International Competition between Corporate Governance

Systems: Outcomes in the USA, Germany and Colombia

Vorschau

Inhaltsverzeichnis, Datei (430 KB)
Leseprobe, Datei (450 KB)

Beschreibung

This dissertation has shown that indeed the internationalization of production systems and the globalization of the markets for goods, services and capital have triggered and intensified the competition between corporate governance systems. Similar to the competition in other economic areas, where, for example, domestic goods and factor prices tend to converge to the world prices after opening to international competition, over the years the traditionally diverse corporate governance systems have become more homogeneous. The elements, provisions and aspects where convergence has made more progress are: boards’ form and functions, strong minority shareholders’ rights, universal banking systems, bankruptcy law, the capital market as an important corporate financing source, investor-oriented accounting standards (e.g. IFRS) and employee ownership as a means to motivate staff to undertake firm-specific investments. However, convergence does not mean that the national systems have equally moved towards each other, rather the Principal-Agent model, followed by the USA, has prevailed. The main reason for the dominance of the Principal-Agent model seems to be the preponderance of the US-economy, particularly on global financial markets. Although this is not a topic of this dissertation, in the last two decades a competition between capital market- and bank-centered financial systems can be observed. The capitalmarket centered financial system, recommended by the Principal-Agent model, has gained importance, whereas the traditional leading position of credit institutions has impressively decreased.