



## 1. Introduction and research questions

Over the last two decades after the Rio-1992, forests and their associated protection and utilisation issues have become significant at an international level of forest governance (Edwards and Giessen 2014; McDermott 2012; Rahman and Giessen 2014) and, as a result, an international forest regime has evolved (Giessen 2013a; 2013b; Gluck *et al.* 2010; Humphreys 1996, 2006), which comprises a wide range of international policies, institutions and actors. Recent scholarship has characterised the regime as an international forest regime complex (IFRC) (Rayner *et al.* 2010), consisting of a number of partly competing/partly reinforcing elements, such as forest-related biodiversity, trade and climate provisions (Giessen 2013a, 2013b; Gluck *et al.* 2010; Humphreys 1999, 2006; McDermott *et al.* 2010; Rayner *et al.* 2010; Rahman and Giessen 2014). A regime is defined as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982: 186). An actor can express his ideas through learning and socialisation process attaching to the development process of issue areas within the regime (see Smouts 2008; Rahman and Giessen 2014).

Following globalisation and internationalisation, the influence of non-domestic actors on domestic policy processes has been rising, and diverse actors and institutions have started to extend their influence beyond state borders (Arts *et al.* 2010; Bernstein and Cashore 2010; Howlett and Ramesh 2002; Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Rahman *et al.* 2016a). In this context, the actual influence that international actors, institutions and policies can have in different domestic settings is of current research interest (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Giessen 2012; McDermott *et al.* 2010; Burns and Giessen 2015; Rahman *et al.* 2016a). According to Bernstein and Cashore (2010, p. 111), ‘the ultimate goal of many international and transnational attempts to address global problems is to influence domestic policy making processes rather than simply to constrain or modify the external behaviour of states’. To understand the influence of non-domestic actors on domestic policy process, Bernstein and Cashore (2010, 2012) developed a framework that explains four distinct pathways of influence: international rules, international norms and discourse, interventions in market, and direct access to domestic policy making process and each of the pathways has its own causal logic of influence (Rahman *et al.* 2016a). According to the theorem of direct access, domestic policy change may be influenced by direct funding, education, training, assistance, and capacity building, and probably even by the formation, through ‘co-governance’, of partnerships between authorities and public or private actors, both domestic and international (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Rahman *et al.* 2016a).

Donor organisations are non-domestic actors that operate with and within sovereign recipient countries (Rahman *et al.* 2016a). As such, they have limited formal options to influence decisions on domestic policies. Nonetheless, given their financial, technical, and expertise-related means, they may be expected to have a considerable degree of formal and informal influence over domestic policy issues (*ibid.*). The motivations for donor countries and organisations to engage in developmental aid have been questioned for a long time, and such questions have consistently been on the development policy research agenda



(Aurenhammer 2013, 2015; Brukas and Hjortsø 2004; Harriss-White 2002; Khan 2009; Ojha et al. 2014). According to Boyce (2002), “Instead of viewing aid as a flow of resources from donor countries to recipient countries, we must reframe the discourse and practice of aid to ask the critical questions: aid from whom, aid to whom and aid for what ends?” This statement invokes the critical question: what are the formal and informal interests of the donors who allocate development project aid (Rahman and Giessen Unpublished)? According to Krasner (1982), a basic question in the study of international regimes might be: What is the relationship between regimes and the basic causal factors, such as power, interests, and values? The interests of relevant actors influence the adoption and implementation of forest issue elements at the domestic level (Rahman and Giessen 2014). Hence, forest biodiversity, forest-related climate change, community-based forest management etc. are important issues in the international forest regime, and one might question which actors (domestic and international) benefit from the issue by engaging in relevant policy tasks.

Moreover, according to the broader aspect of bureaucratic politics theory, the donor as a foreign state bureaucracy consists of formal and informal interests (Aurenhammer 2013; Krott 2005; Rahman and Giessen 2014). In the broad policy field, they compete by attracting national and international allies who contribute power resources and by formulating policies. Through these processes, different public bureaucracies including the donors, through their development cooperation, use domestic (biodiversity/climate change) policies to acquire new tasks for their organizations and, in doing so, further their interests and increase their power (see Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). A powerful actor may be able to convert an issue into government policy through agenda setting and policy formulation (Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Wibowo and Giessen 2015a), based on his power sources (Krott et al. 2014). This seizure of power through the acquisition of policy tasks and changes in power distribution over time are crucial factors that set the limitations and possibilities of sectoral policy issues in specific countries (see Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016).

Hence, we employed the case of Bangladeshi forest sector and used donor’s development cooperation policy in terms of project aid and induced policies, to analyse how donor as a foreign state bureaucracy influences domestic policy making process as well as gains power and serve interests as a result of this policy initiatives.

Bangladesh’s forest policy has changed over time with community-based forest management and climate change becoming more important over time (Rahman et al. 2016a). This development sector has received various levels of substantial development aid in the form of projects (ibid). There has been extensive donor-driven development research in Bangladesh, particularly concerning induced decentralization and empowerment policies (e.g., Mahmud et al. 2012; Uddin 2005; (Rahman et al. 2016a)). However, the utilization of donors’ aid in the forestry sector has rarely been explored (Rahman et al. 2016a). Furthermore, as a developing country, forest biodiversity here is under serious threat of degradation, due to heavy population pressures and extreme climatic events. The country has significant biodiversity hotspots, such as the world’s largest mangrove forests and Sundarban swamplands—that seem to attract extra attention from donors whose development activities are now centered on the Sundarbans (Rahman and Giessen unpublished). In addition, within



the limited state's capacity, foreign donors have been playing a vital role in forest sector policy changes through funding and providing technical assistance (see Rahman et al. 2016a).

