Aufmerksamkeitsstörungen und das Leib-Seele-Problem. (English shop)

Versuch eines empirischsozialwissenschaftlichen Zugangs

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The aim of the dissertation was to demonstrate a way of coming somewhat closer to a solution of the mind-body problem by means of empirical research methods. In addition, the study was intended to provide indications as to which model best fits the data set underlying the study. For this purpose, three model conceptions were distinguished: the materialism model, the identity model as a one-factor model, and the interaction model. Simulation studies showed that even with samples of N≥30 it is possible to investigate empirically which model conception exhibits the best fit to the data set. However, with such small samples the parameters cannot be estimated satisfactorily, so that the magnitude of the parameters cannot be interpreted. For this reason, in addition to the global analysis (change in chi2 in relation to the change in the degrees of freedom: the model with more parameters fits the data better if chi2 decreases more strongly than the degrees of freedom), the possibility of an iterative analysis was investigated: if a so-called recursive model (= monocausal materialism model) underlies the data, then the stepwise increase of the estimated influence of the physiological on the psychological level in the interaction model should be accompanied by an ever better model fit. By contrast, an increase of the psychological influence with a simultaneous reduction of the physiological influence in the interaction model should be accompanied by a deterioration of the fit. For the estimation of magnitude it is assumed that, if interaction should underlie the data, there is a turning point beyond which the model fit deteriorates again during stepwise model testing. This hypothesis was examined on simulated recursive data sets, assuming that with recursive (= materialistically conceived) simulated data there should be no turning point. It turned out that this was often, but not always, the case. For this reason, the estimation of the magnitude of the parameters by means of the iterative analysis must be regarded with caution. The global analysis, by contrast, proved to be very stable in identifying the materialistic model when recursive data underlay it. In terms of content, the study suggests that interaction models fit the data best, whereas the identity model fits by far the worst. The latter may also be due to the fact that the identity model was conceived as a one-factor solution, since the materialistic identity theorists have set themselves the goal of reducing the psychological level to the brain-physiological level and therefore, although they mention the differing intensionalities of psychological and physiological language, they finally appear to forget them again in emphasising the identical extensionality. In this respect it seemed to me consistent to conceive identity theory as a one-factor model. In further investigations it would be desirable if, in addition to the common factor representing the shared extension, two method factors (a psychological and a physiological one) were also taken into account in the model, in order to do justice to the differing intensionality. Such a model, however, at the same time makes clear that although there is a common point of reference, there are also grave differences. Yet it is difficult still to regard such a model as monistic, since three factors would be assumed to underlie the data. Finally, in future investigations the physiological level in particular should be operationalised differently, e.g. by phasic instead of tonic EEG data as in the present study, in order to be able to rule out possible method artefacts. Whether the finding of the present study that interaction models fit the data best is sustainable can only be shown by further investigations that take up the above suggestions. The present study is therefore to be seen only as a small first step towards an empirical approach to the mind-body problem by means of structural equation modelling. The present study thus has no more than the character of a pilot study. The study can be summarised in the following nine points, taking into account the reservations named above:

1. Attention disorders can be regarded as disorders of consciousness (disorders of the executive functions of consciousness and of arousal). As such, attention disorders are well suited to the empirical investigation of the mind-body problem, for the latter arises whenever questions of consciousness are at issue (e.g. in neurophysiological consciousness research and in analytic philosophy of mind).
2. Basic assumptions about the relationship between body and mind are part of the image of the human being with which we, as educators and psychotherapists, do our work. Our image of the human being substantially influences what we do and how we do it. How, for example, am I to support a pupil in developing more personal responsibility and autonomy if I assume that autonomy is an illusion?
3. Popular brain researchers claim that it has been empirically proven that phenomena of the psychological level (e.g. free will, the experience of the self, identity, etc.) are illusions, since, owing to the complete determination of psychological phenomena by brain physiology, there can be no free decisions. This illusion claim, however, has never been investigated directly and empirically; rather, it is derived from studies that as a rule were never conducted for this purpose (exception: B. Libet, who, however, draws conclusions from his investigations different from those of the current mainstream). Reductive materialism and epiphenomenalism, as well as identity theories, are thus based on metaphysical basic assumptions that have not been empirically investigated and hence remain unquestioned. It must, however, be conceded to the model conceptions named above that, within the framework of the classical physical world view, they endeavour to solve the riddle of mental causation.
4. With all reservations, the present study suggests that mental causation, or the influence of the psychological on the physiological level, is not an illusion but an empirical fact. This finding cannot be explained within the framework of the classical world view of physics. Therefore an extension of the world view by quantum physics is required (see Part I, ch. 1.2 and Part III, ch. 1.2 of the present work).
5. The relationship between body and mind, or mind and brain respectively, eludes experimental methodology (exception: the investigations in the wake of W. Penfield, which are, however, not externally valid, i.e. cannot be generalised to the life-world outside the laboratory: direct electrical stimulation of the brain does not occur in everyday life). Moreover, experimental methodology is unsuited to the investigation of circular causalities.
6. By means of structural equation modelling, identity models, materialistic models and interaction models (circular causality) can be tested against one another.
7. Testing by means of structural equation modelling succeeds even with samples ≥30 under certain conditions (e.g. use of ULS estimators, sufficient stability coefficients [stability index <1] in the interaction models, balance of quasi-alpha and quasi-beta error; see the simulation studies in the appendix: order effects of the latent variables).
8. The empirical part of the present study has shown that the mind-body relationship cannot be grasped and described in terms of identity theory, but that as a rule an interaction in the sense of circular causality can be assumed, whereby the weightings of the causal directions differ depending on the aspect in question. If one considers automated actions (e.g. reaction times in a continuous performance test), then the proportion of the influence of the psychological on the physiological level is considerably smaller than vice versa. If, however, processes are concerned in which the proportion of actions that can in principle be consciously controlled is high (e.g. in aggressive behaviour), then the proportion of influence proceeding from the psychological to the physiological level increases markedly.
9. Since the mind-body relationship can best be described by means of interaction models, with quite different weightings depending on the domain of phenomena investigated, education towards autonomy and self-management therapy are possible without falling into the aporias of the materialistic world view.