Filmlizenzen in der Insolvenz (English shop)

Eine vergleichende Untersuchung des deutschen und US-amerikanischen Rechts

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Against the backdrop of the globally flourishing commercialisation of intangible goods, the question of the legal treatment of film licences in insolvency arises with particular urgency. Like hardly any other branch of the entertainment industry, the film business is by its very nature associated with a high level of economic expenditure and therefore with corresponding risks. While the distribution of and trade in copyright exploitation rights has attained a high degree of internationality, it remains the task of national insolvency law to eliminate unsuitable or unsuccessful competitors from the market in an order prescribed by the state.

In this context, the study undertakes a comparison of the legal systems of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America. The focus is on questions that are also central to international business dealings: the classification of film licences as intellectual property rights in insolvency and, in particular, the insolvency-proof nature of the licence agreements concerned.

Following a brief historical introduction, the author first sets out, in the first chapter, the German and US legal foundations of the licence, and in the second chapter discusses, from a comparative law perspective, the central questions of whether licences belong to the insolvency estate and of the insolvency administrator’s right of election. The third chapter addresses the highly practically relevant questions concerning the options available to licensors for terminating agreements in the event of the licensee’s insolvency. The fourth chapter – the centrepiece of the work – finally deals with the legal consequences of insolvency for existing licence relationships, identifying both risks and possibilities for securing positions. In this connection, the highly relevant and much-discussed question arises as to whether the principle of abstraction should apply only in a limited manner in copyright law. The author traces this problem by examining the contested analogy to § 9 VerlG and demonstrates structural differences through a comparison with US law.