In view of this background, the study proposes the following guiding research questions:

### **How do foreign donor bureaucracies influence domestic forest policy and policy change?**

To understand the main research question, more detailed questions are offered as follows:

1. Which issues do foreign donor bureaucracies aim to take influence on?
2. Can policy changes be observed following donor influence and funding?
3. Can policy changes be casually linked with funding?
4. Which coalition strategies do donors use for achieving the goals regarding policy changes?
5. Which policies gain formal political support by donor funding?
6. Which bureaucracies gain informal political support by donor funding?
7. How do foreign donors serve their informal self-interests by development project funding?

These questions will be addressed in a cumulative PhD dissertation consisting of eight peer-reviewed publications. A brief description of the six constitutive publications is given below:

*Article 1: Rahman, M. S., Giessen, L. (2014). Mapping international forest related issues and main actors' positions in Bangladesh. *International Forestry Review*, 16 (6), 586-601.* This article identifies the most relevant international forest-related policy issues currently discussed in Bangladeshi forest politics and analyses the active actors and their positions on the issues identified.

*Article 2: Rahman, M. S., Sadath, M. N., Giessen, L. (2016). Foreign donor's driving policy changes in recipient countries: Three decades of development aid towards community-based forest policy in Bangladesh, *Forest Policy and Economics*, 68, 39-53.* This article analyzes the influence of donor aid for development projects on domestic policy change, particularly on community-based forest development policy in Bangladesh.

*Article 3: Rahman, M. S., Giessen, L. (2016). The power of public bureaucracies: forest-related climate change policies in Bangladesh (1992–2014). *Climate Policy*, DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2016.1197093.* This study analyzes the power added to specific climate – relevant bureaucracies over time as a result of the policy tasks allocated to them through myriad international and domestic forest-climate policies.

*Article 4: Rahman, M. S., Sarker, P. K., Giessen, L. (2016). Power players in biodiversity policy: Insights from international and domestic forest biodiversity initiatives in Bangladesh from 1992 to 2013. *Land Use Policy*, 59, 386-401.* This article investigates the distributive



effects of forest-related biodiversity policies on the power capabilities of the main relevant bureaucracies in Bangladesh.

*Article 5: Rahman, M. S., Giessen, L. (2016). Formal and Informal Interests of Donors to Allocate Development Funds: Evidence from Bangladesh Forest Development Project Aid (Under review in the World Development Journal). The study explains answering the central question – does allocation of donor’s development project aid advance formal development goals of a recipient country only or do they serve the informal political, economic and other strategic self-interests of donor organizations.*

*Article 6: Rahman, M. S., Miah, S., Giessen, L. (2016). The direct access process to domestic policymaking through development projects: Insight from USAID induced forest co-management initiatives in Bangladesh (To be submitted). This article demonstrates how USAID as a non-domestic actor influences domestic policy making through the process of direct access to domestic policy making and coalition building strategies with state and non-state actors by implementing a series of forest co-management projects in Bangladesh.*

## **2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis**

### **2.1. Forest development cooperation policy and project-based development aid**

The theory of forest development cooperation policy and project based development aid, a key concept of this study, is presented in Article 2 (Rahman et al. 2016a) and Article 5.

Development cooperation policy includes all bi-governmental, bilateral, and through international organisations, multilaterally implemented aid measures, especially those of a technical and financial nature (Aurenhammer 2013; Rahman et al. 2016a). Such policies are executed based on concrete project support programmes, or financial contributions (Aurenhammer 2013, p. 2; Rahman et al. 2016a). Considering the development cooperation, forest policy represents a separate policy sector (see Giessen and Krott 2009; Giessen et al. 2013; Rahman et al. 2016a). However, forest development policy is defined as a subset of a donor’s development cooperation policy, where a donor government (co-)finances forest-related aid measures, implemented on a bi-governmental, bilateral or bi-multilateral basis (Aurenhammer 2013; similar, Brukas and Hjortso 2004; Ojha et al. 2005; Shackleton et al. 2014; Rahman et al. 2016a). This study covered both bi-governmental and bi-multilateral development cooperation. ‘Bilateral cooperation’ exists when actors from two countries, the donor (e.g. United States Agency for International Development [USAID]) and the recipient (i.e. Bangladesh), participate in the developmental process (Rahman et al. 2016a). The cooperation is bi-governmental when only government institutions are involved (Aurenhammer 2013, p. 2; Rahman et al. 2016a). ‘Bi-multilateral cooperation’ is a distinct form of bilateral cooperation, which is implemented through an international organisation (e.g. the World Bank or United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]), with the cooperation still being attached to a certain donor and a recipient government (Aurenhammer 2013; Economic Relations Division [ERD] 2014; Rahman et al. 2016a). According to Bauer et al. (2012, p. 28), an international organization can be defined as “an institutional arrangement that combines three elements: a normative framework, a group of member



states, and a bureaucracy as administrative core”. In this cooperation policy, ‘donor’ refers to a foreign state and/ or non-state bureaucracy that has the assigned task of implementing developmental cooperation (Rahman et al. 2016a). This bureaucracy or in other words, the donors supply resources (especially of a financial and technical kind) to a recipient government’s bureaucracy in the form of external assistance (ibid). Financial resources may be provided through loans or grants (ERD 2014; Rahman et al. 2016a). This cooperation policy and its development concept attract constant criticism from a wide range of development experts, who, instead of viewing the politics as formal development concerns, extend their focus to informal aspects such it being a method of gaining power and fulfilling the interests of powerful actors (Escobar 1995; Pronk 2001; Sachs 1992; Yufanyi Movuh 2012; Article 6).

