had practised surveillance. Firstly, because a leadership to such control existed at least no later than 1955 (cf. eg., Gieseke [ed.], *op cit.*). Secondly, the *MfS* in this archival information addressed the need of a "strengthening" of this work, reflecting a comparative view concerning improvement. Thirdly, since the archival information (cf. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 002176, p. 7; BStU/Berlin, Tgb.-Nr. 0/147/59) refereed to that earlier given orders concerning the telephone control from 1958 and 1959 lost their validity. Fourthly, because a refugee and a former Lieutenant of the ADM of Dresden, Günter Gebauer, has told that the *MfS* in Dresden observed the main office of the evangelic bishop in Dresden in 1958 (Untersuchungsausschuß Freiheitlicher Juristen (ed.), *Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstraße 22, Agentenzentrale SSD*. Berlin 1960, p. 35).

[9] To clear up any possible misunderstandings about the use of the word "measure" towards the controls taken by the Department 26, the A, B, C, etc., measures were not only known as "measures" ("*Maßnahmen*") in the *MfS*. They were also known as for example "missions/orders" ("*Aufträge*") and "tasks" ("*Aufgaben*"). Therefore, these words (in English) will be used in the following to name this work.

[10] The use of "all Departments" in these cases reflects upon the higher positional units of the *MfS*, i.e., mainly the Main Departments and independent Departments that often were the units involved when setting out commands that automatically counted and came from the top to bottom of the respective units' different Lines.

[11] Based upon the given explanations to the power hierarchy and structure of the *MfS*, the following should be kept in mind: when referring to the Department 26 in singular, it is either meant the Department 26 in the Central of the *MfS* and/or in the ADM's, whereas this automatically can be seen from the treatment of the material. The singular form, where natural, also reflects upon a general approach when considering the Department 26. When the term is used in plural, it referees to all the Departments 26, i.e., mainly those of the ADM's when nothing else is being signalised. Since the Department 26 internally worked close together with all of its units and thereby functioned through the already illustrated Line structure, when it is required the term "Line" is used to generally put a name on the more detailed description of the work of the Department 26. Much similar to the spirit of understanding towards the conceptions mentioned in the Introduction, additionally, where seen as possible, it is being applied in order to have a variety in the use of terms and illustrations for the Department 26 (meaning that the terminology "Departments 26" is not the only term being taken to explain something identical). If nothing else is being noticed, the descriptions having been done here also apply when treating the Department M.

[12] The Division O in the ADM's was a direct, subordinate part of the Department 26. The only difference laid in the name, as the Division O of an ADM actually was the smaller counterpart in the ADM's to the Central's Department 26's subordinate units. The changing of the name took place in 1960 (Order Nr. 374/60. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000652), where the previous Department O was renamed Department 26. At the same time, the independent Divisions in the ADM's belonging to the Department 26 kept their names. With these changes, others followed as well with interest to improve the quality of the work of the operative-technical units, higher the conspiracy, achieving a tighter planning, coordination, and control.

and ADM's were made fully responsible within their area.

The use of the word "conspiracy" in the context of the *MfS* held different meanings.[13] Conspiracy was the fundamental principal of the political-operative work. The superiority over the subversive "enemy" was Alpha and Omega, where the security political activity of the *MfS* was to be ensured.[14] The conspiracy was recognised as being accomplished through the efforts of secrecy towards the enemy and the public, by means and methods of hidden forces as well as through the camouflage of the political-operative plans, intentions and measures. The conspiracy was arguably used based on the revolutionary experiences of struggle of the international labour movement in the confrontation with the bourgeois power and repression apparatus. It was always apparent in the fight for power or to secure the political power of the labour class, and not somehow independently to be used from this political goal. As such, this shows that it was an important tool within the GDR system, for the sake of reaching the set goals.

The political-operative work especially served the win and use of important information as well as realising necessary security political changes within the society. Furthermore, it was also valuable for the security and work capabilities of the *IM*'s, and for the preparation and execution of different processes to uncover, repress and liquidate the enemy.[15] To the acting of all active forces, rules of the conspiracy applied, which were kept through decisions in service. With every political-operative task and the elaboration of their realisation, the basic rules were modified and supplemented. The principals of keeping secrecies and awareness were closely connected with the conspiracy, where the conspiracy was the most important. To the rules of conspiracy, amongst other things, belonged: the consciousness of the actions taken as a co-worker of the *MfS* and the interest

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[13] Cf. e.g., Suckut (ed.), *op cit*., p. 215ff.

[14] With the use of a word such as "enemy", the *MfS* answered to its military status especially Mielke had ordered upon from the very beginning. "Blocked Objects" was another word the *MfS* used for dehumanising former citizens of the GDR that lived in the FRG (cf. e.g., C. Bergmann, *Die Sprache der Stasi. Ein Beitrag zur Sprachkritik*. Göttingen 1999). Their families, still living in the GDR, was named "Return Connections", and western organisations standing available to help in terms of escapes were called "Criminal Leagues of Human Trading".

[15] As shown in former chapters, it was neither an exception for the Department 26 that the work with *IM*'s was of particular importance from the very beginning and all the way up to the end of the *MfS*' life (cf. e.g. also BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001247; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001248; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 10; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 12; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 13; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1671/81; BStU/Dresden, MfS - BV Dresden. Nr. 7021; BStU/Halle, MfS - BV Halle. Abteilung 26. Nr. 101). On the contrary, it often happened that the *IM*'s were the ones that made the first connectional step for the Department 26 to be able to carry out surveillance. This was a fact, since these Unofficial Co-workers originally worked at the German Post as regular workers where the smallest suspicion existed when someone in the first place were to do such pre-work.

of the enemy, thorough control of own behaviour and critical evaluation of every action and measure in regards to accessibility from the enemy. Additionally, hindering of letting knowledge reaching any part outside the Ministry as well as consequently protecting the political-operative secrecy, were also important matters. When preparing and executing the political-operative tasks, the rules of the conspiracy were concretised and supplemented.

For the Line 26 to solve the political-operative tasks of all Departments, ADM's and DSP's, a stricter standard was put. Missions were only given for especially important *OV*'s when other means could not be applied and were not effective enough.[16]   Alternatively, it was given because the work on certain persons showed to be possible through these measures.

The *MfS* regularly categorised its suspects within two main classifications, which were objects to closer surveillance. Besides these actions, there often already existed other types of surveillance of these people. These citizens either belonged to the category of the *Operative Personenkontrolle, OPK* (Operative Personal Control), or the *OV*.[17]   Concerning these tasks of surveillance, they were of special importance to the *MfS*, since most units of the Ministry in some way or the other had to do with them. An *OPK* was made to identify anyone that might have committed an offence according to the *Strafgesetzbuch, StGB* (Criminal Law Book), that might have had a hostile, negative attitude or which might have been exploited for hostile purposes by the enemy. The central purpose of an *OPK* was to answer the question "who is who". Different means and measures were taken, in order to get answers to this. Amongst others, the *MfS* used *IM*'s, post and

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[16] *OV*, *Operativer Vorgang* (Operative Process). For further explanation to the *OV*, see next paragraph.

[17] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/81. *Richtlinie Nr. 1/81 über die Operative Personenkontrolle*; BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 100/76. *Richtlinie Nr. 1/76 zur Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge*; T. Garten Ash, *The file, a personal history*. London 1997; U. von Saß & H. von Suchodoletz, „*feindlich-negativ". Zur politisch-operativen Arbeit einer Stasi-Zentrale*. 1. Auflage. Berlin 1990; Suckut (ed.), *op cit.*; Wawrzyn, *op cit*. Through the whole of the *MfS*' life, it existed such procedures against people. However, the names of the classifications were from time to time somewhat different. The *OPK*'s and the *OV*'s were the typical classifications, which were the final names used to such work. After a supplement to the Guidance 1/76 done in 1985, one also had developed what was called *Zentraler Operativer Vorgang, ZOV* (Central Operative Process) and *Teilvorgang, TV* (Part Process). In such cases as the *ZOV*'s, one unit of the *MfS* was responsible for having introduced particular measures that more or less were identical to what took place under an *OV*, where it cooperated with other units of the *MfS* to reach a common goal. The way these other units worked closely together with the mission-giving unit was understood as being the *TV*'s (cf. e.g., Suckut [ed.], *op cit.*, p. 421).

telephone control.[18]   In such cases as the *OPK*'s and *OV*'s, it was not the Department M or 26 that in the first place had made the decision to undertake surveillance.   In nearly all cases, this came from a mission-giving unit of the *MfS*, e.g. a Main Department. When ordered upon from the Main Department that had decided upon what it wanted to find out, the work often involved and concerned fulfilment that had to be done from either the Department M and/or Department 26.[19]   When a confirmation of different presumptions was made through an *OPK*, the *MfS* often tightened the control by transferring the control to reach higher intentions as the importance called for being classified as an *OV*.[20]   An *OPK* file consisted of an introductory report, documents in regards to the registration of persons, objects, plans of measure, post, protocols of summarised telephone calls, other documents that stated the actual knowledge of a case as well as *IM* reports. An *OV* file contained the identical, however the level of seriousness towards the suspected was higher.   These files aimed to uncover any criminal actions done from one or more persons, by finally bringing them before a court of law.[21]   The means and measures used against these persons were identical to what was used towards an *OPK*. However, additional methods were for example room surveillance, search of conspiracy and measures of destruction.[22]

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[18] As mentioned above, within the Department 26, the Department also ran own operations regarding the *IM*'s (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 12; BStU/Schwerin, MfS - BV Schwerin. AOPK 842/89; BStU/Schwerin, MfS - BV Schwerin. AOP 848/89). The Department M also used *IM*'s to uncover enemies of the state. Such persons floated around everywhere in the society, and as soon as the *IM*'s picked up something of importance, the Departments M and 26 were informed. Based on the *IM*'s, these Departments became reasons to open or do further investigations on particular suspects. As the *IM*'s also existed in other units of the *MfS*, especially in the Main Department XX, measures were ordered upon through other units of the *MfS* to be undertaken often meaning involving the Departments M and 26.

[19] Cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1671/81; BStU/Schwerin, MfS - BV Schwerin. AOPK 842/89.

[20] Cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1671/81; BStU/Schwerin, MfS - BV Schwerin. AOP 848/89.

[21] Such is given in BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1460/89. The Department XX mainly activated the operation, whereas one person of a family in the period 1975-1980 was registered as an *OPK*. This was done from the *MfS* since the person was under suspicion for having done espionage to the disadvantage of the GDR as well as having operated with enemy hatred publicity against the state. Based upon this, the controls coming from the Departments M and 26 were undertaken, against the whole family. As time went by, following into the 1980's, through different means of control the *MfS* clearly stated that the main suspect had a huge network in which he had used much of his time to activate what the *MfS* saw as criminal acts. Up to a certain point, the suspect obviously knew what was going on in terms of being controlled, as he arranged with mail in English telling the receivers that he knew that his post was being controlled. He thereby also knew that he deliberately took part in what was considered as criminal acts from the point of view of the *MfS*.

[22] Further to this will be given in the following.

These ways of working shows that the *MfS* used all means available, for catching what it looked upon as criminal. Having the law in mind the *MfS* clearly broke it, since using the wide spectre of means. Additionally, we register that these efforts were done with the interest to protect the system. A system, which in the first place where not meant to protect the individual from the aforementioned operation through a justified approach. To further work on an *OV*, the following means and methods were typically used:

- investigations of persons and articles related to leading groups of investigation such as organs of the Customs Service[23]

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[23] The *MfS*' Departments M and 26 also worked hidden within the Customs Service although the particular Department of the *MfS* responsible for such work was formally situated under the Main Department VII (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001389; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 399). This Department was the 'Post Customs Service Investigation', PCSI. The work of the PCSI was to a certain degree connected and accomplished with the work of the Department M, and/or other units of the *MfS*. That is, the work decided upon to be fulfilled by the PCSI was in many ways directly or indirectly related to the work of the Department M, since the PCSI mainly controlled packages of large size (*Paketen*). In the founding year, some specific instructions to the work of the PCSI were given, which, amongst others, will be further considered in the next chapter. From its time of existence, the rules given in those days stayed as guidance for the work, with few exceptions. This unit was already built in 1962 mainly to see to that all kinds of packages sent with the post were controlled. The organisation of the PCSI remained the same until the early 1980's, where the *ZKG* (Central Coordination Group; Escape, Moving) formally took over the responsibility of the Department for a short time, until 1 January 1984 (cf. e.g., R. Wiedmann [ed.], *Die Organisationsstruktur des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit 1989*. 2. Auflage. Berlin 1996, in the BStU series, *Anatomie der Staatssicherheit. Geschichte, Struktur und Methoden*, K.-D. Henke, S. Suckut, C. Vollnhals, W. Süß, R. Engelmann [eds.]). From 1 January 1984, it was structurally organised under the Department M. The PCSI of the *MfS* will not be treated particularly further than mentioned, firstly, because there exist rather few archival sources to this particular Department. Secondly, since not formally being a part of the Department M before 1984, five years before the collapse of the *MfS*. The *MfS* considered it as necessary to have such an organ, most likely since the method of posting packages to East Berlin was used more frequently after the building of the Berlin Wall (cf. e.g., Grimmer et al. [eds.], *op cit.*, Band 1, p. 516ff.). After the Wall came in 1961, it was not as easy anymore for example for spies to meet in West Berlin for different job and private matters. Although the PCSI was not formally under the Department M before 1984, from the earliest days the Department M worked closely with other units of the *MfS* - hereunder the Customs Service, and vice versa. The latter was already stated a year after the foundation of the PCSI (cf. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000823). By this, we can clearly see that the Department PCSI to a certain degree developed together with the Department M. It was addressed a need for further advancement on the quality of the work of the Department PCSI as well as the coordination of the work done by the Department PCSI and Department M. Additionally, it was of importance to develop the measures of conspiracy within the work procedures of the Department PCSI. This change and expansion of the working methods can be explained as a reason due to the Berlin Wall having been built two years earlier. More postal traffic took place between the GDR and FRG, firstly as a result of more people having crossed the borders by the end of 1961. Secondly, since the borders of the GDR

- means of the Departments M, 26 and PCSI[24]

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more or less had been hermetically closed, one of the communicative ways of action was through the post traffic. Concerning the control of packages, any item related to any matter was searched for. Regularly, these were for example: - radio equipment with their belongings, - other types of equipment aimed for use in terms of espionage or paramilitary activities, - type writers, - paper raising suspiciousness of holding secret information, - film material, - hidden means of payment, - precious metal, - highly expensive gifts (stereos, walkman, radio recorder, calculator, etc.), - newspapers, journals, books, almanacs, flyers, etc. (from western production), - piston, printing equipment, text templates, - diploma work, scientific work and information of the GDR sent to the West, - maps, drawings, descriptions of places, personal documents, work contracts (because the *MfS* suspected a planned escape), - packages led onto a third person. To the latter, the *MfS* also searched for signs that implicated a wish to take up contact with organisations, institutions or private persons in the West.

[24] In the year of 1963, Mielke went out with an Order that mainly concerned a matter of power that signalised the increasing importance of the overall post control (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000911; Grimmer et al. [eds.], *op cit*., Band 1, p. 515). It was so that Major Werner Klippel who already acted as the Deputy of the Main Department II also was given the instruction and control of the Department M and Department PCSI. The work achieved higher importance, as Klippel was under direct orders of Mielke. He was entitled to give directions in all questions towards the Department M and Department PCSI, and the Departments M as well as the Work Groups of the PCSI in the ADM's. Through this, it is likely that Mielke wanted to achieve two things with this operation. The first was to have someone that was directly under his orders that simultaneously held high powers, so that Mielke had full control with the intension of all alone sitting with the supreme power as described earlier. In other words, his own, personal power was easy to mobilise through this creation, although there, on the other side, existed several stages of power beneath him that resulted in a complicated hierarchy of power. Secondly, having a relative young leader under him made it easier to keep control and maintain loyalty. This may have been safer for Mielke instead of having a more challenging, experienced type of person within the close rows. Since such a person being in the same generation and holding a similar background as him might have dared to oppose him. Similar settings also took place in the ADM's (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department XIX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02, 13.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02). With the latter sources referred to, these co-workers experienced more or less the same. They all came from the older generations, belonging more to the generation of the highest leaders of the *MfS* than the younger guard did. Even though they in most ways had more practical experience with the work of the *MfS* than the younger co-workers had, as time went by, the latter group was preferred to higher positions than the former. Firstly, since the concurrence and potential opposition was less present. Secondly, since the younger generation, at least theoretically, were believed to be more loyal to the powers of the party and state organs. It was perhaps so, as the younger co-workers of the *MfS* received thorough education by visiting the party school of the *MfS* before being employed in the Ministry. This opportunity did not exist in the hectic days of the start phases when building the GDR. In order to secure the system the best way, it was overall therefore much more convenient for the old leaders at the top rather to prefer their younger co-workers to become leaders than having any other solution that was seen as a possibly weaker alternative.

- operative-technical means to observe persons and objects

- special operative-technical means and methods of the *OTS*

The delegation of missions could only be written on the forms that one got at the Department 26 and Divisions O of the ADM's. In other words, the *MfS*' Department 26 made sure it was the only Department being able to authorise missions through its confirmation. Thus, mainly to secure the conspiracy and keeping the secrecy on a maximum, with a minimum risk of spreading. The form was the same for all kinds of mission categories. The shortening for the categories were put in:

- mission A: telephone surveillance

- mission B: acoustic room surveillance

- mission D: optic room surveillance

- mission X: counterespionage work and room security

Not only the interest towards control was informed. It was also given information about the responsible caseworker, its telephone number as well as the receiver of the reports and this co-worker's telephone number.

At the Central, the leaders or deputies of the responsible Departments kept the forms, or they were kept by an authorised co-worker that especially had to do with the organisational treatment of the co-work with the Department 26. Furthermore, they were registered on lists and by need given to the leaders of the Departments or Divisions against a receipt. In the ADM's, the forms were kept by the leaders, the leaders of the Divisions O or an authorised co-worker. Furthermore, they were registered on lists, and only handed out against a receipt. The latter was done on instruction from the leader of the ADM or a superior deputy of a DSP leader, Department leader or Division leader.

As this illustrates, it was double security when doing the work, mainly for the mere reason that no one in such a system could be trusted. There existed not only forms that were filled out in regards to have an overview of who did what at all times. These forms were also registered, which means that one actually made a copy out of a copy. Additionally, there were also only certain persons that could order upon certain work, and when such was done it went through different levels of bureaucracy for the sake of finally putting it out in life. On the other side, the bureaucracy was in the first place not only meant to be there in the 'traditional' German sense. Moreover, it was to be functional on behalf of the strict security of the *MfS*. A fast telephone call between a unit and the Department 26 agreeing upon what to do would perhaps have led to a faster and

an apparently more effective treatment of a task. However, this way of solving
a task did not increase the guarantee for the *MfS* and its Department 26 on what
exactly to do on different occasions in the same way as a piece of paper would
ensure. A piece of paper could also approach the tasks more thoroughly than the
results of a telephone call would have done. Besides, a piece of paper being sent
through secret channels was believed to be far more secure from any type of threat
than a simple telephone call.

The forms regarding the Central were only allowed to be filled out in hand
writing by the leader or deputy of any Department. In the ADM's, the leader, su-
perior deputy, leader and deputies of the Departments and independent Divisions
were allowed to do so. A transfer to other co-workers was not allowed. The in-
terest the *MfS* had with such a structure laid in the reason to let as few co-workers
as possible know the actual procedures and goals of work.[25] This ensured the
work better, mainly towards the accessibility of the enemy. The enemy could be
anywhere, which was the idea of what might be called 'inner security'. Since, the
MfS obviously made sure that the co-workers were to know as little as possible.
The 'outer security' was mainly concerning the protection of the party and the
state organs. Such points as well as those aforementioned remained rock steady
fundaments of the work of the *MfS*.

The leaders of all Departments and ADM's gave the final word to the A and
X orders, carrying own responsibility for this. Mielke or his Deputy of a Line
confirmed the B and D orders.[26] Missions in custodies, hotels and conspiracy
objects did not need this confirmation. In regards to confirmation in each case,
an explanation had to be added by the mission-giving unit. This was thereafter
checked and confirmed by the leader of the responsible Line. Missions that were
important and needed realisation immediately were marked in a special way. The
leader of the Department 26 informed Mielke about important orders, which the

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[25] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department XX of the ADM
of Rostock. Rostock, 07.05.02, 16.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Lieutenant of
the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 27.05.02. A secretary 'unimportantly'
somewhere involved in a case that typed the reports did not get to know the names of the sus-
pects involved. That is, the names of these persons were written into the report by hand after the
secretary had done its work.

[26] The Deputy of a Line actually reflected upon all of Mielke's Deputies that to any time held
the status of being the superior responsible for any order-giving unit that happened to exist under
their particular area of responsibility (according to the illustrated scheme of the Central, i.e., their
Line or area of responsibility). For example, Deputy Minister Gerhard Neiber was responsible for
the Main Department XXII (Terror Defence), since this was under his Line/area of responsibility.
If the Main Department had ordered upon a mission to be accomplished by the Department 26,
Neiber was the responsible for this particular Line. Thus, since he both was the Minister's Deputy
as well as the Main Department's superior. Taking into consideration how we are familiar with
the structure of the ADM's, in relation to what here has been explained the same idea of structure
applied in the ADM's.

leader was given to complete. A report including the results followed with. As we notice, the more important and valuable a control was looked upon, the higher up in the system of control it had to be asserted in order to receive a confirmation. This shows that not only Mielke and his men had a considerable overview of any matter happening inside the *MfS*. They personally also got involved in special cases, probably to possess a total power. This meant that all the power in practice was in the hands of a few men, with Mielke as the untouchable monarch at the top. Just as the power of the state was built up, the control of the state and all its vital organs laid in the hands of the party. More in detail, here as well, it in fact in general laid in the hands of a few persons. Based upon interests from lower organs that did not possess any power of influence, the power at the top was unquestionable and undisputable for change.

A co-worker that was involved in this process personally did the transmission of an order to the Department 26 or a Division O of the ADM. Otherwise, it was sent in a sealed letter. During the realisation of a mission, a strong cooperation with the Department 26 or Divisions O was needed. All measures that were introduced by the mission-giving unit related to a given mission were solved with the Department 26 or Divisions O. The surveillance through the A, B and D orders were always supported with adjustments on the part of the mission-giving unit. The order-giving units influenced the surveillance results with adjustments, in order to care for the means not being used longer than necessary.

Concerning the orders on A and B measures, these were normally realised within 30 days when no shorter time limit was agreed. A longer work on this meaning maximum 30 days could take place when this was asked upon in writing. Mission going beyond 60 days, was only agreed upon by Mielke. When no extension was asked, a mission had to finish after 30 days, by the Department 26 or Divisions O. In regards to a D order, this was in every individual case agreed. The finishing of the A, B and D orders by the Department 26 or Divisions O were automatically done after communication over telephone, when no extension had been asked upon after the end of the agreement. The order-giving units were informed about the end of an order. The Department 26 or Divisions O deleted the original material as follows:

- A orders   ten days after recording

- B orders   one month after the end of an order

When longer time was necessary, the mission-giving unit asked the Department 26 or Divisions O in time and informed about the needed duration.

In shape of documentation, the evaluation of the original material was executed in the shape of information reports. It was thereafter passed on to the responsible caseworker, whereas finally kept in the *OV*'s. This indicates that such

was made in terms of keeping the original material secret to any price, meaning less endangerment for that a part or the whole of a complete secrecy existed on many hands. The material from the information reports that was given to the mission-giving unit took the shape of an interpretation of the original material. Original reports were arranged with, although not as complete like the first hand original material with all its original contents. This was done only in exceptions, as when especially asked upon. In regards to the return notes, they given back to the Department 26 or Divisions O within 30 days, where they thereafter were kept. Original reports were not to be mixed, or connected with the *OV*'s. Copies as well as extracts were not allowed to be made from the mission-giving units. This indicates that one kept the secret work to a minimum of spreading, where unnecessary making of copies would have increased the risk of causing damage to the work of the Department 26 and *MfS*. At least, not having unnecessary paper floating around resulted in less chances for the enemy to get hold of information. At the same time, the Department 26 easier kept its own co-workers away from material of high secrecy. This also automatically lowered the co-worker's interest of adventure and curiousness, since the system operated with clear rules to any case. In fact, besides the actual work, there were few ways the co-worker had access to the material. Simply said: having as less access as possible resulted in fewer problems. Additionally, we can clearly see that the Department 26 and Divisions O possessed a key role in the work of the surveillance, as they assessed the surveillance done themselves, which thereafter was handed over to the order-giving unit. In most cases, they were the only ones sitting with the actual original material as well as being the only ones knowing the whole context of the real facts to the last detail. This furthermore does not only underline the importance of the Department 26. It also underlines that the roles the Department 26 had were many out of several important ones, considering the organisation and work of the *MfS* having been the repressive power tool of the *SED*.

The documentation of the results of the D orders was given as a positive (visual exemplar) to the order-giving unit, which it thereafter stored. On the other hand, all negatives in regards to a D order of the Department 26 or Divisions O were kept in sealed covers. In some cases, the surveillance through the B and D orders was taken over from the order-giving unit. As for these cases, written agreements had to follow in terms of treating the equipment and material that was needed. Like commented on earlier, for the control to be effective the *MfS*' units often cooperated with one another. In regards to the tasks done for the X orders, these were agreed upon from the mission-giving unit and Department 26 or Divisions O.

Reports and documentations were in general personally handed over by the Department 26 or Divisions O against a receipt, whereas person in each case and every time was namely mentioned from the mission giver. Thereafter, this person

holding the reports and documents carried the full and whole responsibility of the material. Thus, one knew at any time where the material was being kept. The information reports given over to the order-giving unit were under own responsibility kept or destroyed through the intension of the conspiracy. Concerning the original material, original reports were kept in the units of the Department 26 or Divisions O after a successful evaluation for three years.

In regards to the final evaluation of the missions and the belonging orders, the mission-giving units had to send a shortly written information to the Department 26 or Divisions O about the success of the applied means for the A, B and D orders.

The Guideline of the Department O concerning the mission-giving and mission handling of the A and B orders with the Department O at the Central or the Divisions O in the ADM's from 24 February 1958, lost their validity and were withdrawn from the Department 26 by 31 August 1962. The identical counted for the Writing of the Department O, Tgb.Nr. 0/147/59, from 3 February 1959, concerning the extension and ending of A and B missions.

Probably as a result of the somewhat awkward system of bureaucratisation combined with the complex execution of commands, only approximately a couple of months after the Service Instruction of 1962 had been given out Superior Deputy Minister Lieutenant General Beater came with yet another statement that belonged to this command.[27] It was like there once more was reason to inform about the necessary exactness in regards to the realisation of the Service Instruction. Especially one point was repeated, as a matter of importance. A remembrance of what was informed about to this point especially had to be paid attention to, as the leader of the responsible Line had to check and confirm the given-in B and D missions with their belonging reasoning. When problems to this still existed, through the leader of the responsible Line all confirmations for the B and D missions were basically pointed to Beater or his deputies, in order to avoid more questions and unnecessary loss of time.

What is somewhat curious in regards to this is that there on one hand was underlined a need for a less loss of time. On the other hand, one can ask whether a savour of time was being served, as the system it was accomplished under obviously did not change. That is, one was interested in saving time regarding the operations where the problem laid in the way it was done. Beater did not change the procedures, which explains the reason to why it is difficult to see that this could have resulted in a savour of time. In fact, one would expect an extended use of time, since he suggested that any questions related to the mission was first to go through the leader of the responsible Line before reaching him or his deputies. Perhaps the policy of Beater rather did lie in other directions and use of words.

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[27] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 002175.

Having in mind the authoritarian role a leader in the system of the GDR had compared to the opposite a subordinate carried, such a repetition of commands was surely meant to show a harder line towards the co-workers. The showing of the harder line was maybe not the point as such, but rather to signalise the patterns of reaction existing in such a society. Additionally, such a reaction also clearly illustrates a power and dominance, which was, and was to remain unquestionable.

If one includes the interest of security, one can arguably defend this way of executing and thereby maintaining the known procedures. Going through different levels of commands before finally being executed, would normally result in less danger following the overall procedure of a mission from start to end. One can perhaps compare to people investing in funds contra one stock. As known, in funds there are many stocks parted into different areas, whereas having only one stock means holding only one interest. In negative times, the one stock is normally more vulnerable than the fund containing many stocks placed on different areas.

The arguments to the discussions done above are believed legitimate when compared to an Order that came from Mielke in 1966 regarding the structure and accomplishment of tasks.[28] Firstly, since the Department 26 from this time was directly functional under Mielke, through his *AGM* led by Major General Scholz. Furthermore, the leader of the Department 26 continued to inform Mielke about important problems to the realisation of the Service Instruction of 1962, or in the relation to questions of decisive and fundamental character. This was typically informed of to all possible co-workers of the *MfS*. These changes were possibly done to bring about higher effectiveness, as it from then on existed fewer steps between taking the first decision towards a mission and all the way up to Mielke, since the Department 26 became 'closer' subordinated to Mielke. However, finally yet importantly, in this context one should stress the importance the Department 26 played by entering this new stage. On the contrary, Mielke evaluated it as such that the Department was to be directly placed under him.

1.2 The 1970's: expansion of the telephone control

By 1970, the GDR was still not seen as an official recognised state in the world community, meaning the state's future and thereby survival was insecure. In relatedness, the *MfS* amongst others things therefore had a stronger interest to fulfil its tasks to maintain a minimum of problems for the GDR both externally and internally. The surveillance through the telephone control increased by the year 1970, as Mielke meant the telephone connections between the GDR and FRG were being used by enemy powers for the maintenance of the connections and

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[28] Order Nr. 5/66. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001024.

provocations.[29] By this, the *MfS* claimed that these connections were not only used for a widening of the network of spies. It was also used to provoke the party and state organs, in order to higher the influence of the western powers in the GDR.[30]

From this time and onwards, the *MfS*' Department 26 continuously kept abusing the law. Meanwhile, in 1968, a renewed *StGB* had come.[31] That is, Article 31, paragraph 1, clearly stated that the secrecy of the post and telecommunication was insusceptible. Furthermore, paragraph 2 said that these secrecies could be limited based on judicial reasoning, if something would endanger the security of the socialist states, or when it concerned a criminal act. This was perhaps so. However, once more, the *MfS* continued to abuse these laws by determining a criminal act and not acting after that a criminal act had taken place. In other words, the *MfS* completed an own, defined task, which in practice meant it did investigation of people in order to find out whether someone had done something criminal. The same year on the same date, a reconsidered *StPo* (Criminal Process Regulation) also came.[32] According to paragraph 115, section 1-3 of the *StPo*, the law on surveillance of post and telecommunication said clearly in such cases as these that no post or any surveillance of the telephone or similar were legal to execute. Here as well, it was only possible if persons already were under suspicion and officially involved in a criminal case, and not to find out if one was allowed to state a criminal offence by doing controls the way the *MfS* executed.

To identify and avoid such enemy actions, Mielke confirmed the Department 26 to control and search for the possible actions from the enemy. This was done by determining the overall public and private telephone traffic between the GDR and FRG including West Berlin, through the Departments and Divisions O of the ADM's Leipzig,[33]

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[29] Order Nr. 22/70. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001541.

[30] For all units of the *MfS*, they were ordered to work actively with the problems concerning any sort of spying. Amongst others, some of the greater contributors to such work were the Departments M and 26 (cf. e.g., Grimmer et al. [eds.], *op cit.*, Band 1, p. 432ff.).

[31] Strafgesetzbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Gesetzblatt I, 12.01.68, p. 1; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Rep. 4, Nr. 11; Gesetz über die Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Gesetzblatt I Nr. 47, 07.10.74, p. 425.

[32] Strafprozeßordnung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Gesetzblatt I, 12.01.68, p. 49.

[33] What is here a bit curious with the *MfS*' work regarding its politely strict and detailed work is that Mielke in the Order somehow still continued only to use the name "Department O" without further differentiations, to what at the time and for a longer period also had been known as "Department 26". As aforementioned, this Department was renamed in 1960. However, the use of the old name was probably done, since not all the Divisions O had become a Department O or a Department 26 (cf. below, Order Nr. 33/72. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001491).

Magdeburg and Schwerin.[34]   The telephone lines were highly interesting to observe, since the *MfS* calculated that when a telephone was used it often happened that the participators in calls came with critical comments to the regime. In other words, the surveillance was pulled through with high potential of observing all lines. The control was under the designation "Task V". The leaders of the mentioned ADM's had to manage the conditions for an exact control and evaluation of the traffic in their Departments and Divisions O, based on the assigned plans and working places. Not only did the *MfS* break the laws applicable, they did so with clear intensions because it seems it had to do so in order to fulfil the tasks planned.

For the security of the central characters of the "Task V" in relation to Mielke's commands, the leader of the Department 26 at the Central decided over the forwarding of the information resulting from "Task V". Additionally, he gave the orders to the leaders of the Departments and Divisions O, and guaranteed the instruction on this area of task. The forces and means put in for the "Task V" were not used in the frame of tasks for the ADM's. The leader of Mielke's Work Group was allowed to assign their other actions when such was needed. A delegation of power obviously seemed to be more effective, in order for these Departments and Divisions O to function more rational and with higher success. However, in line with aforementioned suggestions, Mielke kept the full power and final word at any time. As we know, the GDR was recognised as an independent state in 1971 by the majority of states existing in the world community. Officially, after having signed the agreements in Helsinki and getting along with the initiatives of Willy Brandt, it apparently also turned out more flexible in many ways. Especially towards its neighbouring state, the FRG, as well as its own citizens. Officially, at least, the GDR wanted to. To a certain degree, this was also the case, since based one the truth of having to.

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[34] Not only was the term "West Germany" deliberately used, holding a special meaning. Additionally, the policy of the GDR also made such an explicit use of words for the west part of Berlin. As we see in the discussion, the *MfS* observed the telephone traffic connected to the FRG. Officially, West Berlin was also a part of the FRG, meaning that it would have been unnecessary explicitly to specify West Berlin. However, this was most likely done both to underline the importance West Berlin had, laying in the heart of the GDR as well as that these use of words give the signal that it somehow was not considered as being fully, belonging to the FRG, if at all. Furthermore, since the GDR at the time still had not been recognised as an own, independent state by the FRG, the GDR did not either see the point in making any differentiations. Many East Germans also saw the whole of Berlin as actually being a - the - part of East Germany, since the capital of the GDR was East Berlin. Perhaps the most important with this is that East Berlin for the GDR only was named Berlin, in a way then including the west part as being the whole and belonging part of the 'GDR's' Berlin. This may not only have been the case for the citizens, but also for the state. Since after having recognised each other's states, the GDR continued to use the term "West Berlin", as somehow being separated from the FRG. The term "West Berlin" will be further used in the analysis, mainly to illustrate the differentiation of the *MfS*' area of operation.

As we have seen in earlier chapters, the tone was in practice somewhat different. This was also reflected upon through the work of the Department 26. The present and future tasks of the political-operative work and the scientific-technical development that were the results of this put higher requirements on the Line 26.[35] The necessity of a closer cooperation within the *MfS* was needed if the Department 26 was to cope with its tasks and interests. In other words, with time, the *MfS* seemed to increase its work in order to control the population in all ways. This was evidently, when for example reasoning this through the increase of co-workers after Honecker entered office.

It was therefore necessary to create structure and working places in regards to the conditions of development, and with this manage the leader and cadre questions. For accomplishing the measures necessary, Mielke decided that the Divisions of the ADM's were to be reconstructed. This led to a rebuilding into Departments.[36] The already existing as well as the new built Departments held the identical name of Department 26. The structure of the Departments became as follows:

- 1 leader of the Department

- 1 deputy leader of the Department

- 1 officer for evaluation and information

- 1 secretary (female)

- 3 Divisions

New achieved working places for the Departments were confirmed. With time, this was only going to develop, as for example the ADM of Rostock's Department 26 by the end of 1989 held five Divisions. The leader of the respective ADM's ensured that the resulting political-operative, operative-technical and organisational measures from the reconstruction were realised. Regarding the guarantee of the necessary stability and the conspiracy in these Departments, intended changes of the co-workers as well as the efforts of new co-workers was agreed upon with the leader of the Department 26 at the Central. When changes came, it was not, or at least seldom, coming from the co-workers that daily experienced different situations and thereby could evaluate decisions for fruitful changes in the future. The rule of the hierarchy of power remained rock steady, where the fewer ones at the top made the important decisions on behalf of the execution of work in their lower organs. Maybe this was fruitful, as one normally would expect a bit more

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[35] Order Nr. 33/72. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001491.
[36] This did not count for the ADM's of Karl-Marx-Stadt, Leipzig and Magdeburg.

knowledge from a person holding routine, compared to a young, inexperienced co-worker. Nevertheless, as it perhaps would have been more fruitful to do both, this rather explains the system of power. A system where one blindly followed orders coming from above, just like in the military and the way the power in this system was built. The only difference, being a huge one, is that these men of military normally have a life outside their jobs where they more or less can decide over own faith. This was however not the case in the GDR and the *MfS*, as the security service owned one's life both inside as well as outside the service. One was able to carry out influence only when asked. For the system, it was quite functional. Some would say, for nearly 17 000 000 there should have been taken more considerations and larger differentiations than presumably were done. However, this was exactly the point with this system and society: not to make people question, or make them develop critical minds. This was already decided. If not, this and similar was only decided upon from those that had power, whereas the regular citizens at the same time had few, if any, chances to influence decisions. Yet, worse, if one somehow tried without permission there were clear rules on how to deal with such people. The *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 M played important roles to crush the enemy.

By the mid of 1979, the *StPo* of 12 January 1968, going through its third process of evaluation, was changed.[37]   Besides the three sections of paragraph 115 existing, it was now added a fourth section. All normative decisions that had been taken until this time concerning the telephone surveillance turned into shape of law. As of before, it was only possible to complete surveillance in urgent cases where there existed strong reasons of a criminal act having taken place. This was again limited only to involve persons under suspicion, and had to be confirmed by the General State Attorney and in few cases by the *MfS*. The latter again having had to get a judicial confirmation within

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[37] Strafprozeßordnung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Gesetzblatt I Nr. 17, 28.06.79, p. 139.

48 hours.[38] This law was apparently looked upon as a strengthening of the citizen's security. However, in practice, and as discussed above in some examples, the *MfS* was simply too powerful to be stopped from a 'simple attorney'. Even the General State Attorney was in practice considered as such an attorney, even if it would have come so far as actually to receive a 'no' to further processing.

Before this decision of law had settled, something astonishing although not surprising took place 18 December the same year. This was to influence the given laws as well as the actions taken by the *MfS*.[39] As known the *MfS* continued to do its work to the telephone control mostly not in accordance with the law. Rather, it was accomplished through secret means. However, the *MfS*' Department 26 could not do the work alone, for it to achieve the highest possible level of observance. An agreement upon cooperation from 18 December 1979 between the General State Attorney, Minister of Interior and leader of the *DVP*, Minister for State Security as well as the leader of the Customs Service made the work of the Department 26 even easier to fulfil. The Department 26 could from now on turn to different channels of the party and state organs that had influence on decisions of surveillance of the citizens, which furthermore meant increasing the alternatives of surveillance. Formally, however, as known, the rule was arranged so that any respective unit of a state organ was either to ask the General State Attorney or the *MfS* through writings for further possibilities and allowance of surveillance as long as a reasoning led to such. Quit a large factor of disqualification and danger primarily in terms of the security of the citizens. Since this furthermore only speaks against any reasonable function regarding the protections and safety of the population, in addition to what we have witnessed so far. Mainly because the *MfS* acted as both the secret surveillance organ on behalf of the *SED* and GDR as a whole towards the inhabitants, whereas at the same time with the known

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[38] The paragraph 109 also allowed the investigation organ (Main Department IX, of the *MfS*) to confirm and go ahead with such surveillance. However, this was only possible when there seemed to exist elements that could lead to endangerments of a case. In any case, it was settled to run in such a way that an authorised person of the pre-investigation procedures had to give in a statement in writings to the leader of the responsible ADD of the Post and Telecommunication. The latter leader thereafter had to confirm the interest of surveillance (i.e., the reason for the pre-investigation procedures, the wanted connection of the pre-investigation procedures as well as the duration of the pre-investigation procedures). Afterwards, the leader of the ADD of the Post and Telecommunication had to give this further on to the local relevant authority's leader (for example a post and telecommunication office). This authority's leader again had to pass this on to a lower local relevant organ and its leader (the local place of mediation), which was situated closest for taking and carrying out the responsibility of the observance. Pure technically, this last organ was ordered upon to record the suspect's voice, to be able to identify the suspect at a later stage. Everything taking place was both recorded as well as written down for archival matters. When the whole business was finished, the route of reporting to the top (i.e., the investigation organ) was reversed, following the exact identical way as it had done downwards.

[39] *Anweisung* (Instruction) Nr. 1/1980. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Rep. 4, Nr. 11.

conditions being the organ supposed to guarantee the security and safety of the citizens. An exemplary illustration to how the roles of the security service quite arbitrarily and unlimited were mixed in such a system, which thereby also explains how the judicial and political power of the GDR was built up.

The State Secretary at the *MPF* came with the Instruction that was sent to the important parts within this area concerning matters of post and telephone control.[40] He addressed the ensuring of a unified procedure as well as a carrying out of the requirements of the law. This was to be done through a parallel security of the required secrecy to the surveillance of the telecommunication traffic in the investigation procedure. Thereafter, he listed the practical procedures on how to go forward with the necessary steps, when it existed a reason to do this type of surveillance. This was how the formal steps were, which after 18 December 1979 was supposed to be followed for all involved in these matters when turning to the organs this Instruction was sent to. As we know, the *MfS* took use of those procedures it pleased, with its own steps of method.

In order to withdraw or put a stop to the methods of the *MfS*, as far as the information as of today concerns, no form of formal, high positioned objection from any organs of the party and state appeared after the aforementioned settlements concerning this control was a fact. Laws or not, to this surveillance as with many others the *MfS* accomplished the Ministry used at least all the benefits it possibly could get out of the present situation. This is a reflection of yet another fact that the *MfS* was immensely strong both towards as well as in the party and state apparatus of the GDR.

1.3   The 1980's: the final years of the Department 26

With the growing dissatisfaction among the population the longer the time went by as commented on earlier, the efforts done by the Department 26 needed to be strengthened even further. One would maybe guess that the *MfS* in general had gotten a better hold of the situation. One can partly say that it did, since having gotten more experienced in the use of methods and work. On the other hand, new tasks frequently came in order to try to manage - at least have a potential of - a complete surveillance of the citizens. Since this was the fact, it may seem as if the *MfS* did not manage to repress the people totally the way the party's security and control apparatus was set to do. Besides, an even growing dissatisfaction within the *MfS* took place, which only made the

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[40] These were the leaders of the different directions of the German Post, leaders of the post and telecommunication offices, telecommunication offices as well as the leader of the office of telephone communication in Berlin.

situation worse.[41]   It was the opposite of an ideal situation, which could have meant that the *MfS* had a total control of the situation, less external and internal pressure as well as a stagnation of tasks and development taking place.

The Service Instruction from 1984 claimed that the further shaping of the developed socialist society in the GDR had to be carried out in hard class confrontation with the "imperialism".[42]   Furthermore, it was considered that the security service of the state primarily required improvement. Through the political-operative work, one needed to increase upon the work against the enemy. With operative-technical means and methods, the Line 26 carried a valuable contribution to this. It was warned from the Minister that when something went wrong according to important cases, this was immediately to be reported to either him or one of his Deputies.[43]   The importance of the Department 26 roles and tasks could not have been stronger underlined.

The interest was to reach an improved activity concerning the efforts of the specified means and methods of the Line 26. This was done to ensure the conspiracy towards a tight regulation when using operative-technical means as well as the effective co-work of the units with the Line 26.

The leaders of the units of the Line 26 were made responsible for the mission bound efforts in regards to conspiracies of operative-technical means and methods inside the GDR. Thus, in order to work on authentic information that supported the work on *OV*'s, *OPK*'s and other processes. This was being done through:

- telephone surveillance of persons using the telephone of the German Post and other cable bound news systems (mission A)

- surveillance of telex, individual connections, conditional connections in the telex traffic (mission T)

- acoustic surveillance in locked and limited rooms and spaces (mission B)

- optical and electrical observance and documentation predominantly in rooms (mission D)

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[41] This was for example the feeling among the co-workers of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02). This person meant that the worst taking place was the differences that existed between the generations of co-workers. Whereas for this person's generation, who by this time was in their 50's still having a genuine attitude and believe in the role and function of socialism, the younger that came into work and slowly took over did not possess such interests. For those, it was more the individual possibilities that counted, whereas issues like career opportunities, money, etc., played the most important parts of their work.

[42] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 007745. "Imperialism" was the common word the *MfS* used on the western powers. At the same time this clearly stated the apprehension, which the party of the GDR evaluated the West as being (i.e., imperialists).

[43] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 22.

- the effort of special security technical arrangements and chemical means of marking (mission S). For example secretly taken tests of suspicious, oppositional forces were taken through this mean. It also concerned objects

Additionally, mission X was presented once more. This mission was executed to uncover and clarify placed means of surveillance done from the enemy as well as radiation on important objects and arrangements inside the GDR and on foreign political representation in the GDR.[44] Further, an introduction of the resulting measures from this was done in regards to take advantage of the present experiences. Amongst other things, this meant that one got aware of where other units of the *MfS* had operated or now were operating. So that no form of for example de-conspiracy of for example an A measure, or in general, that hindering, dangers - from an enemy using a telephone line in the GDR, and double work was taking place.[45] That is, everything ran smooth as long as the different units of the *MfS* informed of where they had been, or were undertaking operations. Through this information, the task X was not put in, since it then only would have disturbed operations that might have been understood different had it not been for the access to the addressed information.

