Relative Leistungsturniere und umweltfreundliches Verhalten (English shop)

Theoretische Überlegungen und experimentelle Evidenz

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The dissertation examines, from an agency-theoretical perspective and by experimental means, the linkage of performance tournaments with the delegation of environmental decisions in firms. In a relative performance tournament, two or more agents compete for a higher remuneration (tournament winner prize). In order to obtain or increase the probability of receiving the tournament winner prize, agents can alter the assessment base for their remuneration by cheating. If, for example, they accept high emission levels exceeding legal requirements, they may thereby reduce the costs in their division. In doing so, they cheat the principal, since an implicit behavioural norm is violated. At the same time, a principal may also benefit from the cheating, as the cost savings accrue to him if the cheating goes undetected. In any case, however, the cheating is at the expense of society, which is harmed by the excessive emission levels.

The present work investigates whether and to what extent competition in the form of performance tournaments affects the cheating behaviour of agents. Laboratory experiments were used as the method of investigation, as they allow the variation of individual parameters under controlled conditions.

The results of this study are relevant for firms: when designing corporate incentive systems for employees, attention must be paid to which “loopholes” — such as the opportunity to cheat — may arise. If these are anticipated as far as possible through “smart” incentive systems, cheating and the long-term consequences resulting from it can be minimised.