Foreign donors’ development cooperation approach Bangladesh with food aid, commodity aid, project aid, program support, and technical assistance (Dorosh and Haggblade 1997; ERD 2014a). Most foreign assistance is in the form of project aid (ERD, 2014b; Rahman et al. 2016a). According to ERD (2014b, 2014c), the focus of foreign assistance has substantially shifted, from commodity/food to project aid, and the proportion of project aid is at now its highest level (Rahman et al. 2016a). From the year of independence onward, from 1971 to 2013, disbursements included US\$ 6.76 billion (11%) in food, US\$ 10.91 billion (18%) in commodities, US\$ 38.38 billion (65%) in project aid, and US\$ 3.26 billion (6%) in budget support (ERD, 2014b; Rahman et al. 2016a). In Bangladesh, this Development Project Aid (DPA)<sup>1</sup> is provided in loans and grants, primarily to implement development projects included in the ADP<sup>2</sup> (ERD 2014b; Rahman et al. 2016a). Moreover, the technical assistance program, in the form of project aid, is intended to engage the services of experts, for institutional strengthening, and capacity building programs, to conduct feasibility studies and undertake preparatory project work (ERD 2014a; Rahman et al. 2016a). Generally, DPA is slotted in an “investment”<sup>3</sup> and/or a “technical” assistance category (GOB 2010). In the first case, a DPP<sup>4</sup>, which is an agreed-upon and valid document for investment project aid implementation, is used; in the latter case, a TPP<sup>5</sup> is used to implement technical assistance projects in Bangladesh (GOB 2010; Rahman et al. 2016a). This research focuses on DPAs that encompasses both DPPs and TPPs as potential sources of donor funding in the forestry sector of Bangladesh (Rahman et al. 2016a).

---

<sup>1</sup> DPA (Development Project Aid): This refers to an arrangement of foreign assistance in a project-based format (i.e., DPP & TPP), through which development activities are performed in diverse sectors (Rahman et al. 2016a).

<sup>2</sup> The Annual Development Programme (ADP) is the government-planning document prepared for a single fiscal year, which lists an array of development projects for different sectors, together with brief summaries of funding arrangements (Rahman et al. 2016a).

<sup>3</sup> Investment project—projects that are investments, for example, infrastructure development, institution building and providing basic services (Rahman et al. 2016a).

<sup>4</sup> DPP (Development Project Proposal): This is the government-prescribed format for project documentation, comprising elements necessary to implement an investment project successfully (e.g., objectives, activities, budget, timeframe, funding and implementation modalities) (Rahman et al. 2016a).

<sup>5</sup> TPP (Technical Assistance Project Proposal): This is the government-prescribed format for project documentation comprising elements necessary to implement a technical assistance project successfully (e.g., objectives, activities, budget, timeframe, funding and implementation modalities) (Rahman et al. 2016a).





Hence, the concept of forest development cooperation and project based development aid is important to demonstrate how the development cooperation in the form of development project aid by the foreign donors influences domestic policy changes. This led to the hypothesis 1.

## **2.2. Theorem of direct access to domestic policy making**

The concept of direct access to domestic policy making is used specifically in Article 2 (Rahman et al. 2016a) and Article 6 (Unpublished).

To understand the influence of non-domestic actors on domestic policy process, Bernstein and Cashore (2010, 2012) developed a framework that explains four distinct pathways of influence: international rules, international norms and discourse, interventions in market, and direct access to domestic policy making process (see Rahman et al. 2016a). Each of the pathways has its own causal logic of influence (Bernstein and Cashore 2010). According to Bernstein and Cashore (2010), influence through 'international rules' can be exerted by treaties, trade agreements and powerful international organizations (Article 6). The rules are obligatory which generate pull towards compliance (Franck 1990), whereas 'international norms and discourse' refers to appropriate behavior (Bernstein and Cashore 2010; Article 6). Institutional norms can influence domestic policy change (Bernstein and Cashore 2010) however discourses do not directly affect domestic policymaking but helps other pathways to occur (Burns and Giessen 2015; Article 6). The pathway of 'market' influences domestic policy change through manipulating market following direct action: boycott campaign; and indirect action: certification systems and use of market mechanism (Bernstein and Cashore 2010, 2012; Article 6). However, due to lack of timber market, criteria and indicator framework for sustainable management of production forest, forest certification procedure, as well as ban on commercial harvesting on natural forests in Bangladesh; a very little chance of influence through the market intervention mechanism could exist in the country (Choudhury 2011; Giessen et al. 2016; FAO 2011; Sadath and Krott 2012; Rahman and Giessen 2014; Article 6).