The leaders of the Line 26 were also responsible for further tasks such as ending the coordinative settlements with the responsible units, concerning long time and complex efforts of the operative-technical means that amongst other things were connected to objects of conspiracy.[46] Together, these units of the *MfS* solved tasks such as orientation of chosen objects and their belonging technical fulfilments regarding the Departments 26.[47] In order to solve these particular tasks seen in relation to both certain interests and questions of coordination, together with the Departments 26 these units mainly concentrated on permanent objects such as objects of conspiracy, attentions, rooms of negotiation and all sorts of guesthouses. Furthermore, hotels as well as diplomatic objects and institutions were of importance.

Concerning the co-work with the leaders of the ADD of the German Post, it was underlined that it still was of importance to accomplish the common direction to the rules of the surveillance and recording of the telecommunication traffic according to paragraph 115 of the *StPo* of 18 December 1979. As known, it existed different procedures to such execution. However, it was of importance that the

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[44] Amongst other things, this led to the Department 26 co-working with other units like for example the Main Department PS (Person Protection, Attention), in regards to the clearance and security (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563).

[45] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563.

[46] Cf. also BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, pp. 44-46.

[47] Hereunder were also changes and developments, planning of financial and material security as well as determining the limitation and responsibility of the principals that concerned the co-work for solving the matters (who was to do what, when, where, etc.).

responsible Department 26 received knowledge of the realisation of a set task, especially for the interest of the conspiracy to the different introduced measures. This, as well as the missions from the Central, normally came from an authorised person of the leader of the Main Department IX that thereafter passed it on to an authorised person of the Department 26 at the Central. In the ADM's, it normally came from an authorised person of the leader of the Department IX, where an authorised person of the Department 26 received the order. It was also typical that the Department 26 at the Central got the procedures to the realisation through two different ways. That is, from the Main Department IX, the leader of the Department 26 at the Central achieved either the arrangement of the General State Attorney towards surveillance and recording of the telecommunication traffic, or the arrangement of the investigation organ concerning surveillance and recording of the telecommunication traffic. After the leader of the authorised person of the Department 26 had given the documents to the authorised person of the ADD of the German Post for fulfilment against a receipt, the leader of the ADD of the German Post made sure the tasks were fulfilled. The aforementioned documents were both demonstrable and returnable. Once being completed, the leader of the ADD of the German Post or its authorised persons returned to the authorised person of the Department 26 with the following information:

- protocol of the telephone calls office for having accomplished the recording of the actual telephone connection (the protocol contained the period of the recording number of used recorders, quantitative results of number comparisons done as well as information to special incidents)

- recording of number comparisons results (the recording held information to all accomplished outgoing telephone calls with specification of the day, time, chosen call number and to call numbers within same local network of the owner of the chosen call numbers)

- original print of the number comparison arrangements

- recording material in sealed cover

Against a receipt, the authorised person of the Department 26 passed the documents and material on to the authorised person of the Main Department IX. After ending the measure, the authorised person of the Department 26 asked the leader of the ADD of the German Post to give the handed over original documents back. Thereafter, the former person gave these on to the authorised person of the leader of the Main Department IX. The same procedures took place in the ADM's.

It was furthermore of importance to follow the applicable rules to the data storing of postal information, in accordance with the tasks on the regulation of store

use of the *MfS* (user and call number ascertainment), and the storing of voices to personify anonymous/pseudonymous talks within the realisation of the tasks of the Line 26.[48]   This information was given out from the Departments 26 when it was needed from other units of the *MfS*. The process before such information was given out lasted three days. In complex cases, it could last up to three weeks. When information of this character came from the Departments 26, it contained names, addresses and telephone numbers of the persons being in the focus of the *MfS*.[49]   The build up and way of having access to the different call numbers secured the further connections to other stores of the Departments 26, which at any time was rapidly identified. This meant that one also had access to observed persons' social security number, occupation, other or new addresses, etc. What also made it easier and faster in regards to finding the persons of the voices was that all the units of the Department 26 worked according to the same frames and instructions. Therefore, concerning this point, the units of the Department 26 worked across the ADM territories without technical or professional problems. The Department 26 demanded that everything concerning development was to go past it before eventually newer techniques were expanded between the Departments 26 and *OTS*. Many persons were of interest to observe and thereby store. The key points laid on observing and recording the voices of co-workers from other secret services beyond the socialist states, people practising an activity of secret service interests, anonymous and pseudonymous threat calls, terrorist and acts of violence, political-underground activity, political-ideological diversion, accredited correspondents and state representatives of the FRG in the GDR and the GDR citizens seeking contact with such persons, GDR citizens having contact with the West - for example through relatives or organisations being there for trying to help these citizens out of the GDR, etc.

Quite clearly, the strictness of keeping matters on a high level of secrecy regardless if it concerned or involved co-workers knowing each other well through working close with one another, remained in the 1980's in accordance to how it was given during the foundation of the *MfS*. Even if it sometimes might have worked out somewhat slow to different times and matters, it was after all better to work slowly and thoroughly than fast and incorrectly. The fear and consciousness was always there to be discovered, which were points carefully and constantly considered always holding the interest to improve. The worn out cliché from Lenin that "confidence is good, control is better" stood as one of the political fundaments of the GDR, whereas perhaps the *MfS* was the greatest contributor to those words.

Besides completing tasks of frequent development and qualification of inter-

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[48]   Regulation Nr 9/80.
[49]   BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, pp. 37-38.

nal work of the *IM*'s in order to realise and secure the specific tasks, a related parallel task was to improve the latest technology. The leaders within the Line 26 were responsible for the orientation of the latest knowledge within science and technique, which were directed towards the latest and future development of the Line 26.[50] This was accomplished since one wanted the efforts to be used as forthcoming operative-technical means, through close coordinated and planned cooperation mainly with the *OTS*.[51] This also meant to take advantages of the knowledge of the so-called "brother organs", i.e., the secret services that existed in the other socialist states. Furthermore, the Departments 26 also used products and equipments that were constructed in the West. To the latter point, this strongly indicates that their own techniques did not hold as high quality in order to keep up with the development of tasks and thereby the surveillance. This practically led to a weakening of the surveillance. It also meant that one somehow 'unnecessary' had to charge the units responsible for the financial matters, since it often happened that one had to get hold expensive equipment from the West.

In regards to the *IM*'s, according to the Guideline 1/79 on the work of the *IM*'s, one permanently tried to heighten both the quality and quantity of this staff.[52] Not only did the Departments 26 focus on its own rows of *IM*'s. It also did towards those existing outside its rows, which executed related work for the Department. The Departments 26 was as such for example orientated towards the Line XX/6 with the intention of frequently checking if those *IM*'s were of interest to use.[53] This was possible, because Mielke had settled upon a Department 6 to exist within the Main Department XX, amongst others in order to complete tasks of interest to an important unit like the Department 26. Hereunder, in terms of the aforementioned issues, the Department 6 also held the coordination role between the

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[50] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, pp. 49-51.

[51] Amongst others, the *BStU* has until now not been able to uncover how this was done (cf. e.g., Wiedmann [ed.], *op cit*.). With the further development and qualification of the work, the Department 26's Department 8 at the Central was responsible for leading and organising the scientific-technical elaboration of the operative-technical issues of the Line 26 (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 51).

[52] As everywhere in the *MfS*, one of the most important points concerned the *MfS*' co-workers' task to permanently check upon the honesty and loyalty of the *IM*'s.

[53] Amongst others, in order to complete tasks that were of interest to an important Department such as the 26, Mielke commanded that a Department 6 within the Main Department XX was to be built. Hereunder, it also held the coordination role between the Lines M and 26, in terms of the aforementioned issues. The limitation of the tasks and determination of the individual measures were settled upon through written agreements between the leader of the Department 6 and the leaders of the mentioned Lines. The Department 6 also had to control and lead the work of the Divisions 6 of the Departments XX in the ADM's, for the reason of fulfilling and determining measures as well as accomplishing tasks unitarily. The leaders of the ADM's secured that a limitation and agreement of the tasks between the Divisions 6 of the Departments XX and the tasks of the Lines M and 26 followed under the observance of the conspiracies.

Lines M and 26. The limitation of the tasks and determination of the individual measures were settled through written agreements between the leader of the Department 6 and the leaders of the mentioned Lines. The Department 6 also had to control and lead the work of the Divisions 6 of the Departments XX in the ADM's, for the reason of fulfilling and determining measures as well as accomplishing tasks unitarily. The leaders of the ADM's secured that a limitation and agreement of the tasks between the Divisions 6 of the Departments XX and the tasks of the Lines M and 26 followed under the observance of the conspiracy.

To the tasks, few radically new things were introduced for the Departments 26. Although few things were new, the fight against the imperialism was still an important task to fulfil. With time, it does not seem as this particular task got less prioritised. On the contrary, it was a valuable goal to focus on, where new methods frequently were introduced in order to repress such existence. What was new - at least not up to that time classified, was some missions. Those missions were the "T" and "S". Surveillance of telex, individual connections and conditional connections in the telex traffic had earlier been undertaken by the Departments 26. The difference was that from 1984, this was categorised as an own type of mission. This moreover shows the necessity and importance the Departments 26 and the *MfS* considered the control as. The other mission was mission "S". In addition to what already existed for this type of control, a new type of classification was made. Most likely based on the growing and important challenges the Departments 26 got. The situation had developed in such a way that the Departments 26 felt the need to make extra efforts to special security technical arrangements and chemical means of marking (mission S), with the main interest to operate as far as possible in the hidden.

Regarding the fundaments to the use of the specific means and methods of the Line 26, these instruments were concentrated on supporting the work against the enemy. Strict standards had to be followed while using their efforts.

The use of the specific means and methods of the Line 26 were followed under strict protection of the conspiracy. This primarily demanded from the co-workers of the Line 26 that high requirements were being ensured for the politeness, professional secrecy, consciousness of responsibility and the faithfulness to the *MfS*. Yet, high stability of the co-worker stock was arranged with. Furthermore, the leaders of the mission-giving units informed the leader of the respective unit of the Line 26 of all elaborated case information. This supported the Line 26 through clearance of all persons and regime relations, fetching and presenting of all necessary identifications and documents that were needed to execute the activities. Additionally, this also gave personal support for the intention of securing and observing people that were looked upon as endangering and influencing the security. This was also accomplished to ensure the conspiracy of the means and methods. Besides this, the leader of the order-giving unit supported the responsible unit of

the Line 26 in the process of realising the missions. The elaborated information that was the result of the realisation of missions was also of value to complete, as they were handed over to the leader of the mission-giving unit or its authorised co-worker. Their use were being followed in such a way that the source protection was safely secured.

Two more points to the use of the specific means and methods of the Line 26 were to the very end of importance to see through. By endangers of the conspiracy of the means and methods of the Line 26, all was undertaken to ensure the security and that missions were being cut. When violations of the conspiracy appeared, thorough investigations had to be led in order to find the reasons and responsibility as well as coming up with related conclusions that thereafter were to be followed through acting. When incidents such as these had taken place that had grave effects on the work of crushing the enemy, or were used from the enemy for defamation of the work of the security organs of the GDR, they were immediately reported to Mielke and his responsible Deputy.

The use of the specific means and methods of the Line 26 followed through the units of the Line 26. Exceptions of the possessions and of efforts towards specific operative-technical means through other units needed Mielke's acceptation.[54] As we see, not only was the work of the Departments 26 of highest importance, it was also shaped in the form of clear rules with aims to keep the strictest possible security and control of this work.

As before, the co-workers were made conscious of their work and especially acquainted with their working methods through the means of the party and *MfS*' upbringing of loyal cadres. If something went wrong, the *MfS* was to continue as before to execute internal investigations. Firstly, to find out where the fault was as well as learning from that. Additionally, when having found the responsible, those were made to answer for the case in order for the Departments 26 and *MfS* to find out exactly why a mission went wrong and/or had to be cut off. After all, the *MfS* still calculated that any sort of enemy action could be accomplished within the *MfS* as much as outside. Practically, no one was safe or spared from the system's scythe, if it was seen as necessary to underline or reason the system.

The next consideration concerns the mission-giving to the units of the Line 26, and the cooperation with these for preparing, accomplishing as well as ending missions.[55] Mielke or his Deputy for the Line where the mission-giving belonged confirmed the B and D orders. The B and D orders in custodies, hotels and objects of conspiracy did not need this confirmation, except when it was a matter of installing technique as permanent material. The leaders of any high ranking

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[54] This was the case when for example the Department VIII was wanted upon to be involved together with the Department 26 (cf. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 22).

[55] The giving of the missions followed based on the form "*26*".

authorised unit, or a leader of an ADM were confirming all other orders. This process may be illustrated with a figure:

- For orders A, S, T and X:* Order-giving unit (ADM) ➡ Department 26 (ADM)

Order-giving unit (ADM) ──────────────────────────➤ Department 26 (ADM)

3. Execution (when still relevant, after e.g. analysis)

1. Mission

2. Confirmation

Leader of the ADM

- For orders B and D:** Order-giving unit (ADM) ➡ Department 26 (ADM)

1. Mission
Order-giving unit (ADM)   Department 26 (ADM)

5. Execution (when still relevant, after e.g. analysis)

2.
Leader of the ADM***
(Administrative role)

3.
Mielke, or Mielke's responsible Deputy for the responsible Line (Central)****

4.Confirmation

*   When these orders came from a unit at the Central the confirmation came from the leader of the Main Department or
         independent Department, which was the nearest and relevant authority of the order‑giving unit
**   These steps were not a necessity every time, especially concerning such orders to matters of installing equipment in hotels and
         objects of conspiracy as well as in attentions. Confirmation from the Central was necessary though, when it concerned
         instalment of permanent equipment. The acceptance of the first mentioned took place in the form of a confirmation from either
         the leader of a Main Department or an independent Department, when the case involved a unit of the Central. When a matter
         involved a unit of an ADM, it was typical that the leader of the ADM came with the confirmation (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in
         conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02)
***   This was not a "must" (holding a procedural rule). Nevertheless, when having gone through this step it only carried
         an administrative role (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock.
         Rostock, 06.05.02)
****   One of these mentioned persons had the authority to take the decisions alone

Figure 1.1: The later administrative accomplishments of the commands towards the Department 26 seen from the point of view of the ADM's

According to section 1.8.2 of Mielke's Guideline 1/76, regarding the means and methods of the Line 26 in terms of elaborating persons with foreign citizenship

and citizens of the GDR that held special positions, Mielke's decisions to elaborate the *OV*'s was made applicable.[56] In order to put in the right measures for control of this 'sort', amongst other things, one first checked upon:

- privileged persons and the personnel of foreign representations in the GDR as well as accredited correspondents (made through the leader of the Main Department II)

- citizens of confidential socialist states (made through the security organs of these states in cooperation with the responsible Main Departments and Department X; International Relations)

- citizens of the GDR in special positions. That is, such as representatives of the People's Chambers, AD's, nomenclature cadres of the party and state organs, and other organisations of the society in regards to the nomenclature (through Mielke, his responsible Deputy or typically from the leader of an ADM)

A unit of the Line 26 that was to do a job firstly questioned the mission-giving unit in regards to what it needed of information. Once this was undertaken, the order-giving unit handed over the needed information to the responsible unit of the Line 26, which made it possible to take a decision over the use of the most relative means and methods.[57] Based on the reasons of giving orders and the information of mission-giving units, the units of the Line 26 decided the methods for the actions of the specific means. They also organised and realised their use for achieving the given goals. The elaboration of the successfully achieved material of the Line 26 followed certain needs of information, based on both the reasons of Mielke's instructions as well as those from the mission-giving units. Thus, the Line 26 secured the following:

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[56] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 100/76. *Richtlinie Nr. 1/76 zur Entwicklung und Bearbeitung Operativer Vorgänge*, 1.8.2. Political-operative and criminal law suppositions to the matter of operative processes and required leader decisions.

[57] Such information was for example based on the following: capturing the building papers of a certain object, exact personal information of a suspect, concrete decision of the realising object, if the person in focus plus its related persons were under control of the Line 26, if any eventually de-conspiracy had taken place, if other Lines had put in efforts towards the person in focus and if it had come to de-conspiracy, questions that directly concerned the condition of the object of realisation (information about the electronics, electronically and long distance phone installations, gas and water installations, etc.), information about the living place (place of energy counters, the net of the network electricity cables, relation of properties, files of building constructions, and so forth), instalments done, all repair work done to the relevant technical constructions, closely situated areas and buildings to the object under control, information on the landlord and all present users, etc.

- the objectivity and completeness of the evaluation of information

- the actuality of the information transmission

- the observance of information routes for the transmission of important information

The transmission of the information was done by:

- missions A, B and T as faithful original copy, or summarised report

- missions D and S as picture, respectively report of result

- mission X as result protocol, or investigation report

The transfer of original material to the order-giving units was only fulfilled in especially reasoned exceptions.[58]   The duration of keeping original material followed as shown below:

- mission A   10 days

- mission B   20 days

- mission D   12 months

Through the order-giving unit, exceptions were agreed upon with the unit of the Line 26. Normally, the original material was elaborated from the responsible mission-taking unit of the Line 26, which thereafter gave it over to the mission-giving unit. This assessment followed a main pattern, which resulted in treating the original material by checking the:[59]

- basis of the material and aim of the *OV*, *OPK* and *IM*'s procedures

- informational need of the mission-giving unit

- concrete situation within the time of elaboration

- charging and relieving conditions

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[58] This was for example done concerning original material from a magnet recorder when the facts from the recording were used for special situations either by the Department 26 or any other unit of the *MfS*, for the sake of finding out exact information (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 34). Such cases were fulfilled in cooperation with the *OTS* concerning investigation and expert help. Other times this took place were when wanting to find out the voice and frequency analyses of a certain person, or that one translated material of foreign languages.

[59] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 32.

- characterisation of the personality being under elaboration, motives for actions

- conditions for harming the law

- possibilities of measures towards the defence of violating the law, or introductions of combinations

- informational need in terms of the total set of tasks of the *MfS*, coming from crucial information plans

Once being finished, the information went through the post or by a courier of the Department 26. It could also be passed over the telephone in urgent cases. To the latter, there was always the danger that such information was not being given exact as well as that it all was not as secure when being brought through a telephone line compared to the first mentioned options.

Written material with the results of the actions of the specific means and methods of the Line 26 were only destroyed after a decision taken by the leader of the mission-giving unit. The destruction was thereafter reported in a protocol. By archiving in the Department XII (Central Information/Store), the adequate material was classified as locked enclosure.[60] Since even having had procedures of registering material that was of no use or value anymore underlines the considerations and detail work on security, which the *MfS* undertook at any time and place. Every document did not only have to be locked behind walls of steel after ending a shift, they also had to be sealed.[61] Considering the destruction of the material, this also contributes to understand the picture of the top-secret tasks and possessions the Department 26 dealt with. Even if the system of the *MfS* in some ways forced a trust in one's co-workers, there was a danger that lacks or faults could come from within or outside the Ministry, which further could have revealed secret material. When having destroyed the original material, further worries did not have to exist anymore.

One can perhaps say that few technical procedures were changed or introduced from 1984. Rather, they were widened, in terms of a larger and more exact coop-

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[60] The "locked enclosure" reflected upon the security of the conspiracy, especially related to of protecting the sources concerning written material and results coming from the work with the mission categories A, B, D and T. When other units of the *MfS* wanted to look into such archival information they had to get a confirmation from the leader of the unit that was responsible for having archived the material.

[61] BStU/Magdeburg, MfS - BV Magdeburg. Nr. 82. Perhaps this was to the best for curious fingers, as taking such material with home would have meant receiving hard punishment for up to ten years (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02).

eration with other units and available directions and procedures lying outside the Department 26.

Coming to the special tasks of the leader of the Line 26 at the Central, some things should be noticed. To a unified accomplishment of the tasks of the Line 26, the leader had branch specifically to lead the activity of the Departments 26 of the ADM's. It also had to give help and support to solve their tasks. Additionally, the leader controlled their activity, based on Mielke's confirming role of missions, respectively in agreement with the leaders of the ADM's. Through Mielke's responsible Deputy, the same leader had to report to Mielke on especially important results of the actions of the specific means and methods of the Department 26. Additionally, through the knowledge coming from the results, it had to report on all "electronic spy attacks" of the enemy that had been done.[62]

Mielke had up to a certain time given different general guidelines of planning as well as general orders to material planning. Based on these, the leader (of the central unit) of the Line 26 at the Central planned the necessary operative-technical means and equipments for the Line 26, in order to realise specific tasks. It also made these features disposal for the units of the Line 26 in the ADM's, in accordance to their needs. Finally, with necessary volume the leader ensured the preparation of the reserves.

The leader of the Line 26 at the Central had to both organise and confirm the qualifying professional education and further education of the co-workers of the Line 26. Based on the growing requirements of the Line 26 and the related procedures of determination to the regulation of the scientifial-technical and operative-technical research and development in the *MfS*, the leader had to guarantee the cooperation with the *OTS* systematically. In general, this was something that took place constantly in the Departments M and 26, as the ways of controlling developed continuously in parallel with the challenges. Therefore, ideological schooling and control efforts were means to strengthen the "fight atmosphere".[63] By far, the ideological and thereby the party's aspect of the development towards the 'correct world' went deeply into all types of units of the *MfS*, including the Department 26. Pure technically, if the Departments M and 26 did not possess the equipment that was needed, they turned to their counterparts in the other socialist states for support.[64]

It is perhaps not so surprising that the supreme leader of all the existing units of the Department 26 had such tasks and many responsibilities. What is more interesting to make aware of is the growing importance and value the Department 26 obviously achieved in the *MfS*. Since the supreme leader of the Department on

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[62] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 007745, p. 7.

[63] Cf. e.g., BStU/Halle, MfS - BV Halle. AKG. Nr. 1421, p. 22; BStU/Schwerin, MfS - BV Schwerin. Abteilung M, 1, p. 4ff.; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. OTS. Nr. 1355.

[64] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. OTS/173, p. 142.

a general basis often had to report to Mielke, regardless of being directly under Mielke or not. From 1977, the Department 26 was in fact no longer placed directly under Mielke's own empire.[65] By this time, the tasks of the Department 26 had grown remarkably, and were therefore given over to Mielke's one Deputy (Schwanitz), in order to be more effective in terms of holding a closer control over the daily business. Even if Mielke turned to this solution, this does not show that he evaluated the Department 26 any lower. On the contrary, rather, it was easier to achieve a better overview with the growing tasks the Department 26 had gotten when it was spread onto Deputy Schwanitz who easier and more thoroughly was able to control the Department 26 under his own line of command than Mielke was able to. This was a fact, particularly because he was the one Deputy that to this time had the fewest units in his Line. Mielke most likely also turned to this settlement as he had enough 'own' tasks within his 'own' Line, which made it more convenient to spread the work. Nonetheless, having it this way did not result in less control for Mielke, since we know that he still maintained full control over the Department 26 at any time through the structure and control of power of the *MfS*. If this does not cover enough for illustrating the importance of the Department 26, in all of the ADM's the Department 26 was functionally placed in the leaders' of the ADM's own rows.[66]

Regarding the special tasks of other units, amongst other things, they carried out influence over the Departments 26. From the systematic of the cadre work and the ensuring of a high stability of the co-worker stock, the leader of the Main Department Cadre and Education together with the leaders of the ADM's marked influence through the leaders of the Departments 26.[67] In exceptions of necessary replacements of co-workers of the units of the Line 26 that held wide knowledge of tasks, work procedures and operative-technical means and methods of the Line 26, respectively had obtained special knowledge, abilities and skills from these areas, were like before discussed with the leader of the Line 26 at the Central. In other words, although these men 'only' were the ones fulfilling tasks given from units that in the secondary literature often have been seen as more important than the Line 26, the co-workers of the Line 26 held vital arteries for the functioning, planning and procedures of surveillance. For example, based on reasons of guidelines of planning, material plan regulation and research as well as development regulation of the *MfS*, the leader of the *OTS* secured the development, production and preparation of the operative-technical means. This fulfilment was based on the Department 26's elaborated operative-tactical demands. Furthermore, the leader of the Main Department XX and the leaders of the ADM's secured that the

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[65] Cf. e.g., Gieseke (ed.), *op cit*., p. 44.
[66] Cf. e.g., figure 1.2 (Part B).
[67] Cf. also BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563.

units of the Line 26 were able to complete their specific tasks in the area of the telecommunication of the German Post.[68] To this, between the leader of the Line 26 at the Central and the Main Department XX, determinations of coordination were made. The identical procedure was undertaken in the ADM's. Additionally, the leader of the Department N (Department News; (Security)) at the Central and the leaders of the Departments N in the ADM's stepped in for the Line 26 when needed as replacement towards the connections with the German Post. In such cases, the Department also carried the interests to ensure the planning, preparation and financing of the demanded distribution network through the Line 26. However, not only did these aforementioned units directly cooperate with the Line 26. Based on the reason of the principals in the Service Instruction, determinations of coordination between the leader of the Line 26 at the Central and other units at the Central were made in cases where necessary.

Not only to the end of the *MfS*' life do we see a close cooperation existing. This was also set up systematically in case the Line 26 somehow could not fulfil its tasks. This figures, since it was not only the units explicitly mentioned that stayed assistant if the Line 26 was not able to complete its tasks properly. As such, this indicates a mixture of growing tasks having to be completed combined with co-work in terms of acting more effective. Yet again, this strengthens the thought that the work the Department 26 did was highly prioritised within the *MfS*, in order to keep the population under the strictest surveillance on behalf of the party's interests.

The latter argumentation is also confirmed on behalf of keeping secrecy towards anyone, since the Service Instruction was personally kept of the ones holding it. With the decisions of the Service Instruction, the subordinate leader and other co-workers were only made confident on a need-to-know basis. They were only informed of the necessary information, which was needed for solving their task. Said differently, the importance of the work the Department 26 did was highly valued particularly since the *MfS* internally to this unit underlined the holding of a strict control towards the flow of information. Based on this command, Mielke's responsible Deputy for the Line 26 enacted decisions of enforcement on

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[68] This was done through the Main Department XX's Department 6. From 1985, this unit existed under the Main Department XIX's Department 4 (Service Instruction 10/85. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 005207), and not from 1986 as Wiedmann (Wiedmann [ed.], *op cit.*, pp. 186-207) has claimed. It is neither entirely correct that the Main Department XX and its Departments in the ADM carried all direct responsibility to such work. For example, in the ADM of Rostock in 1979 (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 1609), there took place a hand over of part areas of the Department XX's responsibility of the *MPF* to some DSP's (Grevesmühlen, Bad Doberan, Ribnitz, Grimmen, Greifswald, Wolgast and Rügen). Thus, to improve the guarantee on the territorial responsibility of the DSP's, and carrying out the key work. Nevertheless, according to the Minister's Order 36/67 (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001247), the Department XX was still responsible for all kinds of work concerning the *MPF* units in the ADM.

a daily basis.

After having launched the Service Instruction, it went with immediate effect into force. At the same time, decisions such as the Service Instruction from 1962 as well as the Writing of the Minister from 22 August 1975 lost their validity.

Naturally, all the ADM's of the *MfS* received Mielke's final superior commands to the telephone control. As already known, the ADM's reacted based on their position of the order in the hierarchy of the *MfS*.[69] However, this did not deprive them the right to make own orders, as long as they generally followed the commands that came from above. The ADM of Rostock's leader, Rudolf Mittag,[70] was among those leaders of the ADM's that responded to Mielke's orders by creating a "measure plan" for the ADM of Rostock in relation to the Service Instruction of 1984.[71] Not particularly made, this was nevertheless done to accomplish the Service Instruction of 1984, for preparing and realising the A, B, D, S, T and X tasks of the Department 26.

This command resulted in an improvement of the activity of the efforts of the specified means and methods of the Department 26. It was done in order to ensure the conspiracy towards a tight regulation when using operative-technical means. Additionally, it was given for making the co-work between different units and the Line 26 more effective.

Every leader of the mission-giving unit in person cleared the request for realising B or D tasks with the leader of the Department 26. This was in the rule done six weeks before the planned date of realisation. The following summed up below were treated:

- specification of the material as well as information to cases and persons that had influence on the planned actions

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[69] Out of two things this power levels were clear. Since, firstly, as aforementioned, the information was given on the need-to-know basis. Secondly, the power level and the need-to-know basis are reflected when comparing the words that came from the Service Instruction of Minister Mielke and the words from the leader of the ADM of Rostock. I.e., the latter's "measure plan" started with nearly identical use of words as Mielke had used in his Service Instruction. When returning to the need-to-know basis and the strict control of information flow, this illustrates the fact. Since there normally would not have been necessary, at least not for the practice in the *MfS*, to almost quote orders given in such a short distance of time - or at all. If the latter cannot be justified however, the use of words anyway to a minimum reflects the practices of the *MfS*' power constellations and their influence on own system.

[70] Before Rudolf Mittag took over as leader of the ADM of Rostock (1975-1990), there were three persons having led the ADM before him. For different reasons, the two first ones did not lead the ADM for long (Eduard Switala [1952], Wilhelm Müller [1952-1954]). The leader having lasted the longest in the leading position was Alfred Kraus (1954-1975), who led the ADM to his days of pension.

[71] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2550.

- clear formulation of the set goal concerning the starting measures and further planned measures before, during and after the realisation of specific tasks

- determination of place and time of the planned actions, and the factors that decided upon the actions

- guaranteeing the surveillance of the conspiracy, and the secure installation regarding the technique

- designation of a responsible Division leader, to create the necessary conditions of the actions related to the technique as well as for the oral agreements with the Division leader of the Department 26 being responsible for the realisation

After agreement with the leader of the Department 26, the leaders of the order-giving units sent over the order form of the Department 26 to him immediately after having it filled out.

By the use of legends towards the bound persons that belonged to the objects where the equipment had been built and of neighbouring flats, one acted with outermost responsibility to eliminate de-conspiracy and dangers to the realisation.[72] The legends were agreed with the Department 26. They were controlled as well as adjusted to the local conditions and life habits. Already in the phase of preparation, such methods were used so that the actually goal of the actions were not discovered. The leader of the Department 26 entered the cooperation through the leader of the mission-giving unit. This shows that the Department 26 played an important role in the surveillance of the citizens of the GDR, since already taking an active part in the first phases of the preparations.

After the mission-giving unit had worked on the security plan during the phase of the preparation, the leader of the mission-giving unit thereafter confirmed it. At least three days before the date of realisation it was agreed upon from either the leader, deputy or Division leader with the leader of the Department 26. The security plan contained:

- time of the begin of the security action as well as suggested time of realising the specific measures

- security measures to control respectively bound the object persons/object, the persons of the installation as well as accessing support points and further persons of neighbour flats, with reference to the responsible security forces and their concrete tasks

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[72] Cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 10; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 13.

- reference of the legends to control respectively bound the determined persons

- reference of the retreat legends, especially by danger of a conspiracy, under observance of the necessary forces

- concrete determination for the necessary information and notification system (radio, telephone), and its established support points of leadership

- the responsible of the security actions

With the hand over of the security plans, the order-giving unit gave a report to the leader of the Department 26 on the ascertainment results of the house occupants. This especially addressed the persons that were controlled or bounded, relations in the house and connection and contact persons that practised an influence on the realisation. Additionally, the report was concrete and contained as much detailed information as possible. The information was permanently underlined during treating the elaboration of the material. This indicates that the *MfS* and its Department 26 not only took the plans of fulfilment seriously, but also made sure to plan and thereby secure against any possible failures that might happen. This was particularly important, especially since a number of partners and persons involved were considered as not having had a 'close enough' connection to the *MfS*, qualifying to having had to undertake certain measures of security. The *MfS* never knew, perhaps was one of the neighbours of a suspect the *MfS* cooperated with actually part of counterintelligence, or somehow not so loyal to the *MfS* as it should have been. Obviously, still an important matter was the internal control, which partly illustrates the Ministry's success for many years. Even though we know that it practically was untouchable in the GDR society, the Ministry always worked and operated as secretly as possible based on not being discovered at all, by anyone.[73]

During the time of a B or D measure, measures and responsibility to ensure the security of the technique were agreed upon between the leader of the Department 26 and the leader of the mission-giving unit. Further, a permanent mutual exchange of information was secured. Political-operative measures of the order-giving unit, especially measures of the Department VIII that had an influence on

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[73] These ways of working are stated by Wawrzyn (Wawrzyn, *op cit*., p. 145), where it finally turned out that the internal control also was used to do cover-ups for own personnel. He refers to a case where the co-workers of the Department 26 had discovered people that had undertaken criminal actions. However, from higher positioned persons in the *MfS*, the co-workers having been on the case were told to cut off the surveillance. The cut off was ordered since it turned out they obviously had done observation of their own co-workers having participated in the criminal actions.

special tasks, were agreed upon with the leader of the Department 26. This was executed in order to eliminate dangerous situations in relation to the technique as well as the persons working with it.

To the introduction of the mission A, the leaders of the order-giving units consulted the leader of the Department 26 to check upon free capacity and realisation possibilities before sending over a mission form. By realisation possibilities, the mission form was filled out completely in accordance with earlier orders. It was thereafter sent to the leader of the Department 26.

By planned measures of the missions S (means of marking) and T (Telex), the leaders of the order-giving units agreed together with the leader of the Department 26. To realise measures in category X, a formless request was given the leader of the Department 26. In preparation of the realisation, amongst others, the necessary documentation was made available to the leader of the Department 26. After having realised measures of the mission X, the leader of the Department 26 sent over a result protocol with suggested measures or changes. Thus, to guarantee the security decisions to the leader of the mission-giving unit.

The actions of the means and methods of the Department 26 followed a larger plan of the Minister, Mittag's planning as well as the plans of the leaders of the units cooperating with the Department. Additionally, they were concentrated on certain points that seldom remained constant. By the planning of the actions of these means and methods the necessity was given attention. The leader of the Department 26 gave all missions to Mittag for confirmation. The realisations of the missions exclusively followed the confirmation. This working process illustrates the earlier analyses on how the distribution of power was as well as showing the steps on how to solve a task and thereby functioning. Furthermore, to ensure the conspiracy, the leaders of the order-giving units handed over all the important information on elaborated cases and persons to the leader of Department 26. In this way, a decisive conclusion was taken to which means and methods were the most relevant for use. Additionally, and as repeated, the leaders of the order-giving units had to support the set in forces of the Department in the process of the realisations of the missions. To this, experienced forces from the order-giving unit were put in.

By high dangers of the conspiracy of the means and methods of the Department 26, the leaders of the mission-giving units and the leader of the Department 26 entered all necessary measures to ensure the security. At the same time, all missions were broken up. By damages or irregularities of the conspiracy of the means and methods, when necessary thorough investigations were held in order to find reasons and responsibilities. Additionally, it was from this necessary to state conclusions for the future work. As aforementioned, this was connected with the

interest of running a tight and internal control of all actions taken.[74]

The hand over of the elaborated information followed and was addressed personally to the leaders of the responsible units, by post or through courier of the Department 26. In regards to important information that required an immediate introduction of measures, this was informed of on telephone to the leader of the order-giving unit. The leader of the order-giving unit was entitled to designate a co-worker at the leader of the Department 26, for the reason of collecting information. The leader of the Department 26 ensured that the conspiracy of the material and the *IM*'s were being kept secret under strict use of cover terms. The hand over of original material in shape of magnet tape was in especially reasoned exceptions given to the mission-giving or other units, when other means and methods had to be brought into use for further utilisation to different cases.

With the ending of set tasks, all work done from the Department 26 as well as the produced written material from the mission-giving units were through the efforts of the Department 26 archived or destroyed in the records of the Department XII. They were classified as 'closed'. The destroying of the documents only followed based on the decision from the leader of the order-giving unit. To this, a protocol on destruction was made, and was confirmed by the leader of the mission-giving unit. The protocol on destruction was also added to the records. No security seemed high enough, and coming into these archives of the *MfS* must have been one of the most complicated operations - if one were to try. In order to possess the highest possible control and security, all traces of a mission one could think of were deleted.

The time of keeping the original material followed from the different categories. They were:

- mission A   10 days

- mission B   20 days

- mission D   12 months

Exceptions were agreed upon between the leaders of the order-giving units and the leader of the Department 26. In other words, much the same as to what Mielke had decided.

Independent of the information flow to the mission-giving units, the leader of the Department 26 informed Mittag about all elaborated information of importance that came from the results of the operative-technical measures.

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[74] This however counted for all units of the *MfS*, hereunder the First Lieutenant's Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a First Lieutenant of the Department VIII. Rostock, 14.05.02, 18.05.02). She, herself, knew that she was being controlled, for example through frequently having asked her questions of any kind.

The rightful receiver personally kept the related commands, just as told in the Service Instruction of 1984 from Mielke. With this determination as well, its subordinate co-workers were only made confident on a need-to-know basis. They were only informed of the necessary information that was needed for solving their task. As such, we do not see many changes from Mielke's decisions. Rather the contrary, since an underlining of the commands Mielke had given was the fact. Indeed, Mittag's support to Mielke's commands additionally held a strengthening of important points, such as for example the conspiracy.

The Service Instruction of 1984 did not seem to cover enough in regards to the operations of the Department 26. It covered the fundamental needs for surveillance, however, not all needs to every detail. Therefore, a first supplement to the Service Instruction of 1984 was introduced in 1989.[75] Clearly, the Department 26's tasks and thereby challenges had grown, since a necessary supply of orders was given. Concerning the further elevation of the conspiracy to the actions of operative-technical means and methods of the Line 26, the Service Instruction of 1984 got its supplements as given below. This supplement should be understood in the light of the growing dissatisfaction among the population, which for every day especially at the end stages of the GDR's life became ever stronger. Additionally, increasingly oppositional forces grew within own rows. The tension and tight situation that existed at the time is also shown below, as even the *MfS* itself did not seem to be as strong and self trusted as before.

We already know of the different ways of executing internal control. This seems as even further tightened, since some decisions that earlier were taken in the ADM's at this stage now all of a sudden went through the Central.[76] A kind of mistrust apparently existed, as only the few highly important men of the *MfS* decided over the role of the Department 26. This underlines that the control, its belonging power as well as the trust in its effectiveness was such a prioritised issue, which from the *MfS* was not, and should not have been, an element of surprise.

The transferred operative-technical means by the *OTS* (referred to in the Ser-

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[75] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 007746.

[76] As a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock has told Nessim Ghouas, dating the period especially to the 1980's concerning the internal control that took place, at a late stage in the life of the *MfS* this person got to experience that such work had taken place (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02). His colleagues and himself did not know anything about such control, as this special building was situated outside the main building of the ADM of Rostock. More specifically, this had been secretly set up only some hundred meters away from the main building, on the floor above a kindergarten with the aim of not waking any suspicion. This had been going on for a long time, whereas such control increased with time. This particularly involved the younger generations, which tried to control everyone and everything. At the same time they secured, and were reaching for increasingly power.

vice Instruction of 1984) to the responsible units were given back to the *OTS* by March 1989. The need of operative-technical means was reported to the Department 26 at the Central by the responsible units, which thereafter was planned at the *OTS*. The units that by consideration of necessity had to put in independent operative-technical means of the Line 26 collected a confirmation by Mielke or his responsible Deputy for every single action by means of a form.[77]   Based on the confirmed form, the Department 26 of the Central made the necessary operative-technical means available and ensured advisement and support.

The responsible Department 26 was considered as the area of planning, where the decisions and thereafter actions followed. Based on this, the Department 26 contributed to the aversion of dangers that expectedly could arise through damages and other activities of the enemy. Concerning the cooperation, the responsible unit designated a connection officer. After the ending of the actions, the operative-technical means were given back to the Department 26.

When taken place, damages and violations of the conspiracy of the efforts of the Line 26 were immediately reported to Mielke or his responsible Deputy. By appeared de-conspiracy in accordance to the Service Instruction of 1984, the leader of the responsible unit and the leader of the responsible Department 26 worked close together. This was also done in order to uncover the reasons related to de-conspiracy. These parts of the *MfS* now worked closer together than the Service Instruction suggested, where only Mielke and his responsible Deputy of the Line got informed. On one hand, the parts of the *MfS* that felt were the shoe pinched most logically got their areas of tasks, which was treated further. On the other hand, they did not hold unlimited power, as the leaders of the Departments 26 of the ADM's promptly had to inform the leader of the Department 26 at the Central. The leader of the Department 26 at the Central had to determine and execute measures in common with the leader of all units as well as the leaders of the ADM's. This was done in order extensively to avert possible difficulties for the *MfS*. Apart from introducing measures, the leader of the Department 26 at the Central reported to Mielke.

The mission assignments for the actions of operative-technical means to the responsible Department 26 with the mentioned form in relation to the Service Instruction, only followed when the Department XII confirmed that the person in focus regarding the order-giving unit was actively registered.[78]   This indicates that the *MfS* now, contrary to the Service Instruction of 1984, only assigned mission when persons already had been registered. It was done since simply having too many challenges and people to observe. To objects, the form concerning the Department 26 ("*26*") was also apparent so that the object and territorial competence

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[77] This was the form "*26*".

[78] This was accomplished through the "*F 10*".

of the order-giving unit was made clear.

In the yearly estimation regarding the year planning, the leaders of the units of the Line 26 had to estimate the cooperation with the other units, and to inform about the independent operative-technical means of the Line 26. In relation to this, the leader of the Department 26 at the Central was informed. The latter leader thereafter summarised the results in its estimation to the year planning, and informed Mielke.

Although certain, however not radical, changes were made, one still can see that the *MfS* worked according to procedures having been established in the early phases. Some tasks changed, new came, others were revisited. Nevertheless, it all held the common goal: to trace and fight down the enemy with the available methods constantly being developed. This was all done with the superior aim of developing the society towards a communist direction, supporting the leading party, the *SED*, towards its future goal.

1.4   The practice and importance of the Department 26

Based on what has already been shown, this section aims to illustrate the structures and work of the Department 26 more 'tangible'. Said differently, the focus will rest on a more 'every-day-work' basis, which the *MfS* executed. Thus, the interest is furthermore to expand the knowledge in relation to the material that has been analysed so far, placing the material below into a known context. In regards to the explained in this paragraph, the identical applies when treating the Department M. I.e., the last section of the post control has the same intention.

To be able to monitor, sneak-listen and look into other people's private lives and so forth, was important for the *MfS*' network of control. The Department 26 was responsible for such actions. According to the state committee that was responsible for dissolving the *MfS*, the Department 26 had a total of 31 end places and 279 technical supportive units at the end of 1989.[79] Within this field of control, there were 1486 people fully employed in the *MfS*, whereas approximately 436 of them were in East Berlin. Additionally, at the Central, there finally existed ten Departments of the Department 26, with different Divisions, Groups, etc. The Department 26 held surveillance of thousands of telecommunication connections throughout the republic. Additionally, illustrating that the Department 26 was of highest importance for the *MfS* besides the figures shown, it was directly subordinate the leader of every ADM. Yearly, exclusive personal costs, 15 000 000 GDR Mark was available for the efforts of the Department 26.

The technical equipment the Department 26 had in the Central as well as in the ADM's allowed observing 3780 telephone connections and 50 participants of

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[79] Gill & Schröter, *op cit.*, p. 145; cf. also Schwan, *op cit.*, p. 196.

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telex users at the same time. One a yearly basis, at least 7000 persons was observed. What was astonishing was that the *MfS* did not only watch people from the opposition, but also people that were 'allied' with the Ministry. Thus, a person like Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, being the State Secretary and leader of the *BKK* (Area Commercial Coordination) in the Ministry for Foreign Trade and an *OibE* in the *MfS*, was in the years 1987-88 carefully followed by the Department 26.[80] Another case like Günter Schabowski, a high party functionary and a member of the Politburo, was observed with the same eyes and ears.

The Department 26 did surveillance within the GDR. However, surveillance organised by the *MfS* that went beyond the borders of the GDR also took place, especially with the aim to watch matters that somehow involved both the GDR and FRG. The main responsible for such action in the *MfS* was the Main Department III (Radio Reconnaissance, Radio Defence), which looked after that any telecommunication traffic going beyond the GDR borders was controlled. It was of particular interest to observe communication that took place in the FRG, which was addressed to West Berlin and West Europe. Equally interesting, was the communication between West Berlin and the FRG.

As aforementioned, the Departments 26 accomplished relevant tasks for any unit within the *MfS* that asked for their help. Although the Department 26 was a unit in which any other unit inside the *MfS* was able to ask for assistance in completing their work, some asked the Department 26 more frequently than other. These units were the Main Department II (Counter Intelligence), Main Department XX (State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground) and Main Department XVIII (People's Economy).[81] These were also looked upon as being among the most vital and thereby the most important units for the *MfS*.[82] As for the total number in percentage concerning asked missions to be done by the Departments 26, the Main Department II was responsible for almost 50%.[83] The Main Department XX's percentage was circa 20%, while the Main Department XVIII had approximately 15%.

The final standing command that applied for the *MfS*' Department 26 in cooperation with, amongst others, the German Post, was the Service Instruction of 1984. The aforementioned laws on post and telecommunication in addition to Ar-

[80] Schwan, *op cit*., p. 198.
[81] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02.
[82] A typical example to how, and to that such units of the *MfS* used the Department 26, took place in the AD of Neubrandenburg. In August 1985, a "peace seminar" was held in different places of the AD. The Main Department XX had an interest to observe the different groupings, people, activities, etc., that were present. One of the measures to do so was through the Department 26. Therefore, the Department 26 installed both A and B measures for surveillance on behalf of the Main Department XX (cf. e.g., von Saß & von Suchodoletz, *op cit*., pp. 58-60).
[83] Gill & Schröter, *op cit.,* p. 146.

ticle 31 of the constitution were also supposed to count for and secure any abuse made from any possible surveillance of the telecommunication. However, after Mielke went into office in 1957, he ignored the article, and acted rather in favour of his own plans. Related to the law that applied in those days, as we have witnessed, Mielke obviously disregarded it. Clearly evidently of such was when he introduced Service Instruction 10/62 approximately one year after the building of the Berlin Wall.

