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Cuvillier Verlag

33 Jahre Kompetenz im wissenschaftlichen Publizieren
Internationaler Fachverlag für Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft

Cuvillier Verlag

De En Es
Signaling Theory in Entrepreneurship

Printausgabe
EUR 39,90

Signaling Theory in Entrepreneurship

Essays on its Scientific Application and Receiver Relevance

Julian Bafera (Autor)

Vorschau

Leseprobe, PDF (190 KB)
Inhaltsverzeichnis, PDF (130 KB)

ISBN-13 (Printausgabe) 9783736975323
Sprache Englisch
Seitenanzahl 154
Umschlagkaschierung matt
Auflage 1.
Erscheinungsort Göttingen
Promotionsort Wuppertal
Erscheinungsdatum 23.11.2021
Allgemeine Einordnung Dissertation
Fachbereiche Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Schlagwörter signal, signaling theory, information asymmetries, adverse selection, moral hazard, entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial finance, start-ups, early-stage financing, Spence, receiver, signaler, receiver relevance, business angels, equity crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding platforms, signaling environment, sustainability, new ventures, signaler characteristics, receiver characteristics, sustainability signals, new venture, new venture quality, economic quality, sustainability quality, exchange relationships, systematic review, literature review, ECFPs, signalling, conjoint, decision-making, Nachhaltigkeit, Signal, Signaltheorie, Asymmetrische Information, Frühphasenfinanzierung, Sender, Empfänger, Entrepreneurship-Forschung, entrepreneurship research, Conjoint, Conjoint-Analyse, conjoint analysis, Informationsasymmetrien, information asymmetries, Unternehmertum, Erfolgsbilanz, entrepreneurship,
Beschreibung

This dissertation focuses on the application of signaling theory in the entrepreneurship context. Since the original publication by Michael Spence in 1973, signaling theory has been a relevant solution to mitigate information asymmetries in different contexts, such as economics, management, or entrepreneurship. Especially in the entrepreneurship context, information asymmetries are a central concern, as the survival of entrepreneurs and new ventures depends on their abilities to enter exchange relationships with essential stakeholders, such as investors, future employees, and customers. However, new ventures are particularly uncertain because they lack track records, collateral, and legitimacy. Sending credible signals of their quality is a potential solution to mitigating information asymmetries between new ventures and their stakeholders. This work demonstrates how signaling theory is applied in entrepreneurship research and how the field can develop in the future. Furthermore, this dissertation sheds light on the receiver side of signaling and explains how receiver relevance influences the effectiveness of signals.