However, the present study attempts to employ the “direct access process to domestic policymaking” pathway as an analytical concept which perhaps the least studied of the four pathways (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 600) but the potentially strongest one (Burns and Giessen 2015) and has biggest impact on domestic policy making (Bernstein and Cashore 2010; Article 6). Moreover, Bernstein and Cashore (2012) argue that the direct access pathway is considered as the most effective path by which global influence can exert in domestic policy changes. The influence on domestic policymaking through direct access pathway can occur by means of direct funding, training, assistance and capacity building (Bernstein and Cashore 2010, 2012; Article 6). The influences may also be exerted via partnerships between domestic and international public and private actors and authorities (Bernstein and Cashore 2010, p. 113; Article 6). In this research, these domestic and international non-governmental and private actors and authorities are termed as non-state actors and domestic government organizations are termed as state actors/bureaucracies. The main concern along direct access pathway, which should take care, is sovereignty (ibid). The donor agencies have chance of being viewed as foreign in recipient country (Bernstein and



Cashore 2012). However, the interesting way of influence through this pathway is the sharing of resources, ideas, expertise, knowledge etc. by the international actors with existing groups or making coalition (Balboa 2009; Bernstein and Cashore 2012, p. 601; Article 6).

Hence, this concept is important to understand how foreign donors access to domestic policy process and make policy changes through providing fund, technical resources as well as building coalition with state and no-state actors. This directed to the hypothesis 1 and 2.

### **2.3. Concept of policy change and analytical policy program**

The concept of policy change and analytical policy program is used explicitly in Article 2 (Rahman et al. 2016a), when the author analyses the policy changes on forestry sector, particularly on community-based forestry sector in Bangladesh.

The analysis of policy change is perceived in policy science as the understanding of changes and stability of the policy process and outcomes in accordance with the influencing factors (Giessen 2011; Rahman et al. 2016a). According to Hecló (1974), policy change is actually a large-scale social, economic, and political change, because of the interactions of people within the policy community. These interactions are based on both power and interests (Hecló 1974; Rahman et al. 2016a). Subsequently, Sabatier (1988) has classified the parameters for policy change through the influential aspects of policy subsystems being a stimulant for change. Sabatier (1988) suggests that multiple actors from various levels of the government, who are active in policy formulation and implementation, should be included in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas (Rahman et al. 2016a). He emphasises shared values and beliefs that determine the behaviour of different actors within the policy community, resulting in advocacy coalitions that are responsible for policy change (Arts 2011; Giessen 2011; Rahman et al. 2016a). Analysis of the policy change process over one or more decades is necessary for obtaining a realistic picture of program success and failure (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Rahman et al. 2016a). However, this is a complex challenge for policy scientists, since the analysis includes many actors and their perspectives on particular issues (Sabatier 1988; Soritov and Memmler 2012). Nonetheless, policy change analysis has been at the centre of public policy analysis (Howlett and Ramesh 1995; John 2003; Stewart 2006; Rahman et al. 2016a).

When considering a series of forest sector policies that span two to three decades, it is essential to have an analytical model that can obtain adequate empirical data in order to investigate the causal forces of the studied policy changes (Sadath and Krott 2012; (Rahman et al. 2016a)). Therefore, this study adopts the approach of the analytical policy programme (APP) model (cf. Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Krott 2005; Sadath and Krott 2012). According to Krott (2005), 'A (Forest) policy program [sic] constitutes statements by (forest) stakeholders made in a social context concerning the utilization [sic] and/ or protection of a forest' (p. 23). He elaborated on the boundaries of the policy programme, as a forest policy programme would include corresponding legislation, administrative guidelines, and concepts (Rahman et al. 2016a). In addition, he described the components of a policy programme, including the informative function of a political programme (Krott 2005; Rahman et al. 2016a). The donor induced development projects can be considered as policy programme when the funding through projects stimulate policy changes (Rahman et al. 2016; Rahman

and Giessen 2016; Giessen et al. 2016). The concept of the APP model is also used for examining the goals for the state forest institutions (Stevanov and Krott 2013; Rahman et al. 2016a). A policy programme has four major elements: a) policy issues, b) policy goals and objectives, c) policy implementation, and d) policy impact (fig. 1; Sadath and Krott 2012; Krott 2005; Rahman et al. 2016a). According to Sadath and Krott (2012), specific issues are considered to be the starting point of a forest policy. These issues are generally supported by facts, as well as a forecasting simulation, which justifies the requirement for intervention, and hence the importance of a policy programme (Rahman et al. 2016a). These authors argue that when an issue has been authenticated, programme objectives and/ or goals are set to address the problem (Rahman et al. 2016a). In addition, they state that a problem can only be defined as such when it is recognised by the state, based on facts and with defined objectives and preconditions for the policy already in mind (ibid).

Furthermore, the implementation stage clarifies the job distribution, i.e. who should do what for whom, in how much time, and where (Rahman et al. 2016a). This stage establishes the responsibility and duty of different stakeholders related to the programme, and explicitly describes the policy instruments of a given policy programme (Sadath and Krott 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a). In addition, policy instruments are the bundle of techniques through which government authorities exercise their power in an attempt to change society's behaviour, and to fulfil the policy programme objectives attached to a particular issue (Evart 1998; Sadath and Krott 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a). Etzioni's threefold classification provides opportunities for analysing policy programmes. These three classes are 'regulations, economic (i.e. financial) means, and information' (Evart 1998; Krott 2005; Sadath and Krott 2012). A more detailed analysis on the choice of instruments in environmental policy has been performed by Böcher (2012). According to him, there are four main types of policy instruments employed to influence and coordinate collective action, and he mentioned the 'cooperative' as an additional instrument to Etzioni's threefold classification (Rahman et al. 2016a). The impact stage explains the assumptions of a particular policy programme (Rahman et al. 2016a). It includes both the expected influence of instruments on target groups and their intended impacts (Sadath and Krott 2012; ibid).