What we typically associate with the Department 26 was its telephone control, as the name of the Department itself tells. However, the Department, for many years having been directly under Mielke, also had accomplished other sorts of controls. These were parted into so-called measures/missions, etc., of control.[84] As we have seen, these controls were carried out in different ways, depending on the ordered way of controlling people. In this regard, controls were done by co-workers of the Department 26 that for example carried hidden mobile instruments in their portfolios, umbrellas, inside of their jackets or in fact in their wallets. Microphones were also made for use. In order not to wake attention, they were made extremely anonymous. The same was done with tiny cameras of surveillance. These cameras were often equipped with hydraulics. To be more exact, in co-worker's pockets was a concave rubber ball where a cable led through the sleeves of the arms to a camera on the other side. In order to make it work, all they had to do was to press the ball. After having pressed the ball, air went through the cable whereas this reaction served the releaser. In this way, the co-workers of the Department could easily take pictures of for example a gathered group even without the photographer having to look in the same direction, or moving his hands out from its pockets. These examples were the B and D measures, where more examples will follow below.

In regards to some of the situations mentioned above, the Department also took infrared pictures. Typical equipment that was used was either warm sensitive films or infrared appliances of blitz. From the outside, it looked like a normal suitcase, covered with synthetic leather. In reality, one was able to see through a dark red, infrared folio. Behind this, 12 blitz pipes were placed next to one another with reflectors, and large batteries to serve the high voltage generator. With normal view, a human being's eyes were not able not see these powerful blitzes, because of the infrared. To the issue of using infrared instruments for other situations, especially the Department 26 in the last years of its active life also developed infrared to be used for video cameras. With infrared video cameras equipped with remote control, which were used for places that for a human being's eyes resulted in poor visibility, held during the night an effective watch through a window that gave a larger overview of an area. All this was seen live where the facts were

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[84] Schwan, *op cit.,* p. 193.

shown on a screen, without the necessity of having to lighten up the actual place. In practice, no place, wherever it might have been in the republic, was safe from the *MfS*.[85] Even in the most discrete places, like in toilets, the *MfS* had installed its equipment.

The telephone tapping was classified as being an A measure.[86] Like in the Department as it was with the Department M concerning any measures being done; when the Department 26 had done its part of a surveillance job, the work was handed over to the responsible unit that in the first place had ordered upon the surveillance to be carried out. After a task was completed from any unit in the *MfS* that had asked for the Department 26's assistance, the protocols and any recorded material were normally kept for a short while before it later was deleted. In addition to the already discussed ways of reporting about a case as well as concerning the *ZAIG*, it happened that a small group belonging to the *ZAIG* would give a summary of cases to the Minister and his Deputies, when it for example concerned certain, extraordinary cases. Under normal circumstances, the tapping of a telephone did not last longer than four weeks although an extension of the surveillance was possible. It then had to be ratified by Mielke. Another exception from the typical procedures where Mielke also acted was made when the telephone surveillance was ordered upon for observing 'famous' people of the society. Such a procedure took place since those being observed by the Department 26 were in fact often people with high positions in the party and state organs of the GDR. As we have seen with Schalck-Golodkowski or Schabowski, Mielke had taken an active part in those surveillances. In very special cases, some of the operations were not limited from time. This was the case concerning tapping the embassies and the ambassadors of the most important NATO states that were present in East Berlin, i.e., Great Britain and USA. Additionally, important countries like France was tapped, and of course the representatives of the FRG in East Berlin. Besides this, it was necessary to observe foreign correspondents that were accredited in the GDR, also based on the interest of investigating whether there existed any espionage against the GDR, the reconnaissance of the connection system in the GDR as well as finding out whether there was any political slander processes in their press.

The Department 26 also worked together with the German Post, as the De-

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[85] These techniques were also used during the night, since such equipment was used to observe people, groups, etc., for 24 hours. Where a room on the inside somehow was not manageable to be observed through its window from the outside, a camera was installed where possible. The camera was then however installed with immovability, which in practice meant that it filmed through a certain hidden hole in the roof or the wall. As this camera was stationary and thereby neither had the possibility to make use of focusing nor picture extractions, the Department used solid wide-angle lenses in such cases. Cf. also Der Spiegel, 05.02.90.

[86] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.,* p. 39.

partment M did. When for example an A measure within the Department 26 was being undertaken, the *MfS* worked coordinative with the German Post in order to get access to the telephone lines.[87]   Firstly, the *MfS* internally had to get and order, and to state that order in regards to that an operation for a telephone tap was of interest. As an example, the *MfS* furthermore activated a listening device, or a relevant telecommunication connected the piece between the person to be listened to and the listening post of the *MfS*.[88]   As soon as the traffic was put free from the German Post, specialists from the Department 26 or Unofficial Co-workers from the telecommunication came to connect the *MfS*' listening device in the house's distributor box to the wanted instrument. From there on, all the calls and talks that came in, or were chosen, were automatically recorded. These talks were also classified towards controlling calls according to their number impulse. In such a way, one always knew who called, and to whom. The impulses were chosen and shown on a picture screen, so that when the number was not automatically shown, the co-workers of the Department 26 could register the number called. Phone calls or any other way of observing the population, legally or not, were through measures from the Department 26 brilliant ways of abusing the citizens that became nothing but victims of such operations. The Department 26 possessed one of the most effective organisations within the *MfS* in order to stop the worst enemies that were people belonging to groups like authors, artists, spies, regime critics, interested escapers as well as in fact controlling their own people belonging to the largest group of *MfS* co-workers,

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[87] Cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 12.

[88] It is of importance to underline that the measures A, B and D did not exclusively focus on only controlling certain persons. Firstly, since the possibilities of the efforts were of interest, which often had to grasp over more than one area. This meant that the controls aimed to get information on certain cases that automatically included certain persons. Secondly, since the missions involved clearances of actual cases, which often could not be personified (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 13; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1671/81).

the *IM*'s.[89]

Any technique the Department 26 had was so to say able to watch over all sorts of communication. The Department 26 had different types of recording equipment, which either recorded continuously, others recorded when certain frequencies entered, or the co-workers were also able to listen live. The latter was the case when for example the telephone rang at the living place of a suspect. A lamp in the monitoring centre of the Department 26 then blinked, indicating that a phone call was incoming in which the co-workers could listen to live.

The measures summed up consisted of the A, B, D, S, T and X measures.[90] The A, B and D measures have been mostly focused on, as these were the most frequently used means and methods the Department 26 took into consideration when accomplishing the tasks. They were particularly used, also because they turned

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[89] Without scruples, this was carried out from the very beginning of the foundation of the *MfS* and all the way up to the end, as an example from 1986 shows (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02). There was no hindering when entering an official or an Unofficial Co-worker's most private sphere. The Berlin's Department 26 did so in 1986 in regards to an *IM* (male), based on the reason of unreliable and incorrect behaviour both in and outside the service. Through other sources, it turned out that his wife had a high materialistic attitude, expressing that he earned too little. Through a security control of this particular *IM*, it turned out that his wife had an affair with her former driver's license teacher. It also happened that the *IM*'s, themselves, expressed negative attitudes towards the political situation in the GDR, which consequently was written down by their leading Unofficial Co-worker. This was for example the case with an *IM* belonging to the Department 26 (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 178). It criticised the development in the society through coming with personal meanings to the situation as well as documenting that its colleagues at work in general also were dissatisfied with the presence. This was further underlined by its next meeting with its leading Unofficial Co-worker, as the *IM* report opened with a description of a short stay it had made in West Berlin. It was obviously impressed with all the possibilities that existed in West Berlin. On the other side, the *MfS* also seemed to care for its co-workers' health and capability of fulfilling the work (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 401). "Strong sensitivity to smells", "lack of blood flow", "complications of the throat and lumbar region" as well as "fast tiredness", seemed to be the most typical physical damages of the work. What the psychical matters concerned, the physicians registered that the co-workers suffered because of stress symptoms that followed from less time to do all the work, too much work, change of relational and value systems as a matter of too much contact with the enemy's meanings and activities, scenarios from intimate talks, etc. In order for the co-workers to become fit again, the physicians suggested to do sports and live healthy as well as intensifying the relational work to the political-ideological tasks, in order to strengthen the picture of the clearly existing enemy. Nevertheless, this were factors that contributed to weakening the surveillance, which reasons only grew towards the latest years of activity of the *MfS*.

[90] Cf. also Wiedmann (ed.), *op cit*., p. 359; Schwan, *op cit*., p. 194; Wawrzyn, *op cit*., p. 81. The latter author, like some others, also refers to the measure F, which allegedly should have dealt with photographing suspects in secret. It should also be noticed that the archival information not one time refers to such F measure. Rather, the archival information refers to such operation as being classified under the D measure (e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 9). For these reasons, the measure F has been left out.

out to be most effective. As we know, the B measure dealt with installing equipment in objects such as flats, hotels and vehicles, with the interest of monitoring people.[91] What the *MfS* meant by monitoring people through the B measure did not however only concern the people the *MfS* held as suspects. In fact, it also included surveillance of its own people, since also having installed equipment in its employees' rooms at work. The most classical way of installing the equipment was not through entering the object, but rather dig a hole in the wall from the outside. Such items of surveillance that were placed in walls were as small as a stamp or a currency coin of a *Pfennig*, but brought anyway the clearest sound imaginable. When it turned out impossible to do the listening in this way, they had to enter the objects somehow. In certain cases, where entering a flat also showed impossible, the co-workers of the Department 26 made sure for example to do holes in the wall from the neighbouring flat in order to install the equipment.

Entering a flat or not, for the sake of installing items of listening, the *MfS*' Department 26 had to plan this thoroughly before taking any actions.[92] The *MfS* had to work with greatest carefulness in regards to entering people's flats. The Ministry's work was often planned to the last details, with the aim both to install the necessary equipments as well as making sure that nothing could go wrong. An action of such character consisted of a chain of initiatives that had to be taken from the Department before entering a flat. As already analysed, the first thing the Department wanted to secure was the point of not waking any interests to this operation from anyone that unnecessarily might get involved. The Department 26's people cleared that the neighbour of a suspect did not stay home during the time of installation. However, theoretically, what to do if it turned out that the neighbour stayed home during the actual time of instalment? In order to fulfil the operation safe and sound, the most rational thing was to see to that the neighbour simply did not stay home at the actual point of time. To do this, the *MfS* had for example already prepared fake documents that stated that repairs needed to be done where the suspect lived. Alternatively, the *MfS* came, in disguise, as

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[91] Cf. also BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 10; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 13.

[92] Since it normally was planned to the last detail, one gets the impression that the only thing that was able to produce a failure was a *force majeure*. Nevertheless, well prepared or not, it happened that the Department 26 also made 'simple' mistakes during its work (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 10), which could be illustrated closer through an example (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02). As a group of co-workers were to install listening device on the roof of the known GDR oppositional Wolf Biermann, he surprisingly came home during this work. It was although not a complete failure, since Biermann did not notice that such work was being undertaken. However, the draw back for the group was that the one co-worker working on the roof with the installing at the moment Biermann came home, had to stay up there, nearly breathless, without making moves until Biermann had left the place.

personnel from the *DVP* claimed that someone had called in a bomb threat. The whole building had ten to be evacuated. By this, the Department had successfully evacuated the area of interest.[93]

Of course, what about the suspect itself? What about its family? What about getting into the flat, without leaving any damages and traces? These factors were also part of the chain, which had to be thought of up front. The easiest way of getting in to a flat without leaving any suspicious marks was through having a key. Normally the co-workers had arranged with a kind of universal key, fitting in most places.[94] Nevertheless, alternatives existed though, having been the rule rather than the exception by the *MfS*. An example of an alternative in regards to getting hold of a key to be able to enter a household was settled at schools. A key was arranged with for example by the sport teacher of the suspect's son, which was copied during the time the son having sports at school. The sport teacher - working for the *MfS* and its Department 26, a person typically having been an *IM* - did this by going into the boys' changing room and grab his hands into the suspect son's trousers to find the key. It was thereafter quickly copied, by simply pressing it onto a piece of soap. Was not there a chance that the suspect and his wife/her husband might come home when the Department's employees were in their flat? A solution to this had also been prepared, often based on that the suspect and his wife/her husband was at work. On the actual day of the operation, the people of the Department 26 had already made sure that the suspect and his wife/her husband were occupied with things at work resulting in that they for sure had to be at work at the actual time the people of the *MfS* were in their flat. Once in the flat, the specialists did their work of installing the equipment they meant was necessary. At the same time, they and/or other people from other units of the *MfS* were present in order to secure evidence for a prosecution against any possible crime done by the suspect. After the tasks were fulfilled, the *MfS* at later stages often sent *IM*'s to check upon if someone had found out about these actions, if everything installed was ok, etc. Not every time did the *MfS* send such personnel, since in fact, their own flats - the *IM*'s - were also checked upon. As referred to earlier, no one was safe in such a system.

In addition, even if one tried to keep up with controlling everyone and everything, there also existed cases where the work of the *IM*'s, by chance or not, indirectly was uncovered. In fact, it happened that the matter of such failures were so high valued that the leaders of all the Departments 26 decided to meet each other for fruitful exchanges. Such a meeting having taken place in Dresden in

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[93] Cf. also to other examples, e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit.*, pp. 89-90.

[94] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a First Lieutenant of the Department VIII of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 14.05.02, 18.05.02.

1984 witness this.[95]   It was there given examples of work that had failed, whereas one example treated workers of the German Post having uncovered typical linked taps of the Department 26. This group of people from the German Post had been occupied with interruptions, which resulted in finding irregular connections that somehow had been made. After closer control, some pieces had to be removed, because the workers of the German Post simply were not able to explain logically why there were some technical parts of different telephone connections that were not supposed to be present.

Even if these actions taken by the *MfS* did not carry a judicial right according to related laws of the aforementioned laws on post and telephone control, there were few things, if any, which hindered the *MfS* against taking such actions. Theoretically, the suspect could try to prove for the court that certain people having taken pictures in its flat had entered it illegally. In practice however, a person standing on trial in the GDR - no matter what case background - accused of having done a criminal offence, did not get far, if at all, in terms of speaking for own interests. When the accuser had proofs that the accused had done something illegal, this was what the authority of the law focused on. As mentioned earlier to the political system of the GDR, the judicial machinery possessed few, if any, independence in relation to the party and state organs. The whole apparatus of law had consciously or not, voluntarily or not, in practice a weak voice, if any, against such an incident.[96]   Even if a suspect managed to or dared to raise its voice against such injustice, it only turned out worse for this person in practice.

Other types of examples in regards to B measures are some done from the DSP of Stralsund, which was part of the ADM of Rostock.[97]   In early March 1983, the DSP of Stralsund made a plan for the complete *Hotel Baltic* on how theoretically to be able to construct B measures. Finally, the co-workers ended up with constructing B measures in certain rooms. Everything was planned to the detail, where the hotel got an operational name (apart from its original). To the *MfS* co-workers involved, it was better known as "*Nordstern*". Two of the co-workers of the *MfS* had rented two rooms where they built in the B measures. The day before the rooms had been ordered upon, they were reserved with fake names. After the B measures had been built, it was of importance to keep the work on a scale of high security. The Department 26 never knew, perhaps the B measures somehow were able to be disturbed from renovation, water leaks, etc. In order to

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[95] BStU/Dresden, MfS - BV Dresden. Nr. 7025.

[96] Cf. e.g., A. Worst, *Das Ende eines Geheimdienstes. Oder: Wie lebendig ist die Stasi?* 1. Auflage. Berlin 1991, p. 134.

[97] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 17. The B measure, other types of similar measures as well as any other mean and method used by the Department 26, were always possible to operate, and was as such put in years later after the first ones had been installed and used for the first time (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 14).

secure against such incidents, one of the co-workers got as task to recruit the daily chef of the hotel to become a part of their crew. This person became a *GMS*. With this setting, a close contact between the responsible Division of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock and certain co-workers of the DSP of Stralsund was kept.

To recapitulate, having the D measure of surveillance meant that visual surveillance equipment in for example flats and hotel rooms had been installed. The methods to this type of surveillance were much the same as to those used in the efforts of the acoustic means. Observation done through the S measure consisted of having efforts made in order to secure special security technical material and chemical means. This has not been put weight on through examples, firstly, since such work seldom took place.[98]   When it after all was used, it was only undertaken towards some short phases of certain work. This was then done in order to achieve special signalisation of for example persons, buildings, rooms, etc., which finally assisted in catching the persons under suspicion. Secondly, and as an extension of the first point, since such work normally was known under the methods of technical security and criminal-technical methods, in general this was normally taken care of by the *DVP*.

The T measure resulted in controlling the national telex connections of the telecommunication system. Neither this method of control took place too often, since the Department 26 simply did not get much information out of this type of control. It was like when wanting to use a telex, one had to go to the post office, i.e., meaning operating in public. Understandingly from this, when for example wanting to send a birthday greeting through a telex, other customers at the post office rapidly noticed that one used this possibility as this first of all was somewhat luxurious in the GDR due to the high costs. Additionally, when finally using these patterns of communication, nothing was being kept secret, since one normally without discretion of other customers had to inform the worker at the post office what the receiver of a message was to be noticed of. When the receiver then got

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[98] According to the archives (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008563, p. 9), such work was seldom accomplished, and was not to compare with the criminal-technical methods, as for example Schwan (Schwan, *op cit.*, p. 203) has done. However, in some cases it turned out useful, especially concerning a case in the ADM of Rostock (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02). In regards to one special case involving a spy, certain documents had been marked with chemicals from the Department 26, as they were considered as being of particular security only a few had access to. A person, later by the *MfS* uncovered as a spy, achieved to get hold of the documents, which it photographed. However, what made it easy match for the *MfS* and Department 26 to catch the spy afterwards, was that it had touched the documents with its fingers. The touching of the documents left enough traces for the *MfS* to finally arrest the spy. Holding the documents under an ultraviolet lamp did the identification of the spy through its fingerprints, since the used chemical solution on the documents forced a showing of fingerprints that turned out to belong to the ones of the spy.

the message, this simply meant that yet another person possessed the content of the communication. Could not one rather send coded messages? Mainly based on the aforementioned on how to proceed with such communication, the fear was simply to great towards the *MfS* finally picking up the messages, for example through the employees at the post offices working for the *MfS*.

The X measure stood for controlling the *MfS*' own areas to check out if there existed other technical equipment of surveillance that might have been installed from other secret services. This included everything from controlling electro technical instalments, frequency and radio controls, measures of radiation at technical institutions, techniques of x-ray, checking upon the building constructions and plans of objects, visual control of objects to means of marking items in order to control the presence of the enemy. Besides these measures, the Department 26 also did conspiratorial encroachments in objects like those mentioned above. As an example, one way of checking out if the enemy had installed some sort of equipment, the Department 26 combined the X measure with the measures B and S.[99] The X measure was then already cared for when installing a B measure. When having installed the B measure in for example an electrical outlet in the wall, the co-workers of the Department 26, simultaneously marked the inside of the plug with a certain chemical mean belonging to the S measure. They were like this able to find out if the enemy in the mean time had installed or noticed the equipment of the Department 26 the next time they came to check the installed B measure. If the enemy in the mean time had been checking upon exactly this outlet, the Department 26 would have noticed it, since one was only able to move the outlet in a particular way without leaving any traces. Not knowing this, led to that the mean of the S measure signalised irregular contact with the outlet. This meant furthermore that the B measure, through the X measure, also with the help of the S measure, was not considered as safe anymore.

Finally, the Department 26 also worked on, and prepared the authentic information concerning the *OV* 's and *OPK* 's, and to support other measures and processes. As known, the stricter control of the two was the *OV*.[100] Nevertheless, those classified as being under the *OPK* was controlled in many ways. It was everything from being controlled through the Department M, having their living

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[99] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 06.05.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Lieutenant of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 27.05.02.

[100] For example, in 1988 the *MfS* investigated 19 169 persons classified as *OPK*'s, while the number of persons classified as *OV*'s investigated in 1988 was 4543. Mostly *IM*'s worked on such cases. Taking into consideration the approximate number of *IM*'s that existed in those days in the GDR meant that every second to third *IM* leading co-worker worked on an *OV* (cf. e.g., C. Vollnhals, *Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. Ein Instrument totalitärer Herrschaftsausübung*. Berlin 1995, p. 15).

places searched, observed by *IM*'s as well as to be observed by the Department 26. These persons were in the eyes of the *MfS* because they were seen as oppositional; they were having a love affair with a foreigner, they somehow found themselves often nearby a military base; they were holding contact to a member of the Soviet army; they held higher positions in the society, etc. These were only some of many common classifications, although quite various. Where did such cases lead?

When a suspicion towards a citizen showed to be strengthened, the control got even tighter. This meant that this person nearly automatically was classified in the category of the *OV*. Naturally, the suspicion could turn out to be of no value, if there was nothing that could be connected to the suspect. Nevertheless, although being of no particular value directly to the suspicion the *MfS* had, it could still be used for related matters to the advantage of the Ministry. This variant led in end effect to the *MfS* recruiting the person it had had under surveillance, mainly to become an *IM*. That is, the co-workers of the *MfS* had for a longer period observed its victim long enough to know its exact strengths and weaknesses. This resulted in the *MfS* abusing its information against the person that in the first place did not hold the slightest clue of having been observed for different reasons. It was from the start an easy process to fulfil, because the *MfS* in such cases did not at all first have to check upon whom it recruited. The co-workers already knew, through an already completely secret operation. The worst scenario for the *MfS* was when the weaknesses outdid the strengths. When this happened to be the case, such operations turned out useless, and the cases were thrashed.

Being registered as an *OV* was the highest and most intensive form the *MfS* used against a citizen of the GDR, in order to collect evidence of any possible criminal offence the suspect might have done. As with the *OPK*'s, post was opened, the entering into flats were typical, pressurised at work, building of a B measure or a locater in the victim's car, undertaking of A, B and D measures towards the suspect, etc. Said differently, the surveillance over one man was enormous. Through these actions, the purpose was also to provoke the person enough, really leading it to commit something illegal. Thereafter, the person would normally express his opinion to his family, meaning 'confessing' to a crime for the already installed B measure. In this way, the *MfS* easily had its suspect. From there on, what happened with the person having been caught?

There were different ways of handling such cases. One of them was to process the person officially through the *MfS*' system of investigation organ (Main Department IX) and into custody (Department XIV).[101] Another action was far friendlier, as the *MfS* actually waited for doing something until later, because a

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[101] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Lieutenant Colonel of the Department IX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 02.05.02.

special moment of arresting the person for political reasons did not fit.[102]   A third option was like the example under the *OPK*, to recruit it as an *IM*. A fourth way out was to make the person work for two secret services at the same time, the *MfS* and often the FRG's. Originally, he worked for the FRG's secret service, but after the *MfS* had caught the person in its net, the person only officially worked for the FRG's secret service while actually doing the real secret service work to the advantage of the *MfS*. How was one sure that the person would stay loyal to the *MfS*? This was exactly the point; the person bought itself free from misery by doing these services for the *MfS*, since the Ministry had something on the person that somehow forced it to 'having to' sell itself to the *MfS* with the intention of easiest getting out of the problem it carried.[103]   A fifth variant was the *MfS* using a member of an enemy secret service, however not for its own professional benefits. Rather, the person was used to make the enemy secret service unsure and insecure about its own secret service work. Thus, since the *MfS* openly used this person towards its secret service with the aim of showing the enemy secret service that the Ministry was on its man, and thereby giving the impression of knowing what was going on. A sixth alternative had more directly consequences for the actual person only, as the *MfS* with all means and methods simply tried to ruin the reputation of this citizen. This was executed by for example destroying the network the person had, in regards of using the Departments M, 26 and PCSI. Some activities accomplished by these Departments were through sending the suspect anonymous or pseudonymous post, making use of all means and methods of the telephone control, etc. The *MfS* also blocked the career of a citizen, as a seventh solution.

The *MfS* for example through making agreements with the citizen's superior at work executed the latter alternative. The superior then made sure that this person was frozen out from the occupation. The point was through systematic organisa-

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[102] Such a reason was for example when expecting a visitor from a foreign state, carrying a high political position.

[103] Similar happenings of abusing persons for such aims also took place without a person first having been registered as either an *OPK* or *OV*. This was the fact that happened to a teacher, retold by a pupil of him (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Robert Repnak [born and grown up in the GDR]. Rostock, 25.05.02, 29.05.02). At the time of the incident, the teacher lived and worked in the DSP of Malchin, situated in the ADM of Neubrandenburg. Before this person became a teacher, some years earlier, he had been in the army. There he had made himself guilty of what was seen as a crime, where he afterwards got the choice between going in prison, and likely later not having as many chances because of having been in prison, or to work for the *MfS*. He chose the latter. The work he did for the Ministry was apparently of little importance, where he did not possess any type of important role whatsoever. In fact, after a while, he left the *MfS*, which gave him several problems. In the years 1989/90, during when he was a teacher, the school he taught at became familiar with his activity in the *MfS*. Whereupon his destiny at the school led to dismissing him from his position - even though a large number of pupils demonstrated for keeping him.

tion to bring the person into an occupational and generally hopeless situation of living, and to destroy its self-esteem. A final method used was that responsible authorities of the GDR for example said no to educational possibilities, possibilities that could have given a citizen a deserved higher position in the society. Additionally, such authorities were also able to block the possibilities from persons wanting certain jobs. Through the Department 26, this was important for the *MfS* to control and elaborate, as many positions in the state needed confirmation before being occupied. The *MfS* was involved in such cases due to the Ministry having played an important part when saying 'yes' or 'no' to a certain person being allowed to enter a position in a state organ, or as such - the party. This was particularly interesting for the *MfS* when someone regularly had to go abroad, having been a part of the job. As a final action of those mentioned, was that the *MfS* simply stopped to follow the case further. However, even if the Ministry did not continue to follow up the persons having been in focus, either the Customs Service and/or the *DVP* did. In order to assist these organs, the *MfS* handed over the information it had on different persons to them to be further worked on. What may sound as an ease since 'only' being turned over to these latter organs, may really have been the fact. Particularly when taking into consideration which security organ they had to deal with, and where in the world these persons lived. The *MfS* wanted to observe all telephone talks from the GDR to other countries, especially calls to the FRG. The Ministry also wanted to control all national calls that were of interest. When calling to a foreign country from the GDR, these calls were tapped from a subterranean central south of Berlin, where one intensified the sound quality with the help of the latest technical finesses developed by the *OTS*. As such, this is an example that the regime wanted to nullify the separation between the state and individual.

Resulting from *Ostpolitik* earlier sketched, the connection between the two German states got better during the 1970's. Even if we on the one side know that more people got to travel out of the GDR for different reasons, we at the same time on the other side know that few, actual limbering attempts on the domestic level appeared, in spite of the bonds to the outer world and FRG softening up.[104] This policy led to an increase of the surveillance from the Department 26 and control with illegal border crossings. Increased contact with people holding another opinion than what was proclaimed from the *SED* - at least for all East Germans to hold, could have infected one's own population. In different ways, the regime therefore chose to tighten the grip due to this potential threat. This reality shows the understanding and reaction of the *SED* regime, because increased contact with the enemy meant at the same time greater danger of the enemy moving closer to own territory.

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[104] Cf. e.g., Schwan, *op cit.*, p. 200.

No matter how the importance was regarding the content of the calls the Department 26 recorded, no one was without value. All calls were anyway archived in a special voice register. The voice register functioned in such a way that voices having been recorded earlier were used against certain persons, since calls were voice registered according to the voices of the users.[105] The *MfS* used this excellent opportunity in most of the GDR's ADM's.

For example in the ADM of Leipzig, it has been claimed that it was possible to organise a telephone surveillance of 2000 telephones.[106] Usually 'only' 1000 were operative, where one was able to monitor 360 calls simultaneously. In addition, persons that were observed belonged to the *MfS*' typical categories of surveillance. Those were furthermore, people that had given in their application with interest to leave the republic on a permanent basis, citizens that were under suspicion of escaping the country, people holding oppositional thoughts and actions, intellectuals, functionaries and leading cadres of all possible levels of the East German society, places of education as well as public and state instances.[107] If not, at least the potential for the *MfS* was present, in regards to practically observing anyone. A solution for observing people like these was to arrange a B measure. As aforementioned, which also was the case of the ADM of Leipzig, the receivers of the communication recorded in all secrecy were placed nearby in a conspiratorial flat having with a range between 100 and 500 meters. The receivers then led the monitored recording further onto the monitoring instance. Recorded voices went in a voice archive. This made sure that voices were recognised, as this equipment consisted of technicalities that traced voices known through the patterns of voice registrations of the Department 26.

Since every tone technical recording done from long distance calls or room surveillance only were able to be worked on in the rooms of the *MfS*' ADM, rented cables or special cables through the junctions of the long distance calls the German Post had were transported further onto the monitoring central of the

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[105] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit*., p. 113; cf. also Unabhängiger Untersuchungsausschuß Rostock, *Arbeitsberichte über die Auflösung der Rostocker Bezirksverwaltung des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit*. Rostock 1990.

[106] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit*. Childs & Popplewell, *op cit.,* p. 91, make an incorrect reference in relation to the Citizen's Committee Leipzig's comments regarding the remark to the telephone surveillance the *MfS* executed. Childs & Popplewell claim that: "In Leipzig, 1,000 telephones were being tapped on a daily basis." This incorrectness reminds somewhat to another one they make concerning the control of the post (see below), since they also here present the wrong time of date as well as circumstances in regards to when something took place. The mistake to the case of the telephone surveillance is that 1000 telephones were not being tapped on a daily basis the way Childs & Popplewell claim, because the Citizen's Committee Leipzig only claims that 1000 could be operational as instruments of monitoring.

[107] Similar also took place in for example the ADM of Dresden (cf. e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit*., p. 133ff.).

MfS. Seen in the light of the connection between the FRG and Leipzig that was done from the long distance call junction (Holzhausen), around 100 channels for surveillance purposes to the monitoring experts in the *Runde Ecke* in Leipzig were fulfilled.[108]   As mentioned above, the Department 26 were specialised in many areas, with different interests to observe the whole population. The Department and the organisation in the ADM of Leipzig were no exception. Overall, what concerned the *MfS*' ADM of Leipzig in regards to this surveillance mainly done by the Department 26, to its disposition, it had as much as 69 special cables each one with 50 to 800 double vessels, and 958 rented cables.

The town Rostock and its bathing resort Warnemünde nearby were both one of the most international places for both GDR citizens and foreigners. Many stayed in these areas especially because of business trips. Foreign citizens normally stayed in hotels, which had certain recognition, international standard and were centrally situated. In Rostock, the possibility was *Hotel Warnow*. Wolfgang Kühn at the *BStU*'s regional office in Rostock claims that it in this hotel equipment from the Department 26 was installed in all rooms.[109]   This meant that over 400 hotel rooms were being tapped. More financially wealthy people were in *Hotel Neptun*, in Warnemünde. In this hotel, one had the same surveillance as in Rostock, but with more advanced equipment. In addition, the *MfS* had co-workers there, whereas some for example worked as prostitutes. With this starting point, it is natural to claim that certain people were recruited to work for the *MfS*, as a result of the *MfS* having used recordings of monitoring as means for pressing those having refused to cooperate.[110]   This is yet another verification to that many unexpectedly was caught in the net of the *MfS*, where the force and control apparatus had free hands.

Through the year plans of the Department 26, similar cases and to different types of work the Department 26 did generally existed from the beginning to the end of the *MfS*. As an example, the year plan of 1989 of the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock was no exception.[111]   As mentioned earlier, such work was done based on the central decisions of the party, the Minister, the leaders of the ADM's, the leader of the Department 26 as well as the leaders of the Departments 26 of the ADM's. In a year plan like this that the Department 26 of the ADM of Rostock followed, thorough marks were given to questions like how, why and what to either solve, continue, rebuilt, construct and report. The development to

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[108] The headquarters of the *MfS*' ADM of Leipzig was called *Runde Ecke*.

[109] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Wolfgang Kühn, BStU/Außenstelle Rostock. Rostock, December 1999.

[110] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Wolfgang Kühn, BStU/Außenstelle Rostock. Rostock, December 1999; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Brigitte Trübe, BStU/Außenstelle Rostock. Rostock, January 2000.

[111] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9.

operational thoughts and actions like these were normally reported every month. Furthermore, details were also given in regards to the cooperation with other units of the *MfS*, in order to be able to use the different means and measures towards observation of the population most effectively. Observing the population in such cases meant theoretically that no one was excluded from this thought. To give a perspective of what this control meant, a group the Department 26 largely controlled in fact came from own rows, i.e., having been the *IM*'s. If someone was of necessity to be controlled, those were. This was a fact, since this group carried such an importance role in the whole of the Ministry. Besides doing the technical work and improvement, it also followed that this Department as any other had plans on how to both recruit people and educate the co-workers. This was mainly done through own measures, but also through the Main Department Cadre and Education. It was for example called "collective and personality development", a meaning we already are familiar with regarding the context of the GDR and *MfS*.[112] Particularly during the final years one can perhaps imagine the development and actually atmosphere at work, at least in this crucial stage of the *MfS*' life, as one of the educative focuses was explicitly to "...hinder an above average joy of alcohol..."[113] There are maybe many reasons for this expression. Nevertheless, this anyway illustrates one of the huge internal daily problems, and thereby the weaknesses the Ministry had to struggle with. Surely rising from situations like overload at work due to new and more challenges coming in - rather, never seemed to have an end, hard environmental work relations both at and outside of work as a result of the always high needs for operating perfectly secret and living with a Janus face, etc. Perhaps one of the biggest problems the co-workers saw was the continuously increase of observing their own population when at the same time not seeing something changing for the better. When changes took place, it was mostly for the worse, as if a process of stagnation took place. Since these results held less, if any, influence in relation to what actually was produced through efforts of own work and experiences. The case was rather like this: as time went by, the changes in the daily life and rhythm gave results containing negative facts, where such development also gave further nurture to sink lower into even deeper crisis. A status like this was apparently synonymous with a destructive development, which, in many ways, never seemed to have an end.

Equal to the *MfS*' course of action during processing of post, as we will witness, also this Department operated on the side of the law. The *MfS*' position in the regime often led to the Ministry operating out of own defined roles, where it practically did not exist any form of control mechanism from the state looking after the *MfS* following set guidelines. Since the *MfS* was in this situation, on

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[112] See e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9, p. 19ff.
[113] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9, p. 20.

the one side, this substantiates the patterns of reaction of such a regime, based on the state's use of arbitrary power and means in its attempt to reach its goals. On the other side, this deviates from the theoretical believes towards the practice of a security service seen in the light of the *MfS*. One might say the latter having been the case, since the *MfS* by far controlled the superior development of the regime through its force and control apparatus, although not formally, yet, at least a strong fairleader. In other words, these two combinations indicate that the *MfS* acted as a unique part of and within the state, where the Ministry possessed enough considerable information to decide extremely sensitive power constellations on behalf of the future of the regime.

As we can see above from the analysis of the Department 26, there is no doubt that the Department as a very important unit of the GDR's state security heavily contributed to support the society system of the GDR. The Department 26 executed the commands given from its leaders within the *MfS*, a Ministry we have seen directly and indirectly possessed a crucial role in the system of the *SED*. With the Department 26's many functions and accomplishments through its considerable efforts, it was importantly present for the purpose of acting as a vital guarantor to the rulers of the system.

2   The post control

2.1   The 1950's:

2.1.1   The start up of the controlling of the post

Already in 1950, in the founding year of the *MfS*, there existed a unit of the *MfS* responsible for controlling the post. As early as in 1951 there was a plan existing for the State of Brandenburg on how to control the people's post. This plan also reflected upon similar work that had been given to the other States of the GDR. That is, the oldest found document concerning having a plan on how to control the post dates from 25 May 1951.[114]

This Instruction addressed the need to improve the work in relation to the large political actions existing at the time. Amongst other things, because of the "fight for the peace" and the preparation and carrying out a world youth festival, the Ministry's Department VIa got additional important work on its table.[115] Concerning the world youth festival taking place in the GDR, the *MfS* was well aware of this being an eminent way for the youth from the imperialistic countries to infiltrate and influence the youth of the GDR through postal exchange. A way to stop this was through efforts of controlling the post. Since the GDR claimed that fighting for peace was a prioritised issue on the GDR's agenda in those days, this was yet another reason for doing post control. Enemy forces were able to disturb the peace, like the youth of imperialistic states, when post between the youth of the GDR and youth of western states were exchanged. Therefore, the Departments VIa existing in the States were both quantitatively and qualitatively strengthened. This was done through creating a *Referat Information* (Division Information) in the State Managements of the Ministry for State Security, which consisted of one

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[114] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003464. Schwan, *op cit.,* p. 207, however, claims that the oldest document, which describes the first post control, dates from 1953, through the Service Instruction Nr. 41/53. He relates the information to that this is the oldest found document of the *MfS* that concerned the, to use his word, "post robbery" (done by the *MfS*). Seen from this point of view, Schwan and Nessim Ghouas do not hold the same meanings. Since the document the latter author holds, which concerns the post control and thereby the "post robbery", dates from 1951. At that time, however, it was not named the "Department M". The work was rather done through the Department VIa. Once that has been said, there is strong reason to believe that such a control organised from the *MfS* existed before the document from 1951 was produced and archived in the *MfS* (maybe also in written form). Firstly, since the Department VIa was founded in the same year as the Ministry. Secondly, since the document from 1951 holds the headline "Improvement of the work of Department VIa". Implicitly, at least, and from an expression's point of view, an improvement normally relates to something that already has taken place, where one wants to make a situation better than it at the moment shows to be. Besides this, the Department VIa changed name to Department M by the end of 1951 (cf. e.g., Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit [ed.], *Die rote Gestapo. Der Staatssicherheitsdienst in der Sowjetzone*. 2. Auflage. Berlin 1953).

[115] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003464, p. 1ff.

Division leader, two caseworkers and one person occupied with the stenographical work.[116]

The main work these Departments accomplished was by giving reports on how the atmosphere was in the society.[117] To be able to do this work, places of investigation, *Afas*,[118] were built.[119] However, since the quantity of the mail was presumed to be of some difference in the States, it was decided that every worker in these new built places of investigation had to control mail to the number of 500 every day. The technicality on how to open and read mail was early on place by the *MfS*. The leader of any Department VIa had the duty to see to that the co-workers at all times knew how and what to do when controlling post. The information collected was further reported to the leader of the respective State Managements as well as given to the Central of the *MfS*. Responsible for the work being done properly came from the highest authority within the State Managements. The two persons holding power of this particular Department in the State Managements, held the role of either being the leader of the State Management or being the leader's deputy operative. Obviously, and in relation to the comment above, this sort of work had been accomplished before, since all copies reporting on the atmosphere were reported to the Department VIa at the Central, "...just like before..."[120] Considering the words "just like before" in relation to the time the post control went into existence, the *MfS* obviously broke the applicable law. In addition, since we have seen the Articles of the constitution of the GDR guaranteeing the security of the secrecy of the post and telephone communication. We have anyway also witnessed that it was nevertheless daily routine for the *MfS* to do surveillance of the post and telephone traffic.

[116] As known concerning the State versus the AD structure of the GDR and *MfS*, for the *MfS* it existed State Managements of the Ministry for State Security in the five States of the GDR, 1950-1952. Thereafter, from 1952, one introduced a new structure of the *MfS*, which at the same time led to getting rid of the old one. The old structure was replaced by the familiar 15 ADM's.

[117] "Atmosphere" here means the different meanings of expression people held to different issues. This was a typical focus the Department M was to complete on behalf of the responsible units, and which was maintained to the very end (cf. e.g., a report from ADM Potsdam from 1984, BStU/Potsdam, MfS - BV Potsdam. AKG 846, p. 20; Landesbeauftragte für Mecklenburg-Vorpommern für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [ed.], *Mit Flugblättern und Anklageschriften gegen das SED-System. Die Tätigkeit der Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit (KgU) und des Untersuchungsausschusses freiheitlicher Juristen der Sowjetzone (UfJ). Zeitzeugenbericht und Dokumentationen*. Schwerin 1998).

[118] *Afas* were *Auftragsfahndung bei abgehenden Sendungen*, which meant that outgoing post was controlled as planned according to missions of investigation.

[119] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 377. p. 11 (F. Willkommen, *Die Bildung und Profilierung der Abteilung M des MfS als Bestandteil des Kampfes des MfS gegen den Feind (1950-1961)*. [Diploma work at the College of the Ministry for State Security]).

[120] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003464, p. 2.

Besides this, at this early stage of the *MfS* we recognise the structure the Ministry more or less was going to have all its years of existence. That is, a certain hierarchical structure was given, and as we saw in relation to the Department 26 this meant that the few persons having the main responsibility were on the top. Regarding the reports of the control, they had to be at the Central no later than on the 5. every month, whereas the reports had to be finished and thereby documented every month within the time frame from 25. to the 25. (the following month). The flow of information and control being undertaken were quite clearly present through all spheres of the power hierarchy.

The formulation of the reports were given in such a way that the *MfS* at all times received a correct picture of the political and economic atmosphere in the society. The reports held information of the actual period they reflected. These reports were also divided in accordance to the cases they informed of. It was not only fighting for peace that was important those days. It was also of importance for the Department VIa to notify the leaders of the *MfS* of the position taking that existed to the world youth games, the regime's decision on the price decrease as well as the change of the workers' and freelance intelligentsia's taxation from 28 May 1951.

Not everyone was manageable to observe at the same time. Therefore, the Department VIa was given certain categories of the population they were to observe, which in general were seen as the most important to do further surveillance of. That is, the work consisted of reporting on the atmosphere existing among the workers, in the business community, among the peasants and new builders as well as the intelligentsia. In these reports, the information told how many documents had been read. Based on these documents the Department VIa found out how many that carried a 'too strong' personal character or was apolitical. Additionally, how many positive and negative voices there were to certain issues.

Already as early as in those days, one can see the *MfS* having been interested in getting an overview of which persons that did not want to follow the mass. The *SED* through the *MfS* looked upon this as an important task to accomplish, because the party had decided that it was the most convenient for the state to have a mass of citizens remaining uncritical and passive on behalf of possibly criticising the regime. The earlier they were categorised, the better for the ruling elite. Obviously, no critics were to be tolerated. This was especially directed towards persons that were orientated towards reading other sorts of documents produced by others than the legal press of the GDR, which in the first place had been censured by the party.

Furthermore, these reports on the atmosphere were divided and as such presented. One was for the GDR, and one for the FRG ("West Germany").[121]   In the

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[121] BStU/Berlin MfS - BdL. Nr. 003464, p. 3.

introduction, the atmosphere report held a common description of the situation, thereafter accompanied by circa 12-18 crass examples that held both positive and negative content. These examples also had the names of the receiver and sender, exact address, and, if possible, the social position.

In order to get an overview of the atmosphere that existed in the different circles of the population and social levels, the following was executed: the *Afas*' collected information on the atmosphere that existed in a certain, specific circle of the population. This was done within a specified space of time. More concrete, for the State Management of Brandenburg, between 1 June and 30 June 1951 the post of certain groups of the population was read from 3000 *MfS* co-workers. Divided into three groupings á 1000, the Department VIa focused on three different types of places. The chosen ones were: the east aluminium combine, the steel factory in Brandenburg as well as peasants and new builders.

We can see the early value of the post and telephone and the *MfS* executed towards the citizens of the GDR, in order to protect the regime of the *SED* as good as possible from the enemies of the state. No differences were made towards any groups of the population, as the controls show that all persons of the GDR were considered as potential threats to the system. This threat was considered coming as strong from within the GDR society, as from abroad.

2.1.2 The establishment of the Department M

After the revolt 17 June 1953, the party and state organs of the GDR led severe political losses. The Soviets had indubitable come with a helping hand, saving the GDR regime from further fatal blows. Since the Ministry was the first organ to blame for not having done its job, it was shortly after this incident reduced to become an *SfS* (State Secretariat for State Security), officially carrying a subordinate role in the Ministry of Interior.

Nevertheless, it was therefore rather important for the regime of the GDR to not only keep the organ, but moreover also strengthen it. Without the interest to tighten the control in the GDR by strengthening the security service, the fall of the GDR might have happened earlier than what is a fact. The policy was therefore as follows: no such incident was ever to happen again in the GDR. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior acted shortly after the episode, by amongst other things giving out orders on how to accomplish work that concerned maintaining and strengthening the republic's security. The *MfS* and its post control was no exception, rather the contrary. 30 November 1953, Service Instruction 41/53 was ordered upon the *SfS* from the Ministry of Interior. For many years, this stood as one of the central guiding tools for the Department M, since it treated the work that was done

in the future.[122]   Curiously, from now and onwards, the *MfS* was in most ways easier able to control the post, and for example tap people's phones. I.e., since it was said that it was the West that had started the uprising, through spreading propaganda and sabotage the *SED* and *MfS* believed was part of the plot theory.[123] At this stage, the different registers of the *MfS* were built.[124]   That is, not only to be able to control the so-called enemies of the state, but also to archive own co-workers any unit of the *MfS* had access to use.[125]   Through these archives, the Department M also created a picture of all persons wanting to escape. This constantly expanded to enormous heights all the way up to the end of the *MfS*' life.[126]

With the construction of the GDR in 1949, this command from 1953 referred to that "…it was the first time in the German history that a peace loving, democratic state stand steady in the camp of peace and democracy, and that it enjoyed the trust of the peaceful living people."[127]   Further, the party's decision to pull through the new course, the workers had taken with enthusiasm. Additionally, in the fight for fulfilling this "great task", improving the life quality as well as fighting for peace and unification of Germany, a row of considerable success had been shown. If this was the case, why did the revolt 17 June 1953 take place? These 'two worlds' and their 'conceptions' existed side by side from the very beginning of the foundation of the GDR. It is arguable to put forward that the states seldom went on common paths as long as they existed.

