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Signaling Theory in Entrepreneurship

Hard Copy
EUR 47.88

Signaling Theory in Entrepreneurship (English shop)

Essays on its Scientific Application and Receiver Relevance

Julian Bafera (Author)


Extract, PDF (190 KB)
Table of Contents, PDF (130 KB)

ISBN-13 (Hard Copy) 9783736975323
Language English
Page Number 154
Lamination of Cover matt
Edition 1.
Publication Place Göttingen
Place of Dissertation Wuppertal
Publication Date 2021-11-23
General Categorization Dissertation
Departments Economics
Business economics
Keywords signal, signaling theory, information asymmetries, adverse selection, moral hazard, entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial finance, start-ups, early-stage financing, Spence, receiver, signaler, receiver relevance, business angels, equity crowdfunding, equity crowdfunding platforms, signaling environment, sustainability, new ventures, signaler characteristics, receiver characteristics, sustainability signals, new venture, new venture quality, economic quality, sustainability quality, exchange relationships, systematic review, literature review, ECFPs, signalling, conjoint, decision-making, Nachhaltigkeit, Signal, Signaltheorie, Asymmetrische Information, Frühphasenfinanzierung, Sender, Empfänger, Entrepreneurship-Forschung, entrepreneurship research, Conjoint, Conjoint-Analyse, conjoint analysis, Informationsasymmetrien, information asymmetries, Unternehmertum, Erfolgsbilanz, entrepreneurship,

This dissertation focuses on the application of signaling theory in the entrepreneurship context. Since the original publication by Michael Spence in 1973, signaling theory has been a relevant solution to mitigate information asymmetries in different contexts, such as economics, management, or entrepreneurship. Especially in the entrepreneurship context, information asymmetries are a central concern, as the survival of entrepreneurs and new ventures depends on their abilities to enter exchange relationships with essential stakeholders, such as investors, future employees, and customers. However, new ventures are particularly uncertain because they lack track records, collateral, and legitimacy. Sending credible signals of their quality is a potential solution to mitigating information asymmetries between new ventures and their stakeholders. This work demonstrates how signaling theory is applied in entrepreneurship research and how the field can develop in the future. Furthermore, this dissertation sheds light on the receiver side of signaling and explains how receiver relevance influences the effectiveness of signals.