According to the APP model, changes in any of the four elements of a policy programme indicate a policy change, a key concept in this study, which can be either be a substantive or a symbolic change (ibid). A substantive policy change may be defined as a change in which both policy goals *and* policy implementation change in response to certain issues (ibid). These changes may be made in an incremental or in a radical way (Giessen 2011; Krott 2005; Sadath and Krott 2012; Voitleithner 2002). In contrast, symbolic changes are defined as changes in the policy programme to accommodate new ideas, or to set up new policy goals, but *without* adequate supportive means for implementing this new policy (Sadath and Krott 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a). The APP model can identify the substantive and/ or symbolic nature of a single policy or a series of policies over long periods of time (Rahman et al. 2016a).






Fig. 1: Analytical Policy Program (APP) Approach (Source: Sadath and Krott 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a)

Hence, this theory is important to understand the concept, why policy changes do happen, the type of changes and the donor’s influences on these changes. This led to the hypothesis 1.

#### 2.4. Adapted correlation of variables

The concept adapted correlation of variables is used explicitly in Article 2 (Rahman et al. 2016a) to demonstrate the correlation between donor’s funding and domestic policy changes.

To bring these two variables together and analyse a hypothetical causal relation between them, this study partially followed image of John Kingdon (1995) of multiple streams of policy change and the media policy streaming theory of Sadath and Krott (2013). While comparing the media’s influence on forest policy change, the latter explained that windows of opportunity for policy change might open in the media or in the policy stream (Rahman et al. 2016a). The policy change as a dependent variable has already been analysed elsewhere (Sadath and Krott 2013) and is influenced by a number of independent factors and variables, including international funding (Giessen 2011; Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a). Our study adopted donor funding as a new independent variable to explain its influence on policy changes (Rahman et al. 2016a). It interprets actual and promised donor funding side by side with the domestic policy stream (ibid). From Kingdon (1995) we borrowed the idea that these streams may meet and pave the way for policy change, based on the main actors’ interests (Rahman et al. 2016a).

Hence, this theory is important to understand the causal linkages between foreign donors’ funding and domestic policy changes. This directed to the hypothesis 1.

#### 2.5. Theory of bureaucratic politics including actor’s interests and coalition

The concept of bureaucratic politics, a key concept of this study, is used widely in Article 1 (Rahman and Giessen 2014), Article 3 (Rahman and Giessen 2016), Article 4 (Rahman et al. 2016b), Article 5, and Article 6, when the author analyses actors’ especially, foreign donor bureaucracies’ position, power and interests in the policy field.

Actors—primarily influential actors—have a priori preference for particular design features (Linder and Peters 1990, p. 306), and key state actors have binding authority to make policy decisions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Article 5).



Various policy actors use their influence to ensure that their favorite policy options are among the few that “make the cut” (Howlett and Giest 2013, pp. 17, 19; Majone 2006; Öberg et al. 2015; Article 5). Hence, actors may shape the structure of an ongoing policy debate on a specific policy issue by blocking or excluding potential policy options (cf. Tallberg 2003, see Öberg et al. 2015; Article 5). The influential actors (e.g., bilateral and multilateral donors) participate in a policy field by utilizing their power resources (e.g., funds, technologies, staff) in various stages of the policy cycle (i.e., formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation) (Krott 2005; Rahman and Giessen 2014; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). Thus, the interests of powerful actors can help set a country’s agenda (Rahman and Giessen 2014), influence policies, and contribute to changing interests with regard to specific issues over time (e.g., forestry) (Schusser et al. 2015; Article 5). Hence, the key discussion point in the field of development cooperation policy for actors—whether they are states or an institution/organization within a state, domestic or foreign—is their interest in a particular sector (Article 5). The state bureaucracy as an important actor has its own characteristics and demonstrates politics in the policy field.

A bureaucracy may denote public organizations, departments and agencies (Giessen et al. 2016; Giessen et al. 2014) which can be a state, domestic or foreign actor (Krott 2005; Giessen et al. 2016). The bureaucracies make the decision on a particular problem based on legal standard (Giessen et al. 2014). They may have formal and informal goals or interest: formally, they struggle for problem oriented delivery of public service which stated publicly in their mandate; informally, they follow the institutional interest of survival and expansion e.g. maximizing power, budget and staffs (Krott 1990; Niskanen 1971; Sahide and Giessen 2015; Giessen et al. 2014; Giessen 2011; Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Wibowo and Giessen 2015a). Since interests uncover the truth, they are not openly displayed, but political actions are recordable and predictable, irrespective of their apparent diversity (Schusser et al. 2015). The formal interest is the open and declared statement of goals associated with the relevant actors (Article 5). Such goals are documented in formal strategic documents. However, informal interest is not stated but is accessible (ibid). As forests produce diverse utility, actors’ have diverse interests (ibid). According to Krott (2005), the benefits related to this interest span the entire political and social scope, and each interest is embedded in the area of “ecology, economy, and social” factors (Article 5). Moreover, many scholars agreed that donor’s informal interests are largely connected to the political (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Boyce 2002; World Bank 1998; Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Rahman et al. 2016a), economic (Boyce 2002; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Younas 2008) and strategic self-interests (Hook 1998; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Table 1 details the analytical framework regarding the formal and informal interests of donors to determine the utility of development project aid.