Accordingly, the command also said that the development in the FRG ran

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[122] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017; cf. also BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 498.

[123] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 102102.

[124] This showed to be useful as early as in 1955 and 1956. In 1955, there was registered disorder at the medical faculty of the Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald. Mielke used the opportunity to register all suspicious persons in the GDR that somehow had connections to the universities and colleges of the GDR (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 101558). In 1956, the *NVA* was built. A new key point was settled at once, in order to capture and hinder any hatred writings about the army being spread (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 100963). Additionally, the Department M also wanted to check the atmosphere among the soldiers and their family members as well as the general opinion that existed in the population to the founding of the army.

[125] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 101514. The controlling of own co-workers and their families followed particularly also in the Main Department Cadre and Education. By far, it is reason to believe that the co-workers were well aware of such, as they had to sign an extra statement in addition to the more or less standardised 'contract' with the *MfS*, before starting to work in the Department M (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit.*). This statement concerned the secrecy of the work, which in practice meant they had signed a responsibility that even did not allow talking to their own colleagues about the work they did.

[126] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 101427.

[127] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017, p. 1ff.

in the opposite direction. "Mono capitalists and Junker", i.e., "...the ones that stayed in power and mastered the state apparatus...", led the brutal terror against the freedom fighters and democrats. At the time, such elements participated actively under the leadership of the "American imperialism", preparing an aggression against the "camp of peace". By this, we can still register the strong use of political propaganda the Ministry had used some years before. A split of the German state had taken place, which led to the creation of two German countries with very different structures of society. Since these countries in more than one way separated Europe, there existed a special need on both sides of these countries' borders to show itself better than the other. This was not only a battle between two states, moreover between two systems, two worlds.

The GDR and its *MfS* needed to show how good they were. One might say that for the *MfS*, West Berlin and FRG obviously had become playgrounds for imperialistic secret services. With their subversive activity, from the *MfS* it was believed that these secret services and their spies tried to destroy the people of the GDR's peaceful development. The archival information, for matters concerning the post, tells that the secret services ostensibly tried to poison this traffic with agitation, faked circular post, post containing threats, etc., to disorganise the build up and to hinder the accomplishment of the new course. They also tried to make connection and generate contact to agents and spies.[128]   The *MfS* possessed this picture of the world.

The *MfS* therefore got the task to protect the acquisition against all attacks coming from the enemies the workers of the German People had achieved. In addition, the Ministry was responsible for strengthening the state power further, which also meant expanding the tasks of the post control. This resulted in a strict removal of all anti-democratic and anti-Soviet literature as well as all agitation given in German and other foreign languages. As we understand from this, the freedom to choose what to read was taken away. Not only was this taken away, this was done by a party apparatus that had decided upon what was allowed to possess or not. In other words, the citizens did not have any influence on decisions such as these, something that clearly states one of the totalitarian features of the GDR.

The search also contained an interest of secretly looking into post that had been defined as holding anti-democratic and anti-Soviet expressions of opinion. In order words, one was by this seen as a criminal in the eyes of the *MfS* if disagreements with the politics of the Soviet Union were expressed. This shows that the *MfS* and its post control functioned as the apparatus of the *SED* with the intention to crush down all thoughts diverging with the official policy.

What was not as odd was that the post controllers also looked for post carrying

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[128] Cf. e.g., Grimmer et al. (eds.), *op cit.*, Band 1, p. 514ff.

activities of espionage, or persons operating as agents. However, at the same time during these latter procedures, the *MfS* continued with the interest to capture the atmosphere in the population in relation to certain problems.

What furthermore was established was the creation of a card file register, which documented all kinds of correspondences the citizens of the GDR had with the outside, "capitalistic world".[129]   Additionally, executing the post control towards persons under investigation was not mainly done for the sake of the investigation and following registration. Rather, it was done mainly in order to support the responsible units, which in practice meant a stronger need to follow up the suspected persons. In other words, the control apparatus tightened the surveillance. One had to support the responsible units in their work. An absolute guarantee to the compliance of conspiracy was required, since the work was done in all secrecy.[130]   All transcripts or extractions from mail were secret documents, and was treated as such. Similar applied to the responsible units according to the given criterions of the Department M.

It was not sufficient anymore to continue to control the post as it had been done up to this time. The *MfS* expanded the post control, in order to reveal enemy actions faster as well as fulfilling the aforementioned tasks. Therefore, the Department M became divided into leadership,[131]   secretariat, Division Information,[132] Division Telegram Control and

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[129]   This term was used as a synonymous when treating the "imperialistic" actions.

[130]   The leader of the Department was the only one that held contact with the relevant persons belonging to the security service. The leader handed over the information and received the relevant missions from its nearest superior.

[131]   BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017, p. 3ff.

[132]   The Division Telegram Control was only built in the villages of the ADM's where this was seen as necessary (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017, p. 3). However, this did not only count for the villages, but also for the ADM's (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). Like with the aforementioned organising, the interviewee having worked for the Department M of the ADM of Rostock has claimed that no such place existed in the ADM of Rostock, during this person's entering into work for the *MfS* in 1964. For example, the ADM of Rostock did not at all hold such types of controls before at the beginning of the 1980's. Then, however, they grew rapidly after having become present. As such, this is an indication of having had to extend the control.

Division Post Control.[133]   Furthermore, certain organs had to see to that the commands were followed. In addition, these organs were given with accuracy, meaning that they at all times had the responsibility for knowing which co-worker did what. This was planned to the detail, where these commands existed on all levels of the *MfS* similar to a command force within a military structure. Like the rest of the *MfS,* it was hierarchically built, since the main responsible was the leader of the Department M at the Central regarding when the tasks were being executed. In the ADM's, it was the leader of the Department. Following the ladder further down, the respective Division leaders had the responsibility for their Divisions, no matter if it was at the Central or ADM's.

The partition of the tasks between the Department leader, its deputy and co-workers, was an important settlement towards completing the work. As described above, the leader of the Department M controlled over and gave at all times instructions further onto lower organs of the post control. An important task was to have control over the accomplishment of the instructions of the Department M. Said differently, this meant that the leader always was able to check upon and control if the work was done from the co-workers. From this, it is clear that a certain internal control was undertaken, since the leader had to receive such information. Furthermore, it had to be informed of the character and method of work, and the compliance of the conspiracy. These were written down in terms of what was found out and what was caused. The leaders at the top not only had the full overview on what was being done, but also how it was executed as everything was written down. If any lacks were stated, the leaders of the ADM as well as the leader of the Department M at the Central was informed of the situation. Based on the context of the power hierarchy, not only was the reporting on different cases to the nearest leader of crucial importance. It was also accomplished for the sake

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[133] According to the archival information, the *MfS* divided the Department M into the following: I Leadership, II Secretariat, III Information, IV Telegram Control and V Post Control. However, as given at first by the *MfS*, these parts regarding how it was divided does not keep their structural classification when later being addressed. It is of interest to mention in relation to how scrupulous accurate the *MfS*, on one hand, was at all times. On the other hand, the Ministry also shows somewhat the opposite, when comparing how it at least to this particular issue treated the organising. For example, as given later in the archives, III Information is all of a sudden classified as point II, whereas IV Telegram Control is point III, and V Post Control becomes point IV. Based on the logic of this context, we now see that point I and V (i.e., the numbers about the leadership and the secretariat) are missing. No matter how you divide the case as it is now, two numbers would still be missing anyway. Even if the two latter mentioned groups were not given with numbers, their roles were partly discussed. In other words, although not having been separated with individual numbers like the others and thereby what all of them originally had, they were implicitly discussed. Nevertheless, based on the accuracy of the *MfS*, one gets surprised that such 'faults' were made. Since, also paying attention to details were as important for the *MfS* as any other issue, which one in many ways may underline contributed strongly to 'state and make' the *MfS* - with related success.

of frequently improvement of the tasks and methods towards controlling the population better. In practice, this meant instructions often were given for developing the leaders as well as the co-workers professionally. The leader of the Department M at the Central was obliged to instruct and teach the co-workers frequently, in order to fulfil their set tasks. This was also done so that they were able to make themselves confident with the changing methods of the enemy.

The connection between the Department M of the ADM and the respective control points (CP's) was only done by the leader of the Department M or its deputy. The connection between the CP's and DSP's (District Service Places) was only done from the leaders of the CP's or from co-workers that had been given the task from the leaders. This shows again an example of a system that was clearly built up based on defined tasks. A crucial aim with this was the interest the leaders of the *MfS* had to the co-workers not knowing about what happened on other levels and other parts of the security service. In this way, it gave an automatic security inside the Ministry, since the co-workers knew as little as possible about the overall system. Furthermore, this way of order, unconsciously or not, led to the co-workers concentrating on their field meaning less danger of holding too much power in terms of holding a wide knowledge of the system. Holding too much power could lead to a higher questioning of the system of work, which again might have led to less conformity as well as power struggles. As we see, even inside the *MfS* there was a hard line, unnaturally not descended from the reasons of its existence.

To the types of control, there were given different tasks to execute. The first one dealt with the registration of the post control (PC) assignments. It was not allowed to open the post of the co-workers of the *MfS*. When this was seen as necessary, only the State Secretary (Minister) or its Deputy had the power to decide over this. Since these were the rules, it was fewer guarantees that the co-workers abused their position in any way, even though the security service to a certain extent had an overall control of the work.

Persons that were under PC from different units were card file registered. All those in a DSP that got their post controlled were reported to the leader of the ADM. A unit that had given a mission to do PC's was not mentioned in the card files after people had been controlled and registered at the CP's. This was the solution in order to act in line with the goal of conspiracy, holding the giver of the mission secret for all others involved. Notably, this secret was present primarily for the protection of the work and those involved in the work done inside the Ministry. The enemy did not have as easy access to this work, but the co-workers did. The co-workers were protected from other colleagues, based on the potential threat of endanger and thereby the loss of the secret status. Additionally, this rule of work was kept, since the security service included a certain potential that its own co-workers might leave the *MfS* for the advantage of the enemy. If this was

to happen, at least most of the information remained secret since the co-workers knew too little to harm the secrecy of the overall *MfS* and its post control. The time limit of controlling citizens was set to be three months, which was the rule. When it lasted longer, it was the responsible unit or DSP that extended it. All PC missions that were not extended became closed, the card in the card file taken out and placed in the Department M.

In regards to the execution of the PC missions, these lasted no longer than 24 hours before being back at the regular post again. If the units or DSP's did not keep this set time, the leader of the ADM was informed. Since the time was set to last a maximum of 24 hours, the interest the *MfS* had with this was that working longer than this time might have woken suspiciousness. The latter was not only reflected among individuals, but also in official organs, companies, etc., since their post also was controlled. One can say that even though having been a secret service, the *MfS* was in this way aware of their limitation, as it did not possess the freedom of unlimited actions. However, on the other hand, since this was how it was done in practice, the time limit given the co-workers was based on keeping the actions secret more than anything else was. The transmission and possession taking of PC missions to units or DSP's was registered and given against a signing. Before the possession taking and the hand back of the PC missions, they were controlled in regards to their original conditions. A weakness to the control might have taken place to this particular point. Since, the fact was that the latter was not necessarily done according to the procedure, because it did not always happen that the material was registered before handing it out.[134] One the other hand, registered or not, since the danger was highly present of being caught and strictly punished once noticed, such seldom took place even though the occasion was there.

A registration of documents and transcripts followed, as suspicious mail of certain character was presented to the responsible units thereafter taking a decision on what to do. The post was registered and was only given out against a signing. This particular post was not either allowed to be away from the regular post traffic for more than 24 hours.

The responsible units reported monthly on the progressive result of the Department M. When these units had confiscated post, it was notified in a register book by the responsible unit. When articles of value were found during controlling, it was notified in the register book. When handing it in, it became controlled again, to whether the found content was present or not. Everything was documented, first of all in order to have a system. Secondly, this system made sure to archive all things having taken place. Thirdly, this way of working made it easier for the *MfS*

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[134] Cf. Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02.

to keep control of what the co-workers did at any time. The CP's in the villages inside the DSP's gave in suspicious post of operational and informative character in original to the leader of the DSP, which thereafter took a decision on what to do.

All transcripts of operational and informative character as well as reports on the atmosphere was in the rule kept in the Department M for three months. Correspondence, telex, reports on activities and similar, were kept for one year. The leaders of the Departments M reported daily to their respective ADM leader on the character of the post exchange, on the new and existing material of agitation, on the expression of opinion of the population in regards to frequent questions as well as any matter concerning important post. Since this was done daily, the importance is illustrated regarding what the *SED* and *MfS* felt was of necessity. In addition, what the regime was able to collect as well as undertaking the control of the population.

The Division Information had the task to report daily on the atmosphere in the population. In summary form, it reported daily to the leader of the ADM about the defined meanings of expression that existed among the citizens. On the identical point, it also informed the unit of the leader of the ADM that took care of all sorts of information. Since this not only was reported to the leader of the ADM but also its information unit, the seriousness and safety concerning the flow of information is underlined. The co-workers did it as such that the report was formed in an unrecognisable way, i.e., it was written and produced based upon transcripts taken from mail. Here as well, this was obviously done the same way as described for the Department 26. These reports contained to which questions, in which time and how much read post the analysis of the defined meanings of expressions went through. The co-workers' reports also documented the numbers of extractions and transcripts done with this certain method of working. As we see, not only mail was controlled in terms of their content and expressions. The co-worker also had to categorise the certain questions and expressions mail carried, meaning to the smallest detail. That is, a co-worker within the post control of the *MfS* was also a part of the totalitarian system that functioned with planned goals on how to achieve a better society. The analyses the co-worker did from the post were based on exact codex' in terms of what was to be understood as aggressive, or expressions from the enemy that clearly spoke against the state. The co-workers accomplished their job based on what they had learned was right and wrong within this society system.

One can question whether this was a conscious, chosen, self-chosen, way of participating in a society. For a great deal of the co-workers, force surely laid behind their efforts done for the *MfS*, which are easier to excuse. Those working within the post control that believed in the system should maybe neither individually be accused of having been responsible for the outcome of the control. It is still

not a crime to have one's believes. These believes combined with the growing up and upraising in such a state where one had few, if any, access to other information channels than from the state, makes one perhaps understand the context of actions. There are as well other ways of seeing and differentiate backgrounds of participation to this control. No matter what, it could rather be said that this primarily in many ways was the cleverness of the *MfS*. A state security that made sure the co-workers were not supposed to possess too much information and understanding of what actually happened, as this with a minimum would have led to a resistance of fulfilling the work further on. As a parallel, however, only considered from this point of view, through history it has been said that if more people within the armed forces of Nazi-Germany had known what actually took place concerning the politics of Hitler, many of them would have protested against those decisions that caused millions of innocent lives. Additionally, in such a system, once being in the net of the *MfS* profiting from the skills and experiences of Nazi-Germany, what was one able to do as the little man in order to change only a little bit of and at one's work?

Finally, to the reports, the transcripts and the extractions of operational character were put in certain files regarding the individual units. The transcripts and the extractions of informative character were kept in files concerning individual matters. The issues concerning the operational matters being linked up with the individual units was firstly done as the respective units had a better overview over the actual problem that was closest connected to them. These knew the situation of the problem the best, and were easier able to decide on what to do further. This also shows the interaction the Ministry undertook among its units, where a unit wanting to take action to a certain problem did so in terms of its decision. Such a decision might have involved a controlling of the post. After having finished the mission, the Department M turned back to the unit that had given the mission with the results. In this case, the Department M was an instrument among several, a unit used when wanting to complete a mission of operational character. When simply wanting to get information to a certain case, person, etc., that for example not yet had been actively registered through any unit of the *MfS*, by the spade work of the Department M any unit of the security service were able to use the files of individual character to gain information.

As known, the Department M controlled different variants of post. Such a unit within the post control having done this sort of work was the Division Telegram Control. This was only found in the villages of the AD's, and where they necessarily were needed. In relation to get permission to fulfil this type of work, the Department leaders of the Departments M in the ADM's had to contact the leader of the Department M at the Central.

The Division Telegram Control worked hidden in the main telegraph office as a leading place, a place of registration, or with the statistics. It controlled telegrams,

although no longer than five minutes. Telegrams with suspicious text were copied at once, containing the exact receiver, sender, number, village of the responsible post office as well as date and time. This was given to the leader of the ADM for a further decision on what to do. Telegrams coming from persons getting their post controlled were copied. It was thereafter given over to the responsible Department leader or its deputy. Telegrams were temporary or permanently taken out of the regular post traffic when it existed reference to the known time of a criminal act, when they served as cover ups for cases or containing material of anti-democratic art as well as supporting agitation and disorganisation. By this, the post control of the Ministry did not only search for persons holding anti-system attitudes, but also criminal offences having been committed.

Besides having been the secret police, this also shows the Ministry having executed regularly police functions through its methods. Once more, this underlines the large role it had in the system of the GDR, where it did work that in the first place actually was reserved the judicial system, i.e., the police.[135]

The Division Post Control had different tasks to look after and fulfil. Those were conspiracy, work partition and Work Groups.

Concerning the work of conspiracy, the co-workers of the CP's were only allowed to talk about their work to their nearest superior. The CP was camouflaged as "Department XII" in the prevailing post office. The camouflage, working as Department XII, was done in order not to call any 'unnecessary' attention. That is, if somehow being discovered particularly by anyone outside the security service, there would likely have been less suspicion about its operational reason of work. Since the official reason the *MfS* had was in the name of the control organ of the post, the Department XII. Not only the official reason kept it secret to the 'outside' world. It was accomplished with further measures, due to the co-workers having

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[135] A Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock also found such performance of the *MfS* quite unfitting, which made the co-worker critically ask itself: "what is the actually function of our security service?" (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02). An incident this person referred to, made it doubt and thereby not as strong anymore believe in the system and meaning of power. This was underlined through an example put forward from the person conversed with, as this person told that it simply did not understand what the security service had to do on a football stadium when disorder of different kinds took place. Such interference from the *MfS* happened now and then when the local team Hansa Rostock played its games at home. When disorders took place, the men of the state security were often sent to check upon the situation, and not the police, as it, according to the person conversed with, should have been. In the eyes of the Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Captain of the Department XX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 07.05.02, 16.05.02), similar tendencies were the facts. Amongst other things, this person had the responsibility for observing the university sector, but found his colleagues from time to time having done winter duties as guards at the university.

held identity cards from the *MPF*.[136] These cards had the necessary data and a picture of the respective person, and were produced by the *MPF*. This effort also contributed to the sake of avoiding being discovered by any irregularities, especially since these co-workers deceptively also was under the leadership and control organs of the *MPF*.[137] The people of the post sometimes knew who these co-workers actually were, but could not prove it since they were legitimised as coming from control places of the post that were present in order to complete different measures of control.

The task concerning the work partition was divided as such that no delays in the work process of the post office were allowed to take place. How the time of work and the parting into duties worked was regulated in accordance with the intensity of the post traffic. Night and work on Sunday were parted in a way that the co-workers were able to handle the post traffic. At the CP's, where no night work or work on Sunday took place, supply of post was left out. Every single duty was parted into groups, whereas each of them worked specialised to one type of work.

Interestingly to note is that it was not only the wish of the security service to be as effective as possible. Moreover, the way it did so, as it was an exception not to work on Sundays. It is somewhat peculiar when considering the day Sunday, which through long traditions and history at least in Europe is a day that is generally considered a day of rest from work. At least, no work took place in the CP's on Sundays. On the other side, one can from this conclude that the CP's were not considered of highest importance at all times.

The Work Groups held different organisational tasks, where they were divided into separate ones. These were sorting, which consisted of two smaller units, rough sorting, and fine and mission sorting. Furthermore, it was the technical processing, "Reader", "Writer" as well as "Worker by the Lamp".[138]

One of the two units that belonged to the Work Group dealing with sorting was the unit rough sorting. Except the leader of the CP, this unit's sorter was the only one that could encounter the post among the co-workers in terms of both taking and handing over the post (from the employees at the post). All post that weighed up to 1000 grams was controlled. In the villages, where no control points of articles existed, the co-workers controlled any type of post when it showed to

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[136] This was not the fact concerning the Department M's co-workers of the ADM of Rostock (cf. Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). This indicates that the action of operating as 'only' existing under the secrecy of the Department XII without further camouflage also showed to be enough to avoid suspiciousness. Furthermore, this also means the work was able to function in all secrecy, without contributing to weaken the results of the actual work.

[137] Cf. e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit*., p. 123.

[138] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017, p. 8.

be enough co-workers able to do so. This means that some sort of post clearly did escape the control.

Mail with postcards (registered at the post) was provable. Such mail was however only allowed to be handed and taken over in piecemeal against a receipt. The rest of the mail was registered according to the regulations at the control place where the post came in and was given back. Important information such as date, time of arrival, type of post, number, parted in regards to mail and rough mail, time of departure and signature of the rough sorter, were all written down. After the registration, the more regular mail was separated from the rough mail. The regular mail went through the mission sorting. The working process took place under the following phases:

1. air and urgent post were worked on immediately

2. post coming in (post box mail) were worked on frequently

3. transfers, i.e., post passing through, were worked on in such a way that the post was delivered on time to its final destination

4. the incoming post (post from villages and outside bigger towns) were finished to the next distribution

The rough sorter took out all suspicious post. If a wagon or bag of post had been worked through, this was registered in the register book and immediately thereafter given free for further transportation. Mail that somehow had been pasted together was given to the Work Group responsible for the technical processing. This group also opened this mail. Mails that had been tied were opened from the sorter and treated with utter carefulness. Everything that was confiscated was registered. Post registered mail was especially registered, given the reason of the impounding. Post that was not noted was packed identical to how it was, in order to replace it in its original condition.

In regards to the fine and mission sorting, the more regular mail was controlled. Through the working process in accordance with the PC missions, the post was controlled. Mails that rose suspiciousness in regards of containing agitation were viewed closer. The mission list held only streets and house numbers, alphabetically systematised after AD's and streets. In harmony with a register, one of the co-workers controlled the particular post belonging to a certain person, to check if it already was in the category of getting its post controlled. Mails sorted out in order to be read was suspicious post in relation to the given areas of tasks, post boxes, and post that had been stored. Post that had been sorted out holding material of agitation was especially taken care of. All mail from and to the so-called capitalistic abroad was also sorted out and stored accordingly in a register book. The sorter was not allowed to open post partly.

For the Work Group having been responsible for the technical processing, the technical accessories were distributed from the Department M at the Central. Documents that held signs of eventual secrecies were given in to the Department M at the Central immediately. This Department dealt with the matters since having had all the technical equipment it needed for solving such cases.

It is somehow curious that the security service focused on underlining that the Department M at the Central also had the proper equipment it needed to solve cases holding signs of eventual secrecy. Particularly since the statement in this context at the same time say that the technical processing first of all needed to be supported from the Department M at the Central to be able to discover the secrecy. Secondly, underlining this interest seems like gilding the lily, as we know that nearly every important decision first came from the Central. In other words, since it was clear that the equipment came from forces placed at the Central, why was there a need to underline that the Central also possessed such equipment? When they had this equipment at the Central, why give it out to the Work Group, which, when finding something of secrecy, had to send the secret material onto the Department M at the Central? Would it not have been faster to do this work at the Central, since holding the identical equipment also meaning having a closer control of the work? We know that the *MfS* fulfilled its work with its version of utter thoroughness. However, it may also seem as if the power at the Central did not want that too many - even within their own, closest rows - was to know about such work and results. This can be a legitimate explanation to why one at the Central also had such equipment like what was given out. One maybe considered that one was not able to do all the work at the Central. One distributed therefore necessary equipment to shorten the time of investigation as well as generally making it all more effective. Not only were the latter focused on, but also the matter of spreading the tasks on many co-workers on all levels of the control made the control safer from de-conspiracy. It was also made more secret. Since we know that the different co-workers belonging to the different units of control were not allowed to speak to anyone about their job as well as not being allowed to know anything about the other related areas of control. Nevertheless, as said, when hot material was found it had to be sent in immediately to the Central for further control. Once more, why? This did not only lead to the Central power growing even stronger. It also shows that the central power elite of the security service did not have the trust to its lower organs. Since, it gave them enough equipment to be able to accomplish such work, but, on the other side, once something suspicious was uncovered, this was sent in to the central place at once. There, the responsible after all had the same equipment, although no clear signs existed of a possibility to find out anything new. By this, one can say that at least the central control of the Department M was the only one that finally kept the information and results from the work.

The co-workers of the Work Group having undertaken the technical process-ing were the ones opening and closing the post.[139]   They only used the prepared equipment and steam, whereas in the later years more alternatives existed as re-sults of the development.[140]   In this case, prepared equipment meant using a letter opener, since other means were not allowed. It appeared that post had been closed with additional glue or similar. When this was the case, after once having opened them, it was typical that one closed them and left them in their original style.[141] Particular post written with a special pen leading to such mail having changed colour after opening them, were coloured completely. All post was closed with the given equipments and steam, except post contained pictures, negatives, stamps and special pasted post. This mail was especially taken care of. They were closed manually, i.e., by hand. All other post was put under the press. In fact, when it turned out that mail somehow was decided upon not to be returned to the regular post traffic, the *MfS* mainly did so out of profit interests. The stamped stamps of such mail were regularly sold to collectors abroad. The money from the trade finally went in onto the bank account of the *MfS*.[142]   The stamps were for example also sent to the Main Department Cadre and Education to check if the co-workers somehow were able to use the experiences of this post for the sake of learning and teaching.

The Work Group called Reader went even more in detail to the content of post. Its work was strictly reduced to the allowance of only reading the content of mail at tables having had a white underlay. Furthermore, the content was only taken out from the cover when sitting at the table. During reading, one mainly watched out for how the pages laid, how they were folded and if something had been attached.

When money or other articles of value were found in mail, it was given to the

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[139] Cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02.

[140] For a further analysis to the development, see below.

[141] This was a typical approach of the Department M, in order to hide any possible suspicions of post having been opened and controlled by the *MfS* (cf. e.g., BV Gera's Department M's regulation of work from 11 August 1987. BStU/Gera, MfS - BV Gera. Abteilung M).

[142] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*. In this way, the *MfS* easily got hold of foreign exchange to the benefit of the state's economy. To make it a secret operation through and through, the money from the trade went through the *BdL* (Office of the Leadership) before landing in the "*Deutsche Buchexport- und Import GmbH Leipzig*". The money was thereafter transferred into the bank account of the *MfS*.

leader immediately.[143]   Since it was important work that took place and because of reasons of conspiracy and health, smoking, eating and drinking in working rooms as well as preservation of food and drinks at the working place was not allowed. This reflects the attention to that any type of carelessness would have revealed the work of the Department M.

When a meaning of expression or something suspicious was discovered this was given for copying following a note informing of the subject, pages and lines. Here, as the case often was with aforementioned solutions, the content of the post was brought back to its original condition after having read it. Mail made with special pens that had been coloured were especially marked. The Reader daily made a report of its work. This contained the number of post read and how many meanings of expression were found. Of those found, how many of them were negative and positive was counted, and how many transcripts were depicted. Furthermore, of those, how many were positive and negative, and the character of the meanings of expression. Additionally, the social stand/civil status of the author of mail was written down. At the same time, the Reader put aside post it meant was of suspicion, in order to process them with an ultraviolet lamp. Belonging to this type of investigation was post written with large spaces and line intervals, post with loose documents or pages and post that woke suspicion of having been processed with chemical ink. Such mail was seen as typical post coming from an enemy that wrote its post using methods that were not supposed to reveal for example the issue, content, sender and receiver of certain mail.

Through the post control, it was of importance for the *SED* regime to find out what kind of persons it had to deal with, hereunder, their thoughts and meanings. The *MfS* valued the enemy's use of communication through the post as one of the most threatening ways of attacking the regime and its existence, which is why these controls were done with utter carefulness and accuracy. By this, the Department M was easily able to found out which meanings existed at any time to any issue, among which groups the expressions in the society existed as well as exactly who expressed these meanings, the latter perhaps having been the most important.

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[143] It may sound as when money found in mail that was controlled was found accidentally and confiscated. Related back to the early days, evidence from the ADM of Dresden shows that this work of finding money in post with the help of thorough planning had existed for a long time (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.). It continued to exist until the very end of the GDR. In the years 1980-1985, the ADM of Dresden confiscated several different sorts of currency (more than 20 different currencies), which led to possessing huge amounts of foreign currency. Only in the year 1985, the ADM of Dresden managed to confiscate more than DM 100 000. When looking for money during controlling the post, it was usual to register the money's/payment's bank note number and amount. This was most likely not only done for holding the overview, but rather, more importantly, because of checking upon the work of the co-workers.

In addition, to have had a Work Group Reader, the Department M also had a Work Group Writer. For the latter, the basic conditions were to get exact transcription of the receiver's and the sender's address. The content was written down exactly the way it was in the mail. That is, the sender's sentence construction and characteristics of writing were not allowed to be improved. Issues related to dates, e.g. meetings, evidence of espionage, sabotage and terror was written down at once, and given to the responsible unit.[144] Again, we here see the interest of the Department M and the system of the *MfS* to pass on information as quickly and relevant as possible, in order to work with highest effectiveness. From every transcript done, three or four exemplars were completed. These exemplars contained information of the sender and receiver, the writer of the post's social status, to which question it was related to as well as if it was positive or negative. Furthermore, it was clearly stated from which CP a transcript was accomplished. Concerning transcripts and extractions from mail coming from members of the German People's Police, it was only allowed to write down the sender, receiver as well as the content.

Since the Ministry was to create a best possible picture of the enemy, the identical information was obviously also collected within this Work Group compared to what we witnessed above to the other units. The employees of the German People's Police were also registered, albeit not with as thorough analysis as others got. Nevertheless, even the men of the law were no exception, something which shows the role of the secret service in such a state. The laws and the justice were used pragmatically, with no clear rules of who actually were the rulers and lawful watchers over others in the society. Controlling the post of the employees of the *DVP* additionally illustrates that no one was safe from the security service's apparatus of control. Besides, there were though those co-workers of the security service that only got their mail checked in special cases. The policy of not controlling the persons of the *DVP* more thorough highly likely was determined by the intention of not putting the organs of the state too strongly 'against' one another.

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[144] Acts of terror and violence were always a threat concerning the GDR's sovereignty. In 1975, the Department XXII was built, which dealt with matters like these. In 1989, it became a Main Department, which underlines the importance the *MfS* considered it as. By 1975, the dangers of such acts had increased noticeably, since the GDR a few years earlier had been recognised as a state by the international community. The importance of having a powerful weapon against acts like these was stressed further in 1981, through the Service Instruction Nr. 1/81 (BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000121). That is, since the majority of who was considered as the suspicious people inside the GDR often were workers and students coming from non-socialist countries. As a related point, the work of finding suspected people connected with this issue was not done alone by for example the Departments M and 26 and/or Main Department XXII (Terror Defence). In order to work effective, this was often also supported from the Main Departments XVIII, XIX (Traffic, Post, News) and XX, whereas the leader of the *ZOS* (Central Operative Staff) frequently was responsible for both executing the coordinative and evaluative role.

Secondly, taking into consideration that the co-workers of the *MfS* were 'on the same side' as the *DVP*, would likely only have made it somewhat unreasonable to control the police. Thus, since this might have given doubts and unnecessary suspiciousness to what kind of role the security service and its co-workers actually played in the society of the GDR. It may have endangered the fundament of the security service and its execution of work. However, in order to be as effective as the Ministry was, understandably one simply had to function in such a way simultaneously having led to a certain internal control also of other organs of the state. Some authors have also stated that controls in the secret were being made internally, as colleagues, even from the same unit, controlled each other's post.[145] Reactions were taken among the co-workers, however with no results. In fact, one was punished if refusing to execute determined orders. At the same time, the same colleagues reported to colleagues higher up in the system out of fear, about the subjects and atmospheres existing in the pause rooms. They were to do so in the name of being good citizens. However, in such areas, regularly no one bothered. Moreover, they were rather enjoying feeling that a break was taken from the work procedures, duties, etc, meaning that one normally expressed oneself more freely. Nevertheless, the context in which the reporting existed indicates that the fear was one significant issue the *MfS* and the system as such successfully influenced towards all sorts of people, leading to an interest of spying on each other. The fear resulted in some sort of duty of having to inform, and not unconditionally due to the procedures of the duty having stated this as such. Otherwise, that they might have become the victims of being caught is a plausible explanation for this reaction.

Continuing with the last mission of work having been accomplished through the Work Group subordinated the Division Post Control was done by the Worker by the Lamp.[146] This sort of work in the Department M meant checking post only in a dark room. In such a room, with the help of chemical means, complete post were opened and looked at under a certain type of lamp. After that post first had been under the lamp, the content was thereafter taken out from the cover. Generally, through the special lights of the lamp together with the chemical means, the lamp was able to detect hidden text, texts the normal human eye was not able to register. Any text or content not having been possible to read or recognise from the other units were given to the co-workers of this unit. As in the other units, the cover and every single paper were controlled. After having investigated the content, the material was put in the cover again under the lamp.

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[145] Wawrzyn, *op cit.*, p. 123, p. 130.
[146] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017, p. 12.

Every Work Group had a responsible person as head.[147]   These leaders' tasks were to organise and divide the work correctly, control and instruct the co-workers as well as making co-workers confident with the best working methods.

In regards to the CP's, the leader of a CP was responsible for the accomplishment of the given instructions, a collective cooperation between the co-workers and their belonging partition as well as the instruction of the co-workers. The leader's most important tasks were:

1. the upbringing of all co-workers to honesty, and to hold a moral, ideal attitude. The co-worker had to turn all his attention to this, so that no criminal offence from other colleagues at work took place

2. accomplishment of frequent controls, to check if work was done according to the given instructions

3. to find out the reasons of the faults and lacks existing, and to influence this so that they were removed at once

These controls were registered in the leader's control book. With this type of control, the leader of a CP made sure there existed an internal control at the lowest level of the *MfS*' post control. Point 1 states the securing of the party's and Ministry's contextual understanding of what was meant with honesty and moral. At the same time, this way of being brought up served to control others, and not first look after oneself in terms of acting with the correct moral and attitude. This shows that the co-workers, or the people of the GDR for that matter, at least partially, were not supposed to create their own meaning of right and wrong. This was to be learned from above, with commands. On the other side, in the strictest sense, it might be argued that it is nothing odd with having frequent controls. As well as checking and performing influence over the co-workers' produced faults and lacks, to see to that the work is accomplished better. However, having in mind under which conditions these actions consisted, the question is moreover how, and with what intentions these corrections and controls were executed. At the same time, this had to take place under a strict system, with military influence. One may also ask whether it was system conditioned, resulting in the system having been a self-contributor to the harshness. It seems as if an inner mechanism additionally drove the system of the *MfS* to development of the control.

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[147] In relation to the leader, a few words should be said about the shift leader and its tasks. The shift leader counted as being the deputy to the leader of the CP. When being at work, it had the identical work tasks to fulfil as the leader. Like most organs of control and security, there always has to be a "plan B". In this case, the shift leader looked after that the work and tasks were completed, on behalf of having been the CP's deputy as well as assistant.

2.1.3   Crimes committed from co-workers of the Department M

By the year 1957, the - interim - *SfS* had once more become an own, independent
ministry, more known as the Ministry for State Security. The former leader of the
Ministry, Ernst Wollweber, had been orderly removed from office and replaced by
Erich Mielke.

With all the chaos the incident in 1953 had brought, it took some years before
a new guidance came to how the post control was to be done. A new directive on
how to proceed with the control came in 1957.[148]   This Order, dealt however with
embezzlements from mail through co-workers of the Departments M.

Through the fulfilment of work of the Department M in the ADM's, certain
special happenings had taken place. The *MfS*' Deputy Minister Major General
Walter, who was responsible for having signed the Order, expressed his deepest
concerns to the specific happenings. He particularly related his approach to the
procedures on control, upbringing and instructions of the co-workers through the
superiors. Based on the accomplished investigation that will be analysed below,
it additionally turned out that it did not exist great concerns in the Departments
Cadre and Education in regards to the providing towards selecting the cadres for
work in the Departments M.

From October 1 1956 to January 5 1957, four embezzlements from mail
through co-workers of the Department M in the different ADM's had been known
and investigated. These former co-workers - as they now were known -, all fe-
males, had transgressed heavily against the regulations of the *MfS* as well as the
laws of the GDR. These were facts, since they firstly had abused their official
functions, in order to steal money from the mail.[149]   Secondly, they had partly an-
nihilated post, or taken this with them to their homes. Thirdly, they had personally
sent the controlled post directly to the recipients. All this happened only few years
after the 1953 uprising. Additionally, having in mind the severe incident from 17
June 1953, an important role of the Service Instruction that came later the same
year focused exactly on building up the security service and its post control to
secure the state from further enemies. This also meant controlling own personnel,
as no one was to feel secure due to the *MfS* not taking any chances. However, ob-
viously some disloyal fragments within the *MfS* had been able to commit a crime
against the *MfS*, rules of the post control as well as the state of the GDR. Further-
more, this also shows the *MfS* and its post control still having been vulnerable and
not secure from anyone. Without taking further actions against such crimes, on
behalf of the party the Ministry was anxious that it would experience a new start

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[148] Order 26/57. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000427.

[149] The co-workers all came from different CP's and ADM's, which were: CP Zwickau/ADM
of Karl-Marx-Stadt, CP Bautzen/ADM of Dresden, CP Prenzlau/ADM of Neubrandenburg and
Department M/ADM of Magdeburg.

of oppositional forces. The last one would have expected was that own person-nel did criminal acts towards the secret service, which finally was able to damage the party's face outwards. Something had gone wrong again, as these incidents happened shortly after the comprehensive guidance of the post control from 1953. The situation made it extra complicated, primarily since it happened within own rows. Furthermore, these co-workers of the *MfS* had made enemies out of them-selves, towards a state they in the first place were supposed to protect. Although perhaps having made a greater damage to the Ministry than perhaps to own person due to having been caught, at least the internal control proved to have functioned.

Additionally, one of the accused had kept secret for a long time that she had a relation with the leader of her CP, from where a child was born. The accused had not said that the leader of the CP was the father of the child, but rather given a name of a solider of the *NVA*. All this happened under the influence of the leader of the CP. In the case of the CP leader, he was also accused since having taken part in this.

Concerning the aforementioned woman accused, through the investigation of the personal files it became first known that she two times because of theft had been fired from different working places during her time in service by the *MfS*. In October 1953, she was one time punished with a 5-day arrest because of having been charged guilty of theft while in duty.

All of the accused were immediately taken into custody where an investigation process against the five started. Based on the results of the investigation, the following was decided upon:

1. the former co-workers X.X. and Y.Y. were fired from the *MfS*, and handed over to the court of the GDR for further sentencing.[150] They were to count with the hardest punishment, because of having done their "reprehensible actions"[151]

2. the other three former co-workers were also fired

All of the accused were deprived of their ranks they held in the *MfS*.

In order to take erudition from the above mentioned cases whereas at the same time wanting to prevent similar situations to happen, Deputy Minister Major Gen-eral Walter ordered different changes. These changes debouched to a radically improvement of the control. This meant improving the political moral upbringing and direction of the co-workers, through the superiors in the Departments M at the Central and ADM's. Since it was said that the Department Cadre and Education had done a poor job in finding the right people for the job, the cadre records of

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[150] I.e., the woman that had been taken of theft two times, and her CP leader.
[151] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000427, p. 3.

all persons having been put into duty in the CP's as well as in the ADM's became subject to detailed control. Furthermore, until 1 March 1957, the leader of the Department M at the Central developed an instruction that dealt with securing the work of the Department M in the CP's. Deputy Minister Walter thereafter approved the proposal. Additionally, with monthly frequency, all the co-workers in the Departments M received expert teaching mainly about the work in the CP's as well as about preventive measures in regards to embezzlements of mail. This latter was particularly was noted down and registered. Major General Walter underlined especially one thing to this: he made clear that co-workers knowing of a crime had to expect as hard a punishment as the culprit itself. Finally, as a last interest given from Major General Walter, he emphasised that all co-workers of the Department M at the Central as well as the ADM's were to receive these orders. Additionally, from the date of reception, that it became repeated at least one more time after a month had passed.

Since all workers of the *MfS* in the widest possible sense got informed of this incident, it explains the seriousness of the intention from the Deputy Minister. While it also was known to the ADM's, this stood as an example to all workers of the *MfS* informing about a serious crime having been done against the state of GDR. Further, it illustrated how damaging for the state, people, and the future of the GDR the actions taken from these persons were. In addition, what one had to expect when being disloyal to the Ministry and the state. At the same time, it told the co-workers not only what to do when such might be noticed. Like in a children's school, however, with laws and punishment of a totalitarian society, the co-workers were also - and once again - taught and told how to behave in order to do the work correctly. This, always as the leaders, the persons from above, ordered.

2.2 The late 1950's, the 1960's and 1970's: expanding the tasks of the Department M

By the late 1950's, an Order came that addressed the need to improve the work of the Department M.[152] It focused on improving the recognition of hidden writings done with ink that acted as a mean of camouflaging mail used in the post traffic. It was also of interest thoroughly to catch the use of such material. As we have witnessed from the earlier years, such search existed in detailed forms. An improvement of this was however a demand. It was a request based on the importance of increasing the work and improving the methods, since the Department M's experiences towards the use of such techniques executed by the enemy obviously was a typical pattern of communication.

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[152] Order 8/59. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000620.

Therefore, technical control places were raised in:

- ADM of Erfurt – for the AD's of Erfurt, Gera and Suhl

- ADM of Dresden – for the AD's of Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt and Cottbus

- ADM of Halle – for the AD's of Halle, Magdeburg and Leipzig

- ADM of Rostock – for the AD's Rostock and Schwerin

- Department K, Central[153] – for the AD's of Neubrandenburg, Potsdam, Frankfurt/Oder, Berlin and the Central

The technical control places in the ADM's were each appointed with two co-workers. The Department Cadre and Education of the ADM's had the co-workers available, which already had been picked out from the leader of the ADM and the Department M, and was responsible for getting them into their new working places. As this was criticised in regards to the embezzlements from 1957, the practice was now that the leader of the ADM and the Department M themselves chose which co-workers to have, instead of the Department Cadre and Education having the full responsibility.

Regarding the technical control places, a room with necessary equipment was installed. This room had first gone through rules of security and through the Department K, equipping it with the necessary tools. Through the controls of the Department M, all mail that had certain characteristic signs of text with camouflaged ink was sorted out and passed on to the relevant technical control place at once. The technical control places led the preparatory work for the physical-chemical work of the Department K, so that they treated the mail given to them according to the decided rules.

After having been worked upon from the technical control places under attention of conspiracy, it was made sure that all mail was brought back to the post traffic and finally sent to the recipient. Additionally, through the courier route of the *MfS* and under compliance of the conspiracy, the material worked upon for further physical-chemical work and exploitation were sent over to a specific Work Group of the Department K at the Central.

After having ended the work at the Department K, the result was given further on to the Main Department II. This material was registered in the central expiration as "unknown". Additionally, after the responsible ADM had done a comparative work, it was handed over for further work in the part expirations.

The work of the technical control places was kept with strong secrecy. The persons with the positions named below were the only ones having entrance to these rooms:

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[153] This Department was the forerunner of what became known as the *OTS*.

1. the leader of the ADM and its deputy

2. the leader of Department M of the ADM and its deputy

3. the leader of Department M at the Central and its deputy

4. the leader and the responsible worker of the Work Group of the Department K

As for earlier years, the *MfS* and its Department M followed up the professional qualification of the co-workers through the education of the Department K.

For longer time, the Department M had been situated in every AD. In all the AD's with their belonging post places, the Department M had officially built up units to the smallest detail. They were organised and operated directly or indirectly under the Department. The common ones there were plenty of, belonging to and operating directly under the Department M also being the smaller and perhaps most effective units, were the ones also named *Dienststelle 12* (Service Place 12), or *Stelle 12* (Place 12).[154] With the building of the Berlin Wall, these control places got an even higher status of importance since the direct connections between East and West practically were cut off. This meant the Department M received new tasks to fulfil, since for example western secret services that up to this time had based their work on personal contacts now started to use the post more frequently than before.

With this in mind, Mielke's Superior Deputy Lieutenant General Bruno Beater gave a second supplement in 1967 to a directive regarding accomplishing the tasks of the Line M from 1 September 1966.[155] It said that persons related to all units of the Line M had a considerable part of the collective success of the *MfS* through permanent contribution, and regarding the specific work methods. Nevertheless,

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[154] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 003017; BStU/Dresden, MfS - BV Dresden. Nr. 29; Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *op cit*., p. 32ff; Mampel, *op cit*., p. 88ff; Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ed.), *Unrecht als System, Dokumente über planmäßige Rechtsverletzungen in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands*. Teil III. Bonn 1958, p. 40ff; cf. e.g. also Fricke, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 115. The Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *op cit*.) claimed that no post moving around in the GDR was controlled at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's. According to the archives from the *BStU*, there are however no facts that can confirm this statement, rather the contrary. These places of controlling the post may have held different 'classifiable' names through time (cf. e.g., Department XII, Service Place 12, Place 12). As described so far through different sources, it might at least be argued that they did not differ in terms of working goals (cf. e.g. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). The most common name used until now within the field related to documenting this sort of work, for unknown reasons favours the use of the mentioned terminologies in the text above.

[155] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr 008696.

this was still addressed in order to improve qualitatively through a development and expansion on the side of the leadership.

