Areas | |
---|---|
Serie de libros (92) |
1308
|
Letra |
2293
|
Medienwissenschaften | 15 |
Teología | 51 |
Filosofía | 90 |
Derecho | 405 |
Economía | 834 |
Ciencias sociales | 406 |
Ciencias del deporte | 48 |
Psicología | 229 |
Educación | 185 |
Historia | 178 |
Arte | 106 |
Ciencias culturales | 158 |
Literatur | 115 |
Lingüística | 86 |
Ciencias Naturales |
5354
|
Ciencias Ingeniería |
1746
|
General |
91
|
Leitlinien Unfallchirurgie
5. Auflage bestellen |
Indice, Datei (72 KB)
Lectura de prueba, Datei (170 KB)
In experimental economics cooperation is frequently modeled
by a so-called public-good design. This design tries to depict the
problem that cooperation is benefi cial for every participant but
that there are individual incentives to free-ride, i.e., to invest no
personal effort to increase the common welfare. In public-good
experiments cooperation usually breaks down due to imperfect
conditional cooperation if measures like sanction possibilities,
reputation-building or communication are absent.
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. For example
we introduce a new dynamic public-good design to analyze
whether subjects behave differently when they do not receive
new resources in a multiperiod public-good design. We further
provide a monitoring mechanism that mitigates the free-riding
problem, in the fi rst study with a linear and in a second study
with a non-linear production function. However, the costly
implementation of the monitoring in itself represents either a
(second-level) step-level public-good or a second-level linear
public-good in the latter case. Finally we introduce a limit on
punishment.
ISBN-10 (Impresion) | 3869558172 |
ISBN-13 (Impresion) | 9783869558172 |
ISBN-13 (E-Book) | 9783736938175 |
Idioma | Inglés |
Numero de paginas | 140 |
Laminacion de la cubierta | mate |
Edicion | 1 Aufl. |
Volumen | 0 |
Lugar de publicacion | Göttingen |
Lugar de la disertacion | Universität Erfurt |
Fecha de publicacion | 15.07.2011 |
Clasificacion simple | Tesis doctoral |
Area |
Economía
|