Table 1: Analytical framework for determining the utility of development project aid for donors' formal and informal interests (Article 5 Unpublished)

Theory		Operationalized toward the allocation of development project aid
Development actors'/donors' interests	Formal interests (open and declared statement found in a formal strategic document)	Mandate <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Accomplishing the development goals of recipient countries</li> <li>✓ Signatory to international conventions and protocols</li> <li>✓ Maintaining the public interest of donors' and recipient countries</li> </ul>
		Contribution to achieving policy goals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Provide resources (e.g., funds, technology, staff) to achieve specific policy goals (e.g., conserve biodiversity, adaptation/mitigation of climate change)</li> </ul>
	Informal interests (not stated publicly, but predictable and assessable)	Economic interests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Employing one's own consultant</li> <li>✓ Purchasing goods and services from the donor's country</li> <li>✓ Expanding the market</li> </ul>
		Political interests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Maintaining geopolitical and political influence</li> <li>✓ Branding one's own activities and increased networking</li> <li>✓ Formulating policy and creating good governance</li> <li>✓ Creating an independent information base</li> </ul>
		Strategic interests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Good governance as a prerequisite for investment</li> <li>✓ Focused interventions in poor countries, climate victims</li> <li>✓ Good environmental quality as a requirement for investment</li> <li>✓ Mitigating social conflict</li> </ul>

For long time, the bilateral, bi-governmental and multilateral development cooperation has been practiced between donors and recipient country (Aurenhammer 2013; Rahman et al. 2016a; Sadath and Krott 2012), to which foreign donor is considered as a foreign state bureaucracy with an assigned mission (Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b). These bureaucracies accomplish the tasks or implement development projects by forming coalition with different public and private actors (Burns and Giessen 2015) and collectively can act as political or administrative bodies (Giessen et al. 2016; Article 6). According to Rayner et al. (2001), the collective form of administrative bodies and their shared interest is termed as 'policy sector'. The policy sectors may form coalition to achieve common goal as per their shared interest by influencing public policy (Burns and Giessen 2015; Ingold 2011; Babon et al. 2014; Weible 2005; Weible and Sabatier 2005). As a political and administrative body, they are then well equipped with public mandate, fund, stuffs, expertise, information, alliances, permanent position, and policy making power (Wibowo and Giessen 2015a; Wibowo and Giessen 2015b; Krott 2005, Rahman et al. 2016b, Rahman and Giessen 2016, Giessen et al. 2016). Policy network theory argues that, policy outcomes arise from a body of interdependent state and non-state actors (Babon et al. 2014; Knoke et al. 1996; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Article 6). Marsh



and Rhodes (1992) added that, bureaucratic body must bargain with each other to secure policy outcome while they are in a policy domain. In accomplishing their goals, however, they seek other actors with similar interests, form coalitions, raise bargaining positions, and gain power for organizational expansions (Peters 2010; Rahman et al. 2016b, Rahman and Giessen 2016, Giessen et al. 2016 ). In this process, the competition between bureaucracies occur for resources, staffs, political domains and interests (Peters 2010; Allison 1971; Burns and Giessen 2015; Giessen et al. 2016) based on their preferences, abilities and capabilities of power (Peters 2010; Giessen et al. 2016b; Rahman and Giessen 2016, Burns and Giessen 2015; Article 6). Hence, on the basis of their interests, powers, and preferences, competing donor bureaucracies attempt to maintain or even increase their responsibilities for international forest policy affairs (Allison 1971; Peters 2010; Giessen et al. 2014). Since the agencies or bureaucracies greatly value their own survival, they endeavor to increase their organization's relative strength with bigger discretionary budgets (see Hudson 2005; Wintrobe 1997; Article 5). Therefore, to understand the bureaucratic politics as well as their interests and power, one must need to analyze the budgets, staff resources, exclusive information, policy tasks, and regulatory instrument they hold on a particular policy field (Krott et al. 2014; Krott 2005; Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman et al. 2016a; Rahman et al. 2016b; Rahman and Giessen, 2016).

Hence, this shows that bureaucratic politics including actor's interests and coalition patterns is important in the policy making process of a given policy field and it led to the hypothesis 2, 3 and 4.

## **2.6. Theory of actor-centered power and strategic tasks**

The theory of actor-centered power is presented in Article 3 (Rahman and Giessen 2016) and Article 4 (Rahman et al. 2016b), to explain power gain/loss by the domestic and foreign donor actors.