The permanent qualitative improvement of the leadership of all units was a demand, which also had full validity for the Department M. This included all co-workers in these units having had to be awake, aware as well as acting with a clean moral. It also meant to focus on raising dependable co-workers like before, using any possibility available. However, there was renewed reason to notify that not yet in all units the required work on raising persons with the necessary actions existed. Neither was the accomplishment of the tasks controlled. Said differently, all the earlier given orders to the upbringing, loyalty, completing of tasks, necessary controls, etc., had to be improved based on unsatisfying results.

Beater meant that to be able to run and lead a unit forced to activate a permanent control of the operative-technical tasks. Additionally, one had to make sure that no co-worker was able to take advantage of their positions, especially when taking advantage on the expense of other co-workers. It was necessary to make such factors disappear, as these were able to ruin the *MfS*' reputation in the public. As described in the earlier chapters, although the *MfS* clearly governed the control of the GDR with iron fist and seemed to have sufficient overview over these matters at all times, we on the other hand also see the daily struggles the Ministry dealt with in order to make the ends meet. The picture outwards often given in different contributions to this theme compared to how for example the work processes so far has shown, illustrates a somewhat discrepant situation. By this, it is not to claim that the facts in such contributions are wrong. Moreover, this example contributes to point nuances to the work and control of the *MfS* not having floated as light as it often seems to in earlier descriptions.

Returning to the command of Beater, mainly based on his directive from 1 September 1966, some issues were improved. In this directive, Beater addressed the need to improve tasks like the conspiracy of the work, better relations among the co-workers, higher the moral and make it more clean, work more exact and detailed as well as activate the proper measures. This would all lead to a further development of the co-workers' understanding and context regarding awareness, responsibility and moral.

The following results coming about from this was that the most important task for a leader concerning the collectiveness was the accomplishment of a planned and effective work. With this work, one necessarily reached a new quality within the units of the Line M. This was not only measured in provable results, but also in their impacts of the co-workers' discipline and moral. This relation process was at the same time ran with a stricter form of control, through periodical accomplishment calling upon the full understanding of all honest and disciplined co-workers. Since the *MfS* often underlined the interest of having loyal, honest and disciplined co-workers, this was not only wished upon to make the work go

easier. It seems as if this was a mix between forced and wanted necessity, since there was an evident problem of being able to control the co-workers. This indicates that the *MfS*' leadership saw that a too large and strict internal control highly likely would have led to a dysfunctional system. Therefore, the leadership of the *MfS* also aimed to motivate the co-workers in order for them to really believe in and work for the system. At the same time, we see that this had to be executed under certain political aims, where the *MfS* stood for raising its next generations through the already stated present and future.

In relation to the executive control of the number of co-workers the Line M had, it was controlled how many co-workers in the Divisions of the Department M that were instructed by a leader of a Division. This control counted especially for the CP's (Control Points). One of the changes accomplished was that a leader of a Division did not have to have more than 15 co-workers as subordinates. In such a way, the individual relation and control through the Division leader at both work and living place became more effective.

In all the Divisions and independent Work Groups within the Departments M one worked according to the existing conditions and achieved as much as possible regarding the instructions of work to fulfil. Once again, all this was done in harmony with the processes of work decided upon inclusively holding the necessary measures of control. That is, the work instruction of the Department M at the Central already known to the Department leaders was fundamentally followed. The Division leader held a monthly educational process with its co-workers regarding the instruction of work. Another example to the execution of running a tight control, development, etc., was the co-workers having been put on a list, whereas also obliged to sign in and out on. This process lasted for nearly three months, where an exemplar of the instruction of work was sent to the leader of the Department M, Major General Strobel, by the 20 September 1967. The leaders of the Departments M introduced a monthly unofficial measure of control, where form and accomplishment were especially commented in written. Suspiciousness concerning embezzlement of articles coming from post being present was in written notified of at once to the Department M at the Central.

For the collective of the co-worker, in general it also took place an increase in the activity of control. This was made through the leaders and responsible Division leaders of the Departments M in order to make it more visible. Such was done with pocket control, by spot-checking every quarter per year. This control was primarily executed towards any co-worker, which after duty was able to leave the unit. That the Department M at the Central needed to do visible control of the co-workers shows that these employees were taken away their already little freedom at work. Like in a typical totalitarian state, no one was harmed from control. Much due to the *MfS*, the practice in the GDR was obviously that the people put to control other people where themselves yet controlled by others. It seems as

if the one control gave birth to the other, based on the frequently suspiciousness. Its own inherent force also kept this kept alive. Therefore, it is most certain not questionable whether this system of control became dysfunctional, but to which degree.

The leaders of the Departments M were supported from their ADM leader or deputy operative in many ways, to be able to do the work Beater addressed. For example, all workrooms, especially within the postal buildings where the Divisions of the Department M were placed, were systematically controlled and reorganised having led to an increase of the quality of conspiracy. On the other hand, this helped in such a way that a Division leader achieved a greater overview in regards to activities of control. The control apparatus earned as much from this towards the possibility of performing control of fellow colleagues, as it served to control the defined enemy existing beyond the *MfS*. Any possible costs for these operations were charged on the account of the *MPF*'s ADM's. If no agreements were made, the costs were carried on behalf of the *MfS*. The aim was identical in comparison to what we witnessed to the co-workers of the Work Group Telegram Control working at the local post offices: the work of the Department M was kept as secret as possible, leaving no traces back to the Department when showing to be necessary and possible.

Regarding the confiscated money written down in the control books, a quarter of the yearly amount of the pay done by a single co-worker was analysed in order to get a relative comparative view. The leader of the responsible Department M or Division leader personally made contact with the leader on the area of subject - post security, having been the ADM of Post and Telecommunication. This was done in order to bring about of which character the losses - in fact, what the citizens of the GDR indirectly had transported through the German Post - concerned, or which amount they had. Doing it this way resulted in getting a certain overview about confiscated money. In respect to control measures taken towards the co-workers of the *MfS*, the German Post was included only in accordance with the Department M at the Central. Although working more or less close with the German Post, this measure nevertheless shows the level of secrecy, control and impassivity even one of the closest partners of the *MfS* experienced. The transport route of the mail from the regional offices to the Department M in the ADM's, and from the German Post to the Departments M, was once again controlled. When necessary, it was new formed.

In every Department M, a book was present particularly to inform of lacks, in terms of the Department M at the Central being able to state these facts when doing controls in the Departments M. The co-workers of the Department M at the Central having been put in to do the controlling were obliged to confirm when the already registered lacks had been removed in the mean time between the last visit. This way of accomplishing control also illustrates how the control apparatus was

built up, in terms of its unconditional authority. When the leadership of an ADM did controls of their lower organs, the ADM's superior controlled them. In this particular case, this was the Department M at the Central. In general, just as the controls were undertaken, so were orders given.

To remove all circumstances that would have brought about favours most likely paralysing the full unfold of the awareness and moral was organised by the co-work of all involved of the Departments M. All the ideas and suggestions serving to improve the organisation of the work, complying with the conspiracy and increasing the awareness, were controlled conscientiously. Likewise, this also meant to guarantee their realisation. In other words, these were at the time of fundamental interest for the Department M at the Central to accomplish, because not being able to organise such interests would have meant a considerable weaker possibility of an overall control.

Cadre problems that existed in the Departments M were closer looked at and cleared in cooperation with the cadre department of every ADM. Removal of the standing central point of raising co-workers was solved together with the cadre department. One settled dates for this work, where concrete measures were defined. Permanent control was guaranteed to this as well. Having in mind 1953, the *MfS* had learned from their faults on how to raise co-workers and having a critical, organisational aspect towards them. The co-worker could not just be a member of the Ministry, only because of having signed the *MfS*' paper on working agreements. They had to show themselves good enough for the *MfS* through commitment to the party and state organs. This was only possible through the commands of how the party and *MfS*' leadership wanted its co-workers to become. Said differently, once one for different reasons was in the net of the *MfS*, from day one, being a person with different thoughts, interests, rights and duties, had ceased to exist.

In 1968, the control through the Department M in many ways got even tighter.[156] Strobel decided to build a group of *OibE*'s in the Department M, which at first acted in East Berlin. It started up with five officers, having been for the responsibility of the special emptying of post boxes. Officially, they were workers of the German Post, where the leader of the Post and Newspaper Service at the ADD of Berlin had cleared their efforts and legends. The position carried was either being a truck driver or post box emptier. Practically, they emptied certain post boxes that existed in certain areas of East Berlin, where each one of them had their own particular boxes to empty.[157] By this, the possibilities increased to localise the place of dropping as well as the time. Additionally, it

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[156] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. KS 23514/90, p. 329ff.

[157] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 376, p. 42 (W. Schmieder, *Die Entwicklung der Abteilung M des MfS zur operativen Diensteinheit in den sechziger Jahren*. [Diploma work at the College of the Ministry for State Security]).

was easier to uncover any expressions of hatred towards the GDR a sender had written, or for example also easier to uncover agents.[158]   It also turned out successful, as material of secrecy was noticed while doing emptying in Köpenick and Friedrichshain.[159]   As seen, it was also possible for the *MfS* to identify the persons that had dropped this mail. Mainly since the *MfS* used the different registers that it already had started to build up. More specific, the Department M used for example the register of text and writing comparison to determine whom a sender was.[160]   Strobel for example pulled through 'laws' to determine every sender of post based on its existence or non-existence. In addition, text comparisons were done with the writings the citizens once had accomplished at the *DVP*'s offices while filling out an application for receiving a personal identity card.[161]   Most of the registers in the GDR that concerned the citizens were kept by the *DVP*. The *MfS* having had access to use these registers as it pleased for own benefits

[158] Especially agents used the German Post to send their messages through secret texts, for reaching cover and fictive addresses in the FRG (including West Berlin). When additionally using more than one cover address for one agent, the *MfS* used longer time to discover the spy. It was a large challenge for the *MfS* to make the discovery, since such mail contained irregular codes and deciphered messages. The US secret service likely made it even more difficult for the *MfS*, since having used more than one receiver. The first receiver of post was a person that in the first place was not to have it. This person's role was moreover to pass the mail on to a third person, which actually was to have the post. Otherwise, the agents often used a chemical prepared A4 page, where the text nearly always secretly was a hidden text on the other side of the paper. This side held a text of camouflage, which latter text in the first place apparently was used as official information. This method produced a considerable smell, which alarmed the Department M to watch out for such post (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, Abteilung M/9. M/9/1/853/89). This resulted in the Department M having prepared a conserve of smells, which also was used for other measures such as for example 'Dead Post Boxes' (cf. e.g., Suckut [ed.], *op cit*., p. 372; J. Mader, *Die Graue Hand. Eine Abrechnung mit dem Bonner Geheimdienst*. Berlin 1960). Amongst other things, 'Dead Post Boxes' was part of a conspiratorial, planned hidden drop serving the giving of information, documents, finance and technique, without the user uncovering its identity). Additionally, these conserves of smells could identify suspected persons in regards to sent post (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.). Related to different suspects, this kind of job was done with the help of trained dogs, which recognised smells that already had been stored in bottling jars. Any person could be stored this way if the *MfS* saw it as necessary. Different techniques were used to get hold of people's smells, whereas the most regular was through placing sterilised cloths near the object no one else was to come in contact with. After approximately 30 minutes, the smell was caught. It was thereafter stored in a sealed bottling jar. It also existed prepared mail with fully coded secret texts. Post like this exclusively contained numbers. To the latter, the Department M together with the *OTS* could compare these writings with the handwriting of a spy being under suspicion.

[159] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 376, p. 50.

[160] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 376, p. 38ff.

[161] Amongst having been responsible for issuing these cards was the *DVP*'s *Paß- und Meldewesen, PM* (Passport and Registration Office).

clearly shows the power and position the Ministry had in the system of the GDR. It was apparently nothing hindering the *MfS* getting access to these files, moreover underlining the Ministry's 'simple right-of-way' to strip the population of its personal security. On behalf of the citizens, the security service abused the situation through its performance due to security concerns. Furthermore, this also resulted in building up an own register through copies done from the *PM*'s files. The third change Strobel made concerned finding fictive senders of mail, or when such was believed to be work of agents. He first minimised this control, since only having ordered to execute checking on the dropping of post. Rule four, the dropper of mail got photographed. Thereafter, as a fifth control, one compared the photo of the dropper with the actual passport picture that existed from the *PM*'s files as well as comparing the hidden or none-hidden text. The sixth was to execute a work of investigation based on the reason of the text comparisons with the registers coming from the *PM*. These operations were of high expenses.[162] Secondly, the Department M unluckily did let go of some mail it would, and should have controlled.[163]

To the latter, this was the case of the author Dieter Borkowski. Between July 1966 and June 1971, he managed to send his writings to the FRG, which contained critics of the system in the GDR. His urgent marked mail was not stopped, as he dropped his mail at times around midnight already having found out that no special emptying of post boxes was taking place. He had also camouflaged the mail as love letters, where he managed to send as many as 32 manuscripts under the pseudonym of "*Arno Hahnert*". After he was discovered as an author where also post from him was found, the *MfS* undertook a search in his flat. The control resulted in finding his typewriter, which was used as a mean of proof. This led to his arrest.

The unsuccessful work of the *MfS* concerning the post control also turned out to become the destiny of Werner Stiller.[164] Although this was a matter for the *HV A*, the following example illustrates that there also existed unsuccessful examples of the work between the reconnaissance and Department M. From Stiller's days in the GDR, he worked for the *MfS*. From time to time, amongst other things he

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[162] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 374, p. 15 (W. Jatzlau, *Untersuchung der historischen Entwicklung der Abteilung M in den siebziger Jahren*. [Diploma work at the College of the Ministry for State Security]). Once something suspicious was found, notification was given on a special scheme made for such control (cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02). Prior to accomplish this kind of job, the coming co-workers had to go through different forms of educations teaching them techniques on how to execute analyses of a person's writing. Amongst others, they studied different material of relevance (graphic tables, opening and closing techniques, etc.), and their skills were tested through the solving of related tasks for the future.

[163] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.03.00.

[164] Cf. e.g., Stiller, *op cit*.

illegally sent post to the FRG's secret service expressing an interest of wanting to escape the GDR. Stiller's activity was finally tracked down by the Department M, however too late to arrest him as he already had flown the GDR.

Since this type of work from now on was done with even higher intensification during the evening, nights and mornings, it nevertheless turned out successful. Only having stored all the important data made the work for all units of the *MfS* having the need for such material much more convenient. Mainly since all the aforementioned information laid available for use, besides the information for example a mission-giving unit already had requested. This meant in practice that one also received information beyond the actual interest under investigation, such as information on family members, their original writings, etc. That the register for example also brought links and information of none approved contacts in the West any worker in the GDR could hold, were also results from this. Where relevant, settings like these were naturally passed on for further treatment.

With the bigger picture, the first half of the 1970's brought international relaxation, much because of the FRG's politics of agreement as well as the CSCE. This resulted in the Department M having had to reorganise its tasks, since an increase in people wanting to travel abroad took place. It was furthermore done due to an inner opposition rising increasingly. One typical case that illustrates the Department M's new challenges is related to the two meetings between the Prime Minister of the GDR, Willy Stoph, and the Prime Minister of the FRG, Willy Brandt. Mielke named these two meetings "Confrontation I" and "Confrontation II", which included work for the Department M.[165] The *MfS* was ordered upon from the party to secure and catch all relevant information that held an influence on the negotiations. Additionally, the meetings also captured issues that directly concerned the Department M, since one agreed to try to cut off as much material of agitation that went with the post as possible. Compared from 1970 to 1975 such post decreased, having had a number of 380 000 animosities to result in 'only' 15 000.[166]

Although a certain liberalisation of the travel and visiting possibilities took place as well as that post from the West into the GDR was made easier accessible, this did not mean that one stopped the control totally. The fact was the opposite, and at least this did not officially count for what was done both outside and inside the GDR.[167] Amongst other things, Mielke therefore launched an Order in 1972 that made sure of that search for mail was taking place where there were

[165] Orders 12/70 and 17/70. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 100614.

[166] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 374, p. 28.

[167] In the early 1970's, for example the Main Department VI (Pass Control, Tourism, Inter Hotel) was built, in order to control the GDR's tourists in the socialist abroad, observe the hotels, etc. (cf. e.g., Schell & Kalinka, *op cit*., p. 19).

reasons of suspicion, which somehow could have led to damage the republic.[168]
This was of importance to accomplish, since a drop of mail done by a West Ger-
man inside the GDR was not explicitly included as part of the agreement between
the two German states. Based upon such potentials after the closer cooperation
between the GDR and FRG, besides already having built the Main Department
VI, in 1975 the *MfS* also considered it necessary to build yet another unit. To-
gether with for example the Department M, it dealt with such matters as the travel,
post and opposition. That is why one centrally got the *ZKG* (Central Coordina-
tion Group; Escape, Moving) and its counterpart in the ADM's, the *Bezirsko-
ordinierungsgruppe*, *BKG* (Administrative District Coordination Group). Further
down the ladder, units as the *ZKG* and Main Department XX gave tasks that were
completed through the Departments M, 26 and PCSI.[169] Large and small were
observed. That is, for example the diplomatic missions, UN, CSCE, attorneys,
Amnesty International, etc., because these were channels the citizens of the GDR
used in order to be able to go abroad. In accordance with the inner opposition,
Wolf Biermann was a typical case in which the close cooperation between the
Main Department XX and Department M led to Biermann having bee told never
to return to the GDR.[170]

Before those days, in 1973 a short but important message was given from the
Superior Deputy of the *MfS*. It concerned dangerous material that had been sent
with the post.[171] Based on an existing directive, Lieutenant General Beater set
out the expanded information to signalise preventive actions as well as recognition
and disarmament of transported explosives and poison. This included belonging
material that had been sent by post (letters, packages, etc.).[172] Concerning the
existing directive to signalise these preventive actions and furthermore, Beater
made sure to delete the sentence "[O]nly for use in the service."[173]

This supplement was component to a directive given the same year, which was
practised together with this information. The whole matter of the problem was
also particularly presented for the responsible co-workers. Obviously, an increase
of the control of such material went beyond work in service. In other words, the
enemy operated with more speculated methods to transport their means and meth-
ods of espionage. This led to a widening of the Department M's ways of control,
since not anymore only being accomplished during time at work. Additionally,
since any other co-worker related to this issue were notified of this command, the
importance of discovering any material going through the post sent by the enemy

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[168] Order 5/72. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 100724.
[169] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 102092.
[170] BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 374, p. 38.
[171] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 002547.
[172] Cf. BStU/Berlin, VVS MfS o008 - 610/73.
[173] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 002547, p. 1.

were largely expanded. This became reality, mainly since the units the Department M cooperated with also accomplished such control.

It also happened that the *MfS* moved about. This was no ordinary movement, compared to when people move in and out of offices and flats. Surely, the most important figures were that all was done with high anonymity holding as low a profile as possible, securing the objects as well as making it secret without leaving traces that might have woken the enemy's attention. Although existing in such a context, the daily life and work within the organisation had to go on. In other words, meaning that extra actions in addition to the 'routine' work were dependable upon one another to act successfully, even if this included solving tasks of 'less' importance. In order to illustrate this closer, examples of such immense approach and attitude towards details will be given in the following paragraph.

1977 brought about changes for the Department M in the ADM of Rostock.[174] The leader of the ADM presented the work that was done, a work that focused on an apparently 'unimportant' piece of effort. Due to the changes in work of the Department M, the moving to the object in Graf Schack Street as well as to heighten the effectiveness and conspiracy, Mittag ordered the changes. This led to the handing over of mail to the responsible units, which happened in room 249 of the ADM. This was done to the times below:

- Monday:

    13.00 - 14.00 – the Departments (/units) II, XV, XX, Harbour, DSP of Rostock

    14.00 - 15.00 – remaining units

- Tuesday and Thursday:

    08.00 - 09.00 – the Departments (/units) II, XV, XX, Harbour, DSP of Rostock

    09.00 - 10.00 – remaining units

- Friday:

    08.00 - 09.00 – the Departments (/units) II, XV, XX, Harbour, DSP of Rostock

    09.00 - 10.00 – remaining units

    16.00 - 17.00 – all units

The original mail was not sent to the responsible units anymore, but where assessed in room 249. Exceptions were cleared with the co-worker the leader of the

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[174] Instruction Nr. 2/77. BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 1193.

Department M had authorised. The required mail for assessment purposes coming from the responsible units was copied by the Department M, and handed over the following day. The hand over of mail only occurred to the assessor of the responsible unit. In cases of exceptions, a co-worker was authorised to accomplish the work when the leader of the responsible unit had confirmed such. Extractions from movies and microfiches were made ready by the units that dealt with images, when they unconditionally were of necessity for documenting the material. The negatives were possible to look closer at in room 249 through equipment arranged with. The following times were available:

- Monday:

  08.00 - 12.00

- Tuesday and Thursday:

  10.30 - 17.00

- Friday:

  08.00 - 12.00

The examples are illustrations to how meticulously accurate the *MfS* was to all sorts of work, whether it was work directly concerning the enemy, or own, 'less important' work. All matters were written down, due to easier tracing this back if something would go wrong. That is, it for example was easier to uncover possible deliberate destructions as well as finding out if such appeared within own rows. From this, the *MfS* were in many ways forced to work accurately. Additionally, the examples also give a view on how important the work of the Department M was, since having arranged with these solutions through creating alternatives of handling the situation. At least it was a minimum, for the purpose of letting the necessary work be accomplished.

2.3 The 1980's: the final years of the Department M

It is common knowledge that the GDR had severe problems both politically and economically in the 1980's. During these years, the whole of the GDR society showed its existing problems although many organs did, wanted and/or could not show this openly. Such an organ having had problems within own organisation was the *MfS*. As we shall se below, the *MfS*' ADM of Rostock struggled with problems of capacity like many other ADM's. This followed from the need to focus on, and use the sources they had. On the other hand, one of those organs that grew, although not possessing more financial resources than other organs of the GDR was the *MfS*. The financial resources to be able to grow was not there

anymore in as large amount as the *MfS* perhaps wanted. Nevertheless, it did not decrease its control. The opposite happened, since we know that for example the procurement of *IM*'s and the use of those grew from the 1970's. Seen in the light of the available resources, one this was a fact: the *MfS* had to rethink its policy fundamentally towards the interest of controlling the entire society at all times, much based on reasons given in earlier chapters. Taking into consideration that the *MfS* continued to use a huge amount of the GDR's financial sources to keep the control intact, this shows how important the Ministry was for the fundament of the *SED* state. Additionally, a clear evidence of the importance the Department M played gave further results in 1982, as Mielke directly placed both the Department II and Department M under his 'own empire'. In the ADM's these two Departments remained under the area of the deputy operative.

In 1981, the leader of the ADM of Rostock announced that 'his' Department M held low capacity to perform the work the way it wanted.[175]   It was simply not longer able to fulfil the missions of investigation of all units with the wanted quality they had addressed. Some tasks were dropped, since the Department did not manage to do all of them. Explicitly, one went through all the started missions of investigation, to check upon their

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[175] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 1863.

necessities.[176] It was nevertheless all the way clear from the start that missions not being unconditionally necessary were to be released no later than 3 September 1981.

We have seen that the capacity in some ways turned out to be weaker in some areas. In 1983, it was once more stressed from the leader of the ADM of Rostock that the number of the missions of investigation coming from the responsible units were too high to be treated by the Department M, as continuously, exact and complete like used to.[177] As well, the leaders of the responsible units once again had to prove if it was necessary to have all ordered missions. Mittag in fact suggested to consequently cancelling the number of missions. At the same time, the *MfS* nevertheless continued to order upon increased security.

This was for example carried out in the ADM of Rostock. The main task concerned the security of important post as well as the protection of post based on missions of investigation. Resting upon the Superior Deputy's writings from

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[176] The work related to "25 Rostock 1" and "252 Rostock 22" (these numbers identified both the person controlled as well as the living place) were especially checked (cf. BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOPK 1388/80), since this was a case that had been going on for years. Amongst others, the Department M being involved, this also dealt with the PCSI opening post packages on behalf of commands mainly given from the Department XX due to having been one of the mission-giving units (the Department XX had ordered upon a B mission to be done, which for the PCSI meant opening and photographing the content). Although problems in capacity, this was of interest to keep up, since the ADM of Rostock already for years had achieved successful work on this person. Amongst other things, the post coming from Hamburg to Rostock often contained material of hatred expressions towards the GDR, transistor radios, literature, equipment for producing written material, food, etc., which, although a tight budget for the ADM was enough reasons to continue the work. Naturally, every time there came post this was thoroughly analysed also through x-raying the post. Afterwards, it was decided upon what to do further. The ADM of Rostock had strong reasons to believe that this person was executing some sort of espionage, which thereby qualified to categorise it as a spy according to the laws applicable. Through the controls, the person was considered as being an enemy of the state. The first control appears to have been undertaken in 1967. In 1979, on orders from the investigation organ (Department IX), the actual person was taken into arrest - for the fact of actually not having paid the right amount of taxes. From there on, the ADM of Rostock also engaged the *DVP*, amongst others, to secure evidence as well as hindering any evidence from being damaged in the process. The *MfS* also made sure to hinder flow of information concerning this person, and of its own organ. Furthermore, the *MfS* also undertook investigations of and in the house to secure evidence. It should be noted that it took more than just some controls done from the *MfS* arsenal to get the person under arrest. In addition to the aforementioned, the ADM of Rostock had by the mid 1970's at first put one *IMS* ([Unofficial Co-worker Security] "*Egon*") on the person as well as recruited other *IM*'s/*GMS*' for other job and spare time tasks for the sake of keeping the person under surveillance as much of the day as possible. Furthermore, a larger battery of surveillance weapons had also been activated. Amongst others, the Departments 26, II, VI, VIII and X (International Relations) followed up the suspect's contacts, in terms of finding out its familiar and financial situation, contact sphere in and outside the GDR, political attitude, interests, etc.

[177] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2170.

1 September 1966 and the post crossing the borders, it was only the Department M having the allowance to secure post with specific features.[178] This happened only on request from the leader of a responsible unit. After having done so, the Department M informed the respective unit of any findings.

Since it was the German Post that at first had the responsibility over all in and outgoing post, the *MfS* coordinated with this organ to act with the highest effectiveness in order to receive the post it wanted. In fact, it existed rules for units of the German Post on how to act towards certain mail. The co-workers of the German Post had the duty to hand over any type of post the ADD of the German Post wanted from any of its own units. Once the mail was in central hands of the German Post, the Department M took over from there. This strictness was also reflected in the way co-workers of the DSP's and responsible units not having been allowed to receive post from post workers that were taken out for control. However, this was overruled by the need to be effective. That is, the units treated the hand over as long as it concerned criminal and dangerous affairs where one secured evidence. Important to underline is that this was only done when this turned out to be the only way to do so. However, such an approach did not pass as any other matter of routine. Due to having solved it as illustrated, an automatic control addressed cases like these. After such a solution had taken place, the leaders of the responsible units had to inform the leader of the Department M about the plot. The leader of the Department M took thereafter the necessary measures of security. This indicates that the procedures decided upon from earlier times showed to be more than sufficient for solving the tasks the Department M dealt with. As discussed above, the actual problem was moreover the quantity of work combined with the lack of resources that became the Department M's worries. On the other hand, and as referred to before, the laws were there, officially to be followed. In practice, even if the *MfS*' co-workers were supposed to follow the law, the Ministry together with the German Post had already developed solutions on how to get around this 'legally'.[179] This was done through the leader of the ADD of the German Post or a related *IM* having stipulated finished a fake documented proof telling the German Post of every right to open certain post. The German Post had reason to believe that the content of certain mail was not in agreement with the law.

Post with suspicion of contained articles of explosives was once more in focus. No new measures came. It was still of importance though to treat this with the highest awareness.[180] The enemy continued to challenge the *SED* state with

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[178] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, VVS MfS o008 - 307/76; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 005549; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 1089.

[179] Cf. e.g., BStU/Gera, MfS - BV Gera. AIM 153/73.

[180] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 12/81; BStU/Rostock, GVS MfS o001 - 296/82; BStU/Rostock, GVS MfS o001 - 297/82.

stronger physical means, as the *MfS* after a longer period had passed, once more stressed the need to look after this type of material in the post. As analysed in earlier chapters, also the fact here can only indicate that the resistance against the regime grew ever stronger with continually new introduced methods of showing different kinds of oppositional actions.

Post found through *IM*'s was given the leader of the Department M. When there were necessary to do further moves, the leader of the Department M was confronted with this. This also reflects that the rules were strict, where the co-workers of the *MfS* had to confront the relevant and higher authority before acting further. Such had to happen even if the discoverer of important post held the expertise on what to do further. Doubtless, this also tells us something about the overview and the self-control the *MfS* needed, in order to be effective, have loyal co-workers as well as operating with highest inner and outer security against any possible enemy. Furthermore, it was for example strictly illegal that co-workers of the responsible units opened post simply based on their own interests to do so. As seen already, some of the main reasons for setting the hard line came about as consequences exactly from matters and incidents as illustrated above with the examples from the mid 1950's.

As we have seen, clear capacity problems were addressed in the districts. However, this did not seem to have much influence on the Central, at least not when commands were shaped. This underlines one of the typical problems the *MfS* had, as also discussed in earlier chapters. The *MfS* knew about the plus and minus sides in the society, which were reported further. Nevertheless, the decision makers at the top - in those days even stronger within the *MfS*, endlessly seemed to turn their attention away from these aspects by continuing like before. An evidence of such acting is the commands from the Minister.[181] This resulted in not taking notice of the real facts of what happened in the districts. Rather a widening of the control was the outcome. This can only signalise a larger split between the important powers in the *MfS* having taken place, where a clear unified understanding of the situation was absent. On top of that, more and more people openly expressed their dissatisfied thoughts to the regime, which did not make the situation for the *MfS* any easier. Based on such an atmosphere in the society, it is quite understandable that the *MfS* ordered upon increased control. This had shown to be successful, so what was the point in changing course? However, the difference now compared to earlier years was mainly that the society of the GDR in many ways had stagnated, whereas earlier times had brought growth. In other words, the pressure on the *SED* and *MfS* was considerably higher now, not only

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[181] Order 20/83 (20.12.83). BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008697. If nothing else is being specified, the words "post" and "mail" includes from now on also items related to all sorts of different packages.

from national aspects' point of view, but also from international sides. Nevertheless, what counted for the *MfS* was to maintain and strengthen the control of the society. The latter is a typical aspect of the theory and practice of states with totalitarian features, when seeing it from the introduced theoretical view. With such a background, an invitation to aspire for the sake of reaching a golden middle way was not present. If the *SED* was to reach its future end goal, there did not seem to exist other ways of having a grip on the society and its development.

Mielke commanded different things in order to make changes. He made the effectiveness and qualification of the leadership of the political-operative control higher, to be able to do an improved assessment of the post. These changes were especially applied towards the international and national traffic of the German Post, for the sake of preventing, hindering, uncovering and combating subversive planes, intentions and activities of imperialistic security services and other enemy places and powers. Through these actions, Mielke still not only considered the differentiations between the two world systems to be present. They had perhaps grown even larger. One of the end effects of his commands resulted in the ADM of Magdeburg in 1983 on a daily basis having read approximately 2300 telegrams moving within the GDR as well as 510 telegrams belonging to the foreign traffic.[182]

The Department M received new tasks to solve. The powers and means to political-operative control and assessment of post in the Departments M and PCSI as well as the Departments M and units of the PCSI in the ADM's were merged into one Department. By 1 January 1984, this Department was the independent Department M also existing in the ADM's. At the same time, this resulted in the Department PCSI and its units of the ADM's having been dissolved by 1 January 1984.[183]

Based on the main tasks, concerning both the international and national traffic, the Departments M had special political-operative methods and different scientific-technical means controlling and assessing the post of the German Post. The tasks, having been of a considerable number, amongst other things led to uncover, secure and protect different interests. These interests were:

- stating post from imperialistic secret services, their agencies in the GDR as well as other enemy places and powers

- hindering the broadening of material of the political-ideological diversion used through the postal traffic; stating and decreasing the activity of the enemy's contact activity

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[182] BStU/Magdeburg, MfS - BV Magdeburg. AKG 46, pp. 164-171.
[183] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 008697.

- protecting the leading representatives of GDR and their foreign guests as well as foreign diplomatic missions and their belongings/relatives from terror and other acts of violence in the GDR, which came by the means of post

- uncovering subversive activities from persons and accredited correspondents as well as their technological co-workers from the non-socialist abroad and other states

- the work and overview over important information concerning attitudes, relations, actions and connections from citizens of the GDR and foreigners

  The last mentioned was particularly linked to the defence and reconnaissance activities of the *MfS*. As such, this meant especially guaranteeing the security of the GDR and *MfS* as well as other protection and security organs. Furthermore, matters such as securing the economy and the socialist economic integration, tearing down the political-underground activity, state enemy trade with humans as well as illegal leaves from the GDR were also important factors to hold under control. Additionally, stopping and holding back people trying to leave the GDR and other enemy plans, intentions and activities as well as penetrating into interesting objects and persons were further points focused on.

To the latter point, Amnesty International was included under these definitions due to existing in the capitalistic world. From the *SED*'s point of view, it was seen as indifferent that this organisation tried to carry out apolitical work for the interest of the single human being and its rights. As such, with the help of the *MfS*, this moreover underlines how low the understanding the regime of the GDR showed towards the individual's right to choose and act according to own interests. The *SED*'s focus on peace reconciliation was officially claimed several times, which in some ways likely can be argued. However, compared this relation to the relation 'party versus GDR individuals', such focus had a rather theoretical, far-fetched aspect. Thus, the daily life was often coloured by conflicts than anything else. The largest contributor of the system to making life miserable for those it affected was the *MfS*.

In order to transform the aforementioned points into practical actions, one followed tasks such as feature investigation for stating important post. Another work method was to take advantage of the address investigation, stating post sent to persons or objects. A third option was to execute hand writing investigations identifying persons based on their characteristics of writing and stating post by means of their way/feature of writing. A fourth variant was accomplished through operative-technical work and investigation of post for secret service information.

A fifth task was done through assessment, processing, investigation and recording of information, which concerned post worked on based on their important cases and persons. A sixth alternative was accomplishing controls of records in mission of other units. The seventh solution dealt with the accomplishment of political-operative special features using the possibilities that were given through the work process of the German Post and PCSI. Finally, the eight method was the guaranteeing of a closer cooperation with the responsible units and ADM's.

The structure was that the leader of the Department M at the Central and the leaders of the Departments M of the ADM's fulfilled their political-operative work together with the *MPF* and the Customs Service, or related organs in the AD's. The work was done as fast and exact as possible. Thereafter, it was all given back to normal business. However, the Departments M did not do this only in cooperation with the aforementioned. The responsible Main Departments/Departments XX and VI, amongst others having been responsible for the political-operative security of these state organs also supported them. This reflects the way the *MfS* evaluated the danger from the enemy, i.e., the West, since measures like these were addressed. To the structure, although the Department M more or less continued to be an independent Department, strictly speaking it was under the leadership of the Main Department II. The Departments M in the ADM's were under the leader of the Departments II of the ADM's. Further, an important task for the leader of the Main Department II took place in concert with the leader of the *ZAIG*. These two leaders elaborated a directive for the unified shaping of the political-operative control and assessment from mail of the international and national traffic of the German Post. This was done all for the winning, assessing, processing, preparing and archiving important information through the Department M. After having completed the aims, it was given to Mielke 31 October 1984 for conformational needs. Yet again, we not only see the important work of the Department M, but also the importance it carried in terms of cooperating with other units of the *MfS* for achieving the highest outcome.

The wanted numbers of work places for solving the Department M's political-operative tasks as well as the Departments M's in the ADM's were connected with one of Mielke's earlier given instructions.[184] Furthermore, this was taken into agreement with, and handed over to the leader of the Main Department Cadre and Education. On the appropriate level, the leader was situated in the stock of the Department PCSI and units of the PCSI in the ADM's. This was solved like this in order for the Department M to receive the relevant and correctly educated forthcoming co-workers the Main Department Cadre and Education had the main responsibility for producing. The elaboration of structure and staff plan of the Departments M of the ADM's took place after the taking over of certain given

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[184] Cf. BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 2/83.

frame structure and staff plans. The leader of the Main Department Cadre and Education confirmed them. 15 February 1984, the leaders of the ADM's presented to the leader of the Main Department Cadre and Education the suggestions for the efforts of the leaders of the Departments M.

The belonging tasks of the aforementioned were thereafter such that the leader of the Main Department II with the agreement of the leader of the Main Department Cadre and Education by 31 March 1984 presented the structure and staff plans of the Department M to Mielke. He thereafter confirmed it. The path of power obviously followed the same steps as before, where the confirmation of a command, report, suggestion, etc., needed to be accepted and signed from a higher level before being allowed to be set out in life. As we also firstly saw through this work, the Main Department II now played a larger role over the Department M as it explicitly had done earlier. This came as explained from the view the top men of the *MfS* had concerning what they believed were severe threats to the GDR coming from enemies abroad. Secondly, through the Main Department Cadre and Education, a close follow up was always present. After all, this Main Department's main concern was to produce the most distinguished people for the different jobs the party and *MfS* wished to fulfil.

Since many new commands and changes had been introduced, it resulted in former commands, orders, etc., loosing their validity. Furthermore, they were sent back to the *BdL* (Office of the Leadership), by 31 January 1984. Said differently, since this Order went into force, the instructions given in earlier days were deleted as commands. Amongst others, this was the directive of the Superior Deputy from 1 September 1966 as well as the second supplement to this particular command, released 6 July 1967.[185]

A major worry of the *MfS* and Department M turned out to be the quantity of work combined with the lack of resources. Probably the main reason for such, and as analysed in earlier chapters, was the new and different types of resistance against the regime that only grew stronger with time.

By mid 1984, further proceedings on how to control the people's post as well as the people had been settled for the ADM's.[186] The leader of the ADM of Rostock had decided to impose proceedings for introducing investigation measures in the post transportation, to control persons in the stores of the Department M as well as important post.

This did not mean that one was restrictive with resources. The opposite took place. This command was carried out in order to be more effective, amongst other things due to the PCSI having been unified with the Department M the same year. Since it had been a fusion between the PCSI and Department M, one of the results

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[185] BStU/Berlin, VVS MfS o009 - 598/66; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr 008696.
[186] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2381.

led to giving increased attention to the cooperation the responsible units and DSP's of the ADM had with the Department M of the ADM. The tasks carried out, by far reflected and were based upon the Order from 1983. The work carried out was nearly identical, whereas some elements had been further specified. These commands led to different types of work, as given below.

The first command dealt with the introduction, extension and cancellation of address investigation. The Department M continued executing missions asked from the mission-giving units in terms of stating already existing addresses of recipients. It was thereby possible to fulfil work on behalf of the types of post below:

- post/mail such as normal sized letters[187]
  (letters up to A6, post cards, etc.)

- telegrams

- post/mail (of larger kind)
  (letters over A6 as well as all sorts of post)

According to Order 20/83, when taking missions, it became necessary for the Line M to have identical forms of investigation. In fast cases, the introduction was done through telex from the DSP's. The mission cards had to be sent anyway with the next possible courier. For the continuity of realising the investigation missions one wrote a complete scheme of the required tasks on the mission cards, provided a duplicate. Changes, e.g. delays, were notified to the Department M. The sort of mail was written on the mission card. For every type of control, an individual mission was written when one type of post was not enough for the mission-giving unit. The condition for the giving of a mission depended on the registration of the person in the Department XII (Central Information/Store). In regards to the ADM's, missions having been started for example in a Department M of a specific ADM was only valid for this particular ADM. Concerning the town of East Berlin, the missions were given directly to the Department M at the Central.

It was continuously stated that the missions was to be kept to a minimum. This counted for all units, i.e., the leaders of the units and DSP's. Based on reasons in capacity, to keep control of the missions of investigation, the authorised co-worker of the Department M accomplished monthly agreements with the respective assessor of the units. Through the leader of any unit, the leader of the Department M was allowed to make reductions when the number of missions passed a certain capacity. One could also extend missions. Concerning the letters and telegrams,

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[187] Hereafter known as "letter(s)", where relevant (especially related in the following to BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2381 [1984]; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2819 [1987, 1989]).

this had to be done through the mission-giving unit at least 14 days before the end period of six months. The extension led to treating the mission for another six months. When a mission necessarily had to last longer than a total of 12 months, the leaders of the mission-giving units had in certain cases to get it formlessly confirmed by Mittag or his superior deputy. Concerning other mail, an extension was only made through Mittag or his superior deputy. This counted for another three months. Independent of the aforementioned time limit of elaboration, the cancellation of an investigation mission followed on time.

When necessary, the leaders of the responsible units and DSP's used the possibility to put investigation measures of the Department M into assignment for directing the post traffic. This meant that when doing address investigations concerning international post traffic of letters going in and out of the republic, such missions had the potential to harm any possible person receiving post. In regards to this letter traffic coming in, one checked the address of the GDR citizens. For the outgoing post, one checked the address of the citizens abroad. In certain cases, one had from four weeks up to two months of investigation towards any object. On matters of address investigation in regards to national traffic of letters incoming, this was limited to letters coming from East Berlin to certain AD's, including the AD of Rostock. Concerning especially important cases, the leader of the mission-giving unit took further measures of the investigation of the national letter traffic together with the leader of the Department M. In cases of both international and national telegram traffic, the goal of such address investigation concerned all kinds of telegram traffic. Thus, since the Department M was made aware that the option of executing a complete investigation was not possible at the time. For the address investigation and actions of investigations in international post traffic concerning the incoming and outgoing of other post, investigations in the international post traffic to this were done. In regards to the latter work, fundamentally only an outside work and documentation was completed. However, exceptions existed to this as well. When a need for an exception was the issue, the necessary further bringing measures or measures of investigation were applied in written. A confirmation came thereafter only from Mittag or his superior deputy.

The DSP's of the ADM of Rostock, except the DSP of Rostock, normally received documentation (Xerox) on elaborated material.[188] Otherwise, when there were severe problems, with an introduction of the mission one gave the Department M a reference through the DSP's, or mentioned a related partner at the relevant unit of the ADM.

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[188] This counted for the address investigation of the international letter traffic (in and outgoing), national traffic (incoming) and international and national telegram traffic.

The assessors of each of the responsible units in the ADM of Rostock were addressed to use room 1014,[189] by the authorised co-worker of the Department M.[190] Thus, to be able to undertake immediate assessment of the elaborated type of post. In cases of exceptions, a co-worker was authorised from its leader of the responsible unit to sit with the assessment of the originals. When copies were wanted and asked upon by the responsible unit, it was only accomplished from the Department M. When the leader of a mission-giving unit wanted originals for decision making, the respective assessor took over the actual letter with a receipt for the hand over. This had to be given back to the Department M.[191] The results of telegram control were handed over as copy to the units responsible. Results of the address investigation and the actions of investigation taken to the international post traffic and its mail were sent as documentation to the mission-giving unit. Continuously, the *MfS* obviously followed its known strict rules of secrecy.

Apart from the Department M concentrating on different investigations of addresses, it was also done towards hand writing investigation. When photocopies (no Xerox) of actual writings or comparative writings existed, the condition for introducing a writing investigation was fulfilled. The number of necessary copies for the investigation was four for the investigation in letter traffic, and two for investigation of other post. For the investigation of mail towards unknown recipients from known senders, copies of the mail were most convenient to use (cover and text). The goals, tasks as well as duration of the handwriting investigation were notified of in formless writing through the mission-giving unit to the Department M.

The Department M did not only get post from the German Post, controlling the post in the post offices, etc. The co-workers of the Department also emptied post boxes themselves. Therefore, it existed requirements to the special emptying

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[189] Room 1014 of the main building of the ADM of Rostock (today being a room at the University of Rostock), was the room most frequent in use for purposes such as reading and studying material. This and related reading rooms' opening times were: Monday - Friday: 15.30 - 16.30, Saturday 11.00 - 12.00.

[190] This concerned the address investigation of the international letter traffic (in and outgoing) and national traffic (incoming).

[191] This happened the following day 15.30 and Saturday at 12.00, at the latest.

of post boxes.[192]   This type of emptying was confirmed through Mittag or his superior deputy. The confirmation was to be fetched through the mission-giving unit at the same time with the confirmation of the measures of the Department VIII. This meant the latter Department also followed up any suspicious person it already had taken notice of through work completed earlier. The Department M was informed of the necessary information of the action and cooperation, taking place between the involved units of the ADM. The leader of the Department M was thereby co-responsible for guaranteeing the security and conspiracy being apparent when preparing and pulling through the special emptying.

In regards to accomplishing personal checks in the stores of the Department M, these were carried out based on the Minister's earlier given commands.[193] When a person was registered in the Department M, the determined connections got informed. The sending of a copy followed when asked upon from the mission-giving unit. Related to this was the interest of paying attention to act with thrifty handling concerning photo material, according to an Instruction given from Mittag March 1984. By all means and methods, the Department M used these ways in order to close all possible connections used by the enemy. Secondly, to crush the enemy before it crushed the GDR.

In terms of securing important mail, such tasks were known when being carried out, because most of the tasks had already been given 10 May 1983. Nevertheless, this shows that there was a need to underline and repeat the work tasks of the Department M that were of importance. In relation to the earlier directives from the Superior Deputy, on mission from the leader of the unit responsible, only

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[192] In 1977, the Departments M actually got the overall responsibility of doing the special emptying of post boxes (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 1239). They had done so until this time. However, the main responsibility for executing such work had up to then laid on the Main Department XX. From 1977, the leaders of the Departments M had to be confronted by any mission-giving unit to the matter of solving the tasks. The leaders of the Departments M were responsible for the conspiracy and security through the whole process of operation as well as making sure to avoid political effects when cooperating with places of the German Post. It was considered as a work of major importance, since one had to contact the leader of the ADM or his superior deputy after having fulfilled a mission. To the practical work of such operations, the co-workers of the *MfS* carried both permission from and the working dresses of the German Post during emptying public as well as private post boxes (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. XV 3985/89, p. 16; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 1200). These post boxes were emptied with quick and reactionary work from the Departments M, since often coordinating with the Departments VIII (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02). The Department VIII observed every movement of a suspect. This resulted in that as soon as a suspect had dropped mail in a post box, the Department M was quickly at the actual spot thereafter. To be sure the post box was the correct one, the observer from the Department VIII dropped in an item in the post box indicating to the Department M that it was the actual one.

