Las cookies nos ayudan a ofrecer nuestros servicios. Al utilizar nuestros servicios, aceptas el uso de cookies.

Editorial Cuvillier

Publicaciones, tesis doctorales, capacitaciónes para acceder a una cátedra de universidad & prospectos.
Su editorial internacional especializado en ciencias y economia

Editorial Cuvillier

De En Es
Polit-Economic Analysis of Policy-Making in Ukraine

Impresion
EUR 49,90

E-Book
EUR 0,00

Polit-Economic Analysis of Policy-Making in Ukraine (Tienda española)

Modelling and Empirical Measurement of the Collective Decisions on the Example of Agricultural Policy

Nino Chkoidze (Autor)

Previo

Lectura de prueba, PDF (130 KB)
Indice, PDF (69 KB)

ISBN-13 (Impresion) 9783736997172
ISBN-13 (E-Book) 9783736987173
Idioma Inglés, Deutsch
Numero de paginas 198
Laminacion de la cubierta mate
Edicion 1.
Lugar de publicacion Göttingen
Lugar de la disertacion Gießen
Fecha de publicacion 23.01.2018
Clasificacion simple Tesis doctoral
Area Agricultura
Palabras claves Agrarpolitik, Ukraine, Polit-ökonomische Analyse, Netzwerke, Agrarökonomische Transformation, Interessengruppen, Agrarhandelspolitik, Agricultural Policy, Ukraine, Political Economic Analysis, Networks, Agricultural Transformation, Interest Groups, Agricultural Trade Policy
Descripcion

The work analyses structural, institutional and political determinants of Ukrainian agricultural policy at the end of the 21st century’s first decade. Besides identifying the relevant actors in the policy domain and their interrelations, the study aims to shed light on preferences and general orientation about topical agricultural issues. The results differentiate between four ideological clusters preferring similar positions. Further objectives refer to the influence of institutional and structural factors on the determination of policy outcomes under different scenarios. To this end, the study not only deals with the constitutional order of the political system, in which decisions are formally adopted and implemented, but also with role and access structures of agricultural interest groups. The measured overall political control outflow from politicians to the interest groups amounts to 16.5%. Furthermore, the work econometrically examines the influence of special interests on agricultural trade policy formation and finds evidence that lower import-to-output ratios lead to higher protection levels in sectors dominated by commercial agriculture.