The theory explains that power is a key factor in forest politics and in scientific analyses of the interests and behaviors of actors working towards achieving a policy goal (Krott 2005; Krott et al. 2014; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b). Some scholars argue that power is very much actor oriented (see Arts and van Tatenhove 2004; Foucault 1991 cited in Alston 2015; Schneider 2009), while others believe it is situated at the structural level (see Bourdieu 2001; Giddens 1984). An influential power concept was developed by Lukes (1974), who argued that power can be exercised in three dimensions: power over decisions, power over non-decisions, and power over political agendas (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). Krott et al. (2014) supported the actor-centered approach that focuses on the relevant acting agents and organizational power. The authors further linked structural power with actor-centered power by defining the former as a power source. Furthermore, Krott et al. (2014) relied heavily on Weber's (2000) concept of power, which involves an actor's ability to bring their will to bear despite resistance (Rahman et al. 2016). This is linked with Etzioni's (1975, p. 5) threefold typology of power (i.e., coercive, remunerative, and normative). Etzioni argued that Weber's concepts on resistance and the threat of power can be measured by examining actors' resources and instruments, which were treated as the actors' power elements by Krott et al. (2014). They linked the elements to

observable facts and categorized the power of an actor into three distinct elements: coercion (CR), (dis-)incentives (IC), and dominant information (DI) (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). Here, actor-centered power consists of power capabilities and power exertion (Rahman et al. 2016b). “Power capabilities” refers to the possibility of exerting power through CR, IC, and DI (ibid). These elements, or more precisely, the power capabilities as described in the original concept (Krott et al. 2014), convey a specific social relation involving a potentate and a subordinate, and link them to observable facts, including sources and threats of action (Schusser et al. 2015). Power capabilities are empirically observable, explicitly appearing in policy documents and implicitly detected through actors’ interests or acts that offer the opportunity to collect empirical data (Ibid; Wibowo and Giessen 2015b; Rahman and Giessen 2016b). These power capabilities might be attributed to one actor or distributed among a number of them, which is echoed in the strategic policy tasks of a given country (Wibowo and Giessen 2015b; Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b). Table 2 contains a brief description of each element.

Table 2 Definitions, observable facts, and examples of power elements

Element	Definition	Observable Facts	Example
Coercion	Altering behavior by force	Physical action, threat of physical action, or sources for physical action	Removal of forest users’ rights
(Dis-)incentives	Altering behavior by (dis-) advantage	Provision of, or threatening with, sources of material or immaterial benefit or impairment	Financial support from donors to carry out forest management plan
Dominant information	Altering behavior by means of unverified information	Provision of, or threatening with, sources of unverified information	Expert knowledge about how to conserve protected areas through co-management

Source: Adapted from Krott et al. (2014); see Rahman and Giessen (2016); Giessen et al. (2016); Rahman et al. (2016b)

*Coercion* is defined as “altering the behavior of the subordinate by force” (Krott et al. 2014, p. 37). The state is the principal actor of implementing force supported by laws, acting through the formal power network of actors (e.g., bureaucracies) (ibid; Rahman et al. 2016b). The law provides the bureaucracy with a mandate of control, and the possible application of sanctions for those who disobey them. These rules, however, are indicative of the use of force acting upon the aspects of the forest, encouraging their importance to achieving policy outcome (ibid). Accordingly, the approval of a policy document, or sanctions related to the decision making of an actor, is considered to be the sources of coercive power elements (Rahman et al. 2016b; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Giessen et al. 2016).

*(Dis)incentives* refer to “altering the behavior of the subordinate by means of disadvantages or advantages” (ibid, p. 38). Sources of materials (e.g., all money and technical



sources - such as machine, plants or food and even support in labor), by way of incentives or disincentives, create opportunistic preferences for specific actors based on which policy decision is made (ibid; Rahman et al. 2016b). Therefore, an actor who has been provided with sufficient sources of incentives as an implementation means, towards achieving a forest goal, he/she belongs to that power (Rahman et al. 2016b; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Giessen et al. 2016).

*Dominant information* refers to unverified information through which decisions are made (Krott et al. 2014; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). If the subordinate is unable to check information due to lack of confidence, lack of time, paucity of knowledge or have simple trust, he/she is exposed to the power of the dominant authority (Devkota 2010; Maryudi et al. 2012; Rahman et al. 2016b). Such information power could be made unavailable to the public, or unwillingness to share this could be used to increase the bargaining position of the agency responsible for it (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015b; Rahman et al. 2016b). In this context, expert knowledge of an actor, for instance, which is essential to formulate and monitor any plan and policy, can be treated as informational elements of power (Rahman et al. 2016b; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Giessen et al. 2016). Thus, it is generally believed that state has the capacity to produce such information to which other actors could largely rely on.

This study particularly focuses on gains and losses in the power capabilities of bureaucratic actors over time (Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b). This implies that an actor's power may be dynamic (Rahman et al. 2016b). The actor-centered power concept does not clearly address such power dynamics (ibid). Changes in power over time have already been mentioned by Maryudi et al. (2016), who, in analyzing the dynamics of power, noted that the power capabilities of an actor relatively improved/weakened those of others over the course of time (Rahman et al. 2016b). The present study further develops this concept to determine the dynamics of power capabilities. Moreover, Prabowo et al. (2016, p. 185) argued that "at one point an actor might be powerful, but at other points the power relation shifted depending on the potential sources of power" (Rahman et al. 2016b). The dynamics of power capabilities among relevant public bureaucracies can be measured by observing the strategic policy tasks of a given series of policies over time (similar to Wibowo and Giessen 2015b; Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b).