[193] Regulation Nr 9/80 (regulation of store use).

the Department M was allowed to secure mail that had the aforementioned special characteristics.[194] When this was the case, the Department M informed the responsible unit. As earlier discussed, e.g. under the telephone control, we have though witnessed how such procedures went about in real life. Furthermore, in short to recapitulate, to the tasks there were rules for the units of the German Post. The co-workers of the German Post had the duty to give post to the ADD of the German Post. From there on, the co-workers of the Department M took over. The co-workers from the DSP's and responsible units were not allowed to receive post from post workers taken out, when not having gone through the rightful procedures of treatment. In cases where the postmen turned to the units to give them post, the co-workers of the Department M received it when it concerned criminal and dangerous affairs they had to secure whereas this was the only way to do so. The leaders of the units responsible thereafter informed the leader of the Department M about these cases. Thereafter, the leader of the Department M took necessary measures of security. As we are familiar with regarding the post with the suspicion of containing articles of explosives, procedures were taken following earlier directives from the Central as well as from Mittag.[195]

Post found through *IM*'s was given to the leader of the Department M.[196] Further moves were taken, when necessary. If this was the case, the leader of the Department M was at first confronted about this. Finally, and among the most important rules to security and inner control within the *MfS* that reflects the latter sentence, if not also extending the meaning, was that it was illegal of co-workers of the responsible units to open post based on their own interests.

The units responsible had the option to exclude post from the further transportation to the receiver. However, in the frames of the agreements between the German Post and the post system of the FRG (*Bundespost*) made valid from 1 January 1984, it was decided upon a shortening of the duration of post transportation. In regards to the political and economic importance of the observance of the post agreement, until this time there had not yet been taken decisions about forwarding or exclusion of the forwarding of mail. Nevertheless, this agreement most likely made the work of the Department M less effective, as this resulted in decreasing the time of control. In other words, this meant amputated limits to do proper control. Additionally, the *SED* and *MfS* now came in a dilemma, since the

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[194] Cf. BStU/Berlin, VVS MfS o008 - 307/76; Regulation from 23 March 1976, BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 005549.

[195] Cf. BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 000121; BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 12/81; BStU/Rostock, GVS MfS o001 - 296/82; BStU/Rostock, GVS MfS o001 - 297/82.

[196] Through this, by far the *IM*'s contributed to for example the Main Department II having been able to uncover spies. Since the Main Department got the hint to look after inner and outer hallmarks of mail, as especially the *IMB*'s (Unofficial Co-worker Elaboration) with their field of work made it possible to notify of such signals.

FRG from now on yearly started to pay money to the authorities of the GDR only after the post across the borders showed to be on time. When not being on time, the GDR received less of the money.[197]

Through the Department M's course of assessment activity, only in certain cases as when stating especially important information, mail was temporarily excluded from being forwarded to the receiver. The responsible units or the DSP of Rostock was by means of note acquainted with this decision. The DSP's was informed from the Department M per telex of the temporarily keeping of an original, when the Department was not able to make a decision. When see as needed, through the leader of the units responsible, it was immediately decided upon and at the latest 12.00 the following day, concerning the forwarding/exclusion of the forwarding. The decision was given to the Department M by telephone, under the reference of the key number on the copy/*CFS* number.[198] By the absence of a decision, the Department M (counted from the day of the hand over of the information) passed on the original mail for transportation to the receiver the next day. In regards to keep provable mail (registered mail), the confirmation was picked up at Mittag's or his superior deputy's office together with an agreement of reasoning.

To be able to use of the information of the Department M in the widest sense with regards to the established postal connections, the responsible units gave over reference cards to the Department M.[199] It was the task of the leaders of the units responsible to guarantee that listed overviews of reference cards given in existed by the relevant assessor. The reference cards had to be updated once a year. When no interest existed anymore, the reference cards were demanded from the Department M. Especially such persons, as for example persons with professional secrecy, travel and negotiation cadre, were held under control in the Department M without having been categorised as belonging to any particular goal of investigation. When ascertained postal connections from these persons were made through the work of the Department M, a copy was sent over for acknowledgement to the unit responsible. The latter thereafter took decisions on what to do further.

The example concerning the persons with professional secrecy and so forth, states the *MfS* through its Department M clearly having controlled all sorts of persons that also belonged to the highest positions and organs of the GDR. Quite paradoxically, amongst others, since these men and women gave the *MfS* in the first place a life and reason to live. This moreover illustrates the machinery and logic of such a system, where the effect shows that no one is able to feel safe from anyone. This furthermore leads to the question not only to ask oneself how effective this sort of control the *MfS* led actually were. It also brings about a funda-

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[197] Cf. e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit.*, p. 125.

[198] *CFS*, *Chiffriertes Fernschreiben*, means Ciphered Telex.

[199] These cards were classified as the form "*402*".

mental consideration concerning the actual aim of such a society, when comparing to the given settings it was supposed to follow for the sake of finally reaching its goals.

With these decisions, the commands given below lost their validity, and were handed back to the *BdL* by 1 August 1984:

- Mittag's Instruction 2/77 from 25 march 1977

- Mittag's Writing from 22 June 1977

- Mittag's Writing from 10 May 1983

To the last days of rule, i.e., before the dissemination of the *MfS* in 1989, there was especially one fundamental order that took care of how the control of the post was carried out.[200] It was ordered upon, for the control and evaluation of post. This was necessary to determine, since Mielke meant one had to increase the standard of the reconnaissance and defence planes, intensions and measures of imperialistic secret services as well as other enemy places and forces.[201] This was seen as being used against the GDR and the socialist alliance of states through abusing the post traffic. The command also made sure the cooperation between the Ministry, German Post and Customs Service remained and was developed. Additionally, in 1986, a final command came with the Regulation 11/86 came. This underlined the importance of what was executed in accordance with the Service Instruction of 5 June 1985.[202] Apart from that, still, and known from earlier days, it was regularity for the Ministry to cooperate and co-work with other units of the *MfS*. Especially to this, it was of importance to maintain a close relation with the *OTS*, *VRD* (Administration Reflective Service), German Post and Customs Service.[203] Thus, to make contractual agreements that concerned the control of the post as well as other related ways of controlling and observing the post. With the co-operation from other units of the *MfS*, the work showed to guarantee tasks being done in accordance to the criterions on how mail was caught. Further, it also laid the basics on how to proceed with the controls - for example from conspiracies of opening and closing post, documenting it (copying, photographing, etc.), to perform x-raying.

The command came as a result of the *MfS* needing to run a larger and stronger control with the population than it had done earlier. This command also resulted

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[200] Service Instruction Nr. 3/85 (05.06.85). BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85; see e.g. also Wiedmann (ed.), *op cit*., p. 121.

[201] Cf. e.g. also BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Abt. VI. 1202-1297; Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.,* p. 122.

[202] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 48/86; BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2819.

[203] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85, pp. 5-6, p. 12.

in the maintenance of avoiding the law on surveillance of post and telecommunication, since running a larger and stronger control with the population in practice meant breaking the law.[204]   As we have witnessed, according to § 115, section 1-4 of the *StPo*, from 18 December 1979, the law on surveillance of post and telecommunication said clearly in such cases as these that no post was legal to open. It was only possible if persons already were under suspicion and officially involved in a criminal case, and not to find out if one was allowed to state a criminal offence by doing the controls through the *MfS*. This was exactly the abuse of the law. In other words, although the *MfS* acted as if such a law existed in order to make its work easier, there was no such law. We still see that to complete its work in order to be as effective as possible, the *MfS* needed to break the law. As this need perhaps was not as strong in the beginning of the life of the *MfS* - at least officially, at the end of the GDR's existence there was perhaps rather an exception when the *MfS* followed the laws as they were.

Based on many reasons, tendencies of actually having lost control appears to have been the case, where a stronger control on behalf of at least some 'security for the people' seemed to be of greater importance than for example yielding. At least from the *MfS*' point of view, in regards to save - what was left of - the state. On the other hand, if loosing control was the present case, it was only in comparison to the law. Since, the *MfS* actually worked in order to get (more) control, which it in fact doubtless managed to achieve. However, this achievement went on the costs of ignoring laws and regulations of the state. This showed to appear stronger at the end of the regime, as also evidently showed through roles and functions of the Department 26. This indicates that the *MfS* did loose control, like the rest of the party and state organs of the GDR. It was just too many challenges, which the many parts of the system were not able to keep up with e.g. internally, externally, nationally or internationally. As analysed, one of the main reasons for coming in such a situation was because of the radical changes that happened with the father and creator of the state - the Soviet Union.

For the Ministry to fulfil its necessary tasks meant breaking the law.[205]   According to the law on post and telecommunication and its possible control, the *MfS* itself was in fact able to take out a pre-investigation of a suspect. However, with the intentions and the methods the *MfS* had, it simply did not work in practice to do doing it the legal way for the Ministry to be effective according to their policy of extreme control and secrecy towards the population.[206]   Besides this, as

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[204] Cf. e.g., S. Mampel, *Die sozialistische Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: Kommentar; mit einem Nachtrag über die Rechtsentwicklung bis zur Wende im Herbst 1989 und das Ende der sozialistischen Verfassung*. 3. Auflage. Goldbach 1997.

[205] Cf. e.g. the Service Instruction Nr. 3/85, the third point following from the three listed below.

[206] Cf. Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.*, p. 277; Fricke, *Zur Menschen- und Grundrechtssituation politischer Gefangener in der DDR*, pp. 31-32.

also shown, by law, according to Article 31 of the constitution of the GDR, the secrecy of the post and telecommunication were untouchable. It only had limitations based on reasons of law.

The three most important points that were fulfilled in co-work with the German Post and Custom Service were that:[207]

1. all post transported from mailboxes to buildings belonging to the *MfS* was accomplished with speed and effectiveness

2. the work the Department M did was accomplished without awaking any suspiciousness neither from the German Post or Customs Service, and was also accomplished in all secrecy

3. the way of processing and transporting the post was adjusted to those needs the Department M had according to political-operative control

In general, with special political-operative and scientific-technical means and methods, the Department M controlled and used mail that both internationally and nationally was treated by the German Post.[208]   This did not only mean post coming in from abroad, or post sent domestically. It also meant controlling post that was sent from the GDR to foreign countries. Post sent to the FRG was of particular interest.[209]

One of the tasks the Department M executed was done when controlling post correspondence coming from abroad into the GDR. What was of special interest was post that somehow expressed hostility towards the republic. This was information that contained critics of the societal relations, or writings criticising the way the party ruled the state. Such material was especially produced from groups belonging to the secret service of the FRG. The post control within the *MfS* therefore did not only find it interesting to discover which groups these were. Seen from the point of view that the *MfS* tried to do as much as possible against any eventual critics coming about in the GDR, it was more important to find out who the recipients of such post in the GDR were. It was however not only of importance to control post that came into the GDR, but also to control post having been sent inside the republic. The focus here was covering how, and what the citizen thought. By this, the Department M registered who was of interest to observe further, for clearing cases of importance.[210]

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[207] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85, p. 12.

[208] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85, p. 5.

[209] W. Obst, *DDR-Wirtschaft, Modell und Wirklichkeit*. Hamburg 1973.

[210] This was mainly according to the 1985 Service Instruction's (BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85) pp. 6-11. Two overall files existed. For both persons registered as being connected to the classification "GDR", and those connected to the category "abroad". These files, and thereby the controls, were also used in accordance with the mentioned Regulation Nr. 9/80.

To give another example of the Department M to a large degree having been a department for other units within the *MfS*, the Department M had as well close cooperation with the secret services existing in the other socialist states of Europe.[211]   This was not one of the Department M's main tasks, but rather in the hands of the Department X. The Department M's role was technical in such operations. When a citizen of the GDR sent post from another socialist state of Europe to a western state, the Department M was contacted. The Department M thereafter gave the mail over to the Department X for further investigation. Such precautions were only possible with the cooperation of the German Post and Customs Service. Through this arrangement, the *MfS* served other organs of the state of the GDR, such as for example the Ministry of Interior. The *MfS* manage to do this, because both the German Post and Customs Service were obliged to support and work for the *MfS*. Clearly, this says more about the power and influence of the *MfS*, when the security organ in a state has greater influential sources to pull on behalf of the state's own Ministry of Interior. When decision like these at all had to be taken, one might actually have expected the right organ for such decisions to be the Ministry of Interior in terms of deciding upon a country's inner politics.

The post was controlled according to different interests the Department M and *MfS* had. The control used the most was the so-called *Merkmalsfahndung* (Hallmark Investigation).[212]   This meant controlling the post according to inner and outer hallmarks. Looking for inner hallmarks often resulted in searching for money inside mail. The outer hallmarks indicated that one especially looked after post sent from the FRG to the GDR.[213]

After having taken content out for further control, the Departments M's first task was to see if the mail had names of sender and/or recipient that at all existed in the GDR.[214]   When it turned out that the sender's name given on the mail existed in the GDR, analysis of the handwriting were made in order to find out if the sender itself had used its own address, or if the sender's address was used by others. Finally, a control followed in the person register of the Departments M, checking upon both the sender and recipient. When there was no doubt that there obviously was both a sender and receiver, they were controlled by other units of

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[211] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 1182; BStU/Dresden, MfS - BV Dresden. Nr. 29; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001868; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. AP 5507.

[212] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85.

[213] Concerning such control, one of the most important mottos to follow was: "the most suspicious post is the one looking the most regular" (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02).

[214] Wawrzyn, *op cit*., pp. 130-132, refers to an example where handwriting analyses were made, based on searching for a classified criminal. This mean successfully assisted in finding the person, a spy.

the *MfS*. Firstly, they were thereafter controlled by the Department II (Counter Intelligence) or Department XII. The new postal connections the Departments M uncovered were stored in special person registers of the Departments. In regards to a hallmark investigation having no sender's name, or if mail held a feigned name that was no known by any unit of the *MfS*, the Department M arranged with its own investigation to find out who this might be. This did not only include the category of hallmark investigation. It was an easy task for the Department M to find out who the sender was, even when only the receiver's address was given. The techniques of computer made it possible to actually find out who had sent post only containing the address of the receiver. Even if the computer data bank only was noticed of the receiver's address, within few seconds the computer came up with suggestions to who the sender might be. This was made possible through the data bank due to the *MfS* co-workers over years having built up a network of all possible links existing between registered senders and/or receivers to any country in the world. When wished upon, the Departments M also involved other units of the *MfS* that had the identical aim.

Repeatedly stressed, another method the Departments M had was the *Anschriftenfahndung* (Address Investigation).[215] This method was used against a recipient already being under investigation. As pre-condition for this was the registration of the affected person in the Department XII. Those messages aimed to reach the recipient were first copied and given to the responsible unit having dealt with the type of problem given in the post and/or from the recipient.

The *Schriftfahndung* (Handwriting Investigation) served to uncover a person's identity from its hand or typewriting, when no, or the apparently wrong sender was given.[216] The *MfS* having had its central archive concerning any type of writings registered as well as the registration of all correspondence done by observed persons, investigations of this kind showed to be no challenge for the Ministry. Mainly, since the *MfS* mostly within short time found out sufficiently information to the sender of an item.

The *Sicherstellung von Postsendungen als offizielle Beweismittel* (Guarantee of Post as Official Mean of Proof) normally followed at the same time as it was taken out a pre-investigation through the Department IX (Investigation organ).[217] This action was also taken in regards to when post was controlled, whereas the further investigation of the post was given to the responsible unit involved in a definite case. Another variant of the latter control was systematically to empty one or more post boxes when it was of suspicion that a person already observed by the *MfS* had put post into a post box. Additionally, when necessary, all other

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[215] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85.

[216] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85.

[217] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Lieutenant Colonel of the Department IX of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 02.05.02.

sorts of possible mail alternatives that were sent were held back for control and more.

Coming to the *technische Bearbeitung und Überprüfung* (Technical Processing and Control) of post, in terms of the regular actions as well as with forces of conspiracy, they were opened and thereafter closed for example after having had them photographed and copied.[218] The interest with this was to state any possible suspiciousness of the content, with the further aim of wanting to secure and additionally investigate possible crimes. In addition, an important part of this control was as much to close the mail having been checked without leaving any traces of the control undertaken whatsoever.

The overall treatment of the surveillance and control of the post was handled with utter secrecy. That is why the Departments M had to work carefully and fast. 12 hours was set as limit, to be able to complete their tasks.[219] The time of control having been set to 12 hours in those days is a clear indication that the Department M and *MfS* in general had to increase their working capabilities, in terms of fulfilling the set tasks. This had to be done within this period also based on the challenges the *MfS* faced, which the Ministry simply had to adjust its tasks after. Based on the situation existing, the total amount of hours of control had been reduced to the half, from the original 24 hours in the early 1950's, to the 12 hours by mid 1980's. The reduction was also decided upon based on that Mielke was motivated to fulfil the agreements between the *Bundespost* and German Post. However, he held the minimum of positive tendencies towards this. Overall, perhaps the most important issue was that it gave the GDR a financial input from the FRG.[220] However, these 12 hours were although supposed to guarantee the effectiveness of the control the Department M carried out. Apart from this, in spite of the aforementioned agreement, an increase in personnel and order upon more hours of work contributed to tighten the control.

As we have seen above to the examples of not wanting to be revealed by absolutely none outside the *MfS*, the same anxiety of being discovered also existed within the *MfS*. This yet a crucial reason why the co-workers had such a narrow time limit, since working slower possibly might have led to questions coming from the Departments M's cooperative parts that also were parts of the *MfS*. These parts of the *MfS* were mainly the Unofficial Co-workers that worked within the rows of both the German Post and Custom Service. Any mistakes or suspiciousness caused by the Departments M might have resulted in being reported by these Unofficial Co-workers. Besides, a continuously surveillance of the co-workers of the Departments M in regards to show reliability and discretion was being kept

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[218] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85.

[219] BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85, pp. 12-14.

[220] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 007690.

at all times. They were especially watched outside their own territories, i.e., outside their *MfS* offices, during having done their work at the post offices. One may argue that it, on the one side, was an effective system since even the closest partners as well as their own co-workers at all times were not supposed to know what the other parts did. On the other side, it is possible to claim that such a system held tendencies of not being as effective. Rather, time costing and dysfunctional. Especially since the strict line of policy made sure that few, if any, 'unnecessary' cooperation between different related units of the *MfS*' work was to exist.

The time this Service Instruction went into power (5 June 1985), the Order 20/83 was drawn back. This was also the case of the Writings from 19 February 1976 and 23 March 1976.[221]

The changes in the way of working, methods, etc., continued to take place, because for example other sorts of paper and yet more modern versions of mail solutions appeared on the market. The Department M had thereby to develop new technical measures to cope with the standard. More specifically, to be able easier to uncover secret traces, track down and self hide own biological signs, recognise chemical marks on persons and objects, etc.

The protection against the enemy appearing from every possible corner was followed further after 1986.[222]   Concerning the Department M, this was witnessed, since the Minister ordered upon that the GDR needed an increase of the quality of the political-operative work. In this way, to uncover and clarify the postal connecting systems of imperialistic secret services and other hostile places and forces through the Department M. Practically, this was done through closer connecting the political-operative investigations towards uncovering intelligence suspicious and other important mail as well as their technical investigation. Furthermore, as often like before, the work also included the comprehensive guarantee of the conspiracy, in particular by shortening the operational time of this mail in the Departments M. No differentiations were evaluated by the *MfS*. The Ministry, together with the leadership of the GDR, looked upon threat as coming from anyone - both inside and outside the GDR. This expressed threat continued to be present, perhaps stronger than ever before. In order to understand the situation the GDR and *MfS* experienced, one should first of all also see this in relation with the analysed political happenings between the East and West during times like these. Secondly, combined with how the party had functioned through its existence. Thirdly, what characteristics and conditions the insides of the party had, 'carrying' the state.

With this background, the work resulted in the Department M at the Central and the Departments M of the ADM's accomplishing the technical investigation

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[221] BStU/Berlin, VVS MfS o008 - 307/76; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr 005549.
[222] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 005610.

of intelligence suspicious and other important mail. In this way, to state:

- cryptographs/cryptograph characteristics

- microfiche

- characteristics opposing operative-technical measures

- criminal traces and their safety device, in particular for identifying unknown writing author/sender (in the following called: technical investigation of mail)

The leader of the *OTS* handed over the needed documentation for the procedures as well as the means and equipment for the technical investigation of mail in the Department M at the Central to its leader. It ensured the development of new procedures for the technical investigation of mail. The *OTS* leader also placed the documentations to these procedures as well as the required special operative-technical means and devices for their use to the disposal of the leader of the Department M at the Central. With high quality and in the shortest time, the leader of the *OTS* secured that the criminal-technical investigations were made available for investigation after, and for the identification of persons. Those relevant were the writing authors and senders of mail.

The leaders of the ADM's, except the leader of the ADM of Berlin, in cooperation with the leader of the Department M at the Central decided by 1 October 1987 upon the material conditions for the execution of the technical investigation of mail in the Departments M. In the context of certain confirmed structure and staff plans, the leader of the Department M at the Central and the leaders of ADM's specified and implemented measures for the personnel security of the technical investigation of mail in the Departments M. Even if the equipment was put forward by the *OTS*, the leaders of the ADM's together with the leader of the Department M at the Central still met in order to decide exactly what kind of and for which purposes the different resources were to be used. Even though the *OTS* developed the different means and methods for the Department M, this did not take place without the influence from other units of the *MfS*. For example, the leader of the Main Department II ensured the leader of the *OTS* and the leader of the Department M at the Central being informed about the newest technical means and methods the imperialistic secret services used in their postal connection systems. The guaranteed technical means were handed over to the leader of the *OTS* for investigation. In other words, before finally executing the work, a huge net of expertise was mobilised in order to develop the measures the Department M and other units needed for observing the population.

As a final procedure, the leader of the Department M at the Central informed the leader of the Main Department II after the complete take over of the technical investigation had appeared. The leader of the Main Department II thereafter informed Mielke about this. Although the Department M mainly accomplished the actual work, on this stage it was strongly administrated from the Main Department II due to the reasons given above. Nonetheless, this however shows the important role the Department M played in order to hinder and stop the assumed actions of the enemy, especially those coming from abroad. The seriousness of these operations was once more underlined, as the leader of the Main Department II directly informed Mielke. Additionally, as we notice, any possible law did not hinder such operations. At the same time, this explains the functions the *MfS* had in the GDR, for saving, protecting and maintaining the power of the party. Officially, by far, and simultaneously, these tendencies were influenced and catalysed through the new political situation in Moscow.

In 1984, it was settled that the PCSI and Department M was to come under one roof. In 1987, a similar story was by far addressed.[223] It was then however no fusion taking place between any of the units of the ADM's. Moreover, a need was present for stating the cooperation of the responsible units with the Department M, to make the work and coordination between the units more thorough. By this, one aimed for operating with increased control. This led to a qualified penetration of and was thereby attached to the Regulation 11/86 of the Minister, regarding the cooperation between the responsible units and the Departments M. At the same time, Mittag's orders from 5 June 1984 lost its validity. For the ADM of Rostock, this meant the leaders of the responsible units secured that the data on the orders for investigation for the Department M were complete, and that changes immediately were communicated in writing to the leader of the Department M.[224]

The leaders of the units responsible ensured the number of orders for investigation being limited to the operationally necessary minimum. By this, we repeatedly see the need for the responsible units to hold their operations to a minimum because of the lack of resources on different areas. In fact, on behalf of the leaders of the responsible units, the leader of the Department M was entitled to arrange with a reduction when the number of missions exceeded the existing capacity. At the same time, extensions were made, however only when necessary. When this happened to be the case, these were done at the latest 14 days before expiration of the period of validity in regards to the orders for investigation.

To missions of investigation (address investigation) concerning the letters and telegrams, the DSP's and the OSP *KKW*, except the DSP of Rostock, was sent over a copy. Concerning other mail, it was sent over a documentation of the data from

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[223] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2819.
[224] This was done with the form "*M 2*".

the receiver and/or sender. Regarding especially complicated cases that demanded a short-term estimation of original mail through a coordination officer of the *BKG*, the name of the responsible coordination officer of the *BKG* was given in the order of investigation. This was however done after agreement between the leaders of the DSP's and OSP *KKW* and the leader of the *BKG*. The *BKG* did not normally mix in to such cases. However, since it irregularly happened whereas thereby not having been a common part of the normal work procedures, with this case as well as similar to what we have witnessed to cases like these, the conspiracy of such irregular moves were kept with highest attention.

With immediate effect, an assigned co-worker of the Department M made original mail of the address investigation available to the assigned co-workers of the responsible units as well as the DSP of Rostock. This was made available Monday to Friday 15.00-16.00, in room 1014 in the ADM. When the material of original post was wanted upon from the leader of the responsible unit for reasons of making decisions, the assigned co-worker of this unit took over the original mail by means of a certain form.[225] The leaders of the units responsible ensured that original mail, or the decision over retaining, were given to the Department M until at the latest 15.00 the subsequent day. Copies of original post were made from Monday to Friday for the units responsible as well as for the DSP of Rostock. However, this was accomplished only at the request of the assigned co-workers of these units. On Saturdays, a copy regarding the letters in the context of the address investigation was made and sent to the unit that had given the mission. Exceptions were agreed upon between the leader of the Department M and the leader of the mission-giving unit.

The address investigation in the national letter traffic was prioritised to letters that were sent from East Berlin to the ADM of Rostock. When necessary, the leader of the Department M and the leader of the mission-giving unit agreed upon further measures of the investigation in the national letter traffic. As from a few years earlier, the address investigation of other post took place only in regards to the international post traffic. Concerning the copies of important mail, when the need was present, the leader of the Department M ensured the responsible units were handed over such information. Concerning the deliveries of original mail for decisions to be taken by the leaders of these units, similar procedures as mentioned above were taken. Measures for the execution of the special emptying of mail were punctually agreed upon between the leader of the mission-giving unit and the leader of the Department M. More specifically, this was done 24 hours at the latest before any actions were. The leader of the Department M secured that all determined connections were informed of the controls of the stores of the Department M. Based on an earlier command from Mittag (1987), except

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[225] This was done with the form "*M 3*".

for the DSP of Rostock, on requirement (informal) the transmittal of a copy of stored material followed for the DSP's and OSP *KKW*. This also applied to the responsible units and the DSP of Rostock, only when having needed insight into the material.

Necessarily repeated in order for the leader of the ADM to underline the strictness and secrecy of the operations towards controlling the post, the co-workers of the units were not entitled to receive mail from employees of the post. In the cases where employees of the post turned to the units and referred to mail that reported on the presence of a criminal offence and a danger in the delay, receiving post was permitted when it was inevitable to introduce immediate measures and proof. The leaders of the responsible units put the leader of the Department M in knowledge of the circumstances. According to the present status, the leader of the Department M arranged with the necessary measures of security. The same affair applied to mail with suspicion of holding explosive articles. Consequently, the measures were executed in accordance to Mittag's commands referred to above. Mails that for any reason were secured by *IM*'s and/or *GMS*' remained unopened until the hand over to the leader of the Department M had taken place.

The *MfS* and its Department M were at all times very accurate with the work, i.e., on how and what to do to in regards to merely anything settled. Therefore, it is not as strange that such a highly advanced system developed and was used due to the different and new roles they at all times received, and vice versa. Perhaps more important to why this was done at the later stages of the Department M's life was on the basis of the decrease in available resources. On the other hand, they had had successful training and experiences up to these moments, so there was not much to revolutionise on the preparation. This is also a reason to why many of the co-workers of the *MfS* never really well actually did feel where they and the Ministry stood during the later years and their changes. Not odd, if one considers the position the *MfS* already had had in the GDR for almost 40 years up to this time. Nevertheless, exactly this showed to be the problem, which also many other state organs of the GDR slowly but surely faced by sinking into.

As happened in most places of the GDR, and as late as in 1988, there seemed to be few, if any, easements to the Department M's control of the population. The case was rather the opposite.[226] This time, it concerned the work of passing requests to the Department M in regards to travel abroad in necessary family affairs as well as for disablement pensioners to do the same.

For improving the mission activity of the Department M, any given request to the *DVP* for the sake of travelling abroad in necessary family affairs were from this time passed on to the Department M. Such documents were passed on no later than two months after a trip had ended. Requests to travel abroad based on being a

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[226] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Rep 3/541-583.

disabled pensioner were sent to the Department M no later than two months after the validity period of one year was ended. As far as requests from the period from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1987 were available, these were given over to the Department M by 29 February 1988. When an original request unconditionally was needed after the mentioned time limit from the responsible unit, it stayed in the unit or was asked upon from the Department M.

Although it was easier for older persons and persons settling family affairs to go abroad, the control was nevertheless tight in every way. Even older and/or persons wanting to go abroad to visit their families in the West were with the highest interest controlled as any other citizen of the GDR. Although one might have expected that persons like these would have been one of the most harmless groupings of the GDR society. Old or not, the *MfS* understandingly enough, one the other side, did not care about the age and/or business a citizen of the GDR had abroad or anywhere else. The risk was there of doing enemy actions, where security obviously was number one on the Ministry's list - no matter what. Nevertheless, this shows the interest the *MfS* through its Department M had towards controlling the population, at all times, in any way. It was for example not who went abroad that was of interest, it was the action itself, i.e., that a citizen of the GDR went abroad. Yet other examples related to the ADM of Rostock show cases of how the *MfS* can be said to have lost its actual grip of interests seen in the light of what matters towards control were being dealt with.[227] It is plausible to state that this more or less led to ineffectiveness when speaking of both control aims and financial matters. That is, since for example some of the 'highlights' in 1989 was to execute surveillance of youths and students occupied with the eight world's meetings of youths and students 1-8 July in North Korea. Another case was to observe the Pentecost meeting of the youths of the GDR taking place 12-15 May.

No matter what reason, when even such persons as those referred to above were of interest because of having been suspects in the eyes of the *MfS*, one can surely argue that the control the Ministry performed at this stage had gone beyond any reasonable way of managing its own and the population's life. The latter seen in consideration to a state apparently always having named itself for being a carrier of peace and freedom. On the other hand, one should not forget that this type of control exactly had made the *MfS* a success. That is, in challenging periods as these only a strengthening of the control would be the most significant to do based on the logic of the contextual survival of such a state. As one says in certain contexts of sports: "never change a winning team", might have been the situation the top leaders of the party and state security believed they still found themselves.

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[227] Cf. BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Nr. 9.

After 1988, it remained important to underline that the cooperation between the units responsible and Department M had to be kept.[228]   The work was based upon earlier given commands both from Mielke and Mittag, in regards to higher the quality and effectiveness of the political-operative work of the Department M and the cooperation with the responsible units. Additionally, the leaders of the units responsible had to critically justify and reasonably decide upon necessary cut offs of the introduced mission investigations. Factors like paying special attention to their duration as well as the achieved results solved this. Furthermore, a confirmation to extending mission investigations for the period beyond one year was done through Mittag or his responsible deputy. However, it was only fulfilled in exceptional cases that carried a reason. To this time, the situation for the ADM's can be described as having been somewhat tight in terms of accomplishing usual surveillance of the population. For example, nearly 14 days after the distribution of this command, the leader of the Department M immediately had to report to Mittag on the overall conditions. I.e., the leader of the Department M shared with Mittag crucial figures of fundamental importance for doing the post control, in order for Mittag as easy as possible to focus on the most necessary problems based on the given overview. The information consisted of a number of facts, such as having informed of the number of maintained controls compared to the same amount of controls having been done six months earlier. Second point was to give the number of occurred cancellations as well as the details of this. Third and final, Mittag was interested in knowing the amount of control missions that had to be proceeded further, towards persons neither actively registered in an *OV* nor *OPK*.

With these facts, it seems as if the few people on the top plus some others involved in the ADM's knew about the critical situations. However, in a system like this it turned out to be a handicap in terms of having been able slowly but surely to see into one's death, as changes were difficult to oppose to the highest leaders of the Central. It would have been a complete new and radical situation if suggestions and orders would have gone and been accepted the other way around. Additionally, we should have in mind how we have witnessed the way even some top ranking leaders of the *SED* turned their backs on both the reforms of the Soviet Union, and the reported status on the situation done from the *MfS* during critical phases. As stressed from the Central and ADM's, one of the crucial points in fulfilling the work was that this had to be done through a tighter cooperation between any accessible and relevant organ of the GDR considered as being able to contribute to the work of the *MfS*. However, at the very end, it did not seem as if cooperation and means were enough, nor sufficient. This turned out to be the case as a change in the command of the *MfS*' Department M in the ADM of Ro-

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[228] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 3024.

stock took place, which was representative for the situation of the *MfS* and GDR by 1989.[229] The situation in the GDR was at the point of boiling. Therefore, it was not particularly odd that the *MfS* acted pragmatically - or moreover had to, due to the frequent, nearly day-to-day changing situations. The command reflected the changes that were done to the determination of Mittag's Writing from 5 March 1987, in regards to the qualification of the cooperation between the responsible units and Department M.[230] As will be shown below, in general, the change resulted in an extension of the tasks and possibilities of the responsible units controlling the post. This was connected with the picture on the facts of cooperation, means and capacity. Since it obviously existed problems in capacity, all possible cooperation and means were put closer together by reorganisation. This effort was done to act more adequate, since fewer resources than earlier were available. It was an attempt to organise the available forces for this type of control, without simultaneously solving the tasks with too high costs.

Therefore, a supplement came concerning the possibility of extension. These were done at the latest 14 days before expiration. Extensions beyond the period of one year were only permissible in special cases of exception, and had to be shown to Mittag or his responsible deputy for confirmation. In other words, a stricter rule to such work was given. Another change that was made resulted in a widening on the information of control, because of having deleted one sentence. To the missions of investigation (address investigation) concerning the letters and telegrams, except the DSP of Rostock, the rest of the DSP's as well as the OSP *KKW* had until this time bee sent over a copy. This practice was removed, and became replaced by the interest to rather approach "units" to matters like these. In other words, from this time on it now meant including all units of the ADM of Rostock. Furthermore, the given below discussed earlier was also changed by removal:[231]

> "[O]riginal mail of the address investigation is made available with immediate effect in room 1014 to the assigned co-workers of the responsible units as well as the DSP of Rostock, by an assigned co-worker of the Department M. [F]rom Monday to Friday, copy of original mail is made for the [...] responsible units and DSP of Rostock only at the request of the assigned co-workers of these [...] units. [C]oncerning related work on Saturdays, a copy regarding the letters belonging to the address investigation is made, and sent to the [...] mission-giving unit. Exceptions are allowed. They are agreed upon between the leader of the Department M and the leader of the mission-giving [...] unit."

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[229] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 2819.

[230] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 107/89.

[231] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 107/89. Freely rendered by Nessim Ghouas.

Concerning for example the quotation, since removing the command, it is taken for granted that such an action meant a more flexible way for all units to collect information. Particularly, since we have seen the *MfS*' many reflections on how to become more effective in the light of the present context. The identical can only be claimed for the following sentences.

2.4 The practice and importance of the Department M

In order to fulfil the needs of security of the *MfS* and of GDR, the Department M was of crucial importance. This was also explicitly valued from the Minister, as he in 1988, on the 39. National Day of the GDR, dedicated the high honourable state order *Kampforden. "Für Verdienste um Volk und Vaterland"* in gold to the whole apparatus of the Department M.[232] Although the Department M was an independent Department, it was formally under the wings of the Main Department II (Counter Intelligence).[233] The Department M was situated in every ADM of the GDR. In every ADM, it had connections to other units organised and operating directly or indirectly under the Department. The Department M worked according to a 'rule' that no forms of private communication via post and telecommunication in reality were to remain private. The *MfS* - like with the Department 26 - had the potential to control large parts of the communication regarding all personal intimations that had to do with critics of the regime. As for any other matter of control in these socialist societies, the separation between the private and public space was tried wiped out. In addition, the GDR regime's claimed communication monopoly in practice resulted in that it became easier for the party to accomplish the control work.

As we have seen through the analyses, the Department M was mainly a unit fulfilling tasks for other units of the *MfS*. At the ADM's and all the way down to the lowest organised unit, the Department, small or large, existed. From having had at least 140 full time co-workers at the Central by 1953, by 1989 the Department M at the Central had at least 516 co-workers.[234] The Department was from within parted in still ten Departments, each of those having had their Divisions, different Groups, etc. In the ADM's by 1953, there were approximately 500 full time co-workers of the Department M. By 1989, the Department M had at least 1676 co-workers in the ADM's. The full time workers having had the task to control the post were mainly working from within the Ministry, German Post as well as in areas within the Customs Service. Armed with own and other units' (e.g., the

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[232] Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit.*

[233] Schell & Kalinka, *op cit.*, pp 27-28.

[234] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. HA Kader und Schulung. Abteilung Planung 9, 15; Komitee zur Auflösung des Amtes für Nationale Sicherheit, *Faktenmaterial zur Auflösung des Amtes für Nationale Sicherheit*. Berlin 1990.

OTS) technical equipment constantly developed, the post control and other related units were principally able to look into any post sent. However, practically, it was impossible due to the fact of having had an overwhelming volume.

Fricke states that in the ADM of Dresden, between 4000 and 5000 items of post out of 100 000 posted were controlled every day.[235] In the ADM of Rostock, daily having circulated 120 000 items, between 3000 and 4000 were controlled.[236] In the ADM of Suhl, where there were between 40 000 and 50 000 sent daily, 2500 were controlled. The number for the ADM of Suhl is claimed to be the relative average for the ADM's. Recalculated from numbered facts into percents, this means the Department M controlled at least 5% of the post. However, Fricke does not come up with numbered figures of the total control of all the ADM's if we for example consider this in relation to the amount of post having been controlled related to the post that was in German Post's traffic. The latest number from the *BStU* concerning the controls accomplished tells that an approximate of 6000-10 000 in average were being opened daily in every of the ADM's, in the 1980's.[237] This means having controlled circa 90 000-150 000 items of the post traffic countrywide. Unfortunately, there cannot be stated a relativity in terms of e.g. percentage of the controlled post, since not knowing the total amount of post having circulated every day in the ADM's. Nevertheless, in real facts, the numbers show to be way above those of Fricke.

The Citizen's Committee Leipzig has claimed that circa 120 *MfS* co-workers on a daily basis worked in the ADM of Leipzig's Department M.[238] They were administrated from the *MfS*' Leipzig headquarters *Runde Ecke*. It is believed they opened between 1500 and 2000 posted items. Few, if any, outside the *MfS* noticed that post was taken in for controlling, since a typical method the *MfS*' Department M used to get hold of mail was to head for the post places outside the post employees' working time to pick up sacks of mail. Additionally, this was very good camouflaged, since there existed rooms at for example the post offices or railway stations the regular post workers had neither the permission nor the

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[235] Cf. e.g., Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 48.

[236] T. Ammer & H.-J. Memmler (eds.), *Staatssicherheit in Rostock. Zielgruppen, Methoden, Auflösung*. Köln 1991, p. 188; Unabhängiger Untersuchungsausschuß Rostock, *op cit.*, p. 225.

[237] Cf. e.g., BStU/Magdeburg, MfS - BV Magdeburg. 46, AR 8, pp. 164-171; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.

[238] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.*, p. 121. In for example the ADM of Rostock, by the end of 1989 there were 122 co-workers in the Department M (cf. e.g., Ammer & Memmler [eds.], *op cit.*, p. 188). At the same time in the ADM of Neubrandenburg's Department M, there were 96 co-workers (von Saß & von Suchodoletz, *op cit.*, p. 18)

possibility to enter.[239]   The whole was an effective operation where the *MfS* co-workers worked fast, because of wanting to avoid any form of attention. According to the time plan applicable for the later years, the time of processing was set to last no longer than 12 hours. Related to this, in order to investigate the post in all secrecy, the Departments M regularly asked for technical support from both the *OTS* and *VRD*.[240]

Usually, the *MfS* co-workers in the ADM of Leipzig and the other ADM's opened post with water steam, which was a known method.[241]   When this did not work, the Department had available a special chemical mixture that was used for opening mail.[242]   Three to five percent of all controlled post remained in *Runde Ecke*, stored, classified and/or investigated closer. Amongst other things, money sent by post remained there. According to the Citizen's Committee Leipzig, it claims the *MfS* co-workers yearly took out approximately 180 000 DM from the mail for

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[239] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02. As we know, the co-workers of the Department M were equipped with identity cards from the *MPF*. However, when entering the rooms at the post offices were they worked they had to show their *MfS* identity cards, since it was strictly secret to enter these rooms (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 17723/89, p. 18). Additionally, the co-workers of the Department M had to carry a certain jacket stripped of pockets while working, because the *MfS* wanted to secure that nothing possibly could be stolen. While controlling post, it was always two co-workers present practically meant for observing each other's work (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Lilo Nagengast, BStU/Berlin, Abteilung Bildung und Forschung. Berlin, 18.04.02; Nagengast & de Pasquale, *op cit*.).

[240] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, GVS MfS o008 - 10/85; BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. OTS. Nr. 1405.

[241] In fact, if something had destroyed the mail through using this particular method of opening the experts of the Department M were brought in. This was done since the Department had no other chose than to use these persons to copy the post in handwriting replacing the original exactly in the shape it was (cf. e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit*., p. 128). Besides, there were different types of steam machines. When mail held articles that were not able to cope with the hotter steam of up to 100 °C, the cold steam equipment was used, which had a temperature of around 50 °C (cf. e.g., BStU/Gera, MfS - BV Gera. M 5). For national mail, one also used a special Hungarian machine when opening mail with steam, leaving less traces than others (Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02).

[242] Cf. e.g, Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 48.

own pleasure.[243]   From the point of view of the law, this was not only being done illegally in a technical way. These controls also meant taking away the security and personal freedom of the people involved. One might also add that such behaviour from the co-workers neither was in harmony with the rules of working. As partly known, when post was controlled it happened that the *MfS* in some ways practically stole the content. Between 1984 and 1989, it has been said that the co-workers of the *MfS* collected a pure financial value from the post worth over 32 000 000 DM.[244] This was thereafter placed in the state's finances.

Not only were other people's properties taken out from the post within the GDR. It also took place a planned process for example of emptying post originally sent in the FRG, which however finally landed in the GDR as so-called "*Irrläufer*".[245] Such mail was given from the German Post to the Departments M to be confiscated. Post like this somehow increased after 1985. It does not exist any clear answers to how this came to be. Once employees of the Departments M have come up with a plausible statement, concluding it must have existed many Unofficial Co-workers inside the *Bundespost* having worked for the *MfS*. They made sure that post ended the journey in the GDR. This conclusion emphasises a crucial factor of the *MfS* - the conspiracy. This is amongst other things clearly an evidence of that as few co-workers as possible knew what happened outside their own tasks of control. Additionally, the outcome of work was meant to end like this much thanks to the need-to-know principal. Since 1985, a value of goods from this post worth over 4 000 000 DM was taken out. Most of it was placed in special stores that belonged to the *MfS*. The items were thereafter sold to high-ranking *MfS* officers. The rest of the amount and issues went to units of the *MfS*, whereas a smaller part ended its travel within the Customs Service's special shops.

Even if the sender of mail had not written its name and/or address on the mail, the ADM of Leipzig's Department M used for example the illustrated hand writing analyses. Based on these analyses, the Department M developed a method that found out what kind of sex and age the authors of post had. The hand anal-

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[243] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit*. It is however interesting to note that Childs & Popplewell, *op cit.,* p. 91, refer to the same book and page number as Nessim Ghouas, however, without drawing the same essence from the material. Nessim Ghouas means the authors in an incorrect way treat the Citizen's Committee Leipzig's facts, since they refer to the post surveillance as: "[T]he *MfS* stole DM 180,000 annually in the 1980s." The mistake of Childs & Popplewell lies in that the Citizen's Committee Leipzig not specifically refers to the 1980's or other years. Rather, the Citizen's Committee Leipzig says that approximately 180 000 DM "yearly" ("Jährlich…") was taken from controlled post. Cf. e.g., Fricke, *MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der DDR-Staatssicherheit*, p. 48.

[244] Schwan, *op cit*., p. 206; cf. also Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02.

[245] "*Irrläufer*" was mail that actually accidentally had been sent to the wrong address.

yses the Department M made were also used by other units inside the *MfS*, such as for example the Main Department XX (State Apparatus, Art, Culture, Underground).[246] We are familiar with the aims of the uses of the handwriting, i.e., for example to uncover if the same enemies' hands had written illegal slogans and paroles on walls, benches or other similar places where people normally were.[247] The public was supposed to be isolated from the enemies of the regime, and such expressions broke with the message of the *SED*. These methods' consequences to eliminate the enemies from the society underline the interests of the party and security service. With the aim to uncover the hostility, mainly the Main Department XX entered the many levels of the society, with for example the assistance of the Department M.[248] Manuela Hamann experienced one episode where handwriting analysis was presented from the Main Department XX based on expert help from the Department M, as a mean of controlling the enemy.[249] When she was a pupil at *Polytechnische Oberschule* (Polytechnical School), someone had written the slogan *"Wir sind hier nicht frei"* ("We are not free here") on one of the school's wall.[250] When the responsible for running the school discovered what had been written, one immediately rang the alarm clock meaning that all pupils had to return to the classrooms. The *MfS* arrived at the same time as the school administration removed the mess up, in order to find the guilty one(s). They did not however seem to find someone guilty for the incident. On another of the school's walls two days later yet another parole was written, which sounded: *"Das stimmt"* ("That is right"). This expression was in relation to the first, and led to the *MfS* once again arriving at the scene. This time, the *MfS* co-workers made it clear that if there were no confessions they had to find the guilty one(s) using handwriting analyses. Before this happened, the confession came. The guilty ones were taken

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[246] Cf. e.g., H. L. Arnold (ed.), *Text + Kritik. Feinderklärung, Literatur und Staatssicherheit*. München 1993, p. 83; Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), *op cit*., p. 22.

