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Institutionenökonomische Analyse von Ausgleichsmechanismen in der Eingriffsregelung in Deutschland und den USA

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Market Orientation in Nature Conservation? An Institutional Economics Analysis of Compensation Mechanisms in Impact Mitigation Regulation in Germany and the USA

Given the increasing number of options for providing ecological compensation measures under a compensation obligation – triggered by an impact (adverse effects on nature and landscape in Germany, or adverse effects on a wetland in the USA) – the question arises as to which compensation mechanism is advantageous for implementing impact mitigation regulation. The mechanisms examined are Classical Compensation (compensation by the project developer on the impact site), land and measure pools in Germany, and trading in eco-points (commercial wetland mitigation banking) in Florida, USA.

Empirical data were collected by means of qualitative interviews in the USA (Washington DC, Florida) and in Germany. The compensation mechanisms are analysed and assessed using criteria derived from New Institutional Economics. For this purpose, a problem-oriented approach drawing on property rights theory, principal-agent theory and governance theory was developed and applied. The factors of uncertainty, opportunistic behaviour and specificity of the transaction “impact / compensation” play a central role. Conflicting objectives and information asymmetries, as well as the transaction costs associated with enforcing the compensation obligation, vary considerably. In view of the international research approach, the transaction environment is also taken into account. As a result of the study, recommendations are derived for the institutional design of compensation provision in Germany.

From the perspective of New Institutional Economics, Classical Compensation is characterised by considerable transaction problems and inefficiencies. Vertical integration and external pooled compensation (public measure pools) promise advantages. As impact mitigation regulation becomes more flexible, the characteristics of the transaction change in such a way that the integration of private, profit-oriented third parties for the provision of compensation and replacement measures becomes attractive. A stronger market orientation in Florida led to a reduction in implementation deficits and to effective information and monitoring systems.

The experience from the USA as well as the theoretical relationships show that above all the separation of the sub-transactions “impact” and “compensation” helps to avoid unfavourable hold-up situations and potential moral hazard behaviour of the kind observed in Classical Compensation. The profit orientation of the actors is instrumentalised through the design of the market rules in favour of ecological effectiveness; cost efficiency and full transfer of costs to the party causing the impact are here – in contrast to public pool operators – in the actors’ own interest.