The power process is one of the basic concepts depicting the interconnection of stakeholders in a policy framework (Krott 2005). In this interaction, some players may either gain or lose power (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). According to Krott et al. (2014), the power of an actor consists of power capabilities and power exertion, in which the latter can change the behavior of actors and the former provide their basis of power (Rahman et al. 2016b). Furthermore, the power capability of any actor shows their potential to exert power through CR, IC, and DI (ibid). Hence, the capability and absolute/ultimate gain that are obtained by an actor through cooperation can show which actor is the real winner (Wibowo and Giessen 2015b; ibid). In this process, capability can be considered as a whole power source held by an actor, such as budget allocation, number of staff, strategic tasks, and exclusive information (Ibid). In our study, we deal with the power capabilities of an actor by analyzing the strategic tasks of a given policy. A strategic task was

selected as one of the various power sources based on the fact that every task should be equipped with another source of power (e.g., budget, staff, exclusive information, etc.; see Wibowo and Giessen 2015b).

Every policy establishes certain tasks and assigns them to a specific actor (i.e., a bureaucracy) (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). Similarly, Easton (1965) argued that the political system focuses entirely on the complex of stakeholders and their activities. Hence, a strategic task for one bureaucracy consists of a task that can be related to different stages of the policy cycle: formulation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation under distinctive policies and projects (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). Moreover, strategic tasks correspond with what Schusser (2013) and Krott et al. (2014) called power features (Rahman et al. 2016b). Therefore, a strategic task is one of the most important and formal avenues for measuring the power capabilities of an actor (see Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016).

Hence, this shows that specific power capability of particular actor and it changes over time is important to direct a particular policy issues like biodiversity. This led to the hypothesis 3.

## **2.7. Policy and policy cycle**

Article 3 (Rahman and Giessen 2016) and Article 4 (Rahman et al. 2016b) explain the concept policy and policy cycle. The theory is used in order to select appropriate policies as well as to understand the distribution of policy tasks among various actors.

Policies are defined as planned actions adopted or proposed by an organisation or individual intended to address a problem (Howlett et al. 2003; Rayner and Howlett 2009). Forest policies are defined as: i) forest-focused policies (formally and explicitly addressing forests as a primary issue), ii) forest-related policies (as a secondary issue), or iii) forest-relevant policies (not addressing forests formally and explicitly but having empirical relevance for forests on the ground) (see also Kleinschmit and Edwards 2013; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). This research examines forest-focused and forest-related biodiversity and climate change policies. Projects led by foreign donors in this study are treated as policies in the above sense. This is appropriate as projects, primarily development projects aided by donors, were found to be an important part of Bangladesh forest policy (Rahman et al. 2016a). Moreover, Sadath and Krott (2012) considered extra financial investments, regulatory instruments, and informational instruments as policies to analyse Bangladesh forest policy changes (Giessen et al. 2016; Rahman and Giessen 2016). In addition, for developing countries with limited state capacity, development projects contribute significantly as sources of major policy instruments (ibid). Hence, public forest-related biodiversity and climate change policy in Bangladesh combines domestic public policy elements with related foreign donors' projects, with the involvement of Bangladeshi bureaucracy (Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b).

A central focus of politics (e.g. forest policy) is solving pending issues (Krott 2005; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b; Giessen et al. 2016). These issues are determined in the course of three problem-solving phases representing a logical sequence

(ibid). According to Krott (2005), the cycles are as follows: first, policy formulation, which determines the issues to be resolved and standardises solutions in the form of programs; second, policy implementation, which entails the practical application of formulated programs to the issues; and third, policy evaluation and monitoring, which assesses the formulation and implementation of a program (Krott 2005; for a similar analysis of projects, see Brukas and Hjortsø 2004; Rahman and Giessen 2016; Rahman et al. 2016b). These three phases are composed of distinct strategic policy tasks that ultimately represent the power capabilities of an actor under a given policy.

Hence, this concept is important to understand, how does an actor perform policy tasks and subsequently gain power in various stages of the policy cycle. This led to the hypothesis 3.

In line with its objectives, this study will attempt to elucidate the policy influence, power and interests of foreign donor bureaucracies resulting from the effects of internationally induced forest-related policies, arriving at the following hypothesis based on the aforementioned analytical concepts:

*Hypothesis 1: Foreign donors providing funds to national policy cause policy changes.*

Foreign donors influence domestic policy-making processes by providing funds in the form of development project aid being a pathway by direct access to national policy, which leads to policy changes. A link between foreign donors' funding and domestic policy changes exists.

*Hypothesis 2: Foreign donors make coalitions with non-state actors circumventing national bureaucracies.*

In the process of policy making, USAID makes coalition /involves state bureaucracies as marginally as possible just for overcoming formal sovereignty issues. However, the donor involves non state actors substantially in the implementation process largely due to generate information relevant to the interests of the donor. State bureaucracy would be unable/unwilling to perform this function.

*Hypothesis 3: Foreign donors select prominent formal policy issues like forest biodiversity or forest-related climate change in order to put power resources in, forming coalitions with national actors.*

Foreign donors as well as national policy actors gain power capabilities over time via strategic policy tasks assigned to them resulting from induced forest-related climate change and biodiversity policies. Foreign donors serve the formal policy tasks in the policy agenda making coalition with national policy actors.

*Hypothesis 4: Foreign donors orient their funding, in addition to formal policy tasks, towards informal political, economic and strategic self-interests.*