[247] Cf. e.g., Bürgerkomitee e.V. (ed.), *op cit*., p. 133. In fact, the Main Department XX did so from the beginning of the *MfS*' life, then under the structural name of Department V until 1964. The tasks remained, it only changed name to Main Department XX counting from 1964. However, from 1985 these tasks went under the Main Department XIX's Department 4.

[248] Cf. e.g., Wawrzyn, *op cit*., pp. 126-127. The Main Department XX gave for example the criterions for the investigation and what was to be looked for, which the Department M fulfilled. After the Department M knew what to look for, this was arranged at the post offices and control places between these co-workers and the co-workers of the post. They were often not told exactly what look for, based on the aforementioned interest of conspiracy also having included the highest secrecy within the *MfS*. As such, the *MfS* co-workers in any part of the Department M were even not allowed to enter the work place of a fellow colleague having worked in another part of the Department.

[249] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Manuela Hamann. Rostock, November 1999, June 2002.

[250] The GDR's secondary school (lower + upper) from age 7 to 16 years was ten yearly, and was called *Polytechnische Oberschule*.

to the *MfS*' offices for interrogation.[251]

The *MfS* was most interested in finding out who had motivated them to write such hostile propaganda and communication in the public. It was especially necessary to uncover hostility coming from the closest circle, i.e., the family and especially the parents. The motive the *MfS* had was that it wished to cut off all the negative means of subsistence about the regime having descended from the parents. In other words, the hostile domino effect would not spread as effective, when it turned out the *MfS* managed to do so. Therefore, it was important to control this as early as possible in a young GDR citizen's life.

As referred to in the introductory part, through useful overlapping, this is yet another case on how different units worked together with the Department M for stopping the enemy. This work was planned for the superior sake of blocking any enemy like action even though it, on the other hand, were clear definitions within the *MfS* to which units had certain special tasks to carry out. Nevertheless, the use of the same methods in different units - whether the task was to get hold of the enemy in a cooperative way or not, the units mainly had different background interests of controlling the enemy.

Since the *MfS* opened a large amount of all types of post communication every day, it is reasonable to say that the Ministry operated illegal even after the command from 1985. The interest of the total control over the population was maintained to every price, by putting the law aside when necessary. The *MfS* put the law aside when the power elite needed to control the population, which underlines the necessity of action in order to fulfil the determined political goals. In all units of the Department M, the *MfS* employees worked with sorting post, open post, look after special post, copying post, etc. One method of controlling the post more in detail when for example sorting the post was to look after typical features indicating certain suspiciousness. Post like this held features and signs of not having been too high or too low stamped, not pasted, not having carried additional notifications, etc. In addition, everything was suspicious that actually was not supposed to have given such a signal.[252] In other words, all sorts of post the

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[251] Two days later, they were back at school where their fellow pupils were very curious. To illustrate how secretly anything was to be treated on orders from the *MfS*, after having been confronted by the *MfS*, the pupil were not allowed to say a word about what had happened during the talks with the *MfS*. However, with cleverness, in such a system one learns to find and use methods of acting to achieve more than if one would follow the system exactly the way it s given from the leaders. Thus, what the fellow pupils did in order to get answers from the pupils taken away by the *MfS* was to put questions in such a way that these pupils were not forced to give statements. In fact, these pupils did not have to say a word. Since, depending on the questions put, the answers that came were based on nodding and shaking the head.

[252] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02; Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Second Lieutenant of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock. Rostock, 11.12.02.

MfS found suspicious were closer investigated through different methods. There-
after, it was registered and stored. Additionally, although constantly related to the
political situation, the *MfS* put in extra resources when special cases appeared.[253]
The *MfS* did for example the latter when certain citizens of the GDR were under
suspicion (special emptying of post boxes), or when there were foreign citizens
posting mail the *MfS* felt it was a need to keep under surveillance.[254] When the
suspects had laid post in mailboxes they went to, the *MfS*' Department M emptied
the mailboxes before the employees of the post were there to do so.

   The last Service Instruction was meant to have enormous effect. As usual,
given the system of power and influence, this order did not only count for the De-
partment M at the Central. It also counted for the Departments M in the ADM's. In
general, with special political-operative and scientific-technical means and meth-
ods, it was said the Departments M had the possibility to control and exploit mail
that both internationally and nationally was treated by the German Post.[255] As
shown, this did not only mean any post coming in from abroad or being sent do-
mestically. This also meant controlling post that was sent from the GDR to foreign
countries. Especially, any post being sent to the FRG, hereunder West Berlin, was
of interest.[256]

   For the post to be controlled, the *MfS* ran their own operations meaning the
regular post workers knew little, if anything, about this control.[257] Such con-
trol was accomplished in all the ADM's, often centrally, in the AD's capital.[258]
The post was afterwards given to the German Post, which made sure the post was
handed out. However, some of the post never left the *MfS* after having been con-
trolled. Post like this was rather given onto for example the relevant places in
the ADM's, which were given the task to investigate a step further because the
post already had woken suspiciousness. The post was given to these units, as they
in general held the relevant competence for investigating such material. It was

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[253] Bürgerkomitee Leipzig e.V. (ed.), *op cit.,* p. 125.

[254] This was for example the case in 1968, in relation to the Prague Spring (BStU/Magdeburg,
MfS - BV Magdeburg. Sonderkartei; cf. also BStU/Berlin, MfS - Abteilung M 376). At the time,
the Department M controlled as much post as possible that both was aimed for Czechoslovakia,
and where the content was not acceptable because of regime critics of any socialist state. When
possible, this post was placed in special registrations together with information attached of the
sender and receiver. However, this type of work, i.e., with other socialist states, also existed
during 'regular' periods. These efforts accomplished remained until the very end of the life of the
MfS (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Nr. 001868).

[255] Service Instruction 3/85, 1. Decision towards goal of the political-operative work of the
Departments M.

[256] Obst, *op cit*.

[257] When they were to know about it, whereas also somehow having been seen as a security risk,
they were immediately replaced by the higher functionaries of the post (cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS
- BdL. Nr. 17723/89, p. 95ff).

[258] Cf. also e.g., von Saß & von Suchodoletz, *op cit*., p. 18.

arranged this way, firstly, because the work was seen as being better done when the unit situated closest to the suspect was able to deal with the matter. A higher advantage for the *MfS* was achieved since having the investigation process nearby where the suspect lived, as it often happened that the suspect already had been in the light of the *MfS*. Such enemies were then normally registered and maybe onwards later on observed by the *MfS* unit situated closest to the suspect's area of movement. Secondly, when it came to acting against the enemy, the whole operation was seen as more effective and vigorous because of the geographical location between the *MfS* and its suspect.

As we through the above discussed have witnessed, the *MfS* did not in practice have unlimited power even within its domain. Although it is the East Germany's secret service being under analysis clearly having held much more power within its state system compared to other secret services positions in their countries, we know the Ministry clearly controlled the post illegally. This was not only illegal according to East German law, but also because of having arranged with such control through its own 'laws'. On behalf of this reason, it had an interest not to be discovered. It was of general importance for the *MfS* not to reveal itself, not only because of maintaining its secret movements due to being a secret service. It was also important no to be discovered for the mere reason that the *MfS* could not act exactly how it wanted, since being discovered would possibly have led to reactions among all people in the society. Reactions would not perhaps only have come from the persons at the very top, but also among those being on the lower levels of the society.

It appears to be so since the *MfS* in cases like these often went its own ways in terms of practising the interest of control. Commands, rules, etc., was given, which the *MfS* was to follow. However, within the *MfS* these were somehow changed, new rules added, etc. In similarity to what we saw above to the illustration of the power Mielke had over the Department 26, or, for that matter within the state, the stereotype of going own ways after set rules had been given also existed on the highest level of the *MfS*. In other words, the machinery of the *MfS* did not work as smooth in practice as it maybe was meant to - theoretically. On the other side, we although by this cannot say the *MfS* did not work effectively. This is clearly a situation of the opposite. In order to work effective, one had to move away from certain set rules and rather work more pragmatic to adjust to the individual situation for the sake of obtaining a better outcome. Although it is not to compare with directly, this given system of society was in a way a reflection of the five year plans the Soviets to certain times had, in order to fulfil set rules with clearly defined goals. If it for example somehow was seen as useful to produce 100 tons of nails, no one actually cared about if it really was of necessity as long as one fulfilled the goals set. Plenty of nails were produced, but for what? Some were surely used. Nevertheless, the rest was only produced based on the rules,

and not if it necessarily made sense. On one hand, the *MfS* was in such a position, with the given society role all men of the state in general had to fulfil. However, being somewhat more important than 100 tons of nails combined with the power and tasks the *MfS* got over time, it was able to allow itself go own ways. As seen so far, not only did the Ministry do so. In many ways, it had to.

As we have seen above on the examples of not wanting to be revealed by anyone outside the *MfS*, the same anxiety of being discovered existed also within the *MfS*. That is why these co-workers had such a narrow time limit. Since spilling or using too much time on the work most surely would have led to questions from the Departments M's cooperative parts, which had directly or indirectly to do with the *MfS*. These parts of the *MfS* were mainly the Unofficial Co-workers having worked within the German Post and Customs Service. This sort of co-workers reported on any mistakes or suspiciousness shown by the Departments M. Apart from this, a permanent observance of the co-workers of the Departments M in regards to show reliability and discretion was at all times kept. It did not only mean being observed directly at work, i.e., the buildings of the *MfS*, but also in those related places the *MfS* had outside the *MfS* complexes (e.g., when having done work at the post offices).

We are familiar with the PCSI having become an official part of the Department M in 1984. Similar to how for example letters inside the postal system were controlled, so were all sorts of packages in line with the PCSI.[259] From time to time, the PCSI handled more packages crossing the borders than it did of those having been transported inside the republic, and vice versa. As with the rest of the *MfS*, this Department worked with hidden methods towards the public, post workers and workers of the post customs offices, due to having been a unit of the Customs Service of the GDR. The procedures on how the co-workers were presented officially were identical with the ones we have seen appeared by the co-workers of the *MfS* at the post offices. Equal to the regular worker of the Customs Service, when not performing control the co-workers carried the uniform of the Customs Service as well as possessing its identity card. When doing the controls, they changed their uniforms to the typical dresses the post control workers also carried. In addition, in these rooms as by the post, a minimum of two persons had to be present when doing the job. To underline the necessity and value of the secrecy, no mixture whatsoever with the regular workers of the Customs Service was allowed.

Practically the same rules were applicable towards the means and measures of control of the packages as they were for the other types of mail controlling. What was more often used when undertaking this control compared to for example the

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[259] BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Büro der Leitung. Nr. 399; Gill & Schröter, op *cit*., p. 144; von Saß & von Suchodoletz, *op cit*., p. 19; Schwan, *op cit*., p. 207.

control of letters was the use of x-ray. This method was used when there showed
to be a closer need to check upon what possibly was hiding in boxes of coffee, or
even in tubes of toothpaste. When these packages remained unanswered after this
type of control, the co-workers often made a whole through the article. From there
on, they executed investigations with endoscopes like those used for purposes
in medicine. For industrial packages, there existed different methods. Articles
such as fluid and powder were used through for example filters for revealing their
complete content. With hard material such as wood, gips or plastic, the co-workers
had more difficulty in fulfilling the job, because the cover up after having done
the work led to difficulties while trying to replace the material into their original
shape.[260]

Concerning the control the PCSI accomplished, it existed four types of tasks,
which were divided into missions A, B, C and D. With mission A, a unit that
had asked the Department M and/or PCSI for help in order to receive information
achieved this in regards to the place (and time) of treatment, type of mail, sender,
recipient as well as a photo of the cover. When the PCSI undertook a mission B,
post was controlled and photographed. The co-workers took the content of the
post out when operating under mission C, but without that they did anything fur-
ther to matters of control. Rather, one passed this onto the mission-giving unit that
dealt with the relevant issue. For the mission D, mail was not opened or controlled
from the PCSI. It was simply sent to the mission-giving unit. Alternatively, the
mission-giving unit gave the PCSI instructions to pass it onto the recipient. When
nothing else was specified in a mission, mail in the categories A and B was sent
onto the recipient. Concerning any other information not having been informed
of, the missions lasted for three months. Extensions were possible, but only when
it was of necessity. The controllers had to have a common knowledge of the con-
struction of the products as well as a handicraft scent. Thus, since, the investiga-
tions amongst other things were based upon own experiences descending from the
individual co-worker. There did not exist any typical procedures or guidelines of
handling the work. However, in 1983 in the roles of "*Neuerervorschläge*", frames
were created holding a tied procedure to opening and closing methods concerning
investigating packages from the West.[261] This made it possible to use the optimal
variant within the shortest time. Nevertheless, it is though highly questionable
whether this turned out to be effective in practice, in general, when considering
where and how the actual commands and power normally were situated and dic-

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[260] Cf. e.g., Nessim Ghouas in conversations with a Major of the Department M of the ADM of
Rostock. Rostock, 18.06.02.

[261] "*Neuerervorschläge*" meant that the co-workers came up with suggestions to improve the
working methods. This particular unit of the *MfS* was not alone in executing such a task, as
e.g. also the Department 26 accomplished this sort of work (cf. e.g., BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV
Rostock. Nr. 9, p. 11).

tated.[262]

As for persons knowing their post was being controlled, neither the control of all sorts of packages was a secret in the population. When for example relatives from the West sent packages to their families in the GDR, put into the packages was a piece of paper containing a list where all articles following the mail were written down. Through this, the relatives in the GDR knew when something had been taken out, either by controlling the list, or simply if the list was not there anymore.[263] Things having been taken out or not, after packages had been sent the *MfS* often checked upon all the involved persons of such mail. This gave the persons a certain status of being suspects in the eyes of the *MfS*.[264] Several measures where taken. One engaged for example the neighbours of those having received such mail to report on them. The pioneer leader at school was also activated to see what it was able to achieve of information from the children of the suspects. It was also put in measures to control the post of other members of the suspected families that could live anywhere. The results were many. In some cases, the outcome had certain consequences for their children's careers.

According to the law, these actions done by the *MfS* was illegal. However, in order for the e.g. the suspected families to even think about doing anything against this afterwards with the help of the law, would have been of no practical outcome. From the side of the regime, they most likely would have ended up by being accused of blaming the party for having done something wrong. As we by now know, considering using this option, would in fact surely have led to even further problems for the families involved. Since accusing the *MfS* for having done a crime would from the point of view of the families have meant that the state did not function proper. Simultaneously, putting forward such a statement would have been the same as criticising the leading governor of the state - the party, for not acting correct towards the citizens. Actions like these were answered with hard punishment, especially because the *SED* did not welcome such critics whatsoever. Nevertheless, if trying to face the state based on the aforementioned starting point would have demanded from the families to put forward evidence in the court of law. It would have been difficult in practice, since the families would not have had any hard evidence of proof. On the other hand, even if having had evidence, which lawyer in such a state would argue that their own state apparatus and the *MfS* had done something wrong? As analysed earlier, no one was exempted from being under the reactions of the *SED* and *MfS*. Therefore, in practice, due to the risk, few, if any, lawyers would have done something opposing the state system.

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[262] Cf. Nessim Ghouas in conversations with all the interviewees of the *MfS*. On a general basis, all of the interviewees of the *MfS* widely stated a difficulty in exerting influence towards matters like these, mainly based on the build up and function of the system of power.

[263] Cf. BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. AOP 1460/89.

[264] Cf. e.g., BStU/Gera, MfS - BV Gera. Sichtlochkartei 1015/88 (to the *OPK* "*Paket*").

Anyway, even before having come as far, the lawyers most likely would have been pressured to cooperate with the *MfS*. Otherwise they knew what to expect. Even if the procedure would have functioned properly, in terms of the families having a chance to put forward evidence of the illegal behaviour, the *MfS* would have put forward evidence of crimes done by the families. The Ministry could show this from its possession of material found through the control of the post. Although the latter alternative shines somewhat fairer, the *MfS* would have put in all efforts to crush the families' possibilities. Not only regarding their chances to the matter in the court of law, the Ministry would also have taken any other opportunity it had towards the involved. A first action would probably have been to delete all evidence the citizens might have had. When such a matter was cleared, it would thereafter most likely start to make life difficult for the families - mildly put. Therefore, also seen in the light of the example on how the state treated a person after this knew the *MfS* had been in its flat, doing any sort of actions against the party and *MfS* would have resulted in a disaster for any individual in the GDR involved. The latter analyses emphasise the importance the regime had towards achieving the political targets, whereas a fair, functional political and judicial system was not present. Rather, we witnessed the contrary.

Not only was the post of the 'regular' citizens of the GDR controlled. Apart from *IM*'s being all over the society of the GDR controlling the co-workers of the *MfS* as well as any other human being after inspiration from the Soviets and how the *Komintern* and *SMAD* executed control of own co-workers, the *MfS* and its Department M controlled their own co-workers and *IM*'s. That is, in their ways to see if they did the job according to the regulations.[265] Obviously, this was a matter of crucial importance based on the vital work the Department M carried out for the party and *MfS*, since already having been ordered upon in 1952.[266] Amongst other things, the rules said that the employees and *IM*'s had the duty to report on all incoming and/or controlled post sent from the western world, i.e., received post at work or in private. One of many typical control methods was that the Department M sent mail to its employees, where the mail gave the employees the impression that it was posted in West Berlin. Originally, the post was mailed from an unspecified place in the GDR. The trick consisted of that the Department M had labelled West Berlin's postmark stamp on the mail, since the Department had available all national as well as a larger number of international postmark stamps.[267] Besides, the postmark stamps were nearly perfect copied, so that for example employees in the FRG's postal service were not supposed to be able to

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[265] Nessim Ghouas in conversations with Wolfgang Kühn, BStU/Außenstelle Rostock. Rostock, December 1999; BStU/ Magdeburg, MfS - BV Magdeburg. 116, I/1, p. 141.

[266] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. KS II 52/76, p. 114ff.

[267] Cf. e.g., BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Abteilung M (the documentation of 22 February 1980); BStU/Rostock, MfS - BV Rostock. Rep. 4, Nr. 131.

separate the original from the copies. However, not all these copies were as good made and prepared.[268]

One day before the Berlin Wall fell, the functioning leader of the *MfS*, Colonel General Mittig, closed the control points of the Line M.[269] In practice however, the control of the packages was able to be continued through the work of the Customs Service.[270] On the other side, it was of some difficulty for the highest leaders of the Department M to cope with the new situation. On a paper for a conference of the secret service, Major General Strobel reported on positive incidents whereas speaking of identifying spies of imperialistic secret services done in cooperation with the Line II. He continued to underline the contributions made to uncover acts of terror and violence as well as bringing a general overview of the situation for the *MfS*. However, he admitted at the same time that "...a clear rule through law..." did not exist for the activities of the Line M.[271] Concerning Strobel's approach to the functioning Minister's decision, i.e., shutting down the control places of the Line M as well as his own related command towards the Departments M, he only considered as temporary.[272] With effect from 6 December 1989, Strobel was dismissed from his functions. This meant the final shut down of the control, which until then had been going on for nearly 50 years.[273]

From the analysis done above, we clearly witness that the Department M was a very important unit of the state security of the GDR. Furthermore, that it as such was a considerable support towards the GDR's society system. The *MfS* directly and indirectly held a vital role in the system of the *SED*, whereas leading to that the Department M executed the commands given from its leaders within the Ministry.

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[268] Bürgerkomitee e.V. (ed.), *op cit.,* pp. 128-129. It appeared that the postmark stamps of the *MfS* contained certain faults in the look alike of the originals. For example, there were done major faults in the attempt to copy Japan's and Tokyo's postmark stamp. The Department M had not only copied Tokyo's postal code wrong, but also the country's name was wrong inserted. On the original, the country's name was not written in Japanese - "*Nippon*" - but in German (Latin alphabet), as "Japan". Additionally also Minsk's postal code was wrongly copied. The Department had correctly written Minsk with Cyrillic letters, but by mistake written "*Postamt*" (Post Office). The latter was also supposed to be written in Cyrillic. Besides this, Nessim Ghouas has noticed the Citizen's Committee Leipzig having made a mistake while mapping these issues. The mistake consists of not having pointed at yet another fault on the postmark stamp belonging to Minsk. The Department M did not only do one fault on this stamp. On the postmark stamp where labelled "USSR", it should instead actually have been labelled "*CCCP*" (Cyrillic shortened letters for the Soviet Union).

[269] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Abteilung M 1026, p. 50.

[270] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Abteilung M 1026, pp. 59-63.

[271] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Abteilung M 1026, p. 60.

[272] BStU/Berlin, MfS - BdL. Abteilung M 1026, p. 61; cf. also BStU/Dresden, MfS - BV Dresden. Nr. 29.

[273] Order K 4896/89, pp. 1-3. BStU/Berlin, MfS -BdL. Nr. 103651. According to his payment card, he was actually dismissed 31 March 1990.

Based on the Department M's various accomplishments and functions through its considerable efforts, it was crucially present for the sake of acting as an important guarantor to the leaders of the system.

3   The basic guarantors to the effectiveness of the Departments M and 26

We have until now in Part C seen the system and thereby the functions of the Departments M and 26. The focus of the analysis undertaken towards the post and telephone control was supported by the view of using the material in an empirical, descriptive way. In this chapter, the most important facts of the surveillances executed by these Departments intend to be drawn. This way, in order to systematise the most valuable contributions of control the Departments M and 26 undertook towards securing the power of the *SED*. The Departments M and 26 used different means and methods for supporting and securing the *SED* regime. Although many of the options towards accomplishing this work differed from each other, the tasks were aimed for identical purposes. That is, in terms of the main interest of controlling the citizens achieved through the actions of these Departments.

The focus will be to look closer at main points in the structures and methods of the *MfS*' Departments M and 26. Firstly, the matter of the structures will be dealt with, which contains two sub points. The first of these sub points concerns the effective hierarchy function of power related to the horizontally and vertically system. The second will treat the locked society of the *MfS*. In regards to the methods, there are three sub points. Those are conspiracy, breaking the law and fear. The two main points with their sub points practically functioned together. As such, they were inseparable in order for the Departments to function properly. In the presentation below, they will be put forward through own sections in the main points to illustrate clearly were they belonged. Where naturally and relevant though, the other functions intend to be discussed in harmony with the other points.

3.1   The most important structures

3.1.1   An effective hierarchy

As we have witnessed, the *MfS*' structural system was built up in quite a complex way. It seems as if the most important with the structural condition was to have a clear hierarchy, in order to know who did what at all times. To recall the horizontally and vertically power, the premise of this structure was settled in such a way that the orders always were given from top to bottom. These were thereafter to be followed without further questioning. The information of commands were always given with the absolute minimum of knowledge towards a co-worker, amongst other things, making the co-worker within the system of function more dependant of the authority from above. Military principals, having had considerably few flexible opportunities for improvement heavily influenced the system.

When smaller or larger changes took place, with few exceptions, such practice was always ordered from the top. Therefore, even if this system contained many thousands co-workers everyone having had their special task, apparently only a few men on the top controlled all matters.

In general, the last mentioned resulted in the *MfS* operating with an enormous and complex bureaucracy, perhaps beyond imagination for some. First, since one gave little power to other fellow co-workers so that they could settle and complete work as convenient as possible. By this, it is not intended to argue that the system of the *MfS* did not function. Moreover, the point is that parts of some work might have been solved easier had it not been for the way the *MfS*' system functioned. As an example, towards solving tasks belonging to the Departments M and 26, many of the tasks simply had to be ratified by a high authority of the *MfS* before being set out in life. On the one hand, since often confirmed from the top, this resulted in the *MfS* having quite a good overview of any work being done at all times. This also secured the power, as this remained on the top level. Simultaneously one authorised less power and information to subordinate levels. Another example of the aforementioned context was evidently quite clear when showing the different commands coming from high leaders of the *MfS* - whether an ADM or the Central, to the different co-workers spoken with. They were surprised to see how everything was put together, whereas only recognising themselves in some details of an overall work. At the same time, within the 'logic' of the system, the possibility as 'unimportant' co-workers to influence something based on their efforts done was nearly hopeless. All co-workers spoken to confirmed that their work finally was not taken seriously by the top leader of their ADM, since he after all was not interested in facing the facts. Moreover, this was also connected with the fear of one's own existence, sine it would have endangered a top leader's position if putting forward many negative reports to the Central.

The Departments were also overloaded with new tasks and challenges. In relation to this, the already dominating conduct of control from the Central towards the district turned even more centralised. This resulted in leaving less power to the districts. Furthermore, such decisions thereby resulted in even less power to the subordinates actually doing the work, which likely easier could have dealt with certain tasks both faster and better if they had had the power to do so. It may seem as a system of give and take, where the overall security on how to solve tasks was thoroughly considered. Being effective or not sometimes may have come in second hand. Naturally, the *MfS* wanted to be effective, but not at any price. Therefore, it was probably considered as more reasonable to have a gigantic system of complex, awkward practical functions in terms accomplishing tasks, than to have a more flexible system. The latter, believed to hold less focus on conspiracy, although being able to be satisfactory maintained.

Without treating the course of events concerning the conspiracy related to the

methods of the *MfS*, it should although be mentioned in relation to the conditions of the system that the strong focus on these points in some ways made the system complicated to run. Clearly, also having a system built upon mistrust finally led to the result of having to let more and more decisions be taken from the Central. The power at the Central as such got even more elitist dominated, finally only leaving a few men to have the complete overview of the control mechanisms of the state. Furthermore, this raises the question to how effective such a system was after all. Using the logic of the system one can argue that it automatically had to turn out this way, since the only ones having the full information on nearly all matters was the Central. It was therefore believed that the decisions towards surveillance could not have been executed better anywhere else than from this particular place. In some ways, one can argue that the structures of the system not only made the highest leaders at the Central increase their commands to all tasks. By far, they were also forced to, since the system was built upon a need-to-know principal. This made the co-workers possess little knowledge about the context of a specific task the longer down the system one came. The latter combined with the conservative, military system of power did not include being flexible in terms of making (rapid) changes.

The society system of the GDR and *MfS* had its limitations, although any command always came from the top towards the bottom organised in a well functioning, hierarchically system of power. To secure absolute power the *MfS* also controlled the co-workers through internal control. However, it was simply impossible to regulate the 'law' on human beings. Mainly, since persons for different reasons after all to some extent are different, no matter where one is or under which conditions one live. Even taken the haughtiness into consideration, the leadership of the *MfS* believed that too large and strict internal control highly likely would have led to an ineffective system. Therefore, the *MfS* with its Departments M and 26 also put in order a mixture of motivating the co-workers to fulfil the work based on the roles and functions of the Ministry that simultaneously held an ingenious form of hidden press. This came about since a highly prioritised task for the *MfS* was after all to let the collective benefit on the expense of the individual. To solve the eventual case of some showing dissatisfaction to the work, despite the ideological schooling, etc., the *MfS* saw a further need to mould the co-workers by the interests of the *MfS*. By this, the Ministry believed to reach a new quality within the Departments. This did not only measure in provable results. It also did towards their impacts on the co-workers' discipline and moral. That is why this relation process, through periodical accomplishment, amongst others, led to running a stricter form of control. This cleverly called upon the full understanding of all honest and disciplined co-workers. Since the *MfS* often underlined the interest of having such co-workers, they were supposed to feel directly called upon. It furthermore meant doing important work, which was to lead

to something good since earning common interests. The co-workers felt directly spoken to, and was seen as a honourable gesture from the point of view of the co-workers since the leaders showed care. Therefore, the leadership of the *MfS* also aimed to motivate the co-workers in order for them to really believe in and work for the system.

Officially, this signalisation was put forward in order to show that the work really had value, hiding the issue of press towards having to fulfil the work. This was however not done from the *MfS* based on really taking care of its co-workers. Unofficially, it was primarily done to lead the co-workers in executing the work on behalf of fulfilling the set goals of the Ministry and *SED*. Such a system of structural power was and had to be executed with certain political aims, where the *MfS* aimed to produce its next generations through the already stated present and future.

3.1.2 Locked society

In many ways, the analysis of the effective hierarchy structure of the *MfS* was exactly a condition in which for a long time made the system a success. It was mainly successful since the clear powers of hierarchy functioned along the co-workers' commitment towards the *MfS* and party. Additionally, the role of the system provided an exhaustive ideological schooling for the co-workers to be stronger bound in the believes of the reasons of doing what simply 'had' to be correct. By this, the top leaders of the party and state organs also secured to hold possible alternative thoughts in check.

The other important structural factor in order to maintain the full control of the co-workers was done with the interest of operating inside a locked society within the republic. This was totally led by the system of the *MfS*. Amongst other things, this made the Ministry able to secure the development of the state, whereas simultaneously keeping the co-workers uncritical towards the system of function.

After all, besides fulfilling what apparently was correct to do, the system of the *MfS* took care of the co-workers in a special way, but only if it primarily gave benefits to the system. The advantages gave the co-workers opportunities beyond the average of a GDR citizen, for example access to own education, shops and health care. An example was shown through the way the *MfS* took care of all inquiries. Let alone, there is nothing negative with having a free of charge service to all health issues. However, the main - or perhaps only - reason of having such an offer was the interest of keeping the co-workers healthy at all times in order to be able to fulfil their work. The medical practitioners made sure to keep the co-workers as physically healthy as possible, whereas a certain press simultaneously was put on them. Many came because of too high work pressure. Amongst other things, this led to doubt their whole reason of existence

and cause. The medical practitioners put forward a typical, and apparently well functioning 'cure', which provided a balance between the physical and psychical conditions. The 'solution' regarding the psychical issue was often to study the different socialist theories, to achieve a cleaner and healthier life style. This shows that any possible part of the system of the *MfS* and GDR contributed to keep it functioning. On the other side, the visits to these medical practitioners were also done to the personal interest of the co-workers, since such a practitioner normally is a person one can trust. Paying a visit to a medical practitioner 'outside' the *MfS* would have endangered the information of the co-workers towards the outside world. Nonetheless, the example illustrates the exact belonging one had as a co-worker, in practice resulting in having less real choices once being in the *MfS*.

With the aforementioned illustration, it is easy to understand that whatever one may have done or wanted to do, the locked society in the state - the *MfS*, treated any matter in one's life whether having been 'inside' or 'outside' the Ministry. One's whole life was in the hands of the Ministry, which was known through its network. Once being inside the *MfS*, it was normally very difficult just to leave the service based on a personal interest to do so. The fact was that one had been given one's special position for life - regarding any issue, which the matter to health issues showed. The system of the *MfS* held certain rules where one could not as easy choose to visit one's own picked out medical practitioner without the *MfS* knowing it. Therefore, even though having a safe life situation, this was completely regulated by the *MfS*. At any price, the system had to be kept. This required full safety, having led to a locked society within the GDR where the human beings inside it in many ways were reduced to be only pieces in a game.

The example just mentioned combined with the ideological schooling, press, etc., as well as the frequent emphasising to how well the system was, unconsciously or not, made the co-workers uncritical towards the kind of situation they actually dealt - or had to deal - with. It would be too simple to generalise, claiming that any person was as explained. Nevertheless, in such a system of the *MfS* clear rules were given for everyone and everything one did. This existed in the society of the GDR, where there in practice were few, if any, possibility to act individually - as long as it was not agreed.

3.2   The most important methods

3.2.1   Conspiracy

Regarding the work of the Departments M and 26, repeatedly addressed was the need for conspiracy. The role of conspiracy went hand in hand with the interest of secrecy, where the one factor both could not and did not leave the other one out. Conspiracy meant keeping the work secret, whereas secret work was ac-

complished through the conspiracy. Since being emphasised in every command illustrates the level of importance. The conspiracy was Alpha and Omega in terms of maintaining the work being done in the hidden. This factor supported and was thereby close related with the functions of the structures of the *MfS*. Some would say, naturally, conspiracy must be a method of every secret service. However, as seen from the analysis, it is possible to assert that this factor was an issue that was extremely paid attention to in the *MfS*.

If a de-conspiracy of a case or a danger of this would have been the fact, a plan on how to act was already cleared by the responsible units. That is, the parts of the *MfS* involved knew exactly what to do to cover up efforts undertaken towards an activity, in order to leave no traces behind. This meant that one was not to leave traces of work done by the Ministry, which otherwise could have made the work known to persons not being involved. If a de-conspiracy was to happen, i.e., a case becoming known to 'outsiders', the conspiracy, and thereby its secrecy would have been broken. Even if this would have been the outcome of a secret task, the Departments M and 26 would have made sure to put co-workers on the case immediately in terms of finding out what had gone wrong. The similar thoroughness was applied while preparing a case. These approaches show how meticulous the work of the *MfS* was, as nothing was supposed to pass without first having evaluated any related issues thoroughly.

Basing the work upon methods of conspiracy was also accomplished since the work from the fact of trusting no one. The main concept was to reach the work having been settled, which meant taking any precautions available. In this kind of system, it was in practice converted to consider anyone a suspect. Amongst others, this resulted in the strict examination of every co-worker involved in a case, whereas the so-called inner security was applied. Seen from the facts above of the Departments M and 26, the *MfS* made huge efforts to control its co-workers. This left them with little, if any, trust. On the other side, perhaps it is not as strange, this particular system of existence taken into consideration. This was an important point of the role of the conspiracy, which by far and through the existence of the *MfS* was one of the successful methods of working. Still, what made it further effective for the Ministry was the fact that this was connected with the locked society. From this, the *MfS* used this particular link to be able to accomplish an even better control.

Concerning the interest of conspiracy and the need-to-know principal, in many ways we have witnessed a system functioning immensely effective, mostly reaching its aims of control. A further example of this was the illustrated case with post accidentally having been sent to the wrong address ("*Irrläufer*"), often with end stop at the post offices of the GDR. To recapitulate, which illustrates the 'confusion' based of not having had the overview because of the aforementioned organisation of work, why and what sort of post this was remained unanswerable

from the co-workers of the Department M. Even after having been asked as late as after 1989. On the one side, this shows the effectiveness of the *MfS* towards reaching its aforementioned goals. On the other side, these structures might not have been the most convenient solution for a system, since from time to time having led to confusions of who did what. Therefore, this kind of system might end up with working ineffective, also because the methods require a complex and detailed function.

As an extensional point to the latter paragraph, an additional consideration to the little, if any, knowledge of the work done by other units necessarily led to becoming dependent upon another. Quite a paradox, when considering that the idea actually was to work independently, based on for example the interests of conspiracy. As such, this effect also had opposite results. This independence led to the need to create an ever-growing system. Firstly, since the tasks from the first days grew rapidly. By time, they also got increasingly differentiated and challenging. Secondly, this furthermore meant that more units were needed. Since the one unit, based on the principals, was to be protected against the other. Yet again, the function of the system having been astronomic may occasionally have turned out too complex for solving 'easier' tasks when relating them to other principal interests the *MfS* had.

3.2.2   Breaking the law

Another method of the *MfS* resulted in the Ministry finding a very important way of working. This solution led to the *MfS* breaking the law. The *MfS*, having been a security service existing under the conditions analysed, was predestined into a set of roles containing factors such as the means and methods of functioning. Within the Ministry, the mixture of having a huge bureaucracy and a highly prioritised interest towards conspiracy surely led to why the Ministry broke the law from the very beginning. The Departments M and 26 were clearly included in these roles. As we have witnessed, from the earliest days of the *MfS*, the law on post and telecommunication was completely ignored since the *MfS* wished to fulfil the set goals. Based on the general understanding of the *MfS*, it would neither be wrong to claim that it broke the law because it was able to through its enormous power. Therefore, based on the empirical discoveries, only saying that the *MfS* had to break the law because of its conditions of structure would not entirely explain the possibilities of the *MfS*' patterns of activities. Thus, much based on its position in the system also contributes to explain the fact that it also could so, since there did not exist any organ of the GDR that practically raised their hands in protest against such conduct.

As far as the practice of such as system concerned, the consequences of the work led to severe violations of the law. Exceptions towards breaking it seemed

rather to be the rule than the exception itself. As general critics presented, the Major of the Department M of the ADM of Rostock during our conversation illustrated the negative trend of the *MfS*' breaking the law. The Major really believed in doing an honest effort for the *MfS* and the system of the *SED* in order to reach an even better society. This changed however, as this person during the later years of the *MfS* was to experience the opposite through actions done by the *MfS* laying way beyond actual tasks to complete. The huge disappointment made the Major mistrusting the Ministry, thus resulting in loosing faith and believes in the system. This is an example of a person following such a particular society system.[274]

The strong contribution from the Departments M and 26 towards breaking the law for the sake of fulfilling the policy on securing the GDR was done over a longer time. A crucial factor to this was done through the creation of own roles, particularly with Mielke as the head of the system. The functions much because of its inner dynamics produced a unique role for the *MfS*, being able to possess far greater power than actually decided. Seen from the point of view of the *MfS*, breaking the law led to acting more effective. This was a fact, even though breaking it was not meant to be in the first place when compared to the interest of development of this socialist society. The theory of such societies was different. However, if the theory were to be applied, the practice of the *MfS* would most likely have been less effective towards performing the surveillance of the population.

One might say the combinations of the overall system led to violating the law. Even if this from the original point of interests of the system theoretically was wrong, it apparently had to be done to fulfil goals that were more important for the general development. For example, most people with common sense would probably consider contributing to the common good as being a deed, since a number of people would enjoy the effect of this. A majority of people would normally not accept such at any price. However, in the GDR with its *MfS*, there existed few, if any, possibilities to discuss alternative ways of one's own - if not already accepted by the leadership. Free, individual meanings were in general not accepted. The Departments M and 26 quite strongly attended to such not taking place. Even the people on the 'same side', i.e., the co-workers, were seldom allowed to come with suggestions to improve the work. On one side, this shows how little the interest in developing the system was. As we have seen above with the structures, when the co-workers presented reports to different cases it was not unusual that the leadership finally ignored them. Secondly, strictly speaking, what were left of it were many people solving ordered tasks almost like machines, which in effect

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[274] A system that had told all citizens how great it was, and which this person therefore believed in. Apparently the practice of the system did not however follow its actual proclamations, whereas leading the Major - once knowing that all efforts were made for no good, into a frustration and anger not knowing anymore what to believe in.

did not benefit them at all. Rather, only a few benefited from this. Those were the people belonging to the elite cadres of the GDR. It seems like the system had its own mechanism of running, since as long as everything apparently seemed to function no one raised a hand for developing something new or give critics. This again, except from the already given press, led to persons remaining uncritical. Furthermore, this finally resulted in not knowing what was 'right' and 'wrong'. The *MfS* cleverly managed to break the law with few, if any, problems. Mainly, since the function of the system practically opened for such activities, whereas breaking it all in all turned out to be easier and more suitable than the opposite.

Even if the *MfS* acted without breaking the laws discussed, one can question how practical the laws actually were made in terms of the safety and security of the people. Especially if we consider that the *MfS* to some extent had the right to act as a legal authority in cases were criminal acts had taken place. Based on the practical interests of the *MfS* combined with this opening in the law did not only result in illegal actions taken by the *MfS*. The law as such, legally including the *MfS* of having been able to have an important role in undertaking investigations of criminal acts, leads to question where the boarders went between the security and neutrality of the *MfS*. Moreover, this enlightens the problem of the citizens, whereas consequences did not result in a state acting with neutrality or competence when especially taken into consideration the position the *MfS* had in the GDR.

As one main consequence of such arrangements, on behalf of the *SED*, the *MfS* and its Department M and 26 was so to speak determined to break the law. This meant they also acted the way they wanted in order to reach the settled politics. However, even if being a superior power towards the population - or anything, the Ministry and its Departments M and 26 nevertheless wanted to keep its activities as secret as possible. Thus, since the *MfS*, one might say, quite peculiar had a slight apprehension of being discovered by the persons it observed. Legally done or not, and because of the apprehension, the *MfS* controlling the post and telephone of anyone having been of interest resulted in putting certain self-limitations on its actions. On the other side, no wonder if only imagining what would have happened if for example a considerable number of the highest party functionaries of the core circle of the *SED* would have complained about the *MfS* accomplishing control of their post and telephone. Alternatively, if large parts of the population had acted after finding out their post and telephone were controlled.

3.2.3 Fear

The Departments M and 26 by far managed to succeed with the surveillance of the population. From the very beginning of the *MfS*' the Ministry proclaimed to participate in the fight against the enemy. Performing the post and telephone con-

trol for purposes like these was considered as fruitful to execute. As the system was built up, the *MfS* did not accept all sorts of free meanings floating around, which surely would have caused dangers in terms of the existence of the *SED* regime. In fact, over the years, the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 developed in such a way that in practice by far led to an aspect of control having the possibility of being accomplished towards absolutely anyone. To a certain point, it is therefore possible to agree with authors that claim the *MfS* was not able to control everyone the Ministry practically could have controlled. However, the point is far more based on the *MfS* having had the potential to control anyone. As illustrated so far, the operational system made sure that nothing was sure - for anyone. The best way this was shown from the system of the *MfS* was through the method of fear, whereas exactly oneself could be the next one. Seen in the aftermath, if it had been possible, even Honecker could clearly have stated this. No one was to feel excluded from being controlled, which the factor fear provided. Thus, the fear and threat always having been present was perhaps as effective a controlling instrument as the active control itself was. This stated the crucial factor of the implied menace of the *MfS*' work.

From the analysed above, clearly, no one was exempted from control. An exemplary case towards illustrating that anyone could be within range and sight of the *MfS* concerned the older generations and invalid citizens of the GDR wanting to go abroad to pay a visit to their nearest ones. Such a case shows how the *MfS* viewed the risks and dangers concerning the security of the *SED*, whereas the fear also was present among the co-workers.

In fact, from the earliest days the tasks of control done by the Departments M and 26 were not only directed towards citizens of the GDR not working for the Ministry. We know by now the *MfS* accomplished control of co-workers, which was discussed as having been the internal controlling. It was made clear that this type of surveillance was a prioritised task to complete. Based on the permanent focus and updates on the internal controlling due to the conspiracy, this was effectively organised. That is, it was well organised particularly since the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 had a clear hierarchical structure resulting in all parts of the *MfS* knowing to any time exactly where they belonged. This was the reality, even though one had as little or the need-to-know information as possible. Since the co-workers knew accurately where they belonged, such a solution opened for a fast and easy way of finding out where a problem was located. Having the need-to-know principal of work applying to both the Departments M and 26, made it even more convenient regarding the alternatives of possessing a satisfying overview. How effective the functions of the system was, was illustrated on the example of the co-workers of the Department M that were caught of having committed criminal acts against the *MfS*.

The larger the system became, the clearer it became that the *MfS* 'had' to

spend increasingly time on internal control, most likely on the expense of the 'actual' control. Another example on how the structure of the system went hand in hand with the conspiracy and interest to do internal control is the cooperation with the *DVP*. Amongst others, this co-work also led to the Department M having the possibility to access all personal files of the citizens of the GDR. This was possible since the population had to be registered at the police for receiving identity papers. Having said the *MfS* controlled the citizens of the GDR obviously did not differentiate between 'regular' citizens and those citizens working on the 'same side' as the Ministry. To the latter, this included for example citizens employed in state functions like the *DVP*. Once the Department M had gotten access to these files coming from the *DVP*, the Department also used the information to undertake control of the employees of the *DVP*.

On the other hand, much of the reason why the *MfS* managed to act with success for many years was the fact that the co-workers, voluntarily or not, accepted the circumstances of these procedures. It was senseless to criticise the system and its patterns of work when oneself was a part of it. Especially based upon the practice of punishment if such was to take place. Based on the indoctrination of the system of the *MfS* and GDR, most co-workers did not even get as far as to develop thoughts like these mainly because of not being supposed to.

The internal controlling did not only take place through secret means and methods. It was also done more openly, which can be argued to be as effective as the first mentioned form. That is, we remember how the work at the control places of the Department M was executed, as the work could only be accomplished with at least a minimum of two persons having been present. Since with at least two persons being present while performing control, both of them held one another in check through a permanent eye on what the other did. Furthermore, even the working clothes were produced with a certain style primarily in order to hinder the co-workers cheating on the *MfS* through for example enrichment by stealing the content of mail. If this anyway were to happen, there would have been no place to put the theft since the working clothes deliberately were produced without pockets. Besides, other forms of controlling the co-workers also existed, making it more difficult for them to steal anything. One regular form of visible control was to control the co-workers every time they were to leave from work.

Like described several places above, the *MfS* was a locked society functioning through conspiracy. These having been facts were also reasons that most likely generated the fear. Since no one 'outside' the *MfS* knew what was going on 'inside' the *MfS*, the unknown consequences of what might happen once having done something 'against the *SED*' made the fear even stronger. The *MfS*' presence was like a dark shadow hanging over the GDR citizens, whereas permanently having been afraid since not knowing what and how the Ministry performed the controlling. The several and complex roles of the *IM*'s were as such analyses towards

these feelings and imaginations. The psychological effect to this showed to pay of for the *MfS*, since the fear also created a thought leading to be conscious about some sort of intimate control taking place - however, not knowing exactly what. Knowing nothing but the control having taken place made the citizens expect the worst.

Final Considerations

The subject of this thesis has been to look closer at the conditions, means and methods of the *MfS* in the GDR, on the examples of the Departments M and 26. Furthermore, it has been the aim of the thesis to seek the results, which illustrate the roles and functions of the Departments M and 26 in relation to their necessity for the *MfS* and system of the *SED*. That is, in order to be able to fulfil their determined roles inside a specific political system, having held a fundament of different interests aimed for reaching set goals. As such, the analysis of these Departments should be seen as being representative in comparison to other units of the *MfS*, in regards to grasp the general existence of the control mechanisms of the *MfS* that played a crucial part to maintain the power of the *SED*. This basis of functioning was related back to the particular context in which they existed, whereas the theoretical frame was accomplished through putting a main weight on the theory from Friedrich and Brzezinski. As with most theories, neither this one has been able to cover 'everything' concerning a specified matter. However, this was in any case neither the intention. Moreover, the theory was set out to function for the sake of approaching the GDR's system, based on the presumption to be a relevant theoretical tool. One might say the theory was applied out of the interest to officiate as a red line through the thesis, in order to have a theoretical aspect approaching the issues under investigation.

The investigation of the aforementioned was done through a chronological method, whereas the Parts naturally followed one another finally focusing on the analysis of the Departments M and 26. That is, in order to be able to understand the focus of the thesis, certain fundamental steps of such an approach and understanding of the control had to be taken in order of achieving insight of the types of mentioned surveillances and their patterns. Especially when considered that different states during the Cold War, and as of today, with different ways of governing, practice some sort of intelligence. An important factor was therefore to answer what made it unique for the GDR to have its secret service. Another concern was to understand how this service came about, and why it functioned. Furthermore, how it fulfilled its tasks. These approaches and more were addressed due to high relevance, for the sake of understanding the *SED* and *MfS* through fo-

cus on the post and telephone control.

Since we through the first Parts of the thesis already are acquainted with the *MfS* having functioned as the *SED*'s most important tool for keeping the masses in check, it was thereafter of interest to look closer at how the Ministry managed to do so. The roles and functions of the *MfS* were closer looked at, whereas this finally had its chief emphasis through the examples of analysing the Departments M and 26. This was done in order to investigate to which degree they can be said to have had influence on the maintenance of the system of society of the *SED*. Having been a part of the *MfS*, which yet again was a part of the state system, it was important to find out how these two units contributed as guarantors for the survival of the *SED*. Several empirical analyses were taken into consideration, whereas it was illustrated that the Departments M and 26 had crucial importance for the *MfS*, and thereby the *SED*. We know the Departments M and 26 exerted influences to a certain extent towards the development of the societal role of the *SED* (and *MfS*). According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, a security service has although a crucial role to play in such societies. It would therefore be suitable to consider these Departments further in relation to the theory. A great amount of material has been analysed in regards to the Departments M and 26. However, in order further to grasp the relation the Departments had in the overall system of the *MfS* and *SED*, some examples are intended scrutinised in the following aiming to illustrate their positional necessity.

Communication monopoly was one of the factors for totalitarian regimes Friedrich and Brzezinski considered as being of importance to control. Through many illustrations, the *MfS* took this task very seriously. With decisions coming from the *SED*, all citizens of the GDR were to develop and function unison, since the purpose was to reach the goals discussed. Therefore, the communication monopoly was present for raising the masses towards a homogenous stream. This was done by not allowing alternative press to exist, whereas the *SED* simultaneously tried to influence the population through own contributions of different communication. Typical means were the TV programs The Black Channel and Actual Camera as well as the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*. Having had a communication monopoly did not only mean influencing people through different measures. It also called for an influence through tasks of control. The Departments M and 26 strongly contributed to this, since the only larger main way for the citizens actively to communicate illegal material was through using the post and telecommunication. As we have seen, the purpose of such control was to get an overview of who communicated illegally as well as to track down those that spread information the *SED* regime considered illegal.

The *MfS* did not manage to control the entire aspects of communication, even with great help from the Departments M and 26. The theory assumed that states like the GDR had a communication monopoly. Practice in the GDR resulted in the

SED not having had a practical monopoly on this field, which furthermore contributes to weaken the theory. An important reason for the unsuccessful outcome of the communication monopoly was due to the communication technological development. This resulted in not having been able to close all channels of information into the GDR. One can in fact argue it may have made it even worse for the regime that the citizens having used illegal media only were able to achieve partially impressions of the system of the FRG than a more complete one. Particularly since not having received a more complete view of the other society, the population of the GDR may have got a kind of 'paradise' impression of the FRG. Mainly because one only got to know a few things, whereas only having been a few things therefore resulted in a tendency to focus only on and consider these as unconditionally better than the similar existing in the GDR. Having had a possibility of a more complete factual overview instead would probably made the people more critical and not as 'satisfied' with the other system. Amongst others, since they then would have seen the problems and negative sides.

The Departments M and 26 by far managed to control the post and telecommunication. However, not the other communicative possibilities the GDR citizens had, since the Departments M and 26 were only considered as cooperative units for such control. Additionally, these Departments, let alone, neither had the relevant resources for all work within this field. Most likely, it would not have made a difference, since no unit of the *MfS* finally managed to control this. Nevertheless, with their expertise the Departments M and 26 did their efforts to make it as difficult as possible for the citizens to be able to use any kind of communication the way they wanted. This does not only underline the Departments' importance related to their possessive roles. It also shows their wide contributions towards securing what the *SED* leaders reckoned as necessary towards fulfilling the correct development of the society, which furthermore strengthens the theory.

The *MfS*' Departments M and 26 put in all available efforts to crush down the opponents of the regime, in order to get rid of those communicative and communicated ideas that did not fit with the regime's politics. To act effectively, a frequently used signal effect used by the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 was the method of fear. Mainly based on the implied menace, which meant that always having been able to execute control was in effect as controlling as the practicing of this weapon. Regarding the active controlling, by far the Departments M and 26 managed to handle all sorts of cases. This shows the success of the *MfS*, which through its actions made sure to support the mass/leading party, the *SED*. These illustrations furthermore underline the theoretical aspects from Friedrich and Brzezinski. In relation to the aforementioned way of having acted can further be drawn back to the effective hierarchy, in regards to how the commands from the Departments M and 26 were given to accomplish the surveillance. In general, the society of the *SED* functioned identically, whereas this structure was one of many

rules within the *MfS* as well. Therefore, in order to achieve the decided goals, one blindly was to follow rules settled from the top. More detailed, the top in these cases was always one's next superior, which again had its next superior, and so on. This type of mean used in this particular context resulted in having been able to avoid any critics put forward. Based on the latter, this strengthens the theory. Mainly, since Friedrich and Brzezinski say that the people within the system in general were determined to unconditionally behave as subordinates towards the dictations of the highest institutions of the state.

The aforementioned reflects upon the system of power the GDR had where the stronger hand always was situated at the top, with less influences having been allowed to come from the lower level of the society. In the *MfS* it was principally not allowed to question orders having been given, a condition that in general was similar in the rest of the GDR regarding leader's authority. Concerning the Departments M and 26, the power to influence was only seen in relation to what position one had. One would nevertheless believe such a functioning, also simply due to having to hold a true need to motivate any worker, seeking development for the system and those working in it. As for the *MfS* concerning this point, the Ministry can be said to have had a rather unique behaviour in regards to bring motivation to the co-workers in terms of development. Perhaps the only real interest the *MfS* had to develop was when this brought advantages for the *SED* and Ministry. This led to the co-workers coming in second hand, if at all. Speaking of the motives and motivation, it was rather the system that was placed in the middle for the sake of the GDR's determined development. In many ways, both dependently and independently, the system forced to ignore the individuals' needs and interests. These facts also support the theory, because Friedrich and Brzezinski claim that the system's interests always had the right-of-way on the costs of individual wishes towards fulfilling its set goals.

On the other side, concerning the latter discussions, the strengthening of the theory should be of the moderate kind. Probably any secret service existing at the time as well as of today in the western world most likely to a certain degree also operated - and still operates - with a strong hierarchically, military built system. A system like this is known to hold few, flexible possibilities for the sake of being able to function. This shows the moderation of the strengthening of Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory, since this specific role of a secret service was and is not only characteristically for totalitarian societies.

The interest the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 had to act was by far based on the ideological ideas. These ideas were considered as fundaments for the GDR society and its development. The leading party of this society, the *SED*, converted the ideology into different means and methods, whereas the *MfS* was the most important for securing the progress towards the final goal. This included the Departments M and 26 acting thereafter. Through different ways of accomplishing

controls, these Departments' main task was to make sure the communist ideology and ideas were being executed. Simultaneously, the purpose was to exclude any alternative thinking and other possible thought that lay outside what the *SED* considered as the main stream of correct behaviour. In general, no exceptions were made, no matter where in the society one belonged, which age and background one had, etc. An earlier given example towards the general approach of the *MfS* regarding the aforementioned happened with the girl at school. This was shown to illustrate the way and role of acting when something illegal happened, where one of the main interests of acting laid in directly dealing with the problem as early as possible. To recall the case, illegal slogans had been written on walls at the school she once went to, which were considered as severe that the *MfS* came. Although the Main Department XX was responsible for this treatment, this particular case could not be solved without cooperating with the Department M. The case finally led to having found the guilty ones. However, this did not solve the whole problem, since the *MfS* considered it as important an issue to uncover the reasons for this. Thus, it was in many ways more crucial to clean the minds where such thoughts and motives existed, than it was to clean the physical dirt having been done. Simply since this was a severe attack on the ideology, mass party as well as the system. In this way, not only the control was important in terms of uncovering the crimes having been done. The aspect of repairing the real damage, i.e., through for example intensively checking upon the families, was as much a sign of dominating party power through the *MfS*' presence as it was to bring back the guilty ones back on an even keel.

Another similar case towards illustrating a typical pattern of reaction of the *MfS* was the incident of the teacher having committed a crime in the eyes of the *MfS*. This example showed the *MfS* having used its power and role in the system towards an individual that in practice did not have a chance to avoid the decisions having been ordered upon him from the *MfS*. By this, we yet again witnessed the functions and roles the *MfS* executed towards the population. Amongst others, since having been the only force that so to speak punished the citizens in the way it wanted, because of not having followed the system. In cases like these, the *MfS* acted as the all round investigator, judge and, more importantly, physical protector and punisher on behalf of the *SED*. We are familiar with how Friedrich and Brzezinski described the way the leading party uses a secret service to pull through its ideology. Based on the aforementioned facts of the two latter paragraphs, the examples related to the *SED* and *MfS* strengthens the theory's descriptions, since the *MfS* took into use several available functions towards fulfilling the interests of the political goals decided by the leading party.

Comparable examples of the success and importance of the Departments M and 26 with other units of the *MfS* towards preserving the *SED* took place, which a following example will illustrate. It was the Department XX of the ADM of

Rostock, which originally had activated operations for executing control of a family. More exactly, it was one particular person of the actual family that was in the vizier of the *MfS*, which qualified being registered as an *OPK*. This was accomplished since the person was believed to have done espionage to the disadvantage of the GDR as well as operating with negative publicity against the state. Amongst others, controls coming from the Departments M and 26 were undertaken. The surveillance managed to uncover the main suspect having had a huge network, which it had used in different ways. From the point of view of the *MfS*, these acts were defined as having broken GDR law. The secret service's effectiveness was once again confirmed, by having been able to catch an enemy of the GDR. Incidents like this, where for example crimes had taken place, generally automatically led to involving the *MfS* to act - based on its overall role and function in the GDR. The theory says that arbitrary and highly selective use of political power recognise the mass party amongst others through its security service. In this case, we saw the *MfS* having worked as such a tool on behalf of the party, widely deciding upon what was to be considered a crime. Due in this case to also having based upon not accepting different forms of communication other than the leading party's like the theory states is yet a factor underlining Friedrich and Brzezinski's approach. The same can be said about how the suspects were treated by the *MfS* especially after the Ministry's Departments M and 26 had found out that the main person illegally had criticised the societal system.

What simultaneously weakens the theory related to this is the role the *MfS* had towards these cases. Since, besides having been present to uncover criminal acts, the *MfS* at the same time allowed itself to judge whether it was a criminal offence in relation to this, that or the other. Additionally, one might argue that the *MfS* as such used the method of breaking the law to find out if citizens had committed violations of the law. This action shows that the *MfS* put itself above the law, as no law in this case apparently was to apply for the actions of the Ministry. By this, the *MfS* had created own, autonomous roles that also led to a greater independence from the rest of the system. In regards to the theory, these facts put together were not presumed. Rather, a security service did not act with such a great independence from the system, whereas resulting in going completely own ways with own 'rules'. Amongst others, in regards to the positional role the Ministry had, this behaviour shows the *MfS* having gone beyond the theory's assumption concerning the role a secret service was supposed to have.

The Departments M and 26 did not only fulfil work and cooperation with other units of the *MfS* finally aimed only for controlling the citizens of the GDR. With or without cooperation from other units of the Ministry, the Departments also controlled foreign citizens staying in the GDR. For different purposes, with time, a larger colony of foreign citizens was allowed to enter the GDR. The *MfS* interpreted this 'openness' towards foreigners as containing dangerous elements.

Since many of the foreigners 'belonged' to the biggest enemy - the capitalists, this automatically qualified them to be considered as threats to the GDR. From the point of view of the *MfS*, terrorist acts from these persons were one possible way to do damage against the republic. Therefore, the *MfS* used relevant available resources to get a satisfying overview of these persons. For preserving the regime and fight down the enemy activities, it was both necessary and important that the Departments M and 26 did useful work. A typical effort was checking if post contained indications of plans of such acts, or if they were telecommunicated. In the assistance of this *MfS* purpose, the Departments M and 26 also worked close together with other units. This resulted in an increased effectiveness towards hunting down possible criminals. Therefore, units like the Main Departments XXII (Terror Defence), XVIII (People's Economy), XIX (Traffic, Post, News), and XX were also put on the cases. Friedrich and Brzezinski address the totalitarian states' need to act with necessary means and measures against the enemy to secure the leadership and development of the system. Persons as those mentioned above came from state systems the theory considered a threat towards the survival of a state like the GDR. Underlining the theory's validity, a protectoral weapon against these enemies was constantly ready and unfolded through the efforts put in by the *MfS*. The *SED* state aimed for tracing the enemy, which for example was executed from the aforementioned units. In other words, through the help of the Ministry's resources, amongst others the Departments M and 26 supported the *SED* regime by acting against any estimated oppositional force of the GDR.

The Departments M and 26 did not only reap the benefits of the work through cooperating with others units of the *MfS*. From the very beginning of the Ministry's days, they also successfully cooperated with institutions outside the *MfS*. The partners cooperated with were not just like any other. These institutions held key positions in the GDR, not only in terms of treating the post and telecommunication. They were key positions for the *SED* and *MfS*, since it was of importance to control and have the overview over all alternative meanings existing at all times. The main tasks of completing this work lay in the hands of the Departments M and 26. They thereby managed to observe the citizens, all for the purpose of fulfilling the politics of the *SED*. This shows the theory is supported, since it relates to the party and security service activating any possible measure that assists towards achieving an all embracing surveillance of people's meanings and thoughts. As the *SED*'s tool, the *MfS* made sure to cooperate with crucial carriers of the post and telecommunication of the GDR for catching the enemy. Since the enemies amongst others were spreaders of critics against the regime, the *MfS*' Departments M and 26 were easier able to catch them through a close cooperation with any relevant organ of the state. These were tasks requiring huge efforts to be undertaken by the Departments, which therefore necessarily led to

operating with highest conspiracy. It was also of particular importance to execute the work by regularly undertaking internal control. A crucial contributor to such performance was made by the *IM*'s, which directly or indirectly also had to do with the Departments M and 26. Without this type of co-workers, the *MfS* could not possibly know what took place at all. Although the co-workers or any other having cooperated with the *MfS* accepted this taking place - if known at all, still, the permanent knowledge of knowing to be watched nevertheless made the feeling of always fearing something an effective tool for the *MfS*. The latter factors of the *MfS* like conspiracy, fear, etc., helps to show the relevance of Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory. In this way, because the theory relates to behaviour like this used by the security service of this type of state as being effective means on behalf of fulfilling and preserving the leading party's politics. These efforts contributed considerably to underline the power the *SED* through the *MfS* had towards the population.

Besides the Departments M and 26 cooperating with other units outside the *MfS*, they also had frequent contact with other similar communication controlling units existing in the other socialist states of Europe. This cooperation was seen as yet another approach for the Departments M and 26 in terms of increasing its effectiveness towards controlling the GDR citizens. Looking at for example the Department M, since the Department was to hinder alternative communication from spreading through the German Post, oppositional forces of the GDR used other socialist countries' post systems of Europe to spread their messages. Based on the efforts from these groupings, they were not only considered as highly dangerous for the GDR from the point of view of the *MfS*. Since speculatively operating in and from other socialist states of Europe, they were also considered a risk factor for the complete socialist bloc. This was given great attention already from the earliest days of existence, although perhaps not always having had success. As early as only a few years after WW II the socialist countries in Europe were already to experience how alternative behaviour could develop. For example, the *MfS* had had its chaotic days with the 1953 incident in the GDR. Shortly after, revolts took place in Hungary, 1956. The enemy, trying to tear down the system with all means had to be stopped with all means. This was a typical reason for the *MfS* to increase its work - also through cooperating with relevant units existing in the socialist states of Europe. As such, the Prague Spring (1968) is an example illustrating one of many important and successful occasions for the surveillance apparatus. This turned out to be a fact, since amongst others having made extra efforts within the Department M along the already existing measures. Due to these efforts, the Department did not decrease the search for post containing critics towards any socialist state. Mail of importance found was placed in special registrations together with information on the sender and receiver. Illustrating the importance of this work, this type of cooperation with other socialist states also

existed during 'regular' periods, and was maintained until the very end of the *MfS*'
existence.

Based upon the functions and conditions of the system of the state, looking
up the enemy was effectively executed both nationally and internationally. This
was the reality, for example since having worked according to the structures of the
locked society. In such a society, the complete composition of the different roles
made the work a success even though no one was supposed to know what the other
one did exactly. Nevertheless, this was a fact, much thanks to the method of work-
ing under conspiracy. Based on the approaches towards surveillance executed by
the *MfS*' Departments M and 26 as well as seen in the context under which they
existed, the analysis in the latter paragraph underlines the theory. The latter being
a matter of fact, because the GDR's political and physical control apparatus faced
oppositional attacks from the abroad against which they reacted. Handlings like
these were in the spirit of how Friedrich and Brzezinski describe it when such a
state was actively fought by any enemy from anywhere in the world opposing its
system of society. The countries of the socialist bloc had a common goal, which
was to work for reaching the communist society. Since this was an overhanging
goal of the development, in the case of the *SED* and *MfS* it was considered as
legitimate to act with those means as described.

Although 'Mielke's' Ministry had great power to act on behalf of the *SED*
and own politics for crushing the enemy, not all activities were put in only for
these purposes. In the first place, when necessary, they were not at least used until
later. An important part of the work for these Departments was also to achieve
an overview of the situation before taking action. In this way, remaining impor-
tant until their end, the means of the Departments M and 26 turned useful already
from the earliest days of their existence. This can be stated by two typical ex-
amples of the Department M. The first case having had its start year in 1955 was
at first considered as small, although not as small for the *MfS* not to act. In fact,
commands set out to be completed came from highest authority, because Mielke
was involved. At first, Mielke wanted to act against the registered disorder that
took place at one particular university of the GDR. However, this was not enough
for Mielke and the *MfS* to be able to undertake a representative surveillance, since
suspects were estimated to have been anywhere. Therefore, to make solutions of
acting applicable against anyone Mielke used the opportunity to register all sus-
picious persons in the GDR that somehow had connections to the universities and
colleges of the GDR. Furthermore, we have seen that these types of control in-
creased and were heavier focused on. This emphasises the importance of wanting
to know everything to be able to deal with the unwanted behaviour in the popu-
lation at any stage. Having archived the persons with the help of the Department
M, the *MfS* was ready to act when this would have been necessary. This method
of working shows the Ministry having been ready and capable to act against the

enemy on shortest notice, in order to crush them before they used the chance to further actions against the party.

The other case concerns the year 1956, in which the *NVA* was built. This resulted in the GDR having an army of its own. Considering the context, having an own army in such a short time after WW II in a so-called peace loving state could bring about frustration in the population with dangers of escalation. Therefore, to map the feelings floating around in the society called for efforts by the security service. The key point settled implied to capture and hinder any hatred writings spreading about the army. Additionally, the Department M also wanted to check the atmosphere among the soldiers and their family members as well as the general opinion that existed in the population to the founding. In regards to the aforementioned, neither this was thereafter lower prioritised. As witnessed, the opposite took place, because it always remained an important factor to observe the different meanings existing in the population. Whether it concerned matters about the GDR or more 'trivial' issues, having been communicated through the post or telecommunication.

The discussions from the two latter paragraphs show a support of the theory. Thus, since Friedrich and Brzezinski say that the security service in such a state acts against any incidents of disorder, unwanted behaviour as well as being prepared to crush the enemy with different means at any time based upon these factors being threats to the regime's determined present and future. The cases of 1955 and 1956 clearly stress the precise positions of the *MfS* and *SED*, since the reasons were adequate for the Ministry to be alert in order accomplish vital tasks on behalf of the *SED*. As we are familiar with, the goal of the *SED* was after all to maintain an uncritical population accepting no alternative thoughts without its agreement, no matter which spheres in the society one belonged.

While the co-workers of the Departments M and 26 were busy doing one type of surveillance, the Departments parallel kept accounts on other interests of control that came about as effects of the original controlling. This was a typical working procedure for these Departments, which can be illustrated with an example in order to underline the point. Concerning the controlling of the post, only in the year 1985 the ADM of Dresden managed to confiscate a huge amount of money. When for example having searched for money sent with the post, it was regular conduct to register the amount taken out. Besides holding the overview of what was done, such accountancy also provided for the possibility to check the work of the co-workers. That is, to undertake internal control. Firstly, this example does not only show the *MfS* having controlled the post illegally in order to find enemies, it also operated illegally by stealing the content. Secondly, the methods of controlling not only imply the *MfS* having operated with conspiracy in order to avoid being uncovered. The structures of having had the effective hierarchy and thereby the need-to-know basis regarding possession of information, the functions of the

locked society as well as the method of conspiracy also made sure the possibility to do internal controlling was an alternative. This was manageable to accomplish since the way of fulfilling the work resulted in giving as little insight as possible of what one did to the fellow co-worker. Therefore, if a suspicion from a co-worker towards this particular matter would have appeared, in practice the one suspicious thought would not have been any more reasonable than the other. This is arguable, since not knowing the complete view of the actual surveillance and its aims. This automatically kept the co-workers in check. The aforementioned strengthens the theory, since the security organ of the state applied different means of control mainly for uncovering as well as securing the regime against the enemy like the theory addresses. Efforts like these also included to hinder any operation executed by the enemy, which was able to do damage against the totalitarian state's system and development. Besides, anything that was of use to the benefit of the system regardless of the *MfS*' actions having been accomplished legally or not, the Ministry made sure to abuse and trespass the citizens' private spheres by for example systematically controlling the post and thereby collecting any content of value.

As illustrated so far in regards to the examples of the Departments M and 26, we have seen all sorts of possible surveillance having been done. Thus, since practically all of the cases resulted in some sort of side effects, which mostly led to advantages for the *MfS* in terms of having become even more effective than perhaps originally planned. The structures and methods of working were arranged and functioned in such a complex way that it would almost be surprising if a result that was aimed for would not have given the *MfS* more than one single benefit. On the top of it was Mielke. One can only imagine the enormous power the Minister had, when only looking at the relation of power the Departments M and 26 had. The conditions of the system, which underlined that only one ideology and one party were to incorporate the citizens towards the future goals, were naturally also applicable to the *MfS*. Like Stalin, an exemplary towards the use of this opportunity was Mielke. Since he cleverly made sure to build the *MfS* in such a way that especially led to his unique role, and thereby others roles. This background helps to understand why the Ministry managed to be so effective, since the power was clearly levelled. Furthermore, this meant holding exact positioning of everyone having taken part in the system actively or not. Since the system was determined this way, it simply had to lead to a few people sitting in higher positions - whether the *MfS* or not - holding wide power on behalf of many. No matter what the system looked like, the effective hierarchy structure was arranged since the priority was to accomplish the politics. Simultaneously, in order to avoid as many 'unnecessary' problems as possible, the Ministry made sure to operate within a locked society. Provided with factors such as effective hierarchy, locked society and conspiracy, the functions of the *MfS* were believed to be waterproof against any threat from inside as well as outside. An example of such was the Captain of the Depart-

ment 26 of the ADM of Rostock's story about the highly secret unit within this person's ADM, which quite systematically and accurate worked to check out co-workers without their knowledge. Another example is the case were co-workers of the Department 26 had found out that other co-workers had taken part in illegal actions, whereas further investigations to these actions easily were stopped from higher authorities within the Ministry. Related to the analysis in this paragraph, the theory is strengthened. In this way, since Friedrich and Brzezinski point at these societies having clear hierarchical structures of powers all over, whereas using different means of any thinkable power to make sure the settings remain the way the rulers of the state have decided. This means that through the different means of power, particularly the party and its security organ use force according to own comfort to determine the people unconditionally to become subordinates totally adapted to the wishes of the rulers of the state. Related to the GDR and *MfS*, this had to be done since it was seen as the most effective way to lead the masses onto a common path. Clear, hard, etc., hierarchy with its belonging power under the known conditions - small and large - was to make the masses remain silent as well as devoted to the leadership. Furthermore, regarding developing the society and every single individual, it was only the leaders of the system (party, security organs, etc.) that were able to accomplish the crucial task that was to the advantage of the collective. In the GDR, the party made sure it had a security service by the presence of the *MfS* that could contribute heavily to its settled politics and given goals. As we have seen, two vital organs of the *MfS* fulfilling these tasks were the Departments M and 26.

The characteristic for both the Departments M and 26 was the frequent and non-stopping expansion, which had begun from day one of existence. Especially during the first years with Honecker in office, the control apparatus of the *MfS* developed into astronomic magnitudes in terms of aiming to solve any possible relevant issue concerning control. This was partly related to the problems the GDR had to cope with in different ways, whereas a solution for handling many of them apparently was to enlarge the *MfS*. The enlargement also included the Departments M and 26, particularly since they were seen as vital for the work of the *MfS* in many ways. This was clearly expressed by Mielke, who often took an interest to engagement towards these Departments. Amongst others, this was for example stated by the many commands he personally was involved in. Another example would be the formal position the Department M held in the *MfS*, as it finally was directly under control from Mielke. We have also seen the Department 26 having been placed directly under Mielke for many years. Even though this was not the case for the Department 26 until 1989, Mielke several times nevertheless clearly signalised its importance. In this way, since for example the Department 26 in the ADM's was directly subordinated the leader (of the ADM). As witnessed, Mielke had through all his years as leader of the Ministry enormous power. The

effect of this was realised through the structures and methods of the Departments M and 26.

As the problems of the GDR especially increased in the 1980's, the *MfS* and the analysed Departments were overloaded with new tasks and challenges. In relation to this, we have witnessed the already dominating conduct of control from the Central towards the district having turned even more centralised, leaving less power to the districts and thereby the many thousands subordinated co-workers. The *MfS* having been overloaded with new tasks and challenges at the beginning of the last decade led to difficulties in coping with the situations as 'easily' as earlier. Let alone, it was not the *MfS* having been the start of the problems. By far, the relation in the world politics - especially towards Moscow, led to the GDR coming in difficulties. Additionally, the GDR's economy was more or less bankrupt. Among the many expenses it dealt with, a considerable one was the enormously built *MfS*. One problem led to the other. Since having huge problems within the state, the regime's development 'demanded' larger controls to be undertaken by the Ministry. Furthermore, since this required more efforts to be done from the *MfS*, the Ministry needed more resources in terms of financial support to be able to carry out the work. The only problem was there were no places able to care for such support.

The reasons for the internal and external challenges were many, and only seemed to grow with time. Many of the problems had its origin in the GDR society, because of the politics of the *SED*. In order to cope with the ever-growing dissatisfaction of the population, these politics also meant a strengthening of the surveillance executed by the *MfS*. In many ways, this further led to putting the responsibility on the *MfS* in order to solve the existing problems, which yet again led to a "must" towards extending its tasks. The Departments M and 26 followed the development, where increasingly cooperation was asked upon these Departments to be able to solve the tasks. This shows their necessity, as the surveillance done by the *MfS* hardly could have been performed without the Departments M and 26. As such, the increased cooperation coming with time to a certain extent brought success for the *MfS*. From an *MfS* point of view, it was for example both necessary and correct of certain units of the *MfS* to cooperate with the Department M in order to uncover explosives that had been sent by the post. Many would as such claim that this type of work is a relevant task for a security service.

As witnessed, the cooperation did not only exist between the *MfS*' units. From the very first years, such also took place between the Departments M and 26 and the German Post as well as the Customs Service. The *MfS* also reaped the fruits of international contacts. A classical notification towards such benefits would be to make a reflection on the special machines that supportively came from the socialist countries enabling the Department M to control the post both faster and better than it did before possessing such equipment. Had it not been for opportunities like

these due to the *SED* and *MfS*' international sphere of cooperation, the Department would not have been able to do the work as effectively. Regarding the later years, the cooperation was also as importantly arranged. In this way, since the *MfS* in a pressed way 'had' to cooperate with own as well as 'external' forces, due to the problem of fewer resources. By far the Ministry meant it was able to compensate the latter by working closer together with the available instances, believing this to result in higher effectiveness. On one side, it gave results. On the other side, having done increasingly 'unnecessary' work also became a fact. This was the case, since having more and irregular cooperative partners than before resulted in 'having' to control them as well.

The problems in the society did not appear by itself. Neither did they come as rapidly without having had the possibility to react. On the contrary, they had existed for a long time, whereas few were solved to the satisfaction of the population. Rather, the *MfS* was present in order to handle the dissatisfaction, however, not solving the actual problems - many would say, at least not in accordance with the citizens. Having to deal with this context finally made the existence difficult for both the *SED* and *MfS*. The *MfS* simply was not capable to solve the general dissatisfaction existing in the population, although it constantly grew to be able to treat the situations - which it to a large degree managed. However, with a bankrupt state where few resources were left to any matter made life difficult for the Ministry. Besides, not only did the *MfS* have to cope with the external challenges. In the later years, a certain growing internal dissatisfaction among the co-workers was visible as well. All in all, perhaps not as surprising, since such a country was not build upon and did not have its fundament and cornerstone of existence through the support of the people living inside.

The last thing the system would have expected to take a stand on was those internal challenges. The system of the *MfS* was not made to deal with this as a starting point. Mainly because the power and the hierarchy of the *MfS* factually dominated by a few, Mielke holding the unique power of those, was not able to change from within, where the organisation of tasks always only went one way - from top to bottom. Problems were in any case not made easier as it turned out that the older generation belonging to the elite were interested in placing the younger, upcoming co-workers in high positions as for example shown in the ADM of Rostock. Thus, since the latter co-workers were brought up to follow the system with iron fist after having visited the party schools of the *MfS*, which did not exist during the time the older generation went to work for the Ministry. These politics were believed to secure the power of the elite, even if the younger co-workers necessarily did not have the qualified competence for their forthcoming positions. Not surprisingly, without claiming hindsight however, perhaps for most co-workers, how could any of them lastly be able to remain with trust and believe in the system when even the top ranking leader feared their own men? This has

been shown through several examples, whereas this was a characteristic way of working for the *MfS*. As such, the last leader of the ADM of Rostock was one out of many who existed within such a frame, which has been confirmed by the Captain of the Department 26 of this ADM conversed with. Thus, as the Captain told that Mittag had made sure to install cameras and microphones in his office.

Additionally, the political situation in Moscow gave clear signals of leaving the traditional socialist direction, which from then on left the GDR alone with considerably decreased support from Moscow. The disappointment and bewilderment of a considerable number of co-workers finally resulted in many simply deciding to leave the security service even if not legally agreed. A typical example of the opposite taking place is the co-worker of the *MfS* joining the protest marches that took place 1989, as if it would have been the most natural thing to do.

Seen in the light of the incident of 1953, during the final years as well as for the aforementioned year the *MfS* knew that severe problems in the society existed that could have fatal outcome for the leadership of the GDR. However, the major difference to the later years was, firstly, that the *MfS* more definitely knew what the problems were. Secondly, this time it directly involved the *MfS*, partly based on its internal challenges. Although the *MfS* during the later years held considerably greater power than in 1953, it was nevertheless incapable of acting to be able to solve the critical phases. The way the *SED* had the power to respond to the challenges of 1953, so could the *MfS* during the later years. In some ways, to a certain degree the Ministry also did.

However, the actions taken were not enough, although - at least theoretically, sitting with large powers. Even though the *SED* acted in 1953, it had to base its actions upon the help of the Soviet Union. These days were over, leaving the *SED* and *MfS* on their own to find a best possible way out. The party and *MfS* having most of the actual power in the GDR were not anymore able to realise it, perhaps of the reason of having been caught by the 'logic' of such a system. Additionally, having a system of such complexity as the GDR's, knowing what the *MfS* was capable of doing, taking the present situation into consideration, etc., gave a result of being far less capable of deciding towards finding a satisfying outcome for all involved. Perhaps the biggest challenge was in the *MfS* itself, where no one in the hierarchy seriously dared to 'challenge' the other. One can only imagine what would have happened if one had decided to take such a huge step.

Since having less practical alternatives, it is obvious that the system of the *MfS* (along the *SED*'s) as time went by slowly but surely headed towards a dysfunctional status, which finally meant leading into an incapable role - including the very top of the *MfS*. This was also analysed through the many tasks of the Departments M and 26, which were overloaded with work coming from all directions. Therefore, it can further be emphasised that the analysis of the Departments M and

26 in many ways are representative aspects for the general view and development of the whole of the *MfS*. As illustrated, mainly because these Departments, having been the end stations of actual control with their status as mission-taking units, normally performed work of interest on behalf of the mission-giving units. The first thoughts to act towards cases were normally developed by the mission-giving units before having been passed on for realisation in the Departments M and 26. In other words, the Departments M and 26 were contacted to contribute to solve tasks already having been settled by other units of the *MfS*. These other units were normally to know which units of the *MfS* that carried the relevant means needed for completing different tasks.

In all the hectic, it may seem as if the *MfS* finally neither was able to consider who the 'actual' enemies were, nor in which direction to orientate. Only taken the matter of increased cooperation having taken place between the Departments M and 26 and many other elements that existed both inside and outside the Ministry, led to the *MfS*' severely racking its brains to make the ends meet. A particularity, since for example the measures of control having been taken in a wide sense not unusual concerned as much the control of own co-workers as the 'actual' targets. By this, the suggestion of arguing the *SED* and *MfS* system having led to dysfunctional paths is further emphasised, since this type of control frequently increased engendering even more control. On the other side, which perhaps exactly finally became one of the major problems in such a system was the fact that 'nothing was actual' anymore. Thoughts like these make one further ask to what use the huge network of control had.

On one hand, an impressive thoroughness and capacity to treat any possible matter, important or not, with the equal interest and aim of conspiracy became, on the other hand, the *MfS*' violent death. Typical incidents of these measures were the ones settled concerning the different procedures the *MfS* took towards observing the Pentecost meeting of the GDR's youth. Alternatively, how the *MfS* with great interest treated the surveillance of youths and students that were concerned with the eight world's meetings of youths and students in North Korea. It may also seem as if even the consideration that all human beings were seen as a security concern for the *SED* regime and *MfS* had lost its reasonable role and function regarding the whole cause. The latter as well as similar cases was one of many challenges that made existence difficult for the *MfS*. Overall, mainly influenced by politics lying beyond the powers and scope of the *MfS*, one might say the Ministry disintegrated as a matter of nature due to not being needed anymore. Perhaps the closest one can get to evidence concerning the functions of the *MfS* in terms of its means, methods and conditions was the successful and dominating role it turned out to have in the society of the GDR the years 1953-1989. For securing the *SED* regime, one of the *MfS*' greatest aims was to avoid another June Uprising. This shows the surveillance through the *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 undoubt-

edly by far contributed to keep the GDR's citizens in check, on a general basis performed in accordance with the politics of the *SED* and Moscow.

In their theory, Friedrich and Brzezinski includes a security service as being one of the most important tools a totalitarian regime has to reach its goals. Without doubt, we have witnessed the *MfS* having led to emphasising this assumption. In fact, the roles and functions of the *MfS* often turned out to be more extensive than the theory presumed, albeit underlining both its own and the GDR system's importance when considered from a point of view of a totalitarian context. This was mainly based on the *MfS*' connections to the interests towards the determined goals, which in the first place was settled by the *SED*. In many ways, an organisation like the *MfS* simply had to exist in this society of the *SED*, in order to be one of the few crucial players that could and would complete the tasks given. As witnessed, one of the main reasons for the GDR lastly having been left with a dysfunctional society system was based upon the security service not functioning anymore. The *MfS* was finally not able to function much because the party in many ways became superfluous for the society. Additionally, the end status of these two vital organs for the state was largely to 'blame' each other. The essential chain for ruling the GDR became increasingly worn out with time finally leading to an end of its existence, since the one not having been able to pull the other and vice versa.

Based upon the aforementioned, we can therefore deduce to argue the *MfS* was in many ways the most important factor to maintain the *SED*'s existence and regime. Although the system had a certain ideology, security service, mass party as well as a communication monopoly theoretically having been 'politicalised' by the *SED*, it often turned out that the *MfS* in many ways was the factual leader running the state. In this way, since having existed in the particular context with an enormous apparatus having been able to perform surveillance and possess power to such an extent that practically led to a superior dominance over a great amount of actual power of the *SED*. As already concluded, this made the *MfS* go beyond the theory, however, not moving away from totalitarian style, rather, the contrary. Nevertheless, even though having had such a position, the Ministry was present for the sake of accomplishing the determined goals, whereas the party after all was the leading figure towards deciding such political actions. Therefore, undoubtedly, although Friedrich and Brzezinski's theory takes the starting point in terms of explaining a totalitarian state having the known features, the analysed has shown that in nearly all segments of the *SED* state these features somehow involved the *MfS*, and vice versa. Even if Friedrich and Brzezinski did not include this, the overall presentation of the *MfS* above has shown their theory to be applicable to the *MfS* of the GDR.

Within all the differentiations and segments once existing inside the GDR, particularly connected to the *MfS*, large or small, were the Departments M and

26. The Departments M and 26 were two out of many units the *MfS* disposed. Through their work, these Departments greatly contributed to the Ministry's interests. Having existed in such a huge organisational system of power and influence, the link concerning the importance and necessity of reaching the determined goals for a state as the GDR was quite short from these ideas to the Departments' roles and functions, mainly since having done the attempts towards fulfilment through the *MfS*. Having in mind the necessity of having a security organ apparent in such states as proclaimed by Friedrich and Brzezinski, we have through the thesis witnessed why and how the Departments M and 26 were present. These Departments were crucial factors of finally supporting the *SED* regime, which therefore is the main reason for having done the related reflections regarding the theory. That is, it cannot be sufficiently stressed the various ways the Departments M and 26 assisted the *MfS* and *SED* towards maintaining the GDR's system, a system undoubtedly considered as having functioned with totalitarian features.

Having been directly reflected upon these Departments, the theory turned out to be strengthened as well as weakened. Thus, since the means, methods and conditions of the *MfS*' by far was executed with the help of totalitarian techniques. To the latter, particularly towards the analysis of the Departments M and 26, we have witnessed the theory having been applied and confronted with the facts of the material used above. Disregarding the theory, the *SED*'s practice of certain ideas in order to make the country function were emphasised as the overhanging importance towards the development of the superior goals descending from the ideology (and thereby the *SED*). As such, we had the theory, which, on one hand, was applied as a stereotype for certain purposes of the thesis, with aims to 'explain' the GDR, *MfS* and its Departments M and 26 through different analytical approaches. On the other hand, the theory was used for being applied towards a specific frame, i.e., considered the aim of the thesis. Therefore, the theory that has been taken into use both could not capture and has not captured any possible aspect of the *SED* society, hereunder, including the *MfS*' and its Departments M and 26. Friedrich and Brzezinski have evaluated a secret service as being crucial in a totalitarian system. It has been shown that the Departments M and 26 had very important roles for both the *MfS* and *SED*. Based upon the sum of the aforementioned; it is possible to argue that the theory from Friedrich and Brezinski in general has been strengthened, also after having considered the roles and functions of the Departments M and 26.

As a summons to future research, it is advisable to investigate the other units of the *MfS* the same, detailed way. Thus, afterwards to be able to put together the results as a mosaic picture, in order to achieve an overall picture of the East German security service, the *MfS*.

German Abbreviations

Afas *Auftragsfahndung bei abgehenden Sendungen* (Mission Investigation Towards Outgoing Mail)

AfNS *Amt für Nationale Sicherheit* (Office for National Security)

AG BKK *Arbeitsgruppe Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung* (Work Group Area Commercial Coordination)

AG E *Arbeitsgruppe E* (Work Group E)

AG G *Arbeitsgruppe Geheimnisschutz* (Work Group Secrecy Protection)

AGL *Arbeitsgruppe des Leiters* (The Leader's Work Group)

AGM *Arbeitsgruppe des Ministers* (The Minister's Work Group)

AKG *Auswertungs- und Kontrollgruppe* (Evaluation and Control Group)

BdL *Büro der Leitung* (Office of the Leadership)

BKG *Bezirkskoordinierungsgruppe* (Administrative District Coordination Group)

BKK *Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung* (Area Commercial Coordination)

BStU *Die/Der Bundesbeauftragte(r) für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic)

BV *Bezirksverwaltung* (Administrative District Management)

CDU *Christlich Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)

CFS *Chiffriertes Fernschreiben* (Ciphered Telex)

DBD *Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands* (Democratic Peasants Party of Germany)

DDR	*Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic, East Germany)
DVdI	*Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern* (German Administration of Interior)
DVP	*Deutsche Volkspolizei* (German People's Police)
FDGB	*Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (Free German Trade Union Confederation)
FDJ	*Freie Deutsche Jugend* (Free German Youth)
FIM	*Führungs Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* (Leading Unofficial Co-worker)
Gestapo	*Geheime Staatspolizei* (Secret State Police)
GMS	*Gesellschaftlicher Mitarbeiter für Sicherheit* (Society Co-worker for Security)
HIM	*Hauptamtlicher Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* (Professional Unofficial Co-worker)
HV A	*Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung* (Main Administration Reconnaissance)
IM	*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* (Unofficial Co-worker)
IMB	*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter Bearbeitung* (Unofficial Co-worker Elaboration)
IME	*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter im bzw. für einen besonderen Einsatz* (Unofficial Co-worker in, respectively, for a Special Operation)
IMK	*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter zur Sicherung der Konspiration und des Verbindungswesens* (Unofficial Co-worker to the Security of the Conspiracy and Connection)
IMS	*Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter Sicherheit* (Unofficial Co-worker Security)
KgU	*Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit* (Fight Group Against Inhumanity)
KKW	*Kernkraftwerk* (Nuclear Power Plant)
Komintern	*Kommunistische Internationale* (Communist International)
KPD	*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany)
KW	*Kurzwelle* (Short Wave)
K 5	*Kommissariat 5* (Commissariat 5)

LDPD	*Liberal Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Liberal Democratic Party of Germany)
MfS	*Ministerium für Staatssicherheit* (Ministry for State Security)
MdI	*Ministerium des Innern* (Ministry of Interior)
MPF	*Ministerium für Post- und Fernmeldewesen* (Ministry for Post and Telecommunication)
NDPD	*National Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* (National Democratic Party of Germany)
NVA	*Nationale Volksarmee* (National People's Army)
OibE	*Offizier im besonderen Einsatz* (Officer in Special Operation)
OPK	*Operative Personenkontrolle OPK* (Operative Personal Control)
OTS	*Operativ-Technischer Sektor* (Operative-Technical Sector)
OV	*Operativer Vorgang* (Operative Process)
PM	*Paß- und Meldewesen* (Passport and Registration Office)
PDS	*Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (Party of Democratic Socialism)
PID	*Politisch-Ideologische Diversion* (Political-Ideological Diversion)
PUT	*Politische Untergrundtätigkeit* (Political Underground Activity)
SBZ	*Sowjetische Besatzungszone* (Soviet Occupation Zone)
SED	*Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SfS	*Staatssekretariat für Staatssicherheit* (State Secretariat for State Security)
SMAD	*Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland* (Soviet Military Administration in Germany)
SPD	*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
SR AWK	*Selbständiges Referat Abwehr Wehrkommando* (Independent Division Defence Protection Commando)
SR B/CD	*Selbständiges Referat Bewaffnung/Chemischer Dienst* (Independent Division Armament/Chemical Service)
SR GS	*Selbständiges Referat Grenzsicherheit* (Independent Division Boarder Security)

SR PS	*Selbständiges Referat Personenschutz* (Independent Division Person Protection)
SS	*Schutzstaffel* (Protection Force)
Stasi	*Staatssicherheit* (State Security)
StGB	*Strafgesetzbuch* (Criminal Law Book)
StPo	*Strafprozeßordnung* (Criminal Process Regulation)
TV	*Teilvorgang* (Part Process)
UfJ	*Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen der Sowjetzone* (Committee of Inquiry of Free Lawyers of the Soviet Zone)
UKW	*Ultra Kurzwelle* (Ultra Short Wave)
VEB	*Volkseigener Betrieb (Nationally Owned Enterprise)*
VRD	*Verwaltung Rückwärtige Dienste* (Administration Reflective Service)
ZAGG	*Zentrale Arbeitsgruppe Geheimnisschutz* (Central Work Group Secrecy Protection)
ZAIG	*Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe* (Central Evaluation and Information Group)
ZK	*Zentralkomitee* (Central Committee)
ZKG	*Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe* (Central Coordination Group)
ZMD	*Zentraler Medizinischer Dienst* (Central Medical Service)
ZOS	*Zentraler Operativstab* (Central Operative Staff)
ZOV	*Zentraler Operativer Vorgang* (Central